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Foreword
The International Law Studies "Blue Book" series was initiated by the Naval
War College in 1901 to publish essays, treatises and articles that contribute
to the broader understanding of international law. This, the eightieth volume of
the series, contains edited proceedings of a colloquium entitled Current Issues in
International Law and Military Operations hosted here at the Naval War College on
June 25-27, 2003. '
The colloquium's mission was to examine the latest developments in inter-
national law, drawing on issues from then ongoing military operations. In do-
ing so, the colloquium participants focused on the applicability and operation
of the law of occupation, the perspective of military judge advocates at the stra-
tegic, operational, and tactical levels in Operation Iraqi Freedom, maritime op-
erations issues in armed conflict and military operations other than war,
including navigational freedoms in international waters and airspace, the in-
creasingly complex considerations of combatant status and coalition opera-
tions, developments in the laws of targeting and information operations, and
challenges faced in the interpretation and application of the law of armed con-
flict in current and future conflicts.
Renowned international scholars and practitioners, both military and civil-
ian, representing government and academic institutions from throughout the
world participated in the colloquium, which was co-sponsored by the Strategic
Studies Institute of the United States Armv War College at Carlisle Barracks;
the Israeli Yearbook on Human Rights, Tel Aviv, Israel; the United States Coast
Guard Academy; the Francis Lieber Society of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law; the Judge Advocate General of the Navy; the Naval War College
Foundation; the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy of
Salve Regina University, Newport, Rhode Island; and the International Law
Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, United States Naval War
College.
On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, I extend to all the co-sponsors and contribut-
ing authors our thanks and gratitude for their invaluable contributions to this pro-
ject and to the future understanding of the laws of war.
J. L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
Introduction
Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which the United States and her coalition part-
ners conducted military operations for the express purpose of removing
Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, implicated a host of international law issues,
in both theorv and practice. Many of those issues are still being debated today,
more than 3 years later. Was Operation Iraqi Freedom undertaken consistent with
international norms on the use of force? Are tarsetins: norms, as traditionally un-
derstood, adequate in the age of precision strategic strike capability and/or against
an enemy who intentionally fails to distinguish himself from civilians? Or who
purposefully uses protected places from which to launch attacks? Or who pur-
posely attacks protected persons, places and objects? How do States reconcile com-
peting views of what the law of war is, or requires, or forbids, in dealing with
captured foes? Discussing and debating these questions, and others raised by char-
acteristics of the conflict with "rogue" nations and international terrorists, was the
purpose of the colloquium that this book. Volume 80 of the International Law
Studies ("Blue Book" I series, memorializes.
In June, 2003, the Naval War College conducted a symposium entitled Current
Issues in International Law and Military Operations. The colloquium, organized by
the International Law Departments Commander Don Rose, US Coast Guard, was
made possible with the support of the Strategic Studies Institute of the United
States Army War College at Carlisle Barracks; the Israel Yearbook on Human
Rights, Tel Aviv, Israel; the United States Coast Guard Academy; the Francis Lieber
Society of the .American Society of International Law; the Judge Advocate General
of the Navy; the Naval War College Foundation; and the Pell Center for Interna-
tional Relations and Public Policy of Salve Regina University, Newport, Rhode Is-
land. Without the support and assistance of these organizations, the colloquium
would not have been the success that it was. Their support is greatly appreciated.
Two members oi the International Law Department served as primary editors
of this volume. Lieutenant Colonel Jim Friend, JA, L*S Army, initially performed
editorial work on this volume until the exigencies of war intruded and he was
transferred, prior to his normal rotation date, to Kuwait. Major Richard Jaques, US
Marine Corps, eventually assumed these duties and carried them through to fru-
ition. Their dedication and perseverance are responsible for the production and
completion of this excellent addition to the "Blue Book" series.
A special thank you is necessary to Rear Admiral Rodney P. Rempt, former Pres-
ident of the Naval War College for his leadership and support in the planning and
conduct of the colloquium.
The "Blue Book" series is published by the Naval War College and distributed
throughout the world to US and foreign military commands, academic institu-
tions, and libraries. This volume, entitled Issues in International Law and Military
Operations (2003) to more accurately reflect the fact that the perspectives pro-
vided at the colloquium depicted events as known and perceived at the time, is
a fitting and necessary addition to the series as nations continue to wrestle with de-
veloping consensus on how to best deal with groups and tyrants whose willful bel-
ligerence pose unacceptable threats to international peace and security.
DENNIS L. MANDSAGER
Professor of Law & Chairman
International Law Department
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Preface
It should be no surprise that, coming as it did in June 2003, a colloquium that
focused on "current" issues in international law and military operations
would by necessity devote most of its time to the issues and challenges raised by
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the then nascent occupation of Iraq, and the develop-
ing efforts to apply long established maritime rules and principles based on, and
designed to respect, State sovereignty, against a Stateless belligerent. What may
be surprising (or perhaps sadly ironic) is how current the issues, challenges, anal-
yses, positions, and arguments for and against various interpretations and/or ap-
plications of international law to military operations voiced in 2003 remain
today. This suggests that despite the passage ofthree years, little consensus on the
nature, scope and degree of the threat faced, and the appropriate responses
thereto, has yet developed.
Readers unfamiliar with the International Law Studies ("Blue Book") series may
wonder why a work that largely captures the proceedings of a colloquium held in
2003 is only now, in 2006, rinding its way to print. Long-time supporters and con-
tributors who have patiently anticipated publication for some time (especially
those who participated in the colloquium) may well wonder why this volume does
not serve, as previous volumes have, to fully capture all speaker and panelist com-
ments and audience discussion or reflect the order in which those comments and
discussions occurred. To both groups of readers an explanation is warranted, if for
no other reason than to ensure that those deserving of credit in making this book a
reality receive their due.
For reasons of detail that are unnecessary here, most of the record of this collo-
quium was not available to the editors of this publication. Compounding this
problem was the fact that the first two assigned editors found their tenure in the In-
ternational Law Department cut short or interrupted by the exigencies of war. In
significant portions, this work largely reflects an effort starting some 18 months af-
ter the event to recreate the colloquium and capture key portions of it.
Typically, "Blue Books" that serve as a record ofcolloquium proceedings will
reflect the order in which the panel discussions occurred. In this case, however,
because it was impossible to recreate the "give and take" of panelists with each
other and with the audience, and because not all the panels could be included in
the book, the most logical arrangement was to group articles within the major
subject areas addressed (the legality and legitimacy of Operation Iraqi Free-
dom, the tactical and operational challenges in air and land warfare, the wide
variety of issues affecting operations in the maritime domain, and the question
ofhow the law ofarmed conflict needs to develop to adequately address current
and anticipated challenges) as reflected in the Table of Contents. Articles in
which the author refers specifically to another article are grouped within the
same major category.
I also decided to eschew the past practice of attempting, in this Preface, to sum-
marize the key points of each article around a central theme or themes. The choice
of articles and organization of the book itself essentially reflect my perspective on
the key points and themes. Moreover, readers will find it ofmuch more value to de-
cide for themselves what arguments and positions set forth herein have merit. The
only suggestion I offer the reader in making those assessments is to remember that
whatever the law ofarmed conflict was in the past, is today, or will be in the future,
it is not merely a subject for a panel discussion or an academic debate or an intellec-
tual position. For those affected by it, it is a matter of life or death.
As with all works such as this, a number of individuals were involved in the
publication process. Thanks must go to Lieutenant Colonel Jim Friend, JA, US
Army, the first editor, who initiated this effort. A special note of thanks is due to
Mr. Matthew Cotnoir in the Naval War College's Desktop Publishing office. He
served as the "point man" in converting draft after draft into publishable form,
tirelessly and patiently enduring numerous rewrites, reconfigurations, and re-
edits without complaint. Thanks must also go to the contributors to this volume
long after the fact, for their great patience and understanding over the last three
years. In particular, a debt of thanks is owed to Professor Wolff Heintschel von
Heinegg and Colonel Charles H. B. Garraway, CBE, British Army (Ret.), both of
whom served as the Naval War College's Charles H. Stockton Professor of Inter-
national Law during my tenure, and both ofwhom are contributors to this vol-
ume, for their knowledge, expertise, perspective on law (and, more importantly,
on life itself), and comradeship.
Finally, two individuals, for both ofwhom the "Blue Books" are a labor of love,
deserve the lion share of the credit for ensuring that this work has come to fruition.
Simply put, without the leadership arid vision of Professor Emeritus Jack
Grunawalt and the painstaking detailed editing and review of Captain Ralph
xiv
Thomas, JAGC, US Navy (Ret.), both of whom devoted countless hours to this
project, Volume 80 would still be barely a work in progress. Even more, they have
served as mentors, teachers, advisors, confidants, leaders, and friends to the under-
signed in more ways than can be expressed. By all rights, theirs should be the names
printed on the binding of this volume. For everything that is good about this book,
the credit is theirs. For everything that is not, the blame is mine.
RICHARD B. JAQUES
Major, US Marine Corps
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PARTI
JUS AD BELLUM: IRAQ

IIraq's Transformation and International Law
Ruth Wedgwood 1
There is a great delight in returning to the US Naval War College. My time in
Newport as a Stockton Professor of International Law was wonderful in-
deed. But few ofus at the War College in the academic term of 1998-99 could fore-
see the momentous events ofthe next five years. No one foretold al Qaeda's attacks
of September 11, 2001. And we could not know that the United States and the
United Kingdom, alongside their allies, would commit their fortune and fate to in-
tervene again in Iraq, this time to defeat Saddam's Baathist regime. But trouble was
brewing, even in 1998. At the time, Saddam limited and then excluded United Na-
tions weapons inspectors, and the allies conducted a limited military campaign in
Operation Desert Fox. A broad debate on the use offorce began to reenter the pub-
lic square—-when and on what authority military force could be used to compel
Iraq's compliance with post-GulfWar disarmament obligations.
In the immediate moment, we are in the midst of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Faced with Saddam Hussein's continued intransigence in accounting for his weap-
ons programs, in March 2003 the United States and its coalition forces mounted a
fast-moving ground campaign against the Baathist regime, and quickly reached
Baghdad. Public conversation has again focused on important issues of interna-
tional law, including standards for the use offorce, the role of the Security Council,
the methods of enforcing disarmament obligations, and the claims of humanitar-
ian intervention.2 But I will concentrate here on the practical problems and the law
governing occupation and reconstruction.
Iraq's Transformation and International Law
Our panel today is graced by its commentators. Professor Thomas Franck is a
profound scholar on whose foundational work all of us have built. Dr. Nicholas
Rostow has a twenty- five-year career ofdedicated public service, including work as
the legal adviser to the National Security Council and as general counsel to the US
Mission to the United Nations. I should be providing comments on their views,
and not the reverse.
Let me start with a speculation on the more general implications of the current
conflict for Iraq and the Middle East. It is a cause for celebration to see that Saddam
Hussein is gone. Not even the most vocal critics of the war have suggested that
Saddam should be restored to power. No one argues that the Baathist dictatorship
reflected the free will of the Iraqi people. Saddam Hussein was a callow and cruel
leader, and the allied intervention toppled an authoritarian regime of unremitting
harshness. Saddam used chemical weapons to attack Iraq's Kurdish villages. He at-
tempted to destroy the Marsh Shia. He was ruthless in suppressing political oppo-
nents. Among the supporters of Iraqi sovereignty, no one can confuse Saddam's
regime with the claims of democracy.
The end of Iraq's Baathist regime may advance the Middle East peace process.
The roadmap process for Palestinian-Israeli peace still has only a limited chance of
success. But Iraq's threatening stance towards Israel had obvious consequences,
and the end of an aggressive regime in Iraq may change how Israel regards its secu-
rity space. The Baathists supported terrorist attacks against Israel, through financ-
ing and perhaps through training. In the first GulfWar, Saddam Hussein launched
Scud missile attacks against civilian centers in Israel, hoping to create a wider war.
The elimination of an unpredictable and looming threat to the eastern border may
facilitate crucial Israeli concessions on the West Bank.
After September 1 1, it is unacceptable for any country to provide financing or
physical sanctuary to international terrorist groups. This includes any insurgent
group seeking to attack civilians as targets. The Security Council has endorsed new
standards for State responsibility, forbidding any and all assistance to international
terror groups in Resolution 1373. 3 Iraq's financial and material support for terror-
ism contributed to the spoliation ofMiddle East politics, and removal ofthat threat
also may produce salutary results for the region as a whole.
One hopes that the intervention in Iraq will affect other countries in the region
through the example of an emerging democracy. Saudi Arabia and Egypt need to
create some space for popular voice and competition in their politics. Iraq may
demonstrate, if things go well, that there can be a secular, prosperous, heteroge-
neous State in the region under a democratic government. Support for a new and
moderate democratic State should enjoy support from both sides of the aisle in
American politics. The long-term goals of democracy are a realist's agenda, as well
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as an idealist's hope. Harnessing the energies and ambitions of people who have
been excluded from governance is one ofthe elements of real power. And the claim
that totalitarian repression is the only way to preserve stability deserves to be dis-
proved. Iraq is a resource-rich country, and maybe in a better potential position to
demonstrate that a modern democracy can work, than impoverished States such as
Afghanistan or East Timor or other economically desperate places where the
United Nations has intervened.
With respect to weapons ofmass destruction (WMD), we should recall the imme-
diate purpose ofthe Iraqi intervention. At the time ofthe first GulfWar, Saddam had
embarked on ambitious programs to develop nuclear weapons, produce chemical
weapons, and manufacture biological weapons. After he invaded Kuwait, he at-
tempted to speed up the production ofa nuclear bomb. When coalition troops drove
him out of Kuwait, and had the Republican Guard on the run, Saddam agreed to
stringent and unique conditions as part of the cease-fire. Under Security Council
Resolution 687,4 as a condition of the ceasefire, Iraq was required to shut down its
programs to develop weapons ofmass destruction and medium-range or long-range
missiles, and to do so in a transparent way. Resolution 687 placed the burden of
proof on Iraq to demonstrate the dismantling of these weapons programs, as well as
the destruction of components and precursors, and this burden of proof did not
change during the next decade. But to the great surprise of the allies, Baghdad re-
fused to account for the programs ofWMD development, defying the demand for
verifiable destruction ofweapons components under the UN resolution.
The predicate for allied intervention in 2003 was "smoking documents"—not
"smoking weapons." Iraq was in the midst of active nuclear, chemical, and biologi-
cal weapons programs at the close of the first GulfWar, and was required to show
how and when they would be abandoned. Even in the last Iraqi declaration to the
United Nations filed in December 2002, Baghdad failed to give a plausible account
of its weapons inventories and their disposition. It refused to allow weapons scien-
tists to be interviewed outside the country. Ambassador Hans Blix opposed any
military intervention, at least at that time, but as executive director of the UN
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), he acknowl-
edged the unsatisfactory character of Iraq's continued game of hounds and hares.
In the world after September 11, accounting for WMD inventories and their re-
quired destruction is not an optional matter.
Even after the retreat of Saddam's forces, the continuing war in the streets of
Baghdad and elsewhere in the Sunni triangle has presented difficult problems for
the United States and coalition forces in Iraq. Saddam has gambled that the
Baathists can return to power by continuing to inflict damage on the allied forces
and the Iraqi people. He has counted on a version of the "Somalia syndrome"—an
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exhaustion of the United States' political will to continue. He looks forward to an
imagined moment, based on the example of Vietnam, when we will simply with-
draw, whether or not the military and security forces of a democratic Iraq are ready
to take over the fight. He predicts that we will wither, and that the field will be re-
opened for Sunni and Baathist hegemony.
Overcoming the ongoing insurgency will be a great challenge. It is difficult to
create a new Iraqi law enforcement capability. We have had this same struggle in far
more benign environments, whether in Haiti, in Bosnia, or in Panama. It has oc-
curred every time an existing authority is displaced, so it should not be surprising
that we face the issue again. To vet and stand up a police force that is suitably inde-
pendent, robust, and reliable, especially in a country with ethnic divisions, is not an
easy task. It is crucial to have a local face as the intermediary with a large popula-
tion. Defeating an insurgency requires information and cooperation from local cit-
izens. Baathist retaliation against Iraqi citizens who are seen as cooperative with the
new transition has been ferocious. Yet it is clear that if the Sunni resistance is to be
defeated, information from Iraqis about insurgent activities will be critical.
A second practical problem is the wasting and destruction of critical infrastruc-
ture. The arrival of allied forces in Baghdad was followed by a rampage. The disor-
der and debellation would not surprise UN veterans who saw the razing of East
Timor by paramilitaries and militias, after the UN-organized vote for independ-
ence. Part of the violence may be the reaction of a people whose political psyche
was battered by three decades of suspicion and fear. The lesson for military force
structure and capabilities seems clear. In peacekeeping, over the last 15 years, we
have discovered that even if a mandate calls for a limited peacekeeping operation,
forces must have a robust capacity for peace enforcement. Security environments
change too fast, and can render under-equipped forces helpless on the ground.
Now, in Iraq, we see the opposite problem. In the follow-on to a robust combat op-
eration one needs a strong police capacity, with troops trained in security opera-
tions, arrest, and the responsible processing of prisoners. It may no longer be viable
to confine the functions of military police to the reserve components of the US
armed forces. This capability may be needed in the active-duty force to sustain
such situations in the future.
We also need to be frank about how long peacekeeping operations will last,
whether in Bosnia or in Iraq. The time horizon for an international presence in
Bosnia was ignored by at least one White House. An attempt at realism about a
time horizon can improve our training for the tasks at hand. For example, when al-
lied forces are called upon to support local police operations, it would be useful to
have some language capability, to avoid operating in a deaf and dumb show. In
Iraq, we should seek to train allied personnel in rudimentary Arabic. In the work of
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a gendarmerie, it is useful to know who started a quarrel, or to solicit tips without
having a security breach through an unknown interpreter. Independent language
capability will usefully allow each allied unit to check whether a local interpreter is
providing faithful translations.
Another practical difficulty—and another lesson learned from post-conflict
peacekeeping missions—is the importance ofquick and visible economic progress.
The slow decision and funding cycle of the World Bank and other aid agencies is a
terrible obstacle to this, since the period for formulation, approval, and funding of
projects may be two to three years. "Quick impact" projects are critical to showing
Iraqi citizens that their material lives can change for the better. The Army Corps of
Engineers and other US government components have an important role here, to
facilitate the rebuilding of the national infrastructure and the jumpstart of the
economy. Though freedom is a most precious commodity, a prolonged delay in
starting the economic recovery of Iraq will result in the loss of goodwill, and a
greater hesitation to embrace the transformation of Iraqi political society.
The ultimate puzzle is how to substitute civic nationalism for a cult ofpersonal-
ity and ethnic division. A new set of institutions is needed as the touchstone for
Iraqi allegiance and commitment. We faced similar challenges in post-war Ger-
many and during the Cold War, though the differences to be overcome in those
cases were more singularly ideological. The act ofvoting and organizing a govern-
ment can be inspiring. But there were other important efforts in fighting fascism
and communism; in particular, using effective cultural tools. Those days seem to
be gone. Fifty years ago, international funding for a host of cultural and educa-
tional projects was key in restoring German political culture. We have forgotten
how to use cultural power to stabilize a fractious political situation.
And then there is the legal challenge offinding a framework that allows us to ac-
complish these worthy purposes. Are the United States and coalition forces in Iraq
to be considered under the law as an "occupying" force? In Bosnia, NATO was not
characterized as an occupier. The Dayton Peace Accords acknowledged NATO's
role as a peacekeeping force. 5 Characterizing the presence of allied forces as an in-
ternational "occupation" also would have slighted the importance ofBosnia's rees-
tablished civilian government. NATO military commanders were concerned that
the legal category of occupation presumed a degree ofcontrol that might not be re-
alistic, and in particular, were aware that they might not be immediately able to ini-
tiate searches for top-level Serb, Croat and Bosnian war criminals, a duty that
applies to occupiers under the Geneva Conventions. Rather, it was argued that
NATO served in Bosnia in the tradition of a classical peacekeeping force, that is, as
intermediaries tasked to keep the opposing sides apart.
Iraq's Transformation and International Law
In Iraq, with Saddam Hussein's removal, we are once again in an uncertain area
where international law is asked to handle new situations. The Hague and Geneva
Conventions may be read to suppose that an occupying power should leave intact,
as much as possible, the existing institutions of a society. But Saddam's political in-
stitutions were savage and totalitarian, and to maintain their operation would pro-
long a gross violation ofhuman rights. It is hard to conclude that the Hague rules of
land warfare could be intended to protect the Baathists' violent monopoly of polit-
ical power or to bolster Baghdad's disregard for the Shiite and Kurdish communi-
ties. Treaty law must be read as part of a legal landscape in which human rights law
makes its own demands.
The United Nations also has kept eyes and ears, and a voice, on the ground in
Iraq, through a special representative of the UN Secretary-General. This is Brazil-
ian diplomat Sergio Vieira de Mello, who has served also as the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva and has worked in a number of
senior United Nations positions, including as Transitional Administrator in East
Timor. He can be a vital link in mobilizing the UN's specialized humanitarian
agencies, as well as contributing to cooperation among competing Iraqi factions. 6
In an environment of confrontation, the United Nations could serve as a useful
symbol of multilateral commitment. Though the military effort was conducted by
a "coalition of the willing," the reconstruction of Iraq has been mounted under a
broader aegis, in which even countries opposing the war will be invited to contrib-
ute. A visible United Nations presence in Iraq may make it easier for those coun-
tries to participate in the key tasks of reconstruction.
To be sure, we have learned that the United Nations does not enjoy automatic
legitimacy in every situation. Multilateral endorsement is not a respected or com-
prehensible cultural artifact in some corners ofthe globe. This point has been made
by Sir Brian Urquhart, in a wonderful memoir of his dangerous adventures during
the early days of UN peacekeeping. 7 Sir Brian served as a key aide to Dr. Ralph
Bunche and UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold in the UN peacekeeping
mission in the Congo in 1960.
Sir Brian was dispatched to the Congo's Atlantic port at Matadi, passing
through an area where the Congolese Army had staged its mutiny. He found a train
to transport a hardy contingent of Moroccan peacekeepers and had a UN flag
draped across the front of the train. But the UN's emblem did not have the desired
effect. The Congolese, as Sir Brian reports, "had never heard ofthe United Nations.
'L'ONU? C'est quelle tribu?' (The UN? What tribe is that?) a local Congolese offi-
cial inquired."
So, too, we should not assume that Sunni clan members living in the Iraqi city of
Tikrit will show any great deference to the United Nations. The United Nations will
8
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be perceived as the institution that helped to enforce weapons inspections and eco-
nomic sanctions in the 1990's. In other quarters of Iraq, the United Nations maybe
seen as the institution that failed to protect the Kurdish and Shiite communities af-
ter the first GulfWar. This will not enhance its local legitimacy. Nonetheless, in the
eyes of foreign countries, the United Nations' presence may make it easier to con-
tribute to the Iraqi reconstruction effort.
It is often said that the law of armed conflict seeks to solve the problems of the
last war—catching up with worthy innovations demanded by circumstances on
the ground or allowed by new technologies. But there are occasions when even
post-war rules fail to reflect important problems of the most recent conflict. We
should direct a few more words to the problems of adapting the law of occupation
to the project of democratic transformation.
In the aftermath ofWorld War II, the goal ofthe allied occupations was to trans-
form the militaristic societies of Germany and Japan. Yet the 1907 Hague Regula-
tions Respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land8 were and are still in force,
and posed some problems even for lawyers in 1945. The 1949 Geneva Convention
IV,9 on the protection of civilians, did not remedy these problems. Article 43 ofthe
Hague rules states that the occupier should "take all the measures in his power to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, un-
less absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." Article 64 of Geneva Con-
vention IV notes that "The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in
force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying
Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the ap-
plication of the present Convention." And "the tribunals of the occupied territory
shall continue to function in respect of all offences covered by said laws."
In Iraq the goal is to transform a Baathist culture ofoppression. Certainly that is
going to require an intrusion into and transformation of local law, mitigated in
practice by the democratic participation of Iraqis and the United Nations, but
nonetheless, a change of local law that might appear inconsistent with the thrust of
some Hague rules and Article 64 of Geneva Convention IV.
Of course, even forces operating under the mantle of "occupiers" have powers
that could aid a democratic transformation of the country. Under Articles 55 and
64 ofthe Geneva Convention IV, the occupier has to provide for the basic needs of
the population and maintain orderly government. 10 Security Council Resolution
1483 ofMay 22, 2003, enacted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, refers indi-
rectly to the Coalition Provisional Authority as a temporary governing body, pend-
ing the organization of a democratic Iraqi government. It recognizes "the specific
authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of
these states [the United States and United Kingdom] as occupying powers under
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unified command," 11 as well as calling on all States "to assist the people of Iraq in
their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their country." 12 Maintaining
orderly government and assisting the reform of institutions surely could not in-
clude restoring the chaotic brutality of Baathist hegemony.
And then there is the interplay between the law of occupation and human rights
law. Geneva Convention IV was completed in the same historical moment as the
Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights. 13 One thus has a strong reason to read the
two instruments in harmony. The diktat of the Baathist party in Iraq has been a
daily repudiation of the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
To be sure, in an earlier age, there was a much greater acceptance of positive power,
even when exercised by undemocratic regimes. There was less willingness to
openly test the legitimacy of State power before respecting it. But the two-year span
of 1948-49 saw the anointment of both instruments, and it is not unreasonable to
read them together.
Perhaps the simplest justification for the democratic changes that will affect Iraq
lies in the sovereignty of the Iraqi people. The United States and its allies can have
reference to the concurrence of the Iraqi people, expressed through the Interim
Governing Authority and subsequent representative institutions. But one hard les-
son of other peacekeeping operations is that mechanical political choices can also
cement in place an angry nationalism. In Bosnia, elections should have been de-
layed until after 1996. By holding early elections there, we succeeded in electing na-
tionalist parties who could claim democratic provenance alongside their virulent
nationalism. In Iraq, we should not cement in place the sectarian angers that we
—
and the Iraqi people—would ultimately rather not have.
What does one do in peacekeeping when confronted with a tendentious law, with
no other available? The problem of a legal vacuum during occupation is not new. A
UN legal adviser has written elsewhere that it could be handy to have a temporary
criminal code for post-conflict situations, so that peacekeeping forces would have a
legal basis for action. 14 In East Timor, the UN civilian police would arrest and release
those suspected of violent crimes in ongoing cycles, because there was no criminal
code under which to hold and charge them. Nonetheless, in addressing these prob-
lems, we should not forget the major justification for the adaptation and amendment
of prior Iraqi law, including interim measures by the Coalition Provisional Author-
ity. The occupation of Iraq is meant to be transformational, to allow the Iraqi people
the benefits of democracy and modern human rights law, just as the occupations of
Germany and Japan were transformational. The law of armed conflict will in some
way have to catch up to that.
There is a long-term problem for American strategy in these kinds of conflicts.
We have been using ground surrogates in many of our wars. In Bosnia we relied
10
Ruth Wedgwood
upon the Croatian ground campaign. In Afghanistan we had the Northern Alli-
ance. The US Secretary of Defense has the vision, which indeed I share, that our
combat forces need to be agile and mobile, able to get places where there are not
good airfields and good seaports. As a consequence, it maybe necessary to form al-
liances of convenience in the hotspots where we need to send our forces, choosing
the better of the parties on the ground.
But reliance on light and mobile forces poses a potential problem in occupation
and post-conflict policing. When we have succeeded in vanquishing an adversary,
we still need a force structure to carry out the policing obligations ofthe Hague and
Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventions require the occupier to maintain
orderly government and ensure that the normal functions of government are met.
This may be hard to do, until and unless local forces are trained and stood up.
The challenge for American forces in the Iraq intervention was to move quickly
on the battlefield, to keep Saddam Hussein from using any chemical weapons and
to prevent him from repeating the environmental attacks that he used in the first
GulfWar. We must salute the coalition forces that punched their way to Baghdad
so robustly. But a large ground presence will also be needed in post-conflict peace-
keeping, to assure the police authority needed to sustain order. We may look for as-
sistance from other countries, through the United Nations or our own
coordination. Yet in a difficult environment, a core American presence may be es-
sential. Thus, in such operations, we need substantial US contingents available to
follow after the light and mobile forces that vanquish the enemy on the battlefield.
Let me mention Security Council Resolution 1483, and its effect on the Iraqi
economy. 15 Economic sanctions have been lifted. Oil can be sold and efforts can
begin to repair refineries and distribution equipment to facilitate petroleum pro-
duction. The resolution renders Iraqi petroleum products immune from legal pro-
ceedings against them. Thus, Iraq can sell its oil without concern about a replevin
action in a French port. Resolution 1483 also establishes an Iraqi development
fund. Frozen Iraqi assets ofthe Baathist regime can be transferred to the fund, pro-
tected by required independent auditing.
Ultimately, Iraq will face the difficult question of how to form a new constitu-
tion and establish the political legitimacy of a new government. The process used in
South Africa at the end of apartheid may provide a useful lesson. In that situation,
consensus on foundational principles was sought, before addressing specific arti-
cles of a constitution. An unanswered question is who will participate in the devel-
opment of the constitution. The process of drafting a constitution requires
democratic voice as a foundation stone.
There are other crucial choices in the process of constitution-building. Should
the constitution center upon civic nationalism or religious nationalism? One
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American constitutional advisor has supposed that an Islamic Republic is the only
sensible alternative for Iraq. But differences in the interpretation of Islam may cast
this as a provocative course of action, rather than ameliorative. The alternative is a
secular republic or a secular republic that helps to assist established religions. As
Americans, with our history of separation ofchurch and State, we would be uneasy
with direct State support of religion. But this is not North America, and it could be
an attractive alternative to the radical Islamism seen in some other Arab States.
There is a crucial choice to be made about federalism—the degree to which gov-
erning powers are spun out to the regions. Certainly one way of maintaining peace
within Iraq could involve decentralization of political power, at least once order is re-
stored. Significant authority can be vested in local government, in the north for the
Kurds and in the south for the Shia. This territorial federalism may approach a form
of local autonomy. The Kurds obviously would like nothing better. Or one could ex-
plore a form of so-called "consociationalism"—a community-based method of or-
ganizing political society, as seen in Belgium and some other multiethnic states.
There is an economic caveat, however. Many ofthe petroleum reserves of Iraq are lo-
cated in Kurdish areas. Iraqi oil and development revenues cannot be claimed solely
by the Kurds. They must be a national asset. In addition, local autonomy cannot be
used as a mask for ethnic cleansing and forced relocations.
Structuring the executive is a most delicate issue, after the abusive exercise of
power by Saddam Hussein. The separate election of an Iraqi president may afford
greater stability, since presidential leadership will not be immediately dependent on
the waxing and waning of coalitions of minority parties in the parliament. Addi-
tionally, against a history of personality-driven politics in Iraq, a widely-recognized
and democratically-elected president may provide a symbol of transition from the
totalitarianism of Iraq's past to the democracy of the future.
Another difficult issue will concern the status and role ofwomen. Women have
had a more prominent role in Iraq than in some other Arab countries. Certainly,
that prominence should continue.
Finally, the role of the armed forces is a critical issue for the future of Iraq. The
Turkish and Indonesian model in which the armed forces have a role in the parlia-
ment is highly problematic for Iraq, particularly measured against the past and
Saddam's declaration ofwar against his own population. Nonetheless, since Iraq is
a centrifugal society, and since some actors in the region will be tempted to tear it
apart, one needs to preserve a role for a democratic military in which the armed
forces are honored, trusted and valued by the State—and very firmly under the
command and control of a democratic republic.
The Administrator of Iraq's Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador Paul
Bremer, has reemployed some portions of the Iraqi Army as an interim security
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force. There needs to be Sunni participation in the new republic, rather than exclu-
sion from all governmental institutions. If former government employees cannot
participate, they will provide a continuing source of angry insurgents.
Constitution building will take time. One wishes for a flourishing civil society,
with newspapers and civic associations and broad conversation, alongside the pro-
cess of transferring power to organized political groups. In East Timor, Sergio
Viera de Mello contemplated a slow and gradual transfer of political power, be-
cause there was no trained administrative class. (Under Indonesian rule, most of
East Timor's managerial positions were filled by West Timorese or Jakarta-based
administrators.) But very quickly, Jose Ramos-Horta and Bishop Carlos Belo, who
had shared the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize, reminded the United Nations that Indone-
sian rule should not be replaced by practices that could be misapprehended as a
new style of multilateral colonialism. There was great impatience for the visible
participation of the East Timorese in governance. I think the same impulse will be
felt in Iraq. The key is to find a way in which there is a prominent Iraqi role and yet
not allow this to develop into crony capitalism or nationalist hegemony.
In conclusion, one can modestly admit that bundles of legal rules will not be the
determining factor in the immediate days ahead and in the development of a viable
democratic governing structure in Iraq. A successful transition depends on respect
for the principles and values ofHague and Geneva law, while at the same time, re-
establishing a civic culture after thirty years of tyranny. Although there are many
hurdles to overcome, both by the United States and its coalition partners and by
the Iraqis themselves, I am optimistic that at the end ofthe day we will see a demo-
cratic and prosperous Iraq.
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Iraq and the Law ofArmed Conflict
Thomas M. Franck1
The law ofarmed conflict is generally understood to pertain to the rules gov-
erning the conduct of war, the jus in hello. Superior, and antecedent to it,
however, is thejus ad bellum, the law pertaining to the initiation ofwar. A war, even
when fought in accordance with the letter ofthejus in bello, will in no way be legiti-
mate if the conflict was initiated in violation of the jus ad bellum. So, first things
first. Was the war in Iraq undertaken in compliance with the law governing re-
course to force? If, as I believe, the answer to that question is "probably not," then
the war could not have been fought in accordance with the law of armed conflict
because the lawfulness of the conduct of hostilities is determined not only by the
way, but also by why, a war is fought.
The United Nations Charter, a treaty consented to by the US Senate and ratified
by the president and to which more than 190 States are parties, purports as its cen-
tral undertaking to limit the grounds upon which States may lawfully have re-
course to force. Article 2(4) stipulates that parties shall "refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any state." 2 With this provision, the world, as it
emerged in 1945 from history's bloodiest war of aggression, sought forever to re-
pudiate the principle attributed by Thucydides to the Athenians in their conduct
towards the island-State of Melos during the Peloponnesian War that: "the strong
do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." 3
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The conflict Thucydides describes is that initiated by a highly cultivated, rela-
tively democratic Athenian State against the much smaller Melian State, which had
sought to remain neutral in Athens' larger conflict with Sparta. Athens, the histo-
rian tells us, eventually destroyed itself in a futile effort to protect against every ma-
lignant eventuality by attacking and securing the submission of every place from
which danger might emanate. Whether or not one perceives a modern parallel in
these events, it is amply clear that the purpose of the world's most widely ratified
treaty is to repeal the vestiges of the Melian principle, replacing it with a strong rule
against the initiation of war.
The sole exception envisioned by the Charter is set out in Article 5 1 : "Nothing in
the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs. . . ."4
Thus any examination of the lawfulness of US conduct in deploying force
against Iraq in the spring of 2003 must begin by asking whether that action was
congruent with the post-Melian requirements ofthe UN Charter. Ifthe invasion of
Iraq was nothing but an act of self-defense by the United States and the supporting
coalition, or only an exercise of the collective police-power that had previously
been approved by the UN Security Council, then the recourse to force would have
been lawful. The Charter's Article 2(4) no-first-use pledge is clearly subordinate to
the Article 51 -based right of self-defense and also to the authority of the Security
Council, set out in Chapter VII of the Charter, to initiate action against a threat to
the peace. If the 2003 invasion of Iraq had previously been authorized by the Secu-
rity Council, its legality would be beyond question.
It is possible to position the invasion of Iraq in either, or both, of these exculpa-
tory contexts, but just barely. The argument that our armed forces, in occupying
Iraq, have not violated the Charter is not easily or readily sustained, despite the best
efforts of US and British government lawyers. Indeed, the deputy legal adviser of
the British Foreign Office resigned rather than sign on to London's official legal po-
sition. As enunciated by US State Department Legal Adviser William Howard Taft
IV, the argument has two prongs. The first is that the President may "of course, al-
ways use force under international law in self-defense." 3 The readily-apparent
problem with that rationale is that, even if it were agreed (as it well might be) that
the Article 5 1 right of self-defense has been interpreted in practice to include a right
of action against an imminent armed attack, it is difficult to fit the facts of the situa-
tion existing in March 2003 within any plausible theory of imminence. This was a
time, after all, when UN and International Atomic Energy inspectors were already
actively conducting seemingly unimpeded searches for weapons of mass destruc-
tion with the full weight of Security Council resolutions to back them up. Nothing
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in the inspectors' reports lends any credibility to the claim that Iraq, in the spring of
2003, posed any imminent threat of aggression to anyone.
The second prong ofjustification is more sophisticated, averring that the attack
on Iraq by the United States and Britain had already been pre-authorized by the Se-
curity Council. To sustain this assertion, the United States produced a creative, but
ultimately unsustainable reading of three previous Security Council Resolutions:
678, 687 and 1441.6 According to Taft, 7 Resolution 678, with which the Council
had authorized the use of force to oust Iraq from Kuwait in January of 1991, was
kept in force by Resolution 687 of April 1991, which ended the first GulfWar and
imposed stringent disarmament conditions on Iraq. Taft maintained that, as Iraq
had "materially breached" these obligations, the right to use force had revived "and
force may again be used under UNSCR 678 to compel Iraqi compliance " More-
over, Taft said, the Security Council, in its Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002,
which had ordered the inspectors back into Iraq, "had unanimously decided that
Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligation." According to the
Legal Adviser, Resolution 1441 gave Baghdad a final opportunity to comply, which
if disregarded, would constitute a further material breach. He concluded that "Iraq
has clearly committed such violations and, accordingly, the authority to use force
to address Iraq's material breaches is clear." 8 Taft's British counterpart also argued
that Resolution 678 ofNovember 29, 1991 was still effective to authorize "Member
States to use all necessary means to restore international peace and security in the
area" and that, while that authorization had been suspended at the end of hostili-
ties in 1991 by Resolution 687, it was "revived by SCR 1441(2002)."9
Is this a fair reading of the resolution that, in 1991, first authorized the use of
force by a coalition of the willing? Resolution 678 was itselfthe culmination of a se-
ries of earlier resolutions by which the Council had responded to Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait. It called for the immediate withdrawal of the aggressor, imposed manda-
tory sanctions and declared the annexation of Kuwait null and void. In each in-
stance, the Council's purpose, evidently, was to roll back the aggression committed
by one member against another. Only after these measures failed to suffice did the
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter "authorize Member States co-
operating with the Government ofKuwait ... to use all necessary means to uphold
and implement [its earlier resolutions] and to restore international peace and secu-
rity in the region. . . ." 10
Obviously, it was the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty that had motivated the
Council in 1990-91. That Resolution 678 incidentally makes reference to the resto-
ration of "international peace and security in the region" does not connote some
expansive additional mandate beyond that of Kuwaiti liberation. It does not con-
tingently license the pursuit ofquite different objectives such as "regime change" at
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the sole discretion of individual members of the coalition. President George Bush
St. acknowledged as much in explaining why the American military had not pur-
sued Saddam Hussein's forces all the way back to Baghdad. "The U.N. resolutions
never called for the elimination of Saddam Hussein" he said. "It never called for
taking the battle into downtown Baghdad." 11
What Resolution 687 did do was to establish intrusive post-conflict controls over
Iraq and to make these mandatory under Chapter VII of the Charter, subject to col-
lective enforcement in the event of non-compliance. Compliance monitoring, how-
ever, was to be the domain of the Security Council and its inspectors. Baghdad was
compelled to agree to the verified elimination of its weapons ofmass destruction and
of the industrial capacity to produce them, as well as of its medium- and long-range
delivery systems. 12 To make sure this happened, the Council and the UN Secretary-
General were made responsible for creating and supervising the inspectors and for
deploying them, 13 and it was to the Council that Baghdad was required to certify
"that it will not commit or support any act of terrorism or allow any organization
directed toward commission of such acts to operate within its territory. . . ." 14 To
clinch its continuing supervisory role, Resolution 687 stipulated that the Council
was to "remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be re-
quired for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and
security in the region." 15 It is not individual States acting on their own information
without authorization of the Council.
This does not sound as ifthe Council then, or thereafter, intended to cede to the
United States and Britain the right to determine when to use military force in the
absence of an (imminent) armed attack. It does not appear to delegate to individ-
ual members of the Council authority to determine the existence of a material
breach or to decide the appropriate response. To interpret Resolutions 687 and
1441 otherwise would be to imply, without further evidence, an intent of the
Council to overturn the basic architecture of the Charter by authorizing individual
members to effect an unprecedented and uncontrolled derogation from the requi-
sites of Article 2(4). Without supporting evidence, it would be foolhardy to make
such an assumption.
This difficulty for those arguing the legality of US recourse to force is not allevi-
ated by reference to Resolution 1441 of November 2002, which effected the return
of the inspectors to Iraq. While that resolution passed unanimously, it achieved
that goal by resolutely refusing to delegate to individual States the authority to de-
cide if and when its mandate was being violated, let alone what to do about it. Most
members, in voting for Resolution 1441, may have hoped there would be no occa-
sion to cross the bridge of enforcement. However, there is no evidence whatsoever
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for the confident assertion that they intended to authorize individual States to de-
cide whether the Council strictures had been violated and, if so, what to do about it.
What, if anything, is to be learned from the consequences of this US decision to
use force without the requisite Security Council authorization? This was certainly
not the first time a State had chosen to pursue what it perceived to be its national in-
terest by reverting to such unilateral action. France and Britain in Suez, India in Goa
and Bangladesh, Tanzania in Uganda, Vietnam in Cambodia, and even NATO in
Kosovo, are but a few of a plenitude of examples. Sometimes, the unlawful action
was defended by lying about the facts, which, at least, exemplifies the compliment
vice sometimes pays to virtue. In most instances, however, it was argued—not with-
out reason—that, by violating the technical letter ofthe law, the initiator ofthe use of
force was preventing the occurrence ofsome far greater wrong. Any legal system will
take such an argument into account. But these are not the justifications Washington
is producing now that the weapons of mass destruction have not been discovered
and the link ofSaddam Hussein to Al Qaida remains unproven. In the wake of these
disappointments for those who sought to justify this war in traditional terms of self-
defense, we are now being invited to draw more far-reaching conclusions about a
need to reshape the ostensibly broken international system because of its obstinate
refusal to endorse our recourse to force. Some call for the dismantling of the United
Nations as a spent force vainly resisting the reality of American predominance.
France, it is said, needs to be punished and Germany ignored.
But these are the wrong conclusions to draw from the Iraq experience. Drawing
the right ones may have to await further clarifying events, but a few may be ven-
tured tentatively. One is that the collective decision-making process ofthe Security
Council should not be regarded as just a hobble on the sole superpower's discre-
tion, but also as an important reality check, a way to get important perspective that
may even sometimes save Washington from acting too hastily in over-reliance on
its own imperfect and sometimes distorted vision. Another is that the United States
needs the world, and that, without its support for projects important to our na-
tional interest, the successful pursuit of that interest may prove far more elusive
and expensive.
A final lesson is that the rule of law is not a smorgasbord, where the sole super-
power is entitled to pick and choose among its offerings. For example, the United
Nations has put in place an extensive system for preventing and monitoring the
flow of money to terrorists. To implement it, however, States must subordinate
some of their sovereign prerogatives to an interstatal legal regime. Why should
they? Very few countries feel as directly threatened by terrorism as do we: not most
African and Asian States and not even the nations of Europe. If they support us in
the war on terrorism, it is not necessarily in their national interest that they act in
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conformity with these new legal mechanisms, for to help the United States as, for
example, the Government of Pakistan appears to be doing, is to invite the terrorists
to extend their retributive reach. That the legal regime underpinning the war on
terrorism nevertheless enjoys such broad support of governments testifies to the
adherence of States of diverse races, religions, political persuasions and social out-
looks to the rule of law that the Charter supremely exemplifies.
It would be a mistake to underestimate the cost to the culture of compliance
were the United States to continue over-demonstrating its entitlement to
exceptionalism. The war in Iraq was undertaken in what is almost universally per-
ceived as a serious violation of international law and, thus, a weakening of all legal
regimes' capacity to secure acquiescent compliance. This deterioration of the legal
ethos cannot be to the longer-term advantage of the United States, whatever the
short term temptations. If it is not, steps need to be taken to mitigate, not to magnify,
the damage done. In the age of globalization, and globalized anti-governmental ter-
ror, Athens needs the Melians to be willingly on its side.
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International Law and the 2003 Campaign
against Iraq
Nicholas Rostow
1
Introduction
When, on September 12, 2002, President George W. Bush called on the UN
Security Council to enforce its binding resolutions on Iraq and indicated
that the United States was willing to enforce them alone if need be,2 one of the ques-
tions he put before the world had periodically come up in the preceding decade: was
it lawful for a State or group of States to enforce the Security Council resolutions on
Iraq without specific Security Council authorization in each case? Or, to put it an-
other way, "who decides?" 3 The previous occasions when this question was raised in-
volved the enforcement in the 1990s of the No-fly Zones by the United States,
Britain, and, for part of the time, France or larger scale attacks on Iraqi military tar-
gets as in December 1998.4 However one frames this constitutive question, in each
case the answer is that those members of the Security Council decided.
Of course, actions are taken in context, and the lawfulness of an action cannot
be assessed without examining its context. The circumstances of the speech, a year
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, lent special urgency to the Presi-
dent's call. The effort by Iraq to mount terrorist attacks against the international
coalition formed in response to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Iraqi support for Pal-
estinian terrorist attacks against Israel, Saddam Hussein's applause for the Septem-
ber 1 1 attacks themselves, and Iraq's repeated efforts to obtain and then maintain
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nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs and capabilities while defying
obligations stemming from the 1991 GulfWar formed the political and legal envi-
ronment of the 2003 military action.
On September 12, 2002, President Bush summarized the principal UN Security
Council resolutions binding on Iraq and Iraq's failure to comply with them. He
said " [ t] he conduct ofthe Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Na-
tions and a threat to peace Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and
enforced or cast aside without consequence?" 5 He added that the United States had
the right and indeed the obligation to enforce the law against Iraq and called on UN
Member States to join in doing so. 6
The US view ofinternational law applicable to the Iraq case did not and does not
now enjoy unanimous support. For example, Professor Thomas Franck argues
that, in 2003, the United States, Britain, Australia, and others engaged in a use of
force against Iraq not sanctioned under the UN Charter. 7 He disputes the idea that
the campaign was a lawful exercise of the international use of force under existing
UN Security Council resolutions and general principles of international law. In
fact, the arguments Professor Franck disagrees with have merit and deserve elabo-
ration before the invisible college of international lawyers renders its judgment. 8
The Legal Basis for the 2003 Campaign against Saddam Hussein
The argument for the lawfulness of the 2003 campaign against Saddam Hussein's
government of Iraq is rooted in the Persian Gulf situation after August 2, 1990. The
argument concludes that, first, UN Security Council resolutions and statements
from 1990 through 2002 provided legal authority for the 2003 campaign and dem-
onstrated that, as a legal matter, the 1991 Gulf War had not ended, and, second,
that, in any event, Iraq's material breaches of the 1991 cease-fire, which the Secu-
rity Council repeatedly recognized as such, kept alive, if it were necessary to do so,
the Security Council's 1990 authorization to use force to uphold and implement
subsequent resolutions and restore regional peace and security. The terrorist at-
tacks ofSeptember 1 1, 2001, transformed the context and analysis of Iraqi behavior
and ended more than a decade's tolerance of Iraq's refusal to fulfill its obligations,
to the UN Security Council. 9
UN Security Council Resolutions and Council Presidential Statements created
the UN-based legal framework for the 2003 campaign. 10 Resolution 1441, which
the Security Council adopted unanimously on November 8, 2002, recognized "the
threat Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and
security." 1 ' The operative section of Resolution 1441 commences with the finding
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that Iraq "has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant
resolutions, including resolution 687 ( 1991)." 12 These words refer to the beginning
ofthe 1990 Gulf Crisis, when Iraq invaded and purported to annex Kuwait, and ac-
knowledge that the conflict thus begun had remained unresolved. They therefore
put under the lens both the UN Security Council authorization to use force against
Iraq because ofthe invasion ofKuwait and the resolution setting forth the terms for
ending that conflict and authorization.
Material Breach ofUN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)
The Security Council was the forum through which the collective defense of Ku-
wait was managed in 1990. 13 On August 2, 1990, the Council condemned Iraq's in-
vasion ofKuwait ofthe same day. 14 The Security Council then affirmed the right of
collective self-defense in response to the invasion, 15 imposed an economic em-
bargo, 16 authorized the ongoing maritime enforcement of the embargo, 17 carved
out humanitarian exceptions to the embargo, 18 warned Iraq about the conse-
quences of illegal hostage-taking, 19 and addressed other specific issues that arose
during the first four months following the invasion.20
On November 29, 1990, the Security Council adopted Resolution 678 authoriz-
ing the use of force and giving Saddam Hussein until January 15, 1991, to fulfill his
government's obligations to implement pre-existing Security Council resolutions
beginning with Resolution 660, which had condemned the invasion and de-
manded an immediate, unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.21 In the ab-
sence of Iraqi compliance with this ultimaturn, the Resolution authorized "Member
States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait ... to use all necessary means to
uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions
and to restore internationalpeace and security in the area."22 Operation Desert Storm
—
the 1991 GulfWar to eject Iraq from Kuwait—began on January 16, 1991, by decision
of the US-led Coalition, not of the Security Council, and ended with a cease-fire, also
by decision ofthe US-led Coalition, which the Security Council subsequently endorsed
as a "suspension of offensive combat operations" on March 2, 1991.23 Then, on April
3, 1991, the Council adopted Resolution 687, codifying that cease-fire and imposing
additional obligations on Iraq, "bearing in mind" the goal of securing international
peace and security in the area.24 In order to obtain a cease-fire, Iraq formally accepted
the terms of Resolution 687 by letter dated April 6, 1991.25
Resolution 687 set forth the conditions for fulfilling the terms ofResolution 678
but did not rescind or provide for its termination. Since adopting Resolution 687
on April 3, 1991, the Security Council never found that Iraq has met its obligations
thereunder or that Resolution 678, including its authorization to use force "to up-
hold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant
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resolutions," was no longer in effect or even that the war commenced by Iraq's in-
vasion of Kuwait in August 1990 had ended. Indeed, UN Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali's introduction to the UN publication of documents on the
Iraq-Kuwait conflict, 1990-96, states that, notwithstanding the adoption of Reso-
lution 687, "enforcement measures remained in effect, including the sanctions re-
gime and the Council's authorization to Member States to use 'all necessary means'
to uphold Iraqi compliance." 26 As shown by the series of resolutions in 1990, which
tried to manage the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, the Security Council is capable oftaking de-
cisions about mandates.
From 1991 onwards, the Security Council repeatedly concluded that Iraq's ac-
tions failed to correspond to Iraq's obligations. Iraq's refusal to implement Resolu-
tion 687, apparent within one month of the Resolution's adoption, caused the
Security Council to find that Iraq was in "material breach" of the Resolution—that
is, of the conditions for the 1991 cease-fire. 27 The term "material breach" was de-
rived from the 1961 Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties: 28 a material breach
is a repudiation of the agreement or a violation of a provision or term essential to
the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the agreement. Material breach of
an international agreement by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the
breach as a ground for terminating or suspending the agreement in whole or in
part. 29 In the circumstances of Iraq's failure to fulfill essential terms of the cease-fire
agreement by submitting inaccurate and incomplete declarations of its holdings of
prohibited weapons, weapons systems, and support structures, concealment of pro-
hibited weapons and weapons programs, and obstruction of the inspection regime
designed to monitor and verify Iraqi compliance with Resolution 687, 30 the United
States and the United Kingdom and others, including Secretary-General Boutros-
Ghali understood the finding of material breach to mean that the use of force was
again permitted to compel Iraq to comply with its obligations or, as Boutros-Ghali
wrote in 1996, "to uphold Iraqi compliance." 31 Iraq's failure to comply with core
paragraphs of Resolution 687 violated the cease-fire and justified, as a matter of
law, the resumption by the United States and its coalition partners of the use of
force authorized under Resolution 678. 32
Resolution 1441's use of the words "material breach" to characterize Iraq's re-
peated failures over more than a decade to implement the 1991 cease-fire agree-
ment was the ninth such Security Council finding since the end of the Gulf War. 33
In addition, the Security Council also repeatedly found that Iraq was not comply-
ing with its obligations more generally. From 1991 to the end of 2002, the Council
concluded three times that Iraq was in "flagrant violation" of its obligations,34 12
times that Iraq was not complying,35 once that Iraq was in "clear-cut defiance" of
its obligations, 36 three times that Iraq had committed a "clear violation," 37 twice
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that its violations were "clear and flagrant,"38 and once that Iraq was in "gross vio-
lation" of Resolution 687. 39 In addition, from the cease-fire of 1991 through the
adoption of Resolution 1441 in November 2002, the Security Council threatened
Iraq with "serious consequences" 12 times as a result of its persistent non-compliance
with essential terms of Resolution 68 7.40 The different formulations used in the
1990s reflected the widening fissures among the Permanent Members of the Secu-
rity Council with regard to Iraq.
While some, including Professor Franck, have argued that only the Security
Council ought to determine when, after the cease-fire of 1991, it is permitted to in-
voke the authorization of Resolution 678 (1990),41 the United States and others42
have never shared that opinion. The United States consistently has argued that
Resolution 678 remained in effect until the Security Council specifically rescinded
it, that its reference to "all subsequent relevant resolutions" includes Security
Council resolutions adopted subsequent to Resolution 678, and that no subse-
quent Security Council authorization was needed before the United States and
others lawfully could use force against Iraq to compel compliance with Security
Council resolutions, including Resolution 687, which codified the cease-fire. 43 The
Security Council had neither included an expiration date for the authorization to
use force in Resolution 678 nor provided for the termination ofsuch authorization
on Iraqi acceptance ofResolution 687 or for some other reason.44While Resolution
678 contained no time limit, succeeding resolutions, including 1441, contained no
termination of the authorization to use force that was granted in previous Security
Council resolutions. Whether they liked it or not, Security Council members under-
stood that the United States, the United Kingdom, France for a time, and others
would treat Resolution 678 as providing continuing authority. Indeed, although they
justified the maintenance ofNo-fly Zones with reference to Security Council Resolu-
tion 688, the United States, the United Kingdom, and, during the period it partici-
pated in enforcing the No-fly Zones, France used their patrolling aircraft to keep
pressure on Iraq to comply with Resolution 68 7.45 In so doing, they arguably were
acting on the continued authority of Resolution 678.
The British view, authoritatively expounded by the Attorney General, Lord
Goldsmith, on March 17, 2003, stressed the significance of the finding of ongoing
material breach by Iraq in Resolution 1441. Lord Goldsmith concluded that Secu-
rity Council Resolution 687:
[S]uspended but did not terminate the authority to use force under resolution 678. A
material breach of resolution 687 revives the authority to use force under resolution
678. In resolution 1441 the Security Council determined that Iraq has been and
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remains in material breach of resolution 687, because it has not fully complied with its
obligations to disarm under that resolution. 46
Russia's then-UN Permanent Representative Ambassador Sergei Lavrov made
one of the most comprehensive statements against the US and British view in De-
cember 1998, during Operation Desert Fox undertaken by the United States and
United Kingdom. 47 Lavrov argued that the Security Council, which was "actively
seized" of the matter:
alone has the right to determine what steps should be taken in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security. We reject outright the attempts made in the
letters from the United States and the United Kingdom48 to justify the use offeree on
the basis of a mandate that was previously issued by the Security Council. The
resolutions ofthe Security Council provide no grounds whatsoever for such actions.49
He came back to these arguments in 2002, using the word "automaticity" as rep-
resenting the view he opposed. 50
Iraq's "Final Opportunity"
The second part of Resolution 1441 allowed Iraq a "final opportunity" to come
into compliance with its obligations under Resolution 687, thus eliminating its
material breach. In the words of the French Permanent Representative, Ambassa-
dor Jean-David Levitte, Resolution 1441 created a "last opportunity" "to avoid
confrontation." 51 To ensure compliance, the Security Council established what
was called in the negotiations "an enhanced inspection regime" of the UN Moni-
toring, Inspection and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) and the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). "Enhanced inspection regime" meant that
the Security Council had given UNMOVIC and the IAEA clearer, broader, and
stronger instructions and powers than ever before.52
Resolution 1441 required that Iraq make a new declaration of all its weapons of
mass destruction and associated agents and materials and support, research, devel-
opment, and manufacturing facilities and structures. Iraqi material misstatements
and/or omissions in this declaration and "failure to cooperate fully in the implementa-
tion shall constitute a further material breach and will be reported to the Council for
assessment in accordance with paragraphs 1 1 and 12 below."53 When Iraq submitted
its declaration under this Resolution no Security Council Member or UNMOVIC or
IAEA official defended it as complete within the meaning of the Resolution. 54 Indeed,
they found material omissions.55 The preliminary results ofthe post-war survey of evi-
dence of Iraq's programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
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systems further illuminate the inadequacies of the December 2002 declaration; the fi-
nal report confirmed this conclusion.56
Omissions and false statements in the declaration were not enough in the lan-
guage of Resolution 1441 to constitute the "further material breach" defined in
Resolution 1441. The second of the two requirements was "failure to cooperate
fully in the implementation" of the Resolution. Iraq's derelictions in both respects
were evident to the Council and reported by UNMOVIC and the IAEA. 5
"
The rest of Resolution 1441—the part that would determine what came next
—
reflected a compromise between those governments that did not want to require a
second Security Council decision with respect to the use of force and those that
did. 58 The result was agreement to meet "to consider the situation and the need for
full compliance with all ofthe relevant Council resolutions in order to secure inter-
national peace and security."59 Finally, Resolution 1441 ended by reminding Iraq
that the Security Council had repeatedly warned that continued violations of its
obligations would have "serious consequences." In the circumstances of Iraq's fail-
ure to fulfill essential terms of the cease-fire agreement, the finding of material
breach, and the threat that serious consequences would follow non-compliance
with Resolution 1441, everyone understood that the United States, Britain, and
others were contemplating the use offeree to compel Iraq to comply with its obli-
gations if Iraq failed to fulfill them in response to Resolution 1441 although the Se-
curity Council was not unanimous on the legal interpretation of existing
resolutions. 60 Nothing in Resolution 1441 required the Council to adopt another
resolution as a prerequisite for military operations. And, between November 8,
2002, and March 19, 2003, when the United States and the United Kingdom
launched their campaign against Saddam Hussein, the Security Council met some
47 times in public and in informal consultations considering the situation. The
terms of Resolution 1441 therefore were met and the 2003 campaign against Iraq
was lawful in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions and actions on Iraq
after Operation Desert Storm in 1991.61
The Context: The Terrorist Attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001
Iraq's attack on Kuwait in 1990 thus launched the train of events leading to the
2003 campaign. Iraq's unwillingness to accept the outcome of Operation Desert
Storm and comply with Security Council Resolution 687 meant that Iraq remained
a threat to international peace and security after the 1991 Gulf War. Throughout
the 1990s, the Iraq question stayed on the UN Security Council agenda, and UN Se-
curity Council sanctions against Iraq, imposed in the wake of the 1990 invasion of
Kuwait, remained in place. The Security Council monitored application of the
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sanctions, and the UN bureaucracy supervised Iraqi sales of oil and importation of
goods, including foodstuffs and medicines.62 Iraq was contained militarily and
prevented from attacking the Kurds in the north and the Shia in the south by the
American, British, and, for part of the time, French enforcement of the Northern
and Southern No-fly Zones, beginning in 1991. UN inspections of Iraq's weapons
programs had depended in substantial part on intelligence and defector reports,
not on Iraqi cooperation and inspectors' skills, however great, for success. 63 Early
in 2003, the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, and others on the Security
Council
—
perhaps more than the nine needed to adopt a resolution absent a
veto—concluded that every effort to obtain the compliance of Saddam Hussein's
government with Security Council resolutions stipulating the conditions for end-
ing the 1990 Gulf conflict had failed. Why, if Saddam's Iraq was contained and
watched and the economy supervised, did the United States and Great Britain de-
cide to launch the campaign that removed Saddam Hussein from power in 2003?
The answer, as President Bush said on March 6, 2003, lay in the impact of the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The repeated failure by Saddam Hussein's
Iraq throughout the 1990's to comply with Resolution 687, and the repeated failure
within the Security Council to agree about what to do in response, was no longer
tolerable for the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, and others. "Septem-
ber 1 1th changed the strategic thinking, at least as far as I was concerned, for how to
protect our country," President Bush said. "It used to be that we could think that
you could contain a person like Saddam Hussein, that oceans would protect us
from his type of terror."64 Saddam Hussein's statements about the September 1
1
attacks could give no assurance about his attitude,65 and his record of continued
material breach of Security Council Resolution 687, despite economic sanctions,
diplomacy, low intensity military pressure, and repeated Security Council de-
mands, combined to support the view that there would never be voluntary Iraqi
compliance with Resolution 1441 and that changing the regime by force was pro-
portional and lawful and, after September 11, 2001, necessary.
All Security Council member governments believed that Saddam Hussein's Iraq
had not complied with Resolution 687 and at least had programs to develop or ob-
tain nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons of mass destruction, even if some of
them questioned whether Iraq actually possessed such weapons at that moment. 66
In this connection, one should weigh the assessment ofRolfEkeus, the first head of the
UN inspection effort in Iraq, and, in the view of a former British Ambassador to the
United Nations, "the most-clear sighted and by far the most successful" of them:67
[Iraq's policy since 1991 was not to produce warfare agents, but rather to concentrate on
design and engineering] with the purpose of activating production and shipping of
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agents and munitions directly to the battlefield in the event of war. Many hundreds of
chemical engineers and production and process engineers worked to develop nerve
agents, especially VX, with the primary task being to stabilize the warfare agents in order
to optimize facilities and activities, e.g., for agricultural purposes, where batches ofnerve
agents could be produced during short interruptions of the production of ordinary
chemicals. This combination of researchers, engineers, know-how, precursors, batch
production techniques and testing is what constituted Iraq's chemical threat—its
chemical weapon. The rather bizarre political focus on the search for rusting drums and
pieces of munitions containing low-quality chemicals has tended to distort the
important question of WMD in Iraq and exposed the American and British
administrations to unjustified criticism. The real chemical warfare threat from Iraq has
had two components. One has been the capability to bring potent chemical agents to the
battlefield to be used against a poorly equipped and poorly trained enemy. The other is
the chance that Iraqi chemical weapons specialists would sign up with terrorist networks
such as al Qaeda—with which they are likely to have far more affinity than do the
unemployed Russian scientists the United States worries about. . . . While biological
weapons are not easily adapted for battlefield use, they are potentially the more
devastating as a means for massive terrorist onslaught on civilian targets. As with
chemical weapons, Iraq's policy on biological weapons was to develop and improve the
quality of the warfare agents. It is possible that Iraq, in spite of its denials, retained some
anthrax in storage. But it could be more problematic and dangerous if Iraq secretly
maintained a research and development capability, as well as a production capability,
run by the biologists involved in its earlier programs. Again, such a complete program
would in itselfconstitute a more important biological weapon than some stored agents of
doubtful quality. It is understandable that the U.N. inspectors and even more, the
military search teams, have had difficulty penetrating the sophisticated, well-rehearsed
and protected WMD program in Iraq. . . . The Iraqi nuclear projects lacked access to
fissile material but were advanced with regard to weapon design. . . . This is enough to
justify the international military intervention undertaken by the United States and
Britain. To accept the alternative—letting Hussein remain in power—would have been
to tolerate a continuing destabilizing arms race in the Gulf, including future
nuclearization of the region, threats to the world's energy supplies, leakage ofWMD
technology and expertise to terrorist networks, systematic sabotage of efforts to create
and sustain a process ofpeace between the Israelis and the Palestinians and the continued
terrorizing of the Iraqi people.68
The Iraq Survey Group responsible for searching for prohibited Iraqi weapons and
weapons programs in the wake ofthe 2003 Iraq campaign confirmed the existence
of such programs.69
Security Council unity about Iraq's ambitions did not extend to wanting to join
a use of force to obtain compliance and bring an end to the programs—that is, to
overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime. Therefore, the Council's unanimity in
adopting Resolution 1441 expressed more solidarity than existed, as, for example,
the French and Russian statements explaining their votes made clear and the
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French-Russian-Chinese Joint Statement ofNovember 8, 2002, reinforced. 70 Secu-
rity Council members, Secretariat officials, and others agreed that the build-up of
US military forces in Kuwait had persuaded Saddam Hussein to cooperate to the
degree he did with UNMOVIC and the IAEA, but they did not agree that time had
run-out for non-military solutions to the threat posed by Iraq. 71 For example, Russia's
Permanent Representative pulled back from the dire message of Resolution 1441:
Implementation of the resolution [1441] will require goodwill on the part of all those
involved in the process of seeking a settlement of the Iraq question. They must have the
willingness to concentrate on moving forward towards the declared common goals, not
yielding to the temptation of unilateral interpretation of the resolution's provisions and
preserving the consensus and unity of all members of the Security Council. 72
France's Ambassador Levitte said that "the Security Council would maintain
control ofthe process."73 He did not acknowledge that any one besides the heads of
UNMOVIC or the IAEA might report to the Security Council on Iraqi compliance
with Resolution 1441. The fact that Resolution 1441 contemplated reports from
sources other than the IAEA or UNMOVIC ought not to have needed saying but
did because Ambassador Levitte only referred to reports from those sources as
causing the Security Council to meet. Some commentators have seen economic
motives behind Russian and French Iraq policies throughout the 1990s: "By 2000,
Iraq's trade was worth roughly $17 billion, and other countries were determined to
get a piece of it. Iraq carefully awarded contracts to those who echoed its propa-
ganda and voted its way in the Security Council." 74 Perhaps more importantly,
Abassador Lavrov's and Ambassador Levitte's statements revealed again the diver-
gence of perspectives about international threats in the wake ofthe terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001. 75
The importance of those attacks for the United States cannot be exaggerated.
They have exerted hydraulic pressure on US officials, sending them to bed each
night worried that they have again failed to understand bits and pieces of intelli-
gence about terrorist plots, and causing them to look out on the world through a
prism formed by the September 1 1 attacks. Thus, acceptance of Iraq's unwilling-
ness to abide by the result ofthe 1991 GulfWar no longer appeared to be a sensible
policy option.
Conclusion
The legal foundation for the 2003 campaign against Iraq is not the less important
for being well known. The aspiration that international society operate according
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to law is inseparable from the aspiration for international peace. On September 24,
2003, Security Council members joined in emphasizing this point. 76 While there
have been periods of peace, enforced by a balance of power, these periods histori-
cally have ended in great wars. Whether an international system of independent
States, even one that includes international institutions to which States delegate
important powers, can live according to law and even whether that law can be en-
forced so as to strengthen peace within the international society, is a question
whose answer we are still fashioning.
One of the most important and therefore one of the most controversial ele-
ments of the 2003 campaign against Iraq involved enforcement of international
law by a group of States motivated by the attacks of September 11, 2001, without
being able to prove a connection between Iraq and those attacks. Unlike the Af-
ghanistan campaign, which was directed against the apparent source of those at-
tacks, the Iraq campaign involved a response to a previously defined but ongoing
threat, which acquired new seriousness as a result the terrorist attacks. Security
Council actions on Iraq, including the authorization to use force and the repeated
findings of Iraq's failure to carry out its cease-fire obligations, raised the stakes for
all States, especially after September 11, 2001, because of the Council's primary re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Those same
actions created a compelling legal foundation for the 2003 campaign. Critics may
choose to ignore it. They cannot rebut it.
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PART II
AIR AND LAND WARFARE
OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

IV
Jus in Bello Issues Arising
in the Hostilities in Iraq in 2003
Yoram Dinstein 1
The hostilities in Iraq in 2003 brought to the fore a number ofjus in bello issuesdeserving special consideration. This paper will deal with ten such issues.
The Status of Unlawful Combatants
The subject ofunlawful combatancy has alreadybeen addressed by the present writer
in the conference on Afghanistan in 2002. 2 It is not proposed to repeat here what was
stated at some length in the earlier essay. Suffice it to state that, under customary in-
ternational law, a combatant who does not fulfill the cumulative conditions oflawful
(or privileged) combatancy
—
inter alia, that ofhaving "a fixed distinctive sign recog-
nizable at a distance" 3—becomes an unlawful combatant, i.e., he is denied the privi-
leges of a prisoner ofwar status and exposed to the full rigor of the domestic penal
system for any act of violence perpetrated by him in civilian clothes.
The use of uniforms by members of the regular armed forces is a matter of cus-
tom, esprit de corps and convenience. Lawful combatancy is not determined by the
wearing of a uniform per se. As indicated, it is determined {inter alia) by the wear-
ing of a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance. This fixed distinctive
emblem may be less than a full-fledged uniform (e.g., a special headgear or an
armband). But if the fixed distinctive emblem of regular armed forces is a uniform,
Jus in Bello Issues Arising in the Hostilities in Iraq in 2003
then the removal of that uniform in (or in proximity to) combat does divest the
person acting that way of lawful combatancy.
The issue of the removal of a uniform (as a fixed distinctive emblem) by mem-
bers ofthe regular armed forces must be examined within the confines ofspace and
time. A member ofthe armed forces who is performing his duties far from the con-
tact zone with the enemy and removes his uniform without any possible intention
(or even reasonable ability) to deceive the enemy as to his true combatant status
does not thereby lose his entitlement to prisoner ofwar privileges. Thus, the ques-
tion whether military personnel stationed in the Pentagon wear uniform or civilian
clothes while at work is irrelevant to their status as lawful combatants while hostili-
ties are raging in Iraq. However, any member of the armed forces who removes his
uniform during combat—or even en route to combat or in the course of disen-
gagement from it—becomes an unlawful combatant.
The legal position is the same whether the combatants under discussion are
Americans or Iraqis. Thejus in bello applies equally to both sides in an international
armed conflict, regardless of who is in the right—and who is in the wrong—in
terms of the jus ad bellum. 4 One of the hallmarks of the hostilities in Iraq, in 2003,
was that much of the fighting on the Iraqi side was conducted by "fedayeen" who
fought Coalition forces out of uniform. These "fedayeen" were unlawful combat-
ants. But so were any members of the US Special Forces (or other Coalition mili-
tary units) who fought out of uniform.
Removal by a combatant of a fixed distinctive emblem (such as a uniform) af-
fects his entitlement to prisoner of war status. It exposes him either to (i) trial by
the domestic courts of the Detaining Power for any act amounting to an ordinary
crime under the local legal system—such as murder, arson, etc.—which would be
condoned if carried out by lawful combatants in the course of hostilities; or to (ii)
detention without benefit of the immense panoply of protection spread over pris-
oners ofwar pursuant to Geneva Convention (III). However, removal of the fixed
distinctive emblem does not amount to a breach ofthe jus in bello itself, and cannot
be deemed a war crime.
Admittedly, Article 37 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 provides:
1. It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts
inviting the confidence ofan adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is
obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The following
acts are examples of perfidy:
(c) the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status.'
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Neither the United States nor Iraq is a Contracting Party to the Protocol which is,
therefore, inapplicable in the hostilities between them. But, in any event, the provi-
sion ofArticle 37( 1 ) (c) must be viewed as curious and in some respects misleading.
On the face of it, a radical change is brought about in customary international law
as regards the status of combatants who feign civilian status by removing their
fixed distinctive emblem and wear plain clothing. In conformity with Article
37(1 )(c), if the act leads to the killing, injury or capture of an adversary, who is in-
vited to believe that he is facing a civilian, the act is considered perfidious, and it
constitutes a direct breach of the jus in bello itself.
The wording of Article 37(l)(c), to say the least, is surprising, inasmuch as the
Protocol in general—far from imposing more stringent constraints on combatants
taking off their fixed distinctive emblem—actually relaxes in a controversial way
the standards ofcustomary international law in this context. How can one account
for the singular thrust ofthe new stricture? The answer is that Article 37 ( 1 ) (c) does
not amount to much more than lip-service. Any lingering doubt is dispelled by a
rider in Article 44(3) (where much of the controversial relaxation of unlawful
combatancy occurs): "Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph
shall not be considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph
1(c)."6 Even the ICRC Commentary concedes that "[t]here is a certain contradic-
tion in terms" between the provisions of Article 37(l)(c) and Article 44(3). 7
Since—under customary international law—the removal of a fixed distinctive
emblem (such as uniform) by a combatant during military operations is a matter
of loss of privileged status, and not a breach of the jus in bello (let alone a war
crime), it follows that each belligerent party is at liberty to factor in a cost/benefit
calculus as to whether or not circumstances militate in favor of retaining the fixed
distinctive emblem or removing it. Ifmembers of Special Forces units are fighting
behind enemy lines, and if the enemy has a demonstrably poor track record in ob-
serving the jus in hello's norms concerning the protection of hors de combat enemy
military personnel, the conclusion may be arrived at that on the whole it is well
worth assuming the risks of (potential) loss of prisoner ofwar status upon capture
while benefiting from the (actual) advantages of disguise. However, as a rule and in
terms of the armed forces in general (as distinct from high-hazard commando
units), the prospect of loss of prisoner of war status is a significant consequence
that should, and does, weigh heavily on commanders before they give their assent
to an adventurous course of action.
The preservation of traditional modes of combat by uniformed (or otherwise
properly identified) soldiers is a matter of great import. The only way to ensure re-
spect for the basic principle of distinction between civilian and combatants, pro-
tecting the latter from attack and injury, is to enable each belligerent party to know
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whom it is facing. A combatant disguising himself as a civilian deserves the sanc-
tion of loss of prisoner of war status for he endangers all civilians.
Dealing with Suicide Bombers
There is currently a lacuna in thejus in bello, insofar as the growing phenomenon of
suicide bombers disguised in civilian clothes is concerned. 8 Clearly, suicide bomb-
ers disguised in civilian clothes are unlawful combatants. But what effective sanc-
tion is available against them? By its very nature, the sanction of detention or
prosecution (under the domestic legal system) is irrelevant. A civilian (or a com-
batant out of uniform) who merely prepares himself to become a human bomb,
but is thwarted in the attempt, can still be subject to detention or prosecution.
Once the act is executed, the perpetrator is beyond the reach of the law. The ques-
tion as to which measures can be taken by way of deterrence against potential sui-
cide bombers is by no means resolved at the present time, especially in light of the
generally upheld principle that nobody can be punished for an offense he has not
personally committed. 9 Accomplices and accessories to the terrorist act can evi-
dently be prosecuted or detained, but members of the perpetrator's family—or
others associated with him—cannot be held responsible for his conduct solely be-
cause of that connection.
A specific question relating to suicide bombers arises in the context of naval
warfare. The issue is how to protect hospital ships from immense potential peril of
being sunk by suicide bombers operating from speedboats (a la the well-known at-
tack against the USS Cole), with a view to causing vast numbers of casualties. The
problem is derived from the fact that Article 35 ofGeneva Convention (II) of 1949,
in listing conditions not depriving hospital ships of protection, indicates that arms
held on board must be confined to those kept by the crew for the maintenance of
order, for their own defense or that of the sick and wounded. 10 This appears to ex-
clude machine guns (and of course heavier armament) which may repel suicide
bombers." How can hospital ships be safeguarded against the external threat of
suicide bombers in the absence of adequate armament on board? Probably, the
best solution would be to allow light armed naval craft to patrol the waters around
hospital ships. But the matter is not currently addressed by Geneva Convention
(II) or by any other instrument.
Feigned Surrender
The above-mentioned Article 37 of Additional Protocol I, in prohibiting the act of
killing, injuring or capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy, refers also to: "(a)
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the feigning of . . . a surrender." 12 No doubt, this is a reflection of customary inter-
national law. In Iraq, there were many instances in which surrender was feigned
perfidiously. It must be appreciated that the killing, injuring or capture of an ad-
versary, and the perfidious resort to feigning ofan intent to surrender, need not be
committed by the same person or persons. Should combatants hoisting the white
flag of surrender be in collusion with their companions (who are lying in wait),
perfidy is consummated once the latter open fire upon enemy soldiers stepping
forward to take the former as prisoners of war. Still, collusion is the key to such
manifestation of perfidy. In many combat situations, some individuals (or even
units) surrender while others continue to fight. Absent collusion, the fact that John
Doe persists in shooting does not mean that Richard Roe is feigning when raising
the white flag. To be on the safe side, the adverse party's troops need not expose
themselves to unnecessary risks, and they may demand that Richard Roe step for-
ward unarmed. 13
"Human Shields"
Possibly the most characteristic feature of the hostilities in Iraq in 2003 is that the
Saddam Hussein regime constantly—and flagrantly—resorted to the tactics of in-
termingling civilians and combatants, using civilians as "human shields" with a
view to protecting combatants and military objectives. The deliberate intermin-
gling of civilians and combatants, designed to create a situation in which any attack
against combatants would necessarily entail an excessive number of civilian casual-
ties, is a flagrant breach of the jus in hello. Article 51(7) of Protocol I proclaims:
"The presence or movements ofthe civilian population or individual civilians shall
not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in
particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favor
or impede military operations." 14 The concept lying at the root of the prohibition
appears already in Article 28 of Geneva Convention (IV): "The presence of a pro-
tected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from mili-
tary operations." 15 Irrefutably, this norm mirrors customary international law. 16
Utilizing the presence of civilians or other protected persons to render certain
points, areas or military forces immune from military operations is recognized as a
war crime by Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii) of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. 17 The reference to other protected persons extends beyond civil-
ians to prisoners of war, military medical personnel, etc. 18
There are three ways in which the shielding ofmilitary objectives by civilians can
be attempted:
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( i ) One scenario relates to civilians who voluntarily choose to serve as human
shields, with a view to deterring an enemy attack against combatants or
military objectives. Such conduct would amount to an active participation in
the hostilities on the part of the civilian volunteers, who would consequently
become (unlawful) combatants.
(ii) The second scenario comes into play when combatants compel civilians
(either enemy civilians or their own) to move out and join them in military
operations. The civilians in question may be obliged to serve as a screen to
marching combatants, sit on locomotives of military trains in transit, etc.
Acting as they do under duress, these civilians do not become combatants.
Those who coerce the civilians to act in such a manner assume full criminal
responsibility for their conduct.
(iii) The third scenario is a variation of the second. The only difference is
that, instead of the civilians being constrained to join the combatants, the
combatants (or military objectives) join the civilians. That is done, e.g., by
combatants emplacing tanks or artillery pieces in the courtyard of a
functioning school or in the middle of a dense civilian residential area.
Likewise, military units may infiltrate columns of civilian refugees (as
happened during the Korean War), in order to mask a military operation. 19
Once more, the civilians do not become combatants as a result ofthe military
action taken.
All three types of attempts to protect combatants or military objectives with hu-
man shields are equally unlawful.
The crucial question is whether the brazen act of shielding a military objective
with civilians (albeit a war crime) can effectively tie the hands of the enemy by bar-
ring an attack. Article 51(8) ofProtocol I states that a violation ofthe prohibition of
shielding military objectives with civilians does not release a belligerent from its le-
gal obligations vis-a-vis the civilians. 20 What this means is that the principle ofpro-
portionality (discussed below) remains relevant. However, even if that is the case,
the actual test of excessive injury to civilians must be relaxed. That is to say, the ap-
praisal whether civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the military advantage
anticipated must make allowances for the fact that, if an attempt is made to shield
military objectives with civilians, civilian casualties will be higher than usual. To
quote Louise Doswald-Beck, "[t]he Israeli bombardment of Beirut in June and July
of 1982 resulted in high civilian casualties, but not necessarily excessively so given
the fact that the military targets were placed amongst the civilian population." 21
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Customary international law is certainly more stringent than the Protocol on
this point. It has traditionally been perceived that, should civilian casualties ensue
from an illegal attempt to shield combatants or military objectives, the ultimate re-
sponsibility lies with the belligerent State placing innocent civilians at risk. 22 A bel-
ligerent State is not vested by the jus in hello with the power to block an otherwise
legitimate attack against combatants (or military objectives) by deliberately plac-
ing civilians in harm's way.23
Abuse ofHospitals, Mosques and Schools
Throughout the hostilities of 2003, the Iraqis consistently used hospitals, mosques
and schools as weapon arsenals, staging areas for military operations and launch
pads for attacks against Coalition forces. It goes without saying that hospitals,
mosques and schools are civilian objects which are entitled to protection—indeed,
special protection because of their medical, religious and cultural nature—from
attack. However, the jus in hello is clear about the requirement to not abuse that
protection. When hospitals, mosques and schools are put to military use, their pro-
tection is terminated and they become military objectives. 24 Article 52 ofProtocol I
clarifies in Paragraph 2 that any object can turn into a military objective through
use (making an effective contribution to military action); the sole qualification is
proclaimed in Paragraph 3: "In case of doubt whether an object which is normally
dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place ofworship, a house or other dwelling
or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it
shall be presumed not to be so used."25 It must be borne in mind that the presump-
tion is patently rebuttable, and it arises only in case of doubt. There is no room for
doubt once combatants are exposed to direct fire from a supposedly civilian ob-
ject.26 If a steeple of a church or a minaret of a mosque is used as a sniper's nest,
doubt is eliminated and the enemy is entitled to treat it as a military objective.
Even Article 53 of the Protocol, which lends special protection to certain cul-
tural objects and places ofworship constituting the cultural or spiritual heritage of
peoples, prohibits their use in support of the military effort. 27 Article 13 adds that
the protection of civilian medical units shall cease if they are used to commit, out-
side their humanitarian function, acts harmful to the enemy. 28
The pivotal issue here is proportionality. That is to say, in the words ofJudge Hig-
gins, in her Dissenting Opinion in the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Legality ofthe Threat
or Use ojcNuclear Weapons: "even a legitimate target may not be attacked ifthe collat-
eral civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the specific military gain from
the attack."29 Protocol I does not employ the phrase "disproportionate," preferring,
in Article 51(5)(b), the term "excessive."30 Thus, it would be excessive to destroy a
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hospital, with many dozens of civilian casualties, in order to eliminate a single enemy
sniper. 31 In contrast, if, instead of a single enemy sniper, a whole artillery battery
would operate from within the hospital, such destruction may be warranted.32
Individual Targeting of Central Figures in the Regime
Pursuant to the jus in bello, all combatants can be lawfully targeted. 33 This includes
all members of the armed forces (other than medical or religious personnel),
whether or not they are actually engaged in combat. 34 When a person takes up arms
or merely dons a uniform as a member of the armed forces, he automatically ex-
poses himself to enemy attack. The jus in bello does not preclude singling out an in-
dividual enemy combatant as a target, i.e., "attacks, by regular armed military
forces, on specific individuals who are themselves legitimate military targets."35
Thus, leaders of the Iraqi regime—like Saddam Hussein—who wore military uni-
forms and prided themselves on holding high-ranking positions in the Iraqi mili-
tary hierarchy could be targeted by Coalition forces, provided that the latter did
not entrust the mission to unlawful combatants, as discussed earlier.
Looting by Enemy Civilians
Pursuant to customary international law, as reflected in the Hague Regulations Re-
specting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, annexed to Hague Convention II
of 1899 and IV of 1907, pillage of towns and other places is forbidden, either in as-
sault (Article 28) 36 or in occupied territories (Article 47). 37 Pillage means looting
(or plundering) of enemy, public or private, property by individuals for private
ends. 38 Looting is a common phenomenon in warfare, but it is usually perceived as
a problem affecting the belligerent forces (especially in assault or in occupation).
The Iraqi situation was somewhat singular in that the collapse of the Saddam
Hussein regime brought about prolonged large-scale looting of Iraqi public and
private edifices (including, notoriously, the national museums) by the local popu-
lation going on the rampage. Undeniably, the jus in bello prohibition of pillage cov-
ers all types of looting by whoever is undertaking it. The obligation of belligerent
parties is evident, and it is reflected (inter alia) in Article 4(3) of the 1954 Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict: "The High Contracting Parties further undertake to prohibit, prevent and, if
necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, or any
acts of vandalism directed against, cultural property." 39 Surely, this covers all types
of looting, including that carried out by local inhabitants against their own Gov-
ernment, institutions and co-nationals.
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The Status ofJournalists
Article 79 ofProtocol I enunciates that journalists engaged in dangerous professional
missions in areas ofarmed conflict are to be considered and protected as civilians.40
Journalists do not lose their status as civilians by accompanying armed forces41 (or
being "embedded" in them). It does not matter what their specific mission as mem-
bers of the media is: the expression "journalists" covers photographers, TV camera-
men, sound technicians, and so on.42
All the same, it must be understood that when journalists choose to go into the
combat zone, with a view to covering hostilities from the front, they are engaged in
a dangerous professional mission. Being civilians, journalists must not be attacked
deliberately. But one should not be surprised when journalists are accidentally
caught in the cross-fire between the belligerent parties (as happened on several oc-
casions in Iraq). It is unrealistic to expect journalists to undertake a dangerous pro-
fessional mission without casualties.
In any event, journalists must behave as civilians. Ifthey go on their mission un-
der heavily armed guard, and attempt to pull heroic feats (using, if necessary, their
escorts), they are liable to lose their protection.
Treatment ofPrisoners ofWar
Judging by media reports, a number of Coalition soldiers captured by Iraqi armed
forces may have been executed. If so, this was in direct contravention to the most
fundamental rule of Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners ofWar, encapsulated in Article 13 (first Paragraph).43 Willful killing of pris-
oners of war constitutes a "grave breach" of the Convention, as per Article 130,44
namely, a war crime.
The Iraqis also interrogated American prisoners of war on television in a man-
ner that many people in the United States found objectionable. Such interrogation
may have amounted to a violation ofArticle 13 (second Paragraph) ofthe Conven-
tion, which mandates the protection of prisoners ofwar against insults and public
curiosity.45 However, even assuming that that was the case, it is noteworthy that
such an act (unless amounting to torture or inhuman treatment) does not consti-
tute a grave breach of the Convention under Article 130. Moreover, interrogation
on television at least attested that the prisoners ofwar in question were alive in cap-
tivity. The appearance on television therefore substantially reduced the chances of
the subsequent execution of the prisoners of war. It is a matter of record that all
American prisoners ofwar seen on television were in fact, eventually, found alive.
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The Applicability of the Law ofBelligerent Occupation
The Coalition was very eager to present its forces in Iraq as an army of liberation.
But notwithstanding the fact that the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime
brought liberation to the Iraqi people, it must be appreciated that
—
pursuant to in-
ternational law—the legal status of the Coalition forces in Iraq is not that of libera-
tors but that of belligerent occupants. Belligerent occupation is governed by
Articles 42-56 ofthe Hague Regulations of 1 899/ 1 907,46 as well as Geneva Conven-
tion (IV) of 1949.47 It is true that, following the unconditional surrender—and to-
tal collapse—ofNazi Germany and Imperial Japan at the close ofWorld War II (in
May and August 1945, respectively), the Allied countries did not regard themselves
as subject to the application of the Hague Regulations in running the two coun-
tries.48 However, that was before the adoption ofGeneva Convention (IV) in 1949.
Article 2 (second Paragraph) of Geneva Convention (IV) makes it clear that the
Convention applies to "all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a
High Contracting Party."49 It is also noteworthy that the Security Council explicitly
refers to the Coalition forces in Iraq as "Occupying Powers" in two Chapter VII
resolutions adopted unanimously (initiated, in fact, by the United States and the
United Kingdom): Resolution 1472 (2003) and, even more significantly, Resolu-
tion 1483 (2003). Resolution 1472 refers to the duty ofthe Occupying Power to en-
sure the food and medical supplies of the population of Iraq. 50 Resolution 1483
mentions the responsibilities and obligations under applicable international law of
the United States and the United Kingdom as occupying powers; and calls upon all
concerned to comply fully with their obligations under international law, including
in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907. 51
The application of the Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention (IV) to Iraq
is liable to raise a number of issues, such as:
(a) The duty, under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, to "restore, and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."
52
Article 43 has far-
reaching repercussions.
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It should be emphasized that the Occupying Power
must ensure, as far as possible, that life in the occupied territory is not
paralyzed by armed bands and saboteurs. A state of anarchy, which
characterized at least parts of Iraq for a number ofweeks following the end of
major hostilities, could not be allowed to continue.
(b) While regime change in Iraq—ri.e., the overthrow of the dictatorial
regime of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party—was merely a natural
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consequence ofthe Coalition's victory in the GulfWar, American notions of
changing the structure of Iraq, for instance, transform it from a unitary State
to a federal State, may run into difficulties (unless gaining the freely
expressed consent of the local population). Much depends on
circumstances. It is noteworthy that, during World War I, Germany was
accused of a breach of Article 43 when it tried to change the regional
organization of occupied Belgium into two administrative parts (Flemish
and Walloon)/4 On the other hand, when the British divided occupied Libya
into two administrative districts (Cyrenaica and Tripolitania) during World
War II, there was no complaint. 55
(c) Pursuant to the Hague Regulations, there are many issues relating to the
handling of public and private property in occupied territories. The
Regulations are not necessarily draconic for the Occupying Power. Thus, the
Coalition forces could have kept the billions of dollars of cash and gold
bullions found in caches left behind by the leaders of the Saddam Hussein
regime. Article 53 (first Paragraph) of the Regulations expressly allows an
army of occupation to take possession of cash, funds etc. which are the
property ofthe State/
6
The rule is similar to that governing the capture ofthe
enemy's State cash and funds on the battlefield: these constitute booty of
war.
5/
In the event, notwithstanding the preceding provisions, the Coalition,
owing to its self-perception as a liberator of Iraq, chose to take the altruistic
step of preserving the troves found for the benefit of the Iraqi people.
(d) However, in other instances the Hague Regulations may tie the hands of
the Coalition. There are questions spawned by the principle that the
Occupying Power, under Article 55, can only be regarded as "administrator
and usufructuary" of public immovable property.' 8 One such problem
affects the drilling of oil, especially in light of a rather controversial legal
opinion of the Department of State—offered when Israel developed new oil
fields in the Gulf of Suez—but now liable to haunt the Coalition in Iraq.'
9
Having said all that, it should be noted that under Article 6 of Geneva Conven-
tion (IV), the application of most—albeit by no means all—of the provisions of
the Convention ceases one year after the general close of military operations. 60
The general close ofmajor combat operations has already been announced, albeit
perhaps somewhat prematurely. In any event, it is generally hoped (and ex-
pected) that the full application of the Geneva Convention would prove a rela-
tively temporary matter.
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VQuery: Is There a Status
of "Unlawful Combatant?"
Marco Sassoli
1
Introduction
The argument ofthe United States administration that those individuals cap-
tured during the "global war on terror"2 are unlawful combatants not enti-
tled to prisoner of was status may be summed up as follows. 3 First, the United
States is engaged in an international armed conflict—the "war on terrorism." This
is, second, one single worldwide international armed conflict against a non-State
actor (al Qaeda) or perhaps also against a social and criminal phenomenon (ter-
rorism). That armed conflict started—without the United States so characterizing
it at that time—at some point in the 1990s and will continue until victory. Third,
while the United States claims in this conflict all the prerogatives that international
humanitarian law (IHL) applicable to international armed conflicts confers upon a
party to such a conflict, in particular the right to detain enemy combatants without
any judicial decision in Guantanamo; it denies these detainees the protections of
most of that law by claiming that their detention is governed neither by the IHL
rules applying to combatants nor by those applicable to civilians. Fifth, all those
considered to be enemies in the "war on terrorism," even those denied the benefit
of IHL's full protections, are not dealt with under domestic criminal legislation or
under any other new or existing legislation, nor do they benefit from international
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human rights law. The US administration claims that their treatment is entirely
and exclusively ruled by some mysterious rules of customary IHL. 4
In this paper I will address the approach of the US administration towards the
persons held in the "war on terrorism" from the point of view of IHL. As always
when IHL is applied, this implies, first, that the situation in which those persons are
involved must be examined to determine whether it is an armed conflict and, if so,
whether it is international or non-international in character. Second, for those per-
sons who are covered by IHL, their status under IHL has to be determined.
The Status of the "War on Terrorism" under International Humanitarian Law
IHL is today largely codified in treaties, in particular the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions5 and the two 1977 Additional Protocols.6 The United States is a party
to the former, but not to the latter. It recognizes, however, Additional Protocol II as
desirable or even as restating existing law, and most, but not all, provisions ofAd-
ditional Protocol I as reflecting customary international law.
The four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I apply to international
armed conflicts. Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions states that they
"shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties." Only States can be
parties to the Geneva Conventions. Al Qaeda and terrorism are not States, there-
fore, the law of international armed conflict does not apply to a conflict between
the United States, a State, and them. There is no indication that State practice and
opinio juris go further and apply the law of international armed conflict to conflicts
between States and some non-State actors. On the contrary, and in conformity
with the basic construct of the Westphalian system, States have always distin-
guished between conflicts against one another, to which the whole of IHL applied,
and other armed conflicts, to which they were never prepared to apply the same
rules, but only more limited humanitarian rules. Even a conflict spreading over
borders remained a non-international armed conflict. "[IJnternal conflicts are dis-
tinguished from international armed conflicts by the parties involved rather than
by the territorial scope of the conflict." 7
If the aforementioned principles are applied to the "war on terrorism," the law of
international armed conflicts covered the conflict in Afghanistan, because it was di-
rected against the Taliban, representing de facto government of that State. As for al
Qaeda, where it is acting defacto under the global or effective direction or control of
the Taliban, the conflict against al Qaeda may also be qualified as international. 8
Such direction and control exists, however, only in Afghanistan and not elsewhere.
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Each component of the "war on terrorism"—and even" situation in which per-
sons were arrested—has to he examined and its status determined separately. Until
now, it was regretted that once there was an international element to a conflict on a
given territory, the whole conflict could not, under consistent State practice, be clas-
sified as wholly international but had to he split off into its components. 9 Even less
could a worldwide conflict be determined to be international simply because some of
its components were international. Xo one claimed during the Cold War that the
IHL of international armed conflicts applied to internal conflicts such as those in
Greece, Angola, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, or even to political tensions and arrests
in Germany, Italy or Latin America, simply because those were part of the ColdWar,
the "war against communism," or because there were international armed conflicts
between proxies of the two superpowers in the Near East, Korea, or Vietnam.
Components of the "war on terrorism" that do not qualify as international
armed conflicts may be non-international armed conflicts covered by Article 3
common to the four Geneva Conventions and by Additional Protocol II. To fall
under those provisions they must, however, be armed conflicts. Criteria permitting
such classification are the intensity; number of active participants; number ofvic-
tims; duration and protracted character of the violence; organization and disci-
pline of the parties; capability to respect IHL; collective, open and coordinated
character of the hostilities; direct involvement of governmental armed forces (as
opposed to law enforcement agencies); and de facto authority by the non-State ac-
tor over potential victims.
-
Other situations are not armed conflicts at all. Additional Protocol II excludes
"situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and spo-
radic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed con-
flicts."-- Terrorist actions by private groups have not customarily been viewed as
creating armed conflicts.- 1 The L nited Kingdom stated when it ratified Additional
Protocol I "that the term 'armed conflict' of itself and in its context denotes a situa-
tion oi a kind which is not constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes in-
cluding acts of terrorism whether concerted or in isolation." 13 The British and
Spanish campaigns against the IRA '.Irish Republican Army) and ETA (Euskadi ta
Askatasuna I have not been treated as armed conflicts under IHL. 14
IfIHL applies, each conflict has its own beginning and its own end. At the end of
active hostilities in an international armed conflict, prisoners of war (not accused
of or sentenced for a crime) must be repatriated. The detention, such as of Taliban
fighters captured in Afghanistan, cannot be prolonged simply because in the Phil-
ippines or in Iraq the "war on terrorism" goes on.
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The Status ofPersons Held in the "War on Terrorism"
under International Humanitarian Law
Under the Law of International Armed Conflict
In international armed conflicts, there are two categories of "protected persons"
that are subject to two very different legal regimes—combatants, who become pris-
oners of war protected by Geneva Convention III if they fall into the power of the
enemy, and civilians protected by Geneva Convention IV when in enemy hands.
"Unlawful combatants?"
The US administration claims that the persons it holds in the "war on terrorism"
are neither combatants nor civilians but "unlawful combatants." President Bush
himself made this argument concerning the status of Taliban fighters. 15 Other ad-
ministration officials extend it to members of al Qaeda and others qualified as "ter-
rorists." 16 According to the text, context and goals of Geneva Conventions III and
IV, however, no one can fall between the two conventions and therefore be pro-
tected by neither. 17
The first paragraph ofArticle 4 ofGeneva Convention IV states as follows: "Per-
sons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nation-
als." According to the fourth paragraph of that article, persons protected by
Geneva Convention III "shall not be considered as protected persons within the
meaning of the present Convention." This clearly indicates that anyone fulfilling
the requirement for protected person status 18 that is not protected by the Third
Convention falls under the Fourth Convention. The Commentary published by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provides:
Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law: he is
either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a civilian
covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a member ofthe medical personnel ofthe
armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate status;
nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law. We feel that that is a satisfactory
solution - not only satisfying to the mind, but also, and above all, satisfactory from the
humanitarian point of view. 19
The preparatory work for Article 4 confirms this interpretation. The ICRC had
first suggested referring to "persons who take no active part in hostilities." The
XVI Ith International Red Cross Conference criticized this phrasing because it did
not "cover those who commit hostile acts whilst not being regular combatants,
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such as saboteurs andfranc- tireurs."20 This problem was reported to the Diplomatic
Conference that was negotiating the four conventions, which then adopted the
present wording. Moreover, Article 5 of Geneva Convention IV allows for some
derogation from the protective regime of that Convention for persons engaged in
hostile activities. If such persons were not covered by the Convention, such a pro-
vision would not have been necessary.
From a humanitarian perspective, it is dangerous to revive such an easy escape
category for detaining powers as "unlawful combatants." No one should fall outside
the law and in particular not outside the carefully built up protective system offered
by the Geneva Conventions. They are the minimum safety net in the profoundly in-
humane situation that is war, in which most ofthe other legal safeguards tend to dis-
appear. The US administration has declared that it treats all captured "terrorists"
humanely. First, such a vague commitment is not sufficient. The law covers even
those who commit the most horrible crimes; only this allows us to judge over them.
Second, other, less scrupulous States may take advantage of such a new loophole by,
for example, denying the protection of the conventions to US personnel.
In conclusion, all persons who are covered by the IHL of international armed
conflicts and fulfill the nationality requirements must perforce be either combat-
ants or civilians.
Combatants
Combatants are defined as members of the armed forces of a party to the interna-
tional armed conflict. The United States argues that the Taliban held in
Guantanamo, who are members of the armed forces of the de facto government of
Afghanistan, are not prisoners of war, because they "have not effectively distin-
guished themselves from the civilian population of Afghanistan. Moreover, they
have not conducted their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war."21 This allegation may astonish those who remember that during Operation
Enduring Freedom, the United States stressed that it attacked Taliban command
and control centers and did not complain that it was impossible to distinguish the
Taliban from civilians. 22 Ifthe allegation were true, the legal consequence would be
that the Taliban are indeed denied prisoner of war status if they are considered as
"members of other militias [or] . . . volunteer corps, including . . . resistance move-
ments," but not ifthey are "members ofthe armed forces of a Party to the conflict."23
It is at least arguable that the Taliban belong to the latter category. For regular armed
forces, however, it would be dangerous to require respect for the laws of war as a
precondition for prisoner ofwar status. In all armed conflicts, the enemy is accused
of not complying with IHL, and such accusations are all too often accurate. If IHL
violations by regular armed forces were permitted to deprive all their members,
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independently of their individual behavior, of prisoner of war status, that status
could frequently not provide its protective effect. Historically, the United States
never invoked such an argument concerning the German Wehrmacht, which can-
not be considered to have regularly complied with the laws of war.
As for the al Qaeda members captured in Afghanistan, there may be justifica-
tion to deny them prisoner ofwar status on two bases. First, al Qaeda was a sepa-
rate entity that was distinct from the military forces of the enemy State in the
international armed conflict, Afghanistan. Second, even if considered as an
Afghan militia, it is highly doubtful whether al Qaeda complied with the require-
ments to distinguish itself from the civilian populace and conduct its operations
in compliance with the law. 24
In case ofdoubt as to whether persons who have committed a belligerent act are
combatants, Geneva Convention III prescribes that they must be treated as prison-
ers ofwar "until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tri-
bunal." 25 The United States established such tribunals in the Vietnam war and the
1991 Gulf War,26 but it argues that in the case of those detained in Guantanamo,
there is no doubt that they are not entitled to prisoner ofwar status. 27 Ifthe applica-
bility of the clause merely depended on whether the detaining power has doubts,
the latter could always escape from its obligation, which would make the clause
practically useless. 28
If a person fallen into the power of the enemy is determined to be a combatant,
he or she is a prisoner of war. Prisoners of war may be interned, not as a punish-
ment, but to prevent them from rejoining the fighting. Therefore no individual de-
cision needs to be taken in order to detain them. The mere fact that they are an
enemy combatant is sufficient justification for their detention until the end of ac-
tive hostilities in that conflict. 29 Classification as a prisoner of war prevails, as lex
specialis for combatants, over human rights law and domestic law requiring an in-
dividual judicial detention determination. While in detention, prisoners of war
benefit however from the protections of Geneva Convention III, a detailed regime
that ensures they are treated not only humanely, but also not as prison inmates, 30
since they are not serving a sentence and have committed no unlawful act.
Civilians
During an international armed conflict, civilians who fulfill certain nationality
requirements31 are protected if they fall into the hands of a belligerent and enemy, in
this case Afghan, nationals are always protected. In an occupied territory, nationals
of a third country other than an ally of the occupier are equally protected. On a
party's own territory, only neutral nationals are protected, and then only if they do
not benefit from normal diplomatic protection. 32 Protected civilians may not be
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detained, except under two circumstances. First, detention maybe authorized under
domestic legislation (or security legislation introduced by an occupying power) for
the prosecution and punishment ofcriminal offenses (including direct participation
in hostilities). Second, civilians may be interned for imperative security reasons,
upon individual decision made in a regular procedure (which must include a right of
appeal) prescribed by the belligerent concerned. 33 Such civilians are civil internees
whose treatment is governed by extremely detailed provisions of Geneva Conven-
tion IV and their cases must be reviewed every six months. 34
Under any circumstances, civilians who fell into US hands in Afghanistan may
not be held in Guantanamo, but only in Afghanistan. While combatants may be
held as prisoners ofwar in every corner of the earth, civilians protected by Geneva
Convention IV may indeed never be deported out of an occupied territory. 35 Af-
ghanistan was an occupied territory because it came under the control of the
United States and its allies during an international armed conflict.
Surprisingly, and much to my relief, the Legal Adviser of the US State Depart-
ment has admitted that "unlawful combatants" are protected by Geneva Conven-
tion IV. 36 Nevertheless the US administration has not yet comprehended the
practical consequences of this acknowledgement, as it still detains those persons in
Guantanamo and denies them individual judicial or administrative determina-
tions of the basis for their detention.
It may appear ironic to classify heavily armed "terrorists" captured in an inter-
national armed conflict who are not entitled to benefit from combatant and pris-
oner of war status as "civilians." Borderline cases never correspond to the
category's paradigm ofthe individual who has taken no part in the hostilities. Nev-
ertheless these persons fall within the parameters of the law. What is important is
that "civilian status" does not produce absurd results. As "civilians," unprivileged
combatants may be attacked while they unlawfully participate in hostilities. After
arrest, Geneva Convention IV does not bar their punishment for unlawful partici-
pation in hostilities; it even prescribes such punishment for war crimes. In addi-
tion, it permits administrative detention for imperative security reasons and for
derogations from protected substantive rights of civilians within the territory of a
State and from communication rights within occupied territory. 37 Geneva Con-
vention IV was not drafted by professional do-gooders or academics, but by expe-
rienced diplomats and military leaders who fully appreciated the necessity of
concluding an agreement that addressed the security needs of a State confronted
with dangerous people.
Some may find it shocking that unprivileged combatants classified as civilians
have an advantage over captured lawful combatants in that the former are entitled
to individual judicial or administrative status determinations, while the latter are
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not. But combatants are normally easily identified and given prisoner ofwar status
based on objective criteria. Additionally, members of a State's military forces gen-
erally will acknowledge that they are in the armed forces. In contrast, the organiza-
tional membership and past behavior ofan unprivileged combatant and the future
threat he or she represents can only be determined individually.
Under the Law of Non-international Armed Conflicts
The international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed con-
flicts does not provide for combatant or prisoner of war status, contains no other
rules on the status of persons detained in connection with the conflict, nor details
the circumstances under which civilians may be detained. The question as to
whether "unlawful combatants" are combatants or civilians simply does not arise
in non-international armed conflicts. In such conflicts, IHL cannot possibly be
seen as providing a sufficient legal basis for detaining anyone. It simply provides
for guarantees ofhumane treatment and, in prosecutions for criminal offenses, for
certain judicial guarantees of independence and impartiality. Possible bases for ar-
rest, detention or internment are entirely governed by domestic legislation and the
human rights law requirement that no one be deprived of his or her liberty except
on such grounds and in accordance with procedures as are established by law. 38 In
State practice too, governments confronted by non-international armed conflicts
base arrests, detentions, and internment of rebels, including rebel fighters, either
on domestic criminal law or on special security legislation introduced during the
conflict. They never invoke the "law of war."
Outside Armed Conflicts
IHL applies only to armed conflicts. It offers no protection to those held in connec-
tion with those components ofthe "war on terrorism" that do not meet the thresh-
old of a non-international armed conflict. Because IHL has no application to
conduct falling below this threshold, it certainly cannot provide a legal basis for de-
taining in Guantanamo or elsewhere those that engage in such conduct.
Conclusion
Meant as the branch of international law providing protection to all those affected
by or involved in armed conflicts, IHL has become for the US administration a jus-
tification for denying such individuals and others detained under the rubric of the
"war on terrorism" any of the protections provided by human rights law and US
domestic legislation. However, while the United States thus invokes IHL, it is not
ready to provide those detained the full benefit of this law. In effect, the US
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administration argues that they are covered by no law except for those never de-
fined and mysterious rules of customary IHL.
To properly apply IHL, every component ofthe "war on terrorism," the circum-
stances of each individual's arrest or capture, and the basis of each detention must
be examined and classified separately. Many of those held in the "war on terror-
ism" do not fall within the parameters of persons covered by IHL. Others benefit
from the fundamental guarantees of IHL applicable to non-international armed
conflicts. Again, however, that law provides no legal basis for their detention, an is-
sue dealt with by domestic law. Those persons who were captured in Afghanistan
are protected by the IHL of international armed conflicts. Under that law, only
those who are prisoners of war may be held in Guantanamo. Those who are not
prisoners of war are civilians. As such, they may only be detained in Afghanistan
and only after individual judicial or administrative determinations. I am con-
vinced that the "war on terrorism" can be won—and victory may even be easier
—
if the carefully drafted standards of IHL are respected.
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VI
Special Forces' Wear
ofNon-Standard Uniforms
W. Hays Parks 1
In February 2002, newspapers in the United States and United Kingdom pub-
lished complaints by some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) about US
and other Coalition Special Operations Forces operating in Afghanistan in "civilian
clothing."2 The reports sparked debate within the NGO community and military
judge advocate ranks about the legality ofsuch actions. At the US Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM) Annual Legal Conference May 13-17, 2002, the judge ad-
vocate debate became intense. While some attendees raised questions of "illegality"
and the right or obligation of special operations forces to refuse an "illegal order" to
wear "civilian clothing," others urged caution. The discussion was unclassified, and
many in the room were not privy to information regarding Operation Enduring
Freedom Special Forces,3 its special mission units, or the missions assigned them.
The topic provides lessons and questions for consideration of future issues by
judge advocates. The questions are:
(a) What are the facts?
(b) What is the nature of the armed conflict, and its armed participants?
(c) What is the relevant law of war?
(d) What is State practice?
Special Forces' Wear ofNon-Standard Uniforms
What Are The Facts?
Thirty years ago it was my privilege to serve as the first Marine Corps Representa-
tive at The Judge Advocate General's School, US Army, in Charlottesville, Virginia.
As the lone Marine on the faculty, I was expected to attend all major public cere-
monies, including the graduation of each Judge Advocate Officers Basic Course
—
the accession course for new lawyers entering the Army. Course graduation war-
ranted a speech by one of the Army JAG Corps' flag officers. Regardless ofwho the
graduation speaker was, the speech was the same. Written by The Assistant Judge
Advocate General of the Army, the late Major General Lawrence H. Williams, it
was called "the facts speech." Its message was simple and straightforward: Before
charging off to tilt at windmills, be sure you have the facts.
There is much to be said for this admonition and its application in the case at
hand. Condemning certain actions or declaring them a law ofwar violation based
upon news accounts is not a sound basis for analysis. No lawyer would prepare his
case based solely upon news accounts. Indeed, media reports generally are inad-
missible as evidence. Regrettably, there was a rush to judgment by some based on a
less-than-reliable source.
The facts surrounding the issue were two-fold. The first had to do with what was be-
ing worn, and by whom. The second concerned the motive for the NGO complaint.4
In response to the September 11, 2001 al Qaeda terrorist attacks against the
World Trade Center and Pentagon, US and coalition Special Forces began opera-
tions in Afghanistan in late September 2001. At the request—initially insistence
of the leaders of the indigenous forces they supported, they dressed in indigenous
attire. For identification purposes within the Northern Alliance, this included the
Massoud pakol (a round brownish-tan or gray wool cap) and Massoud checkered
scarf, each named for former Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, as-
sassinated days before the al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and Penta-
gon. This attire was not worn to appear as civilians, or to blend in with the civilian
population, but rather to lower visibility ofUS forces vis-a-vis the forces they sup-
ported. Al Qaeda and the Taliban had announced a $25,000 per head bounty on
uniformed US military personnel. Placing a US soldier in Battle Dress Uniform
(BDU) or Desert Camouflaged Uniform (DCU) in the midst of a Northern Alli-
ance formation would greatly facilitate al Qaeda/Taliban targeting of US Special
Forces. 5 As will be seen in review of the law, dressing in this manner more accurately
may be described as wearing a "non-standard uniform" than "dressing as civil-
ians." Special Forces personnel who had served in Afghanistan with whom I spoke
stated that al Qaeda and the Taliban had no difficulty in distinguishing Northern
Alliance or Southern Alliance forces from the civilian population. 6
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The fall of Kandahar in early December 2001 was followed by the collapse of
the Taliban regime and the swearing-in ofHamid Karzai as Prime Minister. An-
other aspect ofUS Special Operations Forces—Army Civil Affairs—began to en-
ter Afghanistan. In November 2001, US Army Forces Central Command
(USARCENT) had established the Coalition and Joint Civil Military Operations
Task Force (CJCMOTF) using soldiers from the 377th Theater Support Com-
mand (TSC), the 122nd Rear Operations Center, and the 352nd Civil Affairs Com-
mand. By January 3, 2002, the CJCMOTF was established in Kabul. It served as
liaison with local officials ofthe Interim Government and supervised the human-
itarian assistance from US Army Civil Affairs (CA) teams from the 96th Civil Af-
fairs Battalion, who were beginning to operate throughout Afghanistan.
CJCMOTF also was the liaison with the US Embassy, and coordinated coalition
humanitarian assistance contributions.
The USARCENT Commanding General made the uniform decision, favoring
civilian clothing over DCU. His rationale was based on two factors: (a) ability of
soldiers to perform humanitarian assistance operations; and (b) safety of Civil Af-
fairs personnel, that is, force protection. 7 A strong desire existed at the US Central
Command (USCENTCOM) headquarters (Tampa) to present a non-confronta-
tional face, as well as a sentiment expressed thatNGO would be reluctant to be seen
working with uniformed soldiers. Additionally, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion person-
nel, who initially operated in Islamabad, Pakistan, were ordered by the US Ambas-
sador to Pakistan to wear civilian clothing rather than their uniforms, reflecting the
sensitive and unique political environment in which US Army forces were operat-
ing. This order was not clarified or countermanded on entry into Afghanistan.
Civil Affairs personnel continued to wear Western civilian attire. Eventually some
adopted Afghan native attire. 8
Other reasons existed for continued wear of civilian attire. In some areas, local
governors would not talk to uniformed Civil Affairs personnel. In December 2001,
the UN-sanctioned International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) began arriving
in Kabul in accordance with the Bonn Agreement. United Nations representatives
refused to meet with US Army Civil Affairs leaders if they were in uniform.
US Army Civil Affairs units have a long, distinguished history. They played an in-
dispensable role in the European Theater of Operations during and after World War
II, and in the postwar occupation of Japan. US Army and Marine Corps Civic Action
units played an equally indispensable humanitarian assistance role during the Viet-
nam War. NGO involvement during those conflicts was virtually non-existent
(World War II) or extremely limited (Vietnam).
Under the terms of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), NGOs operate subject to the consent of
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relevant States parties to a conflict. 9 The GC also contemplated a linear battlefield
in which NGOs could operate in secure areas, a combat environment different
from Afghanistan. Legally and operationally, military operations and require-
ments take priority over NGO activities. However, NGOs provide valuable services
that the military might be expected or required to perform were NGOs not present.
Military commanders must give due consideration to this, as the absence ofNGOs
could add other responsibilities (such as refugee care) to a military commander's
burden. At the same time, NGOs cannot expect a risk-free work environment. Mil-
itary commanders are entitled to make lawful mission-supporting decisions, even
if those decisions might place NGOs or other civilians at greater risk.
Service NGOs have become a more significant player in areas ofarmed conflict over
the past decade. NGO emphasis is on mission performance following the principles of
humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality. NGOs feel obliged to maintain
independence from the agendas ofboth the donors that fund them and governments
and local authorities that allow them to operate in their territory. In contrast, NGOs
see CA engaged in assistance activities as driven by political and security objectives.
The US military leadership was not entirely successful in seeking a dialogue,
much less a working relationship, with NGOs in Afghanistan. The relationship was
particularly bad as US Army Civil Affairs arrived in Afghanistan. Civil Affairs per-
sonnel were denied access to NGO meetings, while some NGOs refused to come to
CJCMOTF-hosted meetings. A senior on-scene Army Civil Affairs officer con-
cluded that the key issue was NGO image and market share. NGOs who had
worked in Afghanistan since the 1980s feared being upstaged by the Army's Civil
Humanitarian and Liaison Cells (CHLC). The NGOs also objected to humanitar-
ian projects being used in support of a military campaign.
The CJCMOTF served as liaison with the Interim Government and supervised
the humanitarian assistance for US Army Civil Affairs teams beginning to operate
throughout Afghanistan. Civil Affairs personnel deployed across Afghanistan to
provide assessments and identify projects for some $2 million in initial aid money.
The money went directly to local contractors. NGOs wanted to be subcontracted.
Based on limited money, a need to have an immediate impact, and concern about
whether such use of these funds was permissible, US Army Civil Affairs leadership
informed the NGOs that it would not subcontract to NGOs. Moreover, due to se-
curity concerns, NGOs were in the main cities but not in the villages where Civil
Affairs teams conducted business. Going directly to local contractors increased the
fear of some NGOs that they would be cut out of their "market share."
Friction also existed with respect to fiscal accountability. US Army Civil Affairs
are expected to account for 100% of funds allocated to it. A substantial amount of
money provided NGO—as much as 60%—is directed to "overhead," preventing
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its allocation toward the designated project, and full accountability. NGOs resent
scrutiny of their financial accountability shortcomings and amounts attributed to
overhead. This increased tension between US Army Civil Affairs and the NGOs.
Social reform was another Civil Affairs/NGO point of tension. Contrary to
claims of neutrality and impartiality, many NGOs in Afghanistan moved into ad-
vocacy of women's rights and human rights. This caused friction with US Army
Civil Affairs, whose role is to provide humanitarian relief without interference in
local customs, however objectionable they may be. Civil Affairs work stifled NGO
agendas on non-humanitarian issues.
A better than average, although uneven, relationship evolved between CA and
NGOs at the working, "grassroots" level. This contrasts with a poor relationship
at higher levels due to the conflicts identified above. NGO resentment of US
Army Civil Affairs and market share concerns apparently prompted the NGO com-
plaint—led by Medecins sans Frontieres—regarding Civil Affairs wear of civilian
clothing. 10 Philosophical differences between NGOs and the military are inevitable.
The uniform/civilian clothes issue was symptomatic of a larger issue. It should be
noted that not allNGOs agreed with the complaint made byMedecins sans Frontieres.
In early March 2002, the CJCMOTF commander, desiring to broker a compro-
mise, directed all Civil Affairs personnel in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif to return to
full uniform. Some Civil Affairs personnel in remote locations (where NGOs would
not work due to the risk) were permitted to stay in civilian attire. On March 19, fol-
lowing its review, USCENTCOM supported CJCMOTF's decision. Guidance and
authority was provided to ground force commanders to establish uniform policies
based upon local threat conditions and force protection requirements.
As a result of the NGO complaint, the issue of military wear of civilian clothing
was reviewed within the Department of Defense (DOD). Following DOD-Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) coordination, guidance was forwarded to USCENTCOM in
May 2002 that was consistent with CJCMOTF guidance issued April 7, 2002. As a
result ofCENTCOM/CJCMOTF guidance, the number of Civil Affairs and other
SOF personnel in civilian clothing had diminished substantially prior to DOD-JCS
action or the aforementioned USSOCOM Legal Conference. 11
What Are The Legal Issues?
Considering an issue in the public sector, including the military, is similar to pri-
vate practice or a law school examination. The legal issues have to be identified and
addressed. In weighing the situation at hand, the following legal issues were
identified:
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• Is it lawful for combatants to wear civilian clothing or non-standard
uniforms in combat?
• If so, are there legal restrictions in use of either?
• Are there unique law of war considerations, such as risks, a commander
should balance in making his decision?
Other questions had to be answered prior to answering these questions.
What is the nature of the armed conflict, and its armed participants? The nature of
the armed conflict in Afghanistan was an issue that prompted considerable discussion
within and outside the government, in large measure due to the nature ofthe enemy.
References to al Qaeda and the Taliban as separate entities constituted an in-
complete and inaccurate picture. The enemy consisted of a loose amalgamation of
at least three groups: the Taliban regime (until its December 2001 collapse, follow-
ing which it reverted to its tribal origins), the al Qaeda terrorist group, used as the
Praetorian Guard for the Taliban leadership (both for internal security prior to and
following commencement of US/Coalition operations), and foreign Taliban. The
picture was further complicated by the tendency of some to refer to the Taliban as
the de facto Government of Afghanistan because it exercised rough control over
eighty per cent of the country. This was open to debate until collapse of the
Taliban, at which time it ceased to be an issue. Up to the time ofthe Taliban regime
collapse in December 2001, a strong case could be made that this was an internal
conflict between non-State actors in a failed State. 12 By the time of US Army Civil
Affairs entry into Afghanistan, the case was absolute.
Another factor was that the United States and its coalition partners were en-
gaged in military operations in a foreign nation. Hence regardless of the status of
the Taliban, an argument could be made that for certain purposes this was an inter-
national armed conflict. However, by the time the uniform issue was raised by
non-government organizations and considered in Washington, the conflict
against the Taliban and al Qaeda looked more like a counterinsurgency campaign
or counter-terrorist operation than an international armed conflict. While the US
Administration chose to apply the law of war applicable in international armed
conflicts as a template for US conduct, 13 it would be incorrect to conclude that all
of the law of war for international armed conflicts was applicable. For example,
neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda personnel were regarded as entitled to prisoner of
war status. 14 Nonetheless, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners ofWar 15 (GPW), proved a useful template for their treatment.
This issue was not entirely new. US and other military forces engaged in the var-
ious peacekeeping and other peace operations during the 1990s frequently sought
to ascertain where they were along the conflict spectrum. From the standpoint of
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US military conduct, the issue made little difference. Department ofDefense policy
is that US military personnel will comply with the law ofwar during all armed con-
flicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and with the principles and spirit of
the law ofwar during all other operations. 16 The primary issue in US and coalition
operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban was entitlement of captured al Qaeda
and Taliban to prisoner ofwar status under the GPW. That, as indicated, had been
decided.
What Is The Relevant Law?
In a speech at the United States Institute of Peace on March 1, 2001, Sir Adam
Roberts declared "Lawyers stick to the safe anchor of treaties." 17 This perhaps is a
more erudite way of expressing the adage, "Ifthe only tool you have is a hammer,
every problem is viewed as a nail." So it was in the debate over SOF wear of non-
standard uniforms. The argument against non-standard uniforms primarily was
cast in terms ofthe Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War (GPW). 18 The author frequently heard critics argue that "in accordance
with" the GPW, (a) SOF were required to wear uniforms; (b) failure to wear uni-
forms was a war crime; and (c) SOF had to wear uniforms and treat captured al
Qaeda and Taliban as enemy prisoners of war in the hope of reciprocity should
any SOF fall into enemy hands. A closer examination of the law reveals (a) and
(b) to be legally incorrect, while (c) was highly speculative at best with respect to
al Qaeda and Taliban conduct.
The GPW and its predecessors contain no language requiring military person-
nel to wear a uniform, nor fight in something other than full, standard uniform.
Nor does it make it a war crime not to wear a uniform. Article 4, GPW, lists persons
entitled to prisoner of war status and subject to the protections set forth in the
GPW. It states in part:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to
one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of
militias and volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and
operating in or outside their own territory, even ifthis territory is occupied, provided
that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance
movements, fulfill the following conditions:
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(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that ofconducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war. 19
Differing views as to whether regular force combatants are expected or required
to meet the four criteria contained in Article 4A(2) are beyond the scope of my
presentation. While history, the negotiating history of article 4 and predecessor
treaties, other provisions in the GPW, and recognized experts strongly suggest
that regular force combatants are entitled to prisoner ofwar status once they are
identified as members of the regular forces (however attired when captured), 20
other experts argue that the 4A(2) criteria are prerequisites for prisoner ofwar sta-
tus for regular force personnel as well as militia members. 21 Court cases, while lim-
ited in number, tend to support the latter point of view. 22 Article 46 of the 1977
Additional Protocol I23 denies prisoner ofwar protection to spies, even if they have
been identified as regular members of the military.
Historical State practice, provided infra, suggests that denial of prisoner ofwar
status is not automatic, while the experience of US military personnel captured
even when in uniform has been one of refusal of the captor to provide prisoner of
war status and/or suffer serious abuse. 24 Past abuses ofcaptured US military and ci-
vilian personnel do not constitute either justification or an argument for military
personnel to abandon standard uniforms. In international armed conflict, stan-
dard uniforms should be the norm; non-standard uniform, the rare exception; ci-
vilian attire, even rarer. But risk of denial of prisoner ofwar status, while a serious
consideration, does not answer the commander's question: Is wearing something
less than the standard uniform illegal? The answer in treaty law and State practice is
clear: Wearing a partial uniform, or even civilian clothing, is illegal only if it involves
perfidy, discussed infra. Military personnel wearing non-standard uniforms or civil-
ian clothing are entitled to prisoner ofwar status ifcaptured. Those captured wearing
civilian clothing may be at risk of denial of prisoner ofwar status and trial as spies.
There is no doubt that in an international armed conflict any commander will,
and should, weigh a decision to authorize the wearing of civilian clothing carefully.
That being said, military personnel are in a high-risk profession, and commanders
often must make life-and-death decisions. Under most circumstances, a com-
mander ordering a frontal infantry assault on a heavily fortified position under-
stands that in doing so, he has accepted that some soldiers are likely to lose their
lives in carrying out his order. Similarly, individuals who join the military should
be under no illusion as to the attendant risks. As British Special Operations
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Executive historian M. R. D. Foot acknowledged, "The truth is that wars are dan-
gerous, and people who fight them are liable to be killed."25
The decision to wear something other than a standard uniform first requires
military necessity. At issue then is what constitutes a "non-standard uniform?" If a
commander provides military necessity for a Special Forces team to conduct oper-
ations in an international armed conflict in something other than the standard
uniform, what steps are necessary to comply with the law ofwar? What guidance, if
any does the law ofwar provide as to what might constitute a "non-standard uni-
form?" Second, what is "treacherous" killing, prohibited by Article 23(b), Annex to
the 1907 Hague IV?
At the heart of the issue is the law ofwar principle of distinction. The law ofwar
divides the population ofnations at war into the belligerent forces and civilians not
taking an active or direct part in hostilities.26 With a single, limited exception,27
only military forces may engage directly or actively in hostilities, that is, in combat-
ant-like activities. Hostile acts by private citizens are not lawful, and are punish-
able, in order to protect innocent civilians from harm.28 Civilians, and the civilian
population, are protected from intentional attack so long as they do not take an ac-
tive or direct part in hostilities. In turn, military forces are obligated to take reason-
able measures to separate themselves from the civilian population and civilian
objects, to distinguish innocent civilians from civilians engaged in hostile acts, and
to distinguish themselves from the civilian population so as not to place the civilian
population at undue risk. This includes not only physical separation of military
forces and other military objectives from civilian objects and the civilian popula-
tion as such, but also other actions, such as wearing uniforms. An early 20th -
century law of war scholar observed: "The separation of armies and peaceful in-
habitants into two distinct classes is perhaps the greatest triumph of International
Law. Its effect in mitigating the evils ofwar has been incalculable."29
Another law ofwar scholar summarizes the principle of distinction in the fol-
lowing way:
It may be said that the principle ... of distinction between belligerents and civilian
population, had found acceptance as a self-evident rule of customary law in the second
half of the 19th century. Indeed, it seems no more than a reflection of practice as
demonstrated in many of the wars fought in Europe in that period. Soldiers were not
merely distinguishable; they were conspicuous in their proud uniforms; and armies
fought each other, and preferred the civilian population not to mingle in their business.30
State practice and treaty development make it clear that the principle is nei-
ther absolute nor rigid. Wearing civilian clothing for intelligence collection is ac-
knowledged in treaty law as a lawful military activity. SOF wearing civilian
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clothing while serving with partisans was common State practice in World War II
and codified in subsequent treaties or their negotiating records, as will be shown.
The ancillary law of war prohibition on "killing treacherously" 31 does not pre-
clude lawful ruses or Special Forces' wearing non-standard uniforms, or openly
fighting in civilian attire with no intent to conceal their combatant status. 32
Wearing of Uniforms
Military wear ofuniforms during conventional combat operations in international
armed conflict reflects the general customary practice of nations, subject to limited
exceptions discussed infra. State practice of uniform wear is extensive, dating at
least to the Peloponnesian Wars (431 to 404 B.C.). 33
The customary principle of distinction is applicable to the regular military
forces. Conventional military forces should be distinguishable from the civilian
population in international armed conflict between uniformed military forces
of the belligerent States. It is an expectation, with codified exceptions, and an-
other exception acknowledged in the negotiating record of the 1977 Additional
Protocol I. 34 The criteria set forth for militia and partisan forces not a part of the
regular military had as their intention recognition of the generally accepted prac-
tice of nations with respect to the characteristics of conventional forces. 35
No rule exists stating that a complete, standard uniform is the only way by
which regular armed forces may make themselves distinguishable from the civilian
population. 36 Historically it has been the predominant way by which military per-
sonnel, including special operations forces, have distinguished themselves from
the civilian population. But it has not been the exclusive way.
A difficulty lies in the lack of definition. There is no international standard as to
what constitutes a "uniform." 37 Neither the 1907 Hague Convention IV nor the
GPW offers a definition or precise standard. In the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary on Article 4, GPW, its author states:
The drafters of the 1949 Convention, like those ofthe Hague Conventions, considered
it unnecessary to specify the sign which members of armed forces should have for
purposes of recognition. It is the duty of each State to take steps so that members of its
armed forces can be immediately recognized as such and to see to it that they are easily
distinguishable from . . . civilians. 38
Similarly, reporting on discussions of the same issue at the 1974-1977 Diplomatic
Conference that promulgated Additional Protocol I, the ICRC Commentary states:
What constitutes a uniform, and how can emblems of nationality be distinguished
from each other? The Conference in no way intended to define what constitutes a
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uniform. . . . "[A]ny customary uniform which clearly distinguished the member
wearing it from a non-member should suffice." Thus a cap or an armlet etc. worn in a
standard way is actually equivalent to a uniform.
The uniform and other emblems ofnationality are visible signs. Although certain kinds
of battle dress of different countries are very similar nowadays, it is nevertheless
possible to distinguish allied armed forces from enemy armed forces by means of
characteristics of outfitting and other signs of nationality. Furthermore, this makes it
possible to distinguish members ofthe armed forces from the civilian population 39
The ICRC Commentary indicates that a State should ensure that its conven-
tional military forces be distinguishable from the civilian population. It does not
specify the manner in which this may be accomplished, nor state that the complete
standard uniform is the only way in which this requirement may be met.
In spite of the clear treaty language in Article 4A(2)(b), GPW ("fixed distinctive
sign"), the device need not be permanent or fixed. What "fixed distinctive sign" means
remains unresolved. In commenting on this, Professor Howard S. Levie notes:
The ICRC has made several statements attempting to offer acceptable interpretations
ofthe meaning ofthe term "fixed distinctive sign" [contained in Article 4A(2), GPW].
In 1960 it stated that the sign "must be worn constantly"; but in 1971 it backtracked
somewhat when it said that the sign must be "fixed, in the sense that the resistant
[partisan or guerrilla] should wear it throughout all the operation in which he takes
part." Moreover, at that same time the ICRC stated that the sign "might be an
armband, a headdress, part of a uniform, etc." During World War II the listed items
were, on various occasions, used by resistance groups; but they were frequently
removed and disposed of at critical moments in order to enable the individual to
escape being identified as a member of the resistance. . .
.
40
Given the generally accepted understanding of the term "distinctive devices"
—
a hat, a scarf, or an armband—a device recognizable in daylight with unenhanced
vision at reasonable distance would meet the law of war obligation to be distin-
guishable from the civilian population. 41
There are at least five categories of clothing: (a) a uniform as such, such as BDU;
(b) a uniform worn with some civilian clothing;42 (c) civilian clothing only, but
with a distinctive emblem to distinguish the wearer from the civilian population;
(d) civilian clothing only, with arms and other accoutrements (such as load-bear-
ing equipment, body armor) that, combined with actions and circumstances,
clearly manifest military status; and (e) civilian clothing, with weapon concealed
and no visual indication that the individual is a member of the military.43 Based
upon historical practice and treaty negotiation records, the first three constitute a
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"uniform." The fourth should protect the individual from charges of spying if cap-
tured provided he is distinguishable from the civilian population by physical sepa-
ration, clearly military duties, and other characteristics. 44 The last is lawful for
intelligence gathering or other clandestine activities. As will be indicated, violation
of the law ofwar occurs only when there is treacherous use of civilian clothing that
is the proximate cause of death or injury of others. The 1974-1977 Diplomatic
Conference45 did not regard it as serious enough to be classified as a Grave Breach.
The United States is not a State party to Additional Protocol I. Following ex-
tensive military, legal and policy review, the United States decided against sub-
mission of Additional Protocol I to the United States Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification. 46 However, the United States acknowledged that it is
bound by Additional Protocol I provisions that constitute a codification of cus-
tomary international law.47
Most paragraphs of Article 44, Additional Protocol I, amended the customary
law of war with respect to entitlement to prisoner ofwar status for private groups
(so-called "liberation movements"). For policy, humanitarian and military rea-
sons these provisions are regarded as unacceptable by the United States, and were a
major reason for the US decision against ratification.
With respect to conventional forces, Article 44, paragraph 7, states: "This Article
is not intended to change the generally accepted practice of States with respect to
wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to regular, uniformed armed units
of a Party to the conflict." [Emphasis added.]
An authoritative commentary on Additional Protocol I
—
prepared by indi-
viduals directly involved in its drafting and negotiation—offers an explanation of
this provision:
Within the Working Group the initial enthusiasm for a single standard applicable both
to regular and independent armed forces was dampened when concern was expressed
that the . . . [new rules] might encourage uniformed regular forces to dress in civilian
clothing Accordingly, para. 7 was developed to overcome this concern The report
of the Working Group, however, states that "regulars who are assigned to tasks where
they must wear civilian clothes, as may be the case . . . with advisers assigned to certain
resistance units, are not required to wear the uniform." The implication of para. 7,
construed in the light of the Working Group report is that uniforms continue to be the
principal means by which members of regular uniformed units distinguish themselves
from the civilian population . .
.
, but that members of regular armed forces assigned or
attached to duty with the forces of resistance or liberation movements may conform to
the manner in which irregulars conform to the requirements of para. 3. . . .48
That being said, another Diplomatic Conference participant offered the follow-
ing comment as to uniform requirement in light of Article 44, paragraph 7: "[I]t
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should be noted that it is apparently not intended to exclude all regular forces from
the application ofthe previous paragraphs of the article. What it does imply, how-
ever, is that regular forces whenever possible (notably in "conventional" types of
hostilities), should continue to wear uniforms."49
Thus, commentaries by participants in the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference
confirm the Additional Protocol I acknowledgement that, where warranted by mil-
itary necessity, it may be permissible in international armed conflict50 for regular
military forces to wear civilian clothing. At issue is whether the action is a legiti-
mate ruse or perfidy.
Ruses and Perfidy
Ruses ofwar are lawful deceptive measures employed in military operations in in-
ternational armed conflict for the purpose of misleading the enemy. 51 The law of
war prohibits "killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hos-
tile nation or army," 52 commonly known as perfidy. 53
Article 23 of the Annex to the 1899 Hague II Convention states:
23. Besides the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially prohibited -
(a) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation
of army. 54
This article, along with Articles 29 and 31, were re-codified with non-substantive
changes in the Annex to the 1907 Hague IV Convention. They are important for
several reasons. They constitute recognition of the general obligation for military
forces to fight in uniform. However, it is not a war crime for military personnel to
wear or fight in civilian clothing unless it is done for the purpose, and with the re-
sult of killing treacherously. What constituted "killing treacherously" was defined
as "perfidy" in Article 37 of Additional Protocol I:
It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting
the confidence ofan adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged
to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict,
with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The following acts are
examples of perfidy:
(a) the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a surrender;
(b) the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness;
(c) the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and
(d) the feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the
United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict."
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In order to be perfidy, the act must be the proximate cause of the killing, injury
or capture ofthe enemy. 36 But while the Diplomatic Conference codified perfidy, it
limited criminal liability. Perfidy was made a Grave Breach only if it involves "the
perfidious use . . . ofthe distinctive emblem ofthe red cross, red crescent or red lion
and sun." 37 Wearing civilian attire or feigning civilian status was not designated a
Grave Breach.
Each differs from US and coalition Special Forces operating in non-standard uni-
forms as part of heavily armed units clearly known and identifiable by the Taliban
and al Qaeda in the war in Afghanistan. Special Forces wear of non-standard uni-
forms, whether partial BDU or indigenous apparel of their Northern Alliance part-
ners, including their distinctive pakol hats and/or tribal scarves, did not constitute
perfidy. US Army Civil Affairs wear of Western-style civilian clothing or indigenous
attire in Afghanistan would not have constituted perfidy unless it had been done for
the purpose, and with the result of, killing treacherously. The NGO complaint made
no such allegation, and no evidence has been surfaced to suggest such conduct.
That being said, the devil always has been in the details in balancing the allowance
for military personnel to operate in enemy denied areas in civilian attire, and perfidy.
At the heart of the balance is the law ofwar principle of distinction. State practice, of
which more will be said, suggests that the lines between the two are far from clear.
There is logic to this history. State tolerance of Special Forces fighting in civilian
clothing in limited, special circumstances, such as support for partisans, is consis-
tent with humanitarian tolerance for captured guerrillas. It follows efforts by
many, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, to provide pris-
oner ofwar protection to all and not to prosecute except in the most egregious cir-
cumstances, such as terrorism and treacherous use of civilian clothing. 38 The
drafters of Article 44 had a better sense of State practice than did critics of US and
coalition Special Forces wear of non-standard uniforms.
Into the midst of this discussion steps the global war on terrorism. Terrorists are
not entitled to law ofwar protection, and the law ofwar is not applicable as such in
counter-terrorist operations. 59 Counter-terrorist units have been authorized to use
hollow-point or other expanding ammunition,60 for example, and have worn civil-
ian clothing or non-standard uniforms on missions. 61 President Bush's radio ad-
dress to the nation and the world on September 29, 2001, in response to the September
1 1 th terror attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, may have prompted
some in the military to err initially and assume that law ofwar rules relating to uniform
wear were not applicable in the military operations that followed in Afghanistan.
This leads to the proper point for review of State practice.
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What Is State Practice?
State practice is important to answering legal questions because it forms a basis for
determining customary international law.62 State practice—a synonym for mili-
tary history—reveals how governments interpret, apply and/or enforce law ofwar
treaty provisions.
State practice in international armed conflict and other military operations con-
tains a significant record of Special Forces wear of civilian attire, non-standard uni-
forms, and/or enemy uniforms as a ruse or for other reasons. Beginning with
Colonel T. E. Lawrence, the celebrated Lawrence ofArabia, State practice reflects an
overt tolerance bordering on admiration for special forces wearing civilian clothing
when working with indigenous persons in enemy denied areas, whether for intelli-
gence gathering or combat operations.63 Special forces personnel captured while
wearing civilian clothing have been treated as spies rather than charged with a war
crime, while Special Forces who fought in civilian clothing and returned safely have
been honored as heroes.
The actions of Colonel Lawrence in all likelihood were not the first in which in-
digenous attire was worn, but one of the more influential. An appreciation of the
list that follows necessitates a brief historical overview.
Germany's annexation of Austria in 1938 sparked interest within the British
military in the potential necessity for irregular operations. Recalling the Spanish
guerrillas in Wellington's campaign against the French in the Peninsular War
(1807-1809), Boer commando success against the British in the 1899-1902 Anglo-
Boer War, Colonel Lawrence's success, the British experience in facing Sinn Fein in
Ireland 19 19- 192 1,64 Chinese guerrilla operations against Japan in the Sino-Japa-
nese War, and other guerrilla activities in other conflicts, in 1938 the Research
Branch of the British General Staff (GS(R)) began research that led to preparation
of Field Service Regulations entitled The Art of Guerrilla Warfare, The Partisan
Leader's Handbook, and How to Use High Explosives, all subsequently noted in
GS(R) Report No. 8 'Investigation of the Possibilities of Guerrilla Activities.65
Commencement ofthe Second World War with the German invasion ofPoland
on September 1, 1939, revealed Germany's first use of Special Forces in civilian
clothing, enemy uniforms, or non-standard attire as a ruse to seize critical objec-
tives. British focus on partisan warfare and Special Forces was renewed with Ger-
many's invasion of Western Europe, the fall of France, and British Army
evacuation from Dunkirk in May 1940. Standing alone, the British leadership iden-
tified several means for action. In addition to traditional means such as naval
blockade and aerial bombing, it directed commando raids and "the undermining
of enemy morale and production possibilities through close co-operation with
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exile governments and through them—or without them—with Resistance Move-
ments in enemy occupied territory." The Charter for the British Special Operations
Executive (SOE) received War Cabinet approval on July 22, 1940. At this time
Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill offered his oft-quoted edict: "And now set
Europe ablaze." Working closely with exile governments, the British Government
began making contact with potential resistance movements throughout Nazi-oc-
cupied Europe, ultimately providing them personnel and material support, subse-
quently coordinating their actions to link them directly to the British and Allied
war effort.
It is important to understand what SOE was, and what it was not. SOE was an
independent secret service. It was not a military service. But SOE relied heavily
upon assignment of military officers to it, coordination of operations with the mil-
itary chiefs of staff, and was dependent on the military services for personnel, sup-
port, supply and transportation. Although intelligence was sometimes a by-
product of its activities, SOE was not an intelligence collection agency. It was in-
tended for its operatives to engage in clandestine, subversive operations in civilian
clothing. The dagger lay concealed beneath the cloak. In Prime Minister Chur-
chill's words, this was "'ungentlemanly warfare' in which the 'Geneva Convention'
rules do not apply and the price of failure was often a slow and terrible death."66
Thus the British Government and SOE operatives consciously entered into this
form of operations fully cognizant of its law of war implications.
The "Geneva Conventions" baby had not been tossed out with the bath water.
As was the case with US Special Forces in Afghanistan in 2002, restrictions were
placed on wearing civilian attire. Military personnel providing transport to SOE
personnel to and from an operation were required to be in uniform, for example,
while late-war operations enabled some to wear uniforms. For post-D-Day opera-
tions, SOE personnel were provided armbands for partisans and British military
personnel not in uniform. Prior to and after D-Day, a clear showing of military ne-
cessity as it related to the mission was necessary for authorization to wear civilian
clothing. For example, on May 30, 1943, the British War Office informed the Com-
mander-in-Chief, India, that the Chief of Staff had decided: "No member of the
armed forces . . . should be sent on military operations, however hazardous, in ci-
vilian clothes, except in the case of subversive activities for which civilian clothes
are essential."67
Germany invaded Russia on June 22, 1941. In response, Russian Premier Josef
Stalin declared that day:
The struggle against Germany must not be looked upon as an ordinary war It is not
merely a fight between two armies ... in order to engage the enemy there must be bands
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ofpartisans and saboteurs working underground everywhere In territories occupied
by the enemy, conditions must be made so impossible that he cannot hold out. . . .68
Soviet partisan warfare differed from that of Great Britain and (subsequently) the
United States, ifperhaps only slightly. Whereas Great Britain and the United States ex-
ported support for underground movements in Axis-occupied nations, the Soviet Un-
ion supported partisan warfare within its own territory occupied by Germany,
operating along interior lines. The partisan movement, organized, trained and di-
rected by Soviet Army personnel, was substantial. In the month of July 1943, partisan
forces carried out 10,000 separate demolitions of track to impede German re-supply
efforts. During the night ofJuly 4, 1944 alone, partisans laid 4,1 10 separate demolition
charges on rail lines; on June 19, partisans planted over 5,000 mines on the roads and
railroads behind the Second and Fourth German Armies. While it was estimated that
250,000 people were directly engaged in partisan operations by 1944, Soviet authorities
boasted that every Soviet civilian in Nazi-occupied territory was at least indirectly in-
volved in partisan activities, and on September 6, 1942, the partisan movement
achieved the nominal status of a separate branch of the Soviet military—something
thought about in the United Kingdom by some, but never achieved in either the
United Kingdom or the United States. Like underground operations supported by the
United Kingdom and United States, Soviet partisan operations—with civilians and
military personnel fighting in civilian attire—were State approved and directed.
United States' movement into partisan operations closely followed Russian and
British actions. Early in World War II, the Roosevelt Administration established the
Office ofStrategic Services (OSS). Forerunner ofthe Central Intelligence Agency, the
OSS was a hybrid organization led by Major General William A. Donovan, a distin-
guished, decorated former Army officer. OSS was under the administrative cogni-
zance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but under operational control of the theater
commander.69 It was an organization focused on espionage, sabotage and partisan
support. US Army personnel provided a major part of the OSS strength, which
reached its maximum of 13,000 in December 1944. US Army Special Forces traces its
lineage to OSS. 70
By the spring of 1944, SOE and OSS were operating together in a variety of mis-
sions.71 Some OSS units operated in uniform, while others did not under all cir-
cumstances. In one of its major efforts, France, OSS operational units worked in
Nazi-occupied territory in direct support of the French Resistance. As a leading
history notes:
The first group consisted of seventy-seven Americans who wore civilian clothes as
organizers of secret networks, as radio operators, or as instructors in the use of
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weapons and explosives. Thirty-three members of that group were active in France
before 6 June 1944, D-Day. . . .[Emphasis added.]
The largest OSS group in France consisted of 356 Americans who were members of
Operational Groups (OG). All recruits for the OGs were French-speaking volunteers
from US Army units, primarily infantry and engineer (for demolition experts). . . .
Working in uniform, these teams parachuted behind the lines after D-Day to perform
a variety of missions. . . 72
In addition to its Operational Groups, OSS worked with SOE in Jedburgh
teams. These teams were intended to be composed of an Englishman, an Ameri-
can, and a continental Europe member, each military, two ofwhom were officers;
the third was the communications specialist. 73 The initial core contained fifty US
officers fluent in French who were to parachute in uniform to resistance groups,
initially throughout France during the weeks following the Allied landings on June
6, 1944. They would provide liaison with the underground, arm and train the Ma-
quis, boost "patriotic morale," and coordinate resistance activity with Allied mili-
tary strategy. Ninety-three Jedburgh teams parachuted into France to join the
Maquis after D-Day, numbering three hundred French, British and US officers.
Eventually they served in other Nazi-occupied territory.
While the Jedburghs normally operated in uniform, this was not always possi-
ble. In an operation in Nazi-occupied France, Major Horace Fuller, USMC,
avoided capture as a result of accepting the advice of his French contact to wear ci-
vilian clothing, including during combat operations. 74
Similar operations occurred in other theaters. On May 4, 1942, a US Navy offi-
cer formed Naval Group China. Composed of Navy and Marine Corps personnel,
its mission was to establish radio intelligence posts, weather-gathering and lookout
stations, form, supply and train indigenous sabotage units, and conduct attacks on
Japanese units and equipment. Also known as the Sino-America Cooperative Or-
ganization, it executed its operations successfully for the duration ofthe war, many
of them in non-standard uniform or indigenous civilian attire, depending on the
mission and situation. 75
This is not the time to recount Allied support for partisan operations in World
War II, nor what then were termed "commando" operations. However, several ob-
servations are relevant to the issue at hand. First, partisan operations were univer-
sal, occurring in every Axis-occupied nation, actively supported by each of the
major Allies—United Kingdom, United States and Russia—and each government
in exile. Second, they were significant in their breadth and longevity. For example,
the French Resistance Movement began shortly following German conquest in
1940 and continued through the war. By 1944, approximately three million men
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and women were associated with the various French Resistance organizations. In
Yugoslavia, 400,000 were involved in partisan operations.
Resistance activity was dependent upon volunteers—whether partisans from
the civilian population ofAxis-controlled nations, civilian and military personnel
serving with the SOE or OSS, or members of Special Forces. All were aware of the
possible consequences if they were caught, whether in uniform or other attire. At
the same time, execution as a spy ifcaptured in something other than standard uni-
form was not a certainty.
Partisan sabotage operations were regarded as a valuable alternative to
highly inaccurate strategic bombing in Nazi-occupied territory, as the Allies
sought to reduce collateral civilian casualties to friendly populations. 76 Partisan
sabotage was the "smart bomb" ofWorld War II. In its employment ofvery pre-
cise means, it was the epitome of the second facet ofthe fundamental law ofwar
principle of distinction. 77 In some cases, the evidence was clear that partisan/
Special Forces sabotage often was more effective than air operations against the
same targets, 78 while in other instances OSS-lead partisans were able to destroy
heavily defended targets that had resisted air attack. 79 While the rationale for
partisan or Special Forces attacks may have been selected over aerial attack
more for political than law of war reasons, 80 it offers evidence of why govern-
ments chose not to condemn attacks in civilian clothing as a Grave Breach in
Additional Protocol I. Special Forces/partisan unconventional warfare opera-
tions tied down Axis units that could have been used more effectively engaging
Allied forces but for the partisan threat, 81 and significantly impaired German
efforts to reinforce their defenses at Allied points of offensive ground opera-
tions. 82 Special Forces and their partisan allies performed other life-saving ac-
tions, such as the rescue of downed Allied aircrew and assistance in running
escape routes. 83 Special Forces served as on-the scene ambassadors where Allied
combat operations killed innocent civilians. 84
Partisan operations, including sabotage and direct attacks on Axis personnel,
were executed primarily in civilian attire, occasionally (after the Allied return to Eu-
rope on June 6, 1944) wearing a distinctive device, sometimes in a partial uniform,
but seldom in full uniform. "Uniform" varied, often being more like modern "gang"
colors than a traditional military uniform. The same was true for SOE and OSS mili-
tary personnel serving with resistance movements and, in some cases, Special Forces.
Finally, partisan operations were successful. Danish historian Jorgen Haestrup
concludes "The Resistance Movements, seen in their entirety, deeply influenced
the course of the war, psychologically, militarily and politically."85 In support
thereof, he quotes Russian historian E. Boltin: "History has never known a popular
fight of such huge dimensions as was apparent during the 1939-1945 war.
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Furthermore the masses had never before taken so directly a part in the military
combat, as was the case in the last war in Europe."86
The preceding comments are offered to show that the wearing of civilian attire
by partisans or military personnel in Special Forces units or in the SOE or OSS was
neither unique, occasional, nor limited in time and space. In the examples that fol-
low, it is clear that the wearing of civilian attire or non-standard uniform (and, in
some cases, enemy uniform) was a deliberate act based upon a decision made at the
highest levels of government.
The list set forth in the Annex (infra) is illustrative rather than exhaustive, and is
offered for historical purposes rather than necessarily with approval or condemna-
tion ofthe missions listed. With the exception ofUS action in Exparte Quirin87 and
the unsuccessful prosecution of Otto Skorzeny,88 the list reveals that State practice
in international armed conflict has tended not to treat wear of civilian attire, non-
standard uniforms, and/or enemy uniforms by regular military forces as a war
crime. Personnel caught in flagrante delicto in civilian attire or enemy uniforms
have been treated as spies, sometimes (but not always) with severe consequences.
However, those who returned safely were decorated rather than punished, mani-
festing an endorsement of their actions by their government.
The wearing ofenemy uniforms is not directly within the scope ofthe issue under
consideration. However, State practice is germane regarding the prohibition on
"killing treacherously" contained in Article 23(b) of the Annex to the 1907 Hague
Convention IV.89 State practice shows that governments have been willing to deploy
Special Forces in civilian attire or enemy uniforms where a major advantage is antici-
pated, and where the gain is greater than the risk to the deployed personnel. Such ac-
tions have not been regarded as a war crime either by the government ordering them
or the government against which the forces were employed.90
State practice provides several points for fine tuning a general principle:
(a) Colonel Lawrence wore indigenous attire while leading the Arab uprising
against the Ottoman Empire in the Hejaz. Coalition Special Forces aligned with
Northern Alliance and Southern Alliance forces in Afghanistan, suggesting a nuance
in the law ofwar principle of distinction: an armed military group recognizable at a
distance and readily identifiable to the enemy by its size and other characteristics,
even when wearing indigenous attire with or without distinctive devices, is acting
lawfully. In essence, there is no "treacherous killing" or perfidy because there has
been no treacherous use of civilian clothing.
(b) Non-standard uniforms or indigenous attire may be adopted for practical
reasons rather than with intent to commit perfidy. The British/Commonwealth
Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), operating behind enemy lines in North Africa
from 1940-1943, adopted the kaffiyeh and agal as a standard part of their uniform
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for utilitarian purposes, for example. The LRDG wore native sheep or goatskin
coats to ward offthe nighttime desert cold, as did British and US Special Forces op-
erating behind Iraqi lines in the 1991 coalition effort to liberate Kuwait. Wear of
the latter by the LRDG served partially as a ruse against casual observation, such as
by enemy aircraft. However, their identity clearly was recognizable at a distance by
enemy ground forces.91
(c) Law ofwar compliance with something as simple as wearing a distinctive device
may not be practical where the enemy is known to punish rather than reward compli-
ance. For example, immediately prior to D-Day (June 6, 1944), British air-delivered
supplies included armbands for partisan and supporting Special Forces' use once
Allied conventional forces returned to the continent. However, distinctive emblem
wear was viewed with skepticism in light ofHitler's Commando Order denying quarter
to any partisans or Special Operations Forces.92
(d) Perfidy requires mens rea, that is, the donning of civilian attire with the clear
intent to deceive. A group of alert, fit young men, heavily and openly armed, sur-
rounding an individual in military uniform, and themselves surrounded by host
nation military personnel in uniform, clearly are a personal protection detail, and
are not attempting to mask their status nor gain an advantage over some unsus-
pecting enemy soldier.
The law of war regards a uniform as the principal way in which conventional
military forces distinguish themselves from the civilian population in international
armed conflict. State practice (including US practice), treaty negotiation history,
and the views ofrecognized law ofwar experts reveals (i) that the law ofwar obliga-
tion is one of distinction that otherwise has eluded precise statement in all circum-
stances; (ii) there is no agreed definition of uniform; (iii) the uniform
"requirement" is less stringent with respect to Special Forces working with indige-
nous forces or executing a mission of strategic importance; and (iv) a law ofwar vi-
olation occurs only where an act is perfidious, that is, done with an intent to
deceive, and the act is the proximate cause of the killing, wounding or capture of
the enemy. My review of State practice found no enforcement by a government
against its own personnel. Enemy combatants captured in flagrante delicto were
prosecuted as spies rather than for law ofwar violations, with the exception of Ex
parte Quirin and the unsuccessful post-World War II US prosecution of SS-
Obersturmbannfuhrer Otto Skorzeny.
Summary
In international armed conflict, the wearing of standard uniforms by conventional
military forces, including Special Operations Forces, is the normal and expected
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standard. Wearing civilian attire or a non-standard uniform is an exception that
should be exercised only in extreme cases determined by competent authority.
In international armed conflict, military necessity for wearing non-standard
uniforms or civilian clothing has been regarded by governments as extremely re-
stricted. It has been limited to intelligence collection or Special Forces operations
in denied areas. No valid military necessity exists for conventional military forces,
whether combat (combat arms, such as infantry, armor or artillery), combat sup-
port (such as Civil Affairs), or combat service support personnel, to wear non-
standard uniforms or civilian attire in international armed conflict.
The codified law of war for international armed conflict does not prohibit the
wearing of a non-standard uniform. It does not prohibit the wearing of civilian
clothing so long as military personnel distinguish themselves from the civilian
population, and provided there is legitimate military necessity for wearing some-
thing other than the standard uniform. The generally recognized manner of dis-
tinction when wearing something other than the standard uniform is through a
distinctive device, such as a hat, scarf, or armband, recognizable at a distance.
Violation of the law of war (perfidy) occurs when a soldier wears civilian
clothing
—
not a non-standard uniform—with intent to deceive, and the act is the
proximate cause of the killing, wounding or capture of the enemy. Perfidy does
not exist when a soldier in civilian attire or non-standard uniform remains iden-
tifiable as a combatant, and there is no intent to deceive.
Discussion ofthe issue raises an appearance of a double standard in considering
Taliban militia/al Qaeda (in Afghanistan) or Saddam Fedayeen (in Iraq) wear of ci-
vilian clothing while justifying SOF wear of Western civilian attire or indigenous
attire. A "double standard" exists within the law ofwar for regular forces ofa recog-
nized government vis-a-vis unauthorized combatant acts by private individuals or
non-State actors. The issue was complicated by the unique nature of operations in
Afghanistan, that is, counter-terrorist operations against non-State actors in a
failed State, and the increased role ofNGOs in a non-linear combat environment.
The law of war principle of distinction cannot be taken lightly. The standard
military field uniform should be worn absent compelling military necessity for
wear of a non-standard uniform or civilian clothing. Military convenience should
not be mistaken for military necessity. That military personnel may be at greater
risk in wearing a uniform is not in and of itself sufficient basis to justify wearing ci-
vilian clothing. "Force protection" is not a legitimate basis for wearing a non-stan-
dard uniform or civilian attire. Risk is an inherent part of military missions, and
does not constitute military necessity for the wear of civilian attire. But the law of
war requirement to wear a complete, "standard" uniform is not as absolute as some
have recently suggested.
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To summarize:
(a) The law of war requires military units and personnel to distinguish them-
selves from the civilian population in international armed conflict. Article 4(A)2 of
the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(GPW) 93 sets forth standards all combatants are expected to satisfy. However, mili-
tary personnel may distinguish themselves from the civilian population in other
ways, such as physical separation.
(b) Standard US military uniforms satisfy the requirements ofGPW Article 4A.
"Standard military uniform" refers to battle dress uniform (BDU), desert camou-
flage uniform (DCU), official flight suit, or other obvious military apparel.94 The
presumption should be that all US armed forces operate in standard uniforms dur-
ing military operations in international armed conflict.
(c) When authorized, the requirements ofGPW Article 4(A) 2 maybe satisfied
by other than the complete standard military uniform. For example, a visible part
ofthe standard military uniform, or a fixed, distinctive sign will satisfy the require-
ments provided that the forces are recognizable as combatants with unenhanced
vision at a distance.
(d) Neither the Global War on Terrorism nor the fact that one is a member of
Special Operations Forces offers carte blanche for military personnel to wear some-
thing other than the full, standard uniform. The wearing of a partial uniform or
non-standard uniform with fixed, distinctive sign should be reserved for excep-
tional circumstances when required by military necessity. Force protection does
not constitute military necessity. Authority should be regarded as extremely lim-
ited, mission and unit specific, and decided by a senior commander or higher, such
as (in the US military) the Combatant Commander responsible for the mission.
(e) While a hat, scarf or armband would meet the fixed distinctive sign require-
ment, a permanently affixed distinctive sign such as an American flag sewn onto
body armor or clothing is more prudent.
(f) Forces operating in other than the complete standard uniform should re-
ceive training in the law ofwar to ensure that they understand the requirements of
distinction and are fully aware of the risks they may face if captured if they fail to
comply with the law of war.
(g) Captured US military personnel (other than escaping prisoners of war)
wearing civilian apparel without a fixed distinctive sign and without visible weap-
ons may be considered spies by their captor. The captor may try them for domestic
law violations (e.g., spying). Unless they otherwise commit an independent law of
war violation (e.g., perfidy), history indicates that the acts will not be regarded as
violative of the law of war.
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ANNEX
TABLE OF HISTORICAL STATE PRACTICE95
Who What When Where Disposition
(if any)
Japan Japanese officers in
Chinese civilian attire
on sabotage mission.
1904 Manchuria
(Russo-Japanese
War)
Captured and
executed.
Russia Russian soldiers in
Chinese civilian at-
tire attacked Japa-
nese units.
1904 Manchuria
(Russo-Japanese
War)
Japanese diplo-
matic protest.
Col. T. E.
Lawrence
(Lawrence
of Arabia)
British Army
Wore Arab attire
while leading Arab
uprising against the
Ottoman (WWI)
Empire, fighting
Turkish Army.
1916-
1918
Hejaz Province
Arabia (Syria)
Lawrence
decorated.
Germany SF dressed as Polish
civilians fake raid on
customs house as
pretext for German
invasion of Poland.
1939 Germany None.
France Free French com-
mander wore indige-
nous attire in attack
on Italian fort at
Murzuk, Jan 11, 1941.
1941 Libya Killed in attack.
United Kingdom Special Operations
Executive (SOE) per-
sonnel in civilian
clothing supported
partisan operations in
Axis-controlled
Nations.
1940-
1945
Europe, Asia SOE agents cap-
tured in flagrante
delicto were incar-
cerated, not always
executed.
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Who What When Where Disposition
(if any)
Germany Danish-speaking SF
dressed as Danish
soldiers seize key
bridge to initiate
invasion.
1940 Denmark None
Germany SF dressed as Dutch
military policemen
seize key bridge at
start of German
invasion.
1940 Netherlands None
Germany SF wearing Belgian
Army overcoats over
their uniforms seize
key bridge at start of
German invasion.
1940 Belgium None
United Kingdom Long Range Desert
Group wore Arab
kaffiyeh and agal,
sometimes wore in-
digenous coats over
uniforms.
1940-
1943
Libya None. Kaffiyeh/ *
agal adopted by
LRDG as official
uniform.
Germany SF wearing Russian
Army overcoats, car-
rying Russian weap-
ons, driving Russian
vehicles, spearhead
German invasion.
1941 Russia None
Germany SF dressed in British
Army uniforms and
indigenous attire,
driving British vehi-
cles, attempt recon-
naissance to Suez.
1941 Libya None
93
Special Forces' Wear ofNon-Standard Uniforms
Who What When Where Disposition
(if any)
United Kingdom SF in German uni-
forms infiltrated
Tobruk as part of
Operation Agree-
ment. Mission exe-
cuted with
infiltration by an-
other officer in indig-
enous attire.
1942 Libya None
United Kingdom SOE-trained,
equipped and trans-
ported partisans kill
Obergruppenfuhrer
Reinhard Heydrich,
Reichsprotektor for
Nazi Governor of
Czechoslovakia.
1942 Czechoslovakia Partisan agents
commit suicide
rather than
surrender.
Soviet Union Russian partisans and 1941— German occu- Partisans captured
military operative 1945 pied territory in were executed.
groups deployed to Soviet Union. Survivors deco-
support them fought rated by Russia
in civilian clothing. postwar.
Soviet Union Naval Spetsnaz con- 1942- German-occupied Same as above.
duct operations in ci- 1945 territory in Soviet
vilian clothing, Union.
enemy uniforms.
Japan Used English-speak-
ing Germans (French
Foreign Legion) cap-
tured in Thailand in
Feb. 1941 dressed in
uniforms resembling
British Khaki to pen-
etrate British lines.
1942 Malaya None.
Germany97 Eight Germans on
sabotage mission
captured in civilian
clothing.
1942 US Tried by Military
Commission for
violation of the
law of war.
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Who What When Where Disposition
(if any)
UK/Australia Operation Jaywick,
combined SOF team
navigated to Singa-
pore in Japanese fish-
ing boat Kofuku
Maru, flying Japanese
flag and dressed in
native sarongs. At-
tacked and sank seven
ships (38,000 tons).
1943 Singapore Participants
commended.
Poland SOE-trained parti-
sans, one dressed in
SS uniform, raided
Pinsk prison near
Brest-Litovsk, freed
prisoners, killed
commandant.
1943 Poland None.
United Kingdom SOE-trained,
equipped and trans-
ported partisans sab-
otaged German heavy
water plant at
Vermok.
1943 Norway None.
Japan
98
Formed Indian Na-
tional Army from
captured Indian
Army personnel, who
fought in Indian
Army uniforms
against British and
Commonwealth
forces in Burma.
1943 Burma Post-war trials of
soldiers under India
Army Act or Indian
Penal Code rather
than charged with
war crimes.
United Kingdom LT. B.J. Barton, No. 2
Commando, pene-
trated German de-
fenses wearing
indigenous attire,
killed German
commandant.
1944 Brae (Ageaen) Awarded Military
Cross.
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Who What When Where Disposition
(if any)
United Kingdom British officers
dressed as German
soldiers, with parti-
san assistance, abduct
Major General Karl
Kreipe, Commander,
22nd Panzer Division
on Crete.
1944 Crete None.
United Kingdom SAS wore mixed dress
of British, German
and Italian uniforms,
and civilian clothing.
1944 Aegean None. One Victo-
ria Cross, numer-
ous other awards.
United Kingdom, Operation Rimau, 1944 Singapore Captured died
Australia combined SF team in
uniform to attack
Japanese ships.
from illegal medi-
cal experimenta-
tion, or were
executed.
United Kingdom Special Boat Squad-
ron(SBS) officer
dressed as priest led
successful attack on
German units.
1944 Nisiros (Aegean) None.
United Kingdom SOE-trained/
equipped partisans
sabotage and sink
ferry carrying Ger-
man heavy water.
1944 Norway None.
United States Office of Strategic
Service (OSS) teams
enter Nazi-occupied
Europe, conduct op-
erations in civilian
clothing.
1944 France, Yugosla-
via, Albania, Bul-
garia, Rumania
None.
United States US Naval Group
China wearing civil-
ian clothing collected
intelligence and exe-
cuted direct action
missions against
Japanese.
1944 China None.
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Who What When Where Disposition
(if any)
United States Army Rangers dress
as German soldiers to
penetrate and fight in
Aachen (OSS
operation).
1944 Germany None.
United States
United Kingdom/
Host nation
Jedburgh teams oper-
ate post-D-Day in
support of partisans,
not always in uniform.
1944-
1945
France, Italy, Yu-
goslavia, Albania,
Netherlands
None.
Germany German Kommando
unit dressed in US
uniforms, driving US
vehicles, penetrate
US lines in Ardennes.
1944 Belgium Members captured
in US uniforms
executed. Mission
commander, Otto
Skorzeny, and ten
others acquitted in
war crimes trial.
United Kingdom Operation Tombola
SAS operation with
Italian partisans. Ci-
vilian attire with
mixed uniform.
1945 Italy None.
Germany Partisan operations
by German SF in ci-
vilian clothing.
1944-
1945
Germany None.
United States OSS team in German
uniforms to conduct
Operation Iron Cross
to execute subversion
missions and capture
or kill senior Nazi
officials.
1945 Germany Mission aborted
by end of war.
United States OSS Operations
Groups operate in US
uniforms, indigenous
attire, Chinese Pup-
pet .Army uniforms.
1945 China None.
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Who What When Where Disposition
(if any)
Indonesia (I)" Soldiers dressed in ci-
vilian attire while at-
tacking civilian
objects.
1965 Singapore Captured and
tried under do-
mestic law.
Indonesia (II)
100
Soldiers in civilian at-
tire captured while
on mission to attack
civilian objects.
1965 Singapore Captured and
tried under do-
mestic law.
United States MACV (SOG) teams
wore non-standard
uniforms operating
in denied areas.
1965-
1971
Southeast Asia None.
United States
101
SF soldier fought in
civilian clothing in
response to Tet Of-
fensive assaults.
1968 South Vietnam Awarded Medal of
Honor.
United States
102
Navy SEAL officer
switched from uni-
form to indigenous
attire to fight way in
and out of encircled
aircrew to rescue him.
1972 South Vietnam Awarded Medal of
Honor.
Israel Operation Aviv
Neurim, IDF SF team
dressed in civilian
clothing raids PLO
Beirut targets.
1973 Lebanon Team commander
Ehud Barac even-
tually becomes
IDF Chief of Staff,
Israel Prime
Minister.
Israel Entebbe rescue force
includes commandos
dressed as Uganda
soldiers.
1976 Uganda Mission successful
in rescuing hijacked
aircrew and passen-
gers held hostage.
United States Team for rescue of
US hostages in
AMEMB Tehran
wore non-standard
uniforms approved
by Joint Chiefs of
Staff, President.
1980 Iran Mission aborted
due to helicopter
failures.
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Who What When Where Disposition
(if any)
Soviet Union, East Spetsnaz dressed in Cold NATO nations Never executed.
Germany (GDR) civilian clothing or
NATO uniforms
trained/planned to
penetrate/operate in
NATO rear, attack
high-value targets.
War
Soviet Union Spetsnaz dressed in
civilian clothing neu-
tralized senior
Afghan officers, then
secured Kabul airport
wearing Afghan
Army uniforms.
1979 Afghanistan None.
North Korea Special Forces infil- 1950- Republic of Treated as spies
trate South Korea 1988 Korea when captured.
wearing Civilian
clothing or ROK
uniforms.
Israel Sarayet Maktal wear-
ing non-standard uni-
forms carry out
successful direct action
mission to kill Abu Ji-
had, PLO military
commander, in Tunis.
1988 Sidi-bou-Said,
Tunisia
None.
Panama 7
1
Infantry Company 1989 Panama (Opera- Captured members
(Macho de Monte), tion Just Cause) treated as prisoners
Panamanian Defense ofwarbyUS.
Forces (PDF), fought
in civilian attire of
shorts, t-shirts, and
straw hats.
United States CINC's SF personal
security detail wore
civilian attire.
1990-
1991
Saudi Arabia None.
United Kingdom/ SF wore kufiyah/agal 1991 Iraq None.
United States and indigenous coats
over uniforms during
operations in Iraq.
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Notes
1. Professor Parks holds the Law of War Chair, Office of General Counsel, Department of
Defense. He is a former Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the Naval War
College. A version of this paper was published in 4 Chicago Journal of International Law 2 (Fall
2003). The views expressed herein are the personal views of the author, and may not
necessarily reflect an official position of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the
United States Government.
2. See, for example, Michelle Kelly & Morten Rostrup, Coalition soldiers in Afghanistan are
endangering aid workers, THE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 1, 2002, at 19.
3. This article offers a subtle distinction. Special Forces is limited to US Army Special Forces
assigned to Special Forces Groups or detachments, Naval Special Warfare (SEALs and Special
Boat units), and Air Force Special Tactics Units, and their coalition counterparts, while Special
Operations Forces includes Special Forces, Psychological Operations units, and Army Civil
Affairs units. There are members ofArmy Civil Affairs Units who are Special Forces soldiers. The
distinction offered in this article is one of unit assignment and mission(s).
4. The section that follows was prepared from personal interviews with Special Forces personnel
and materials provided by the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, US
Army War College, US Army Peacekeeping Institute, and the Department of State. Pertinent
documents are in the author's personal files. In particular, see US Army Peacekeeping Institute,
Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan (2003).
5. Special Forces' wear of Northern Alliance attire was undertaken at the insistence of Northern
Alliance General Abdul Rashid Dostum, commander of its 8,000-man Junbish-e-Millie, the largest
Northern Alliance army. President William J. Clinton ordered the prompt withdrawal of US forces
from Somalia following the October 3, 1993 Battle of Mogadishu in which eighteen members of
Task Force Ranger died. See MARK BOWDEN, BLACK HAWK DOWN: A STORY OF MODERN WAR
(1999). General Dostum feared US withdrawal from Afghanistan if confronted with US casualties.
Multiple Northern Alliance bodyguards were assigned to each US Special Forces soldier. In the early
days of fighting, General Dostum told some of his subordinates in Mazar-e-Sharif that he would kill
them if they allowed their US charges to be hurt or killed. Once US and coalition forces showed that
they were not casualty averse, the bodyguard standards were relaxed. SF wear of the Northern
Alliance pakol, tribal scarves, and beards prevented them from being singled out for targeting by al
Qaeda/Taliban personnel. Wearing indigenous attire also aided SF rapport with the Northern
Alliance forces it supported. Special mission unit Special Forces, whose identities are classified, also
wore beards to reduce risk of media/public identification.
The risk is not new. In 1915, serving in the Arabian Peninsula as a military adviser to Wahabi
chiefAbdul Aziz Ibn Saud, British Army Captain William H. I. Shakespear eschewed indigenous
attire. During a battle between the forces of Ibn Saud and pro-Turkish tribal leader Ibn Rashid,
Shakespear was killed by an enemy sniper when his British Army uniform singled him out and
identified him as a high-value target. See JEREMY WILSON, LAWRENCE OF ARABIA 1043 (1990).
Knowledge of the circumstances ofCaptain Shakespear's death prompted T.E. Lawrence to wear
Arab clothing as he lead the Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule that began June 5, 1916, and to
incorporate the lesson into his "Twenty-Seven Articles" (Articles 18-20) published in August
1917 as lessons learned. Id. at 1043, n.4.
Indigenous personnel over-protection of US Special Forces personnel is not new. Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) Operational Team Muskrat/Bear experienced the same phenomenon in
China in 1945. FRANCIS B. MILLS, ROBERT MILLS, & JOHN W. BRUNNER, OSS SPECIAL
OPERATIONS IN CHINA 300, 321 (2002).
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In Operation Enduring Freedom, Special Forces wear ofthe pakol was possible because ofthe
Pashtun (Taliban) versus Tajik/Uzbek (Northern Alliance) differences in attire. Special Forces
supporting Southern Alliance forces were confronted with a more difficult situation. Southern
Alliance soldiers looked and dressed exactly like the Taliban. Afghan Taliban dressed in Pashtun
attire since they were from the Pashtun tribes. Other Taliban, from Pakistan predominantly,
wore Pakistani attire.
In the south, Special Forces wear of indigenous attire and its distinguishing devices was
encouraged by Hamid Karzai, again to lower US visibility. Accordingly, these Special Forces
wore native tops over their DCU. After three days, the Special Forces abandoned the indigenous
tops for the balance of their tenure, their leader having convinced Karzai that as everyone knew
they were American, there was no reason to pretend otherwise. It also gave the soldiers better
access to their DCU pockets and load-bearing equipment.
6. Because neither Taliban/al Qaeda nor Northern or Southern Alliance forces wore a uniform,
visual friend or foe identification at a distance was a challenge. Third Battalion, Fifth Special
Forces Group, The Liberation ofMazar-e Sharif: 5
th
SF Group UW in Afghanistan, 15 SPECIAL
WARFARE 34, 36 (June 2002). However, this differs from dressing as civilians for the purpose of
using the civilian population or civilian status as a means of avoiding detection of combatant
status. From the standpoint of possible violation of the law of war, the issue is one of intent. As
indicated in the main text, use of non-standard uniform (Massoud pakol and/or scarf) by some
Special Forces personnel was to appear as members of the Northern Alliance rather than be
conspicuous as US soldiers and, as indicated in the preceding footnote, high-value targets.
7. In Are Soldiers in Civilian Clothes Protected Under Geneva-Hague? (unpublished paper, 2003) at
31, Lieutenant Colonel H. Allen Irish provided the following official rationale for the decision:
The need to reduce the potential for violence that may be directed at CJCMOTF
personnel engaged in humanitarian relief efforts in Afghanistan was the critical factor
mandating the decision [to operate in civilian clothing]. In uniform, [CJCMOTF]
personnel may be targeted since they could be confused as being engaged in offensive
combat operations instead of providing humanitarian assistance. . . . The traditional
wear of civilian clothes by unconventional forces for the purpose of humanitarian
assistance is time-proven.
This rationale is historically inaccurate and legally flawed. Civil Affairs personnel are not
unconventional forces. Civil Affairs personnel performing humanitarian assistance in
operations short of international armed conflict have been authorized to wear civilian clothing.
Civil Affairs personnel in international armed conflict have worn standard uniforms only. US
Army and Marine Corps Civic Action (Civil Affairs) personnel operating in the Republic of
Vietnam (1964-1971) wore standard field uniforms in threat circumstances similar to those
faced by Civil Affairs personnel in Afghanistan. US Army Civil Affairs operating in support of
Operation Just Cause (Panama, 1989-1990) and Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm/
Provide Comfort (1991) wore standard BDU. These operations were significantly different from
Special Forces missions in denied territory.
From a law ofwar standpoint, neither "force protection" nor a desire to distinguish soldiers
performing "offensive duties" from those engaged in humanitarian assistance constitutes
military necessity for soldiers to wear civilian attire in international armed conflict.
With respect to the force protection argument, US Army Civil Affairs doctrine in preparation
at the time of the "force protection" decision (and subsequently approved) is to the contrary. US
Army Field Manual 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Table 4-2, at 4-
40, indicates that Civil Affairs personnel in less than full Battle Dress Uniform, complete with
combat equipment, to include Kevlar load bearing vest and individual weapon, risk reduced
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force protection, while noting that wearing civilian clothing "Greatly increases the possibility of
fratricide."
8. Unlike their Special Forces counterparts, Civil Affairs personnel in indigenous attire did not
necessarily wear the Massoud pakol or scarf. Whether wearing western attire or indigenous
attire, some concealed their weapons.
9. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 10, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 301 (Adam
Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000). Article 10 provides: "The provisions of the present
convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the International
Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to
the consent ofthe Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of civilian persons
and for their relief." [Emphasis added.]
10. The NGO civilian clothing complaint was directed at Civil Affairs units and personnel only.
Speaking at a Harvard University Carr Center Symposium, Army-Navy Club, Washington,
October 18, 2002, Nicolas de Torrente, representative of the NGO Medecins sans Frontieres
(Doctors Without Borders [MSF] ), made it clear that the NGO complaint was directed only at US
Army Civil Affairs personnel operating in proximity to NGO. He emphasized that MSF offered no
objection as to the attire ofUS or Coalition Special Forces engaged in counter-terrorist operations
against Taliban/al Qaeda. [Personal knowledge of the author, who was present.]
During the question and answer period, this author offered the counterargument that NGO
personnel working in proximity to uniformed CA personnel might be at greater risk of being
targeted because of an appearance of overt support for US operations, or as collateral casualties
incidental to al Qaeda attacks on uniformed Civil Affairs personnel performing humanitarian
relief operations. Mr. Torrente acknowledged the counterargument before stating that MSF
objected to the presence of any military personnel in proximity to MSF activities.
11. Six months later the Commanding General, US Army Special Forces Command (USASFC),
issued an order re-enforcing standard uniform and grooming practices that received wide media
coverage. See, for example, Kitty Kay, Close shave for special forces, TlMESONLINE, (Sept. 13, 2002),
available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0„3463-413550,00.html; Mike Mount, Close shave
for special ops forces in Afghanistan, CNN.COM/WORLD, (Sept. 13, 2002), available at http://
www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/09/12/afghanistan.clean/; and Headquarters CJSOTF
Afghanistan Memorandum (Sept. 6, 2002), Subject: Uniform and Appearance Standards Policy-
Rescinding of Relaxed Grooming Standards. According to the Staff Judge Advocate for US Army
Special Forces Command, the commander's intent was for field commanders to review the
appropriateness of continued wear of non-standard uniforms and beards, particularly by support
personnel not engaged in combat missions. This is borne out by reports the author received from
special mission units judge advocates, who advised that bearded special mission unit personnel in
non-standard uniforms subsequently briefed the Combatant Commander (Commander,
USCENTCOM). The USASFC order was a general tightening of discipline and uniform standards
where there was no military necessity for wearing either beards or non-standard uniforms.
Special Mission unit personnel operating against al Qaeda grew beards for several reasons:
(1) a dearth of water for daily shaving; (2) for rapport with and to appear like the indigenous
personnel with whom they were serving; and (3) to prevent their identification and thus protect
them, and their families, from terrorist attacks. The latter rationale is not new. In 1918, then
Lieutenant Colonel T.E. Lawrence was publicly identified as a leader in the Arab Revolt. His
biographer explains:
As soon as these reports began to appear, the Censorship and Press Committee in
London issued a warning to editors which read: "The Press are earnestly requested not
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to publish any photograph of Lieutenant Colonel T.E. Lawrence, C.B., D.S.O. This
officer is not known by sight to the Turks, who have put a price upon his head, and any
photograph or personal description of him may endanger his safety.
WILSON, supra note 5, at 552.
In Lawrence's case and the World War II cases, identification risks were limited to the
battlefield. With ease of travel and the global threat of terrorism, the identity of special mission
personnel is classified to protect them and their families. This practice has existed for some time;
see, for example, photographs contained in PETER RATCLIFFE, NOEL BOTHAM & BRIAN
HlTCHEN, EYE OF THE STORM (2000), where the faces of current members of 22 British Special
Air Service (SAS) are obscured.
12. The section that follows (including the text of this footnote) was prepared from materials
provided by the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, US Army War
College, US Army Peacekeeping Institute, the Department of State, and AHMED RASHID,
TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL AND FUNDAMENTALISM (2001).
Arguments with respect to the Taliban militia (as they called themselves) depend only so
slightly on who and when. The Taliban was a loose amalgamation ofoccasional and disparate tribal
and other factions. It was a faction engaged in a civil war in a failed State that owed much of its
strength and origin to the Pakistani Intelligence Service. It exercised none ofthe usual activities ofa
government, other than the negative one of closing down all schools. The Taliban militia never
claimed to be the Afghanistan government or armed forces. The Taliban had no uniformed armed
forces. The Taliban was structured around tribes rather than as a military unit, recruiting the
allegiance of other tribes or personnel from other tribes and private citizens through temporary
alliances, defections, bribery, and conscription, while also relying on foreign volunteers.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the break-up of Yugoslavia, the international test
has been whether an entity is permitted to sit behind the nameplate in the United Nations (and
in other international fora) rather than the previous test of whether it controls population,
territory, etc. The Taliban was never permitted to represent Afghanistan at the United Nations or
in other international fora.
The UN Security Council never recognized the Taliban as the representative ofAfghanistan.
In a number ofUN Security Council resolutions issued against the Taliban, there was discussion
as to whether a binding resolution could be issued against a non-State entity. These Security
Council resolutions included 1189 (1999), 1267 (1999) and 1363 (2001). Security Council
resolution 1 1 89 referred to "the continuing use ofAfghan territory, especially areas controlled by
the Taliban;" hence the Security Council distinguished between the Taliban and Afghanistan.
Prior to September 1, 2001, the Taliban was recognized only by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and
the United Arab Emirates. All three withdrew their recognition following the terrorist attack.
Stated another way, 98.5% of governments, including the United States, did not recognize the
Taliban as the government ofAfghanistan prior to the September 11, 2001, al Qaeda attack. Nor
was it recognized by the League ofIslamic Nations, nor by Switzerland (depositary ofthe Geneva
Conventions). The Taliban was not invited to the 1999 Conference of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies as the Afghanistan representative. Had it been invited, it is likely the US and
other governments would have prevented it from occupying the Afghanistan delegation seat, as
was the case with respect to the FRY in Yugoslavia. By the time coalition operations began in
Afghanistan, no government recognized the Taliban as the Government of Afghanistan.
Once US and allied operations began in Afghanistan in October 2001, al Qaeda assumed
command of most Taliban militia units. As the battle continued, most Taliban withdrew to their
normal areas of Afghanistan, leaving the fighting to al Qaeda and foreign members of the Taliban.
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Any perception of the Taliban as any sort of a national government dissolved following Taliban
abandonment of Kabul (November 12, 2001 ) and US capture ofKandahar (December 10, 2001).
A leading authority, in discussing guerrillas, summed up the Taliban militia and al Qaeda status:
The law of nations, apart from the Hague Regulations . . . denies belligerent qualifications
to guerrilla bands. Such forces wage a warfare which is irregular in point of origin and
authority, of discipline, ofpurpose and procedure. They may be constituted at the beck of
a single individual; they lack uniforms; they are given to pillage and destruction; they take
few prisoners and are hence disposed to show slight quarter.
Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the
United States 1797 (2d ed. 1951).
13. See, e.g., the President's Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War on Terrorism, § 1 (a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (2001 ), also available at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200 1/1 1/2001 1 1 13-27.html ("Military Order").
14. Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, Feb. 7, 2002, available at http://www,whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/02/20020207-6.html; Katherine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules
Fit Taliban Captives, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al. The issues are summarized in John
C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
207 (2003).
15. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 9, at 244.
16. DOD Directive 5100.77 (Dec. 9, 1998), Subj: DOD Law of War Program, para. 5.3.1; CJCSI
58 10.01A (Aug. 27, 1999), Subject: Implementation of the DOD Law ofWar Program, para. 5a. For
this reason, the decision was announced that the United States would apply the law ofwar applicable
in international armed conflict to non-State actors in Operation Enduring Freedom. See excerpts
from interview with Charles Men, Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs, US
Department of Defense, Dec. 16, 2002, Crimes ofWar Project, available at. http://www.crimesofwar
.org/onnews/news-pentagon-trans.html. This announcement was greeted with astonishment by
some international law experts. See, for example, Marco Sassoli, Query: Is There a Status of"Unlawful
Combatant"?, which is ChapterV in this volume, at 57. Comments similar to Professor Sassoli's were
offered privately to the author by his foreign military counterparts. As will be indicated, the intention
was to use the law ofwar applicable in international armed conflicts as a template for US conduct in
Operation Enduring Freedom.
17. Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law: Challenges for the UN Security Council
and the USA, US Institute of Peace, Mar. 1, 2001. [Personal knowledge of the author, who was
present.]
18. Supra note 15.
19. Id. at 245-46.
20. Historically, regular military force entitlement to prisoner of war status was absolute and
unqualified. Article 49 of US General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field (1863) (the Lieber Code), states: "All soldiers, of
whatever species ofarms ... all disabled men or officers on the field or elsewhere, if captured . .
.
are prisoners of war, and as such exposed to the inconveniences as well as entitled to the
privileges of a prisoner ofwar." Reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT: A COLLECTION OF
Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents l (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman
eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT]. Similarly, COMMENTARY ON
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12,
1 949 46-47 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1 960) states: "Once one is accorded the status of belligerent, one is
bound by the obligations of the laws of war, and entitled to the rights which they confer. The
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most important ofthese is the right, following capture, to be recognized as a prisoner ofwar, and
to be treated accordingly."
Entitlement to prisoner ofwar status for members of the armed forces existed without pre-
condition in treaty law. Article 1 to the Annex to Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs ofWar on Land, The Hague, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539, 1 Bevans 631, also
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 9, at 73, and Article 4(A) 1, GPW,
supra note 15. WILLIAM E. S. FLORY, PRISONERS OFWAR 27-28 (1942) states: "Persons serving in
the regular army, navy and air force of a belligerent state have rights as prisoners of war when
they fall into the hands of the enemy. This rule is part of customary international law as well as
treaty law."
Similarly, G.I.A.D. Draper, The PresentLaw as to Combatancy, in REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND
Armed Conflicts: The Selected Works on the Laws of War by the Late Professor
COLONEL G.I.A.D. DRAPER, OBE 197 (Michael A. Meyer & Hillairie McCoubrey eds., 1998),
comments:
Article 1 of the Hague Regulations, and its four express and two implicit stringent
conditions for volunteer and militia corps, represented a triumph for the "military"
faction at the Hague Peace Conference. Those four express conditions: (i) a
commander responsible for his subordinates; (ii) distinctive sign; (hi) open carrying of
arms and (iv) compliance with the Laws ofWar in their operations, enable an extension
of the class of the privileged belligerent by way of identification to the normal features
ofmilitary armed forces. This identification is not absolute. Members ofthe armedforces
who persistently violate the Law of War do not lose their POW status upon capture. The
effect of Articles 4, 5 and 85 of the Geneva (POW) Convention, 1949, makes this clear
[emphasis provided].
Denial to regular forces (including special operations forces) ofprisoner ofwar status and the
protections of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, July 27,
1929, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra, at 421, predecessor to the current
GPW, were held to be war crimes by post-World War II tribunals, including in cases where
British and American military personnel were summarily executed. On October 18, 1942, in
response to British special forces missions, Adolf Hitler issued his Fuhrerbefehl ("Commando
Order"), which declared that Allied special forces, even if uniformed members of the armed
forces, were to be "slaughtered to the last man" (that is, denied quarter, in violation of Article
23(d), Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV) or, if captured, denied prisoner of war status
and summarily executed. The "Commando Order" was declared a war crime at Nuremberg.
International Military Tribunal, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Opinion and Judgment 58
(1947). Its implementation resulted in war crimes convictions by US military tribunals (In re
Dostler, 1 Law Reports of Trial ofWar Criminals, 22-34 (HMSO, 1945), and by British military
courts (In re Falkenhorst, VI War Crimes Reports (HMSO, 1946), and Trial of Karl Buck and
Ten Others, 5 Law Reports of Trials ofWar Criminals, 39-44 (HMSO, 1946).
In the Dostler case, two officers and thirteen enlisted men from Unit A, l bt Contingent (OSS
Operational Group, Italy) were captured March 22, 1944, and executed under the orders from
Major General Dostler, even though they had been captured in uniform. Dostler was tried,
convicted and executed by firing squad following World War II; In re Dostler, and photographic
evidence in author's possession. Other OSS Operational Groups sewed Seventh USA Army
patches on their left shoulder to conceal their OSS identity. Ian Sutherland, The OSS Operational
Groups: Origin ofArmy Special Forces, 3 SPECIAL WARFARE 2, 3 (June 2002).
21. Yoo & Ho, supra note 14, argue that the four criteria contained in Article 4A(2), GPW, are
prerequisites to prisoner ofwar status for regular force combatants. That view is not consistent
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with Articles 5, 85 and 93, GPW or the negotiating history of the four criteria; see, for example,
Draper, supra note 20, at 29; and Jifi Toman, The Status ofAl Qaeda/Taliban Detainees Under the
Geneva t bnventions, 32 Israeli Yearbook on Human Rights 271 283, 285 (2002).
22. An element of inconsistency with customary and treaty law evolved within the United States
during World War II as a result of dicta in the opinion by the United States Supreme Court in Ex
parte Quirin, 317 US 1 (1947), involving the trial of eight Nazi saboteurs captured in civilian
clothing in the United States. Changes in treaty law and US practice since Quirin for the most
part have returned US interpretation to the pre-Quirin position, albeit muddied by the
experience and two subsequent Singapore cases that followed Quirin.
Quirin is lacking with respect to some of its law of war scholarship. Review of the Court's
citation of paragraphs of War Department, Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare (War
Department, 1914 and 1940) suggests that the Court apparently confused provisions relating to
civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, who would be unprivileged belligerents, and those
related to actions by military personnel, who remain entitled to prisoner ofwar status. The Court
correctly stated, citing paragraphs 83 and 84 of US Army General Orders No. 100 (1863), that
soldiers "disguised in the dress of the country . . . if found lurking about the lines of the captor,
are treated as spies, and suffer death." This provision is consistent with Article 29 of the Annex to
Hague Convention IV. However, the Court failed to note paragraph 203 of Field Manual 27-10,
Rules of Land Warfare (1940), which states that spies are not punished as "violators of the law of
war." Rather, the Court erred in stating "the absence ofuniform . . . renders the offender liable to
trial for violation of the laws (sic.) of war." The statement has no basis in the law of war. It is
contrary to Article 31 of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV (a treaty to which the
United States was a party during World War II), which states that "A spy who, after rejoining the
army to which he belongs, is subsequently captured by the enemy, is treated as a prisoner ofwar,
and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts of espionage." Were absence of uniform a
violation of the law ofwar, criminal liability would remain even after a soldier returned safely to
his own lines. Similarly, a commander who orders military personnel to carry out a mission in
civilian clothing would incur no criminal liability for his order. JAMES MALONEY SPAIGHT, AIR
Power and War Rights 287 (1924).
For a summary of the German operation, trial of the saboteurs, and critical analysis of Quirin,
see LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL (2003).
Two cases from Singapore follow the reasoning of Quirin. The facts of each are similar. In
peacetime, Indonesian Marines in civilian clothing entered Singapore on sabotage missions. The
courts determined that while entitled to prisoner of war status under Article 4A(1), GPW, a
dubious finding in and of itself, that entitlement was forfeited when the soldiers executed their
missions in civilian clothing. In both cases the defendants were charged with domestic law
violations rather than violation of the law of war. Stanislaus Krofan & Another v. Public
Prosecutor, Federal Court ofCriminal Appeal, 1966, 1 Malayan Law Journal (1967), and Osman
bin Haji Mohamed Ali and Another v. Public Prosecutor, Privy Council, 1968, 1 A.C. 430.
23. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection ofVictims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), 1 125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 9, at 422..
24. See, for example, Trial of Lieutenant General Shigeru Sawada and Three Others, V LRTWC 1
(HMSO, 1948) (denial of prisoner of war status to and execution of eight US Army Air Corps
personnel); and In re Dostler, supra note 20.
US military personnel captured in uniform during the Vietnam war were illegally denied
prisoner of war status by their captors and routinely tortured. GUENTHER LEWY, AMERICA IN
VIETNAM 332-34 (1978); Howard S. Levie, Maltreatment ofPrisoners ofWar in Vietnam, in THE
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VietnamWar and International Law (Vol. 2) 361, 382, (Richard A. Falk ed., 1969); Stuart
Rochester & Frederick Kiley, Honor Bound: The History of American Prisoners of
War in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973, at 188-194, 199-207 (1998); and Vernon E. Davis, The
Long Road Home: US Prisoner of War Policy and Planning in Southeast Asia 5, 64-84
(2000). Three representative personal accounts detailing the torture and other violations of the
GPW are ROBINSON RlSNER, THE PASSING OF THE NIGHT (1973); JEREMIAH A. DENTON, WHEN
Hell Was in Session (1976); and George E. Day, Return with Honor (1989).
US and coalition prisoners of war captured by Iraq during the 1991 war to liberate Kuwait
were not provided prisoner of war treatment, and were routinely tortured. US Department of
Defense, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian GulfWar 619-620 (1992); Secretary
of the Army, Report on Iraqi War Crimes (Desert Shield/Desert Storm), (1993); United Nations
Security Council S/25441 (Mar. 12, 1993).
25. M. R. D. FOOT, SOE IN FRANCE 20 (1966).
26. For example, US War Department Field Manual 27-10, Rules ofLand Warfare (1940), at
4, states: "The enemy population is divided in war into two general classes, known as the armed
forces and the peaceful population. Both classes have distinct rights, duties, and disabilities, and
no person can belong to both classes at one and the same time."
See also The War Office [United Kingdom], Manual ofMilitary Law, 7 (War Office, 1929):
The division of the enemy population into two classes, the armed forces and the
peaceful population, has already been mentioned. It is one of the purposes of the law of
war to ensure that an individual must definitely choose to belong to one class or the
other, and shall not be permitted to enjoy the privileges of both. . .
.
Similarly, see War Office, The Law ofWar on Land, being Part III of the Manual of Military
Law, 30, paragraph 86 (War Office, 1958), which is the current British law of war manual.
"Belligerent" is the classical term. More recently "belligerents" have been referred to as
"combatants," as medical personnel and chaplains are part of the belligerent forces but are non-
combatants.
27. The levee en masse which, as defined in Article 2, Annex to Hague Convention IV (1907),
supra note 20, is "the inhabitants ofa territory not under occupation who, on the approach ofthe
enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to
organize themselves." Treaty recognition of the levee en masse constituted a first step in
relaxation of the principle of distinction.
28. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed., Vol. II) 206 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1952).
29. James Maloney Spaight, War Rights on Land 37 ( 19 1 1).
30. Frits Kalshoven, The Law of Warfare 3 1 ( 1973).
31. Article 23, paragraph (b) of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 20,
states that it is prohibited "to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile
nation or army.
"
32. Article 24, 1907 Hague Convention IV, id., states: "Ruses of war and the employment of
measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the country are considered
permissible." See also Paragraph 51, US Army Field Manual 27-10, at 101-102 (1956), The Law
ofWar on Land.
33. Where soldiers in international armed conflict lacked proper uniforms through no fault of
their own, they were expected to wear a distinctive emblem to distinguish themselves from the
civilian population. OPPENHEIM, supra note 28, at 429-430.
34. The negotiating record exception is discussed infra. Two treaty exceptions exist. Article 93,
GPW, supra note 15, states in part:
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[Ojffenses committed by prisoners of war with the sole intention of facilitating escape
and which do not entail any violence against life or limb, such as offenses against public
property, theft without intention of self-enrichment, the drawing up or use of false
papers, the wearing ofcivilian clothing, shall occasion disciplinary punishment only
[Emphasis added].
35. Richard R. Baxter, The Juridical Basis of the Distinction between Lawful Combatant and
Unprivileged Belligerent 47-51 (1959) (unpublished thesis, The Judge Advocate General's
School, US Army).
GPW, Article 4A(2) constituted acknowledgement of the legitimacy ofWorld War II partisan
warfare in its amendment of previous treaty categories to "Members of other militias and
members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements. . . ."
[Emphasis added.] This was a further relaxation of the principle of distinction. See
COMMENTARY , supra note 20, at 52-61.
36. US Department ofWar Manual, Rules of Land Warfare (1914, Corrected to April 15, 1917),
paragraph 22, states: " The distinctive sign.—This requirement will be satisfied by the wearing of a
uniform or even less than a complete uniform." See also ALLAN ROSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF
Prisoners of War: A Study in International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed
Conflict 349 (1976).
37. ROSAS, supra note 36, at 349. ("[T]he concept of uniforms has never been explicitly defined
in international law.")
38. COMMENTARY, supra note 20, at 52. SPAIGHT, supra note 29, at 57, emphasizes "The
'distinctive device' does not mean a uniform."
39. Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 468 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987). The ICRC Commentary
does not reflect the complexity of the discussions within the Working Group. As three Diplomatic
Conference participants indicate in their separate commentary, the Working Group experienced
considerable difficulty with the practical details of this issue. See MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL PARTSCH
& Waldemar Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts 205-206 (1982).
40. Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict 49 (1977)
(Vol. 59, US Naval War College International Law Studies). SPAIGHT, supra note 29, at 57,
argued that the distinctive device "must be fixed—externally, so as not to be assumed or
concealed at will." This is not consistent with prior or subsequent practice. The original view
regarding a distinctive device was expressed by Francis Lieber in his "Guerrilla Parties
Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War." In it he noted "Nor would it be
difficult to adopt something of a badge, easilyput on and off, and to call it a uniform". RICHARD S.
HARTIGAN, LlEBER'S CODE & THE LAW OF WAR 40 (1983). [Emphasis added.]
41
.
SPAIGHT, supra note 29, commented at 57:
At what distance should the sign be recognizable? The German authorities demanded
in 1870 that French irregulars should be distinguishable at rifle range. This, says an
eminent English jurist, is "to ask not only for a complete uniform but for a conspicuous
one," [citing WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 523 (5th ed. 1904)].
When rifles are sighted to 2,000 yards and over, the German requirement is clearly
unreasonable. If the sign is recognizable at a distance at which the naked eye can
distinguish the form and color of a person's dress, all reasonable requirements appear
to be met.
At the commencement of the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian Government addressed
a note to Tokio (sic), stating that Russia had approved the formation of certain free
corps composed of Russian subjects in the seat of war, and that these corps would wear
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no uniform but only a distinctive sign on the cap or sleeve. Japan replied: "The Japanese
Government cannot consider as belligerents the free corps mentioned in the Russian
Note, unless they can be distinguishable by the naked eye from ordinary people or fulfill
the conditions required for militia or volunteers by the Hague Reglement." [Emphasis
in SPAIGHT] . Similarly, US War Department Manual, Rules of Land Warfare, supra
note 36, followed the Japanese Government's test:
The distinctive sign.—This requirement will be satisfied by the wearing of a uniform, or
even less than a complete uniform. The distance that the sign must be visible is left
vague and undetermined and the practice is not uniform. This requirement will be
satisfied certainly ifthe sign is "easily distinguishable by the naked eye ofordinary people"
at a distance at which the form ofthe individual can be determined. [Emphasis added.]
HYDE, supra note 12, at 1793, cites this provision as authority.
The term "unenhanced vision" is utilized in Article 1 of the Additional Protocol on Blinding
Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 12, 1995, Doc. CCW/CONF.I/7 (1995), 35 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATTERS 1218. It means normal vision without enhancements, such as binoculars, or vision
corrected to 20/20. For its negotiating history, see Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office
ofThe Judge Advocate General, DAJA-IO Memorandum ofLaw (Dec. 20, 1996), Subject: Travaux
Preparatoires and Legal Analysis of Blinding Laser Weapons Protocol. The memorandum, at 8,
notes the intent of its drafters:
Unenhanced vision means "the naked eye or . . . the eye with corrective eyesight devices,"
such as glasses or contact lens. It does not mean binoculars, a telescopic sight, night-vision
goggles or similar devices used to increase visual capability above that required by an
ordinary person to perform routine tasks, such as reading or driving an automobile.
42. As noted at the text accompanying note 99, infra, British Special Forces in North Africa in
World War II, and British and US Special Forces operating behind enemy lines in Iraq during the
1990-1991 war to liberate Kuwait, frequently wore indigenous overcoats over their BDUs to
counter one of the coldest winters on record, but also as a ruse to reduce immediate, positive
identification at a distance by Iraqi military units.
43. Treaty negotiation records suggest participants did not rely upon "carrying arms openly"
for regular forces. This is one ofthe four prerequisites for militias or partisans seeking combatant
and prisoner ofwar status. The phrase "carrying arms only" has itself been plagued with lack of
agreement as to its meaning. See, for example, W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32
AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 1, 84 (1990) (the debate with regard to Article 44(3), Additional
Protocol I). It also was of limited to no value in Afghanistan, as most Afghan civilians carry
military weapons. Similarly, following cessation of formal combat operations in Iraq (May 1,
2003), private Iraqi citizens were permitted to retain Kalashnikov AK-47 or AK-74 select fire
weapons in their homes for personal protection. Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number
3 (May 23, 2003). [Copy in author's personal files.]
44. As summarized in this memorandum, there is substantial State practice of Special Forces
wear of civilian clothing or non-standard uniforms. As an example of the fourth category, the
personal security detail for Commander in Chief, US Central Command [Combatant
Commander] , during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm ( 1990-9 1 ) , wore civilian attire
on the basis that VIP protection from terrorist attack is not a traditional military mission.
(Attack by conventional Iraqi forces was not regarded as a viable threat.) The personal security
detail worked in close proximity to the Combatant Commander, who wore standard BDU. The
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personal security detail in turn was surrounded by an outer perimeter of uniformed Saudi
soldiers. The civilian attire of the personal security detail was dictated in large measure by host
nation concerns. Their immediate proximity to the commander and uniformed Saudi military,
and their physical separation from the civilian population was consistent with the principle of
distinction. No reasonable case could be made that their actions were tantamount to perfidy.
[Personal knowledge of author and photograph in author's files.]
45. Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. Convened by the Swiss Government in 1974,
the Conference formally adopted Additional Protocols I and II on June 8, 1977.
46. On January 28, 1987, President Ronald Reagan informed the United States Senate that
Additional Protocol I would not be submitted for Senate advice and consent to ratification.
Message of the President of the United States Transmitting the Protocol II Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Noninternational Armed Conflicts, Concluded at Geneva on June 10, 1977, 100 lh Congress, 1 st
Session (1987); 26 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 561 (1987).
47. US Department of State, 3 Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in International Law,
1981-1988, at 3434-3435. See also DOD Law ofWar Working Group, Memorandum for Assistant
Counsel (International), OSD (May 9, 1986), Subject: 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva
Conventions; Customary International Law Application. See also Michael J. Matheson, The United
States Position on the Relation ofCustomary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the
1949 Geneva Conventions" 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLICY 419 (1987), based upon a speech Mr. Matheson made at an American University workshop.
Mr. Matheson's statements with regard to the provisions of Additional Protocol I regarded by the
United States as customary law are based upon the DOD Law of War Working Group
memorandum, cited above. Thereafter he expresses his personal opinion that other provisions
"should be observed and in due course [may be] recognized as customary law, even if they have not
already achieved that status and their relationship to the provisions of Protocol I." Id. at 422.
48. BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 39, at 256-257. The new rules set forth in Article 44,
paragraph 3, were among those found unacceptable to the United States in taking its decision
against ratification. Paragraph 3 provides:
In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of
hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian civilian
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to
an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where,
owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish
himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he
carries his arms openly:
(a) during each military engagement, and
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military
deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate.
Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be considered as
perfidious. . .
.
49. ROSAS, supra note 36, at 333. Continuing, the author notes:
[T]his provision does not seem to imply that all members of regular forces have to wear
uniforms in all situations in order to benefit from prisoner-of-war status. On the other
hand it serves as a reminder that the uniform continues to be the normal way for regular
combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian population. [Emphasis added.]
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The footnote in support thereof states:
In the 1976 report of Committee III [of the Diplomatic Conference] it is stated that
"regulars who are assigned to tasks where they must wear civilian clothes, as may be the
case, for example, with advisers assigned to certain resistance units, are not required to
wear the uniform when on such assignments." CDDH/236/Rev. 1, at 29.
See also, PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL I TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
(Vol. 2) 475 (Howard S. Levie ed., 1980).
50. The uniform requirement has not been codified for military operations short of
international armed conflict.
51. Article 24, Annex to the 1907 Hague IV Convention, supra note 20; SPAIGHT, supra note
29, at 152-156; OPPENHEIM, supra note 28, at 428; War Office Manual, Part III, supra note 26,
at 101.
52. Article 23(b), Annex to the 1907 Hague IV Convention, supra note 20.
53. The distinction between a ruse and perfidy is offered as "whenever a belligerent has
expressly or tacitly engaged, and is therefore bound by a moral obligation, to speak the truth to
an enemy, it is perfidy to betray his confidence, because it constitutes a breach of good faith."
OPPENHEIM, supra note 28, at 420; see also FM 27-10 (1956), supra note 32, ff 49-55.
54. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex:
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, July 29, 1899,
reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 20, at 60-82.
55. Supra note 23.
56. BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 39, at 203-04. As neither Afghanistan nor the United
States is a State party to Additional Protocol I, the United States is bound by this article only to
the extent that it codifies customary law.
57. Additional Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 85, f 3(f).
58. This approach, taken by the United States in Vietnam, was praised by the International
Committee of the Red Cross; see GEORGE S. PRUGH, Law AT WAR: VIETNAM 1964-1973, at
66-67(1975).
This legal approach is not new. During the American Civil War (1861-1865) and the
Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), rebel soldiers captured wearing either enemy uniforms or
civilian clothing were treated as prisoners of war and not prosecuted unless their actions
involved treachery. See, for example, SPAIGHT, supra note 29, at 105-109. Boer commandos'
wearing of portions of British uniforms produced one of the more sensational historic
examples. In 1902 three Australian officers serving with the Bushveldt Carbineers were tried by
British court-martial for murder of captured Boers and murder of a civilian. Their plea with
regard to the murder of the captured Boers was one of superior orders on the basis that Lord
Kitchener had ordered the execution of Boers wearing "British khaki." The prosecution
argued that Boer punishment was authorized only if the captured Boers had worn British
khaki with intent to deceive. Convicted, two of the three—Captain Harry "Breaker" Morant
and Lieutenant Peter Handcock—were executed by British firing squad, resulting in a
controversy between Great Britain and Australia that remains to this day; see, for example,
Nick Bleszynski, Shoot Straight, You Bastards! (2002). (This title is based upon
Morant's last words.) The incident was the basis for the 1979 Australian movie Breaker Morant
starring Edward Woodward and Bryan Brown. Its screenplay was based upon KIT DENTON,
THE BREAKER (1973). Subsequently, Denton authored the non-fiction CLOSED FILE: THE
True Story behind the Execution of Breaker Morant and Peter Handcock (1983),
less sympathetic to Morant than THE BREAKER. Comprehensive, authoritative accounts are
contained in BREAKER MORANT AND THE BUSHVELDT CARBINEERS (Arthur Davey ed., 1987)
111
Special Forces* Wear ofNon-Standard Uniforms
and William woolmore, The Bushveldt Carbineers and the Pietersburg Light
Horse (2000).
59. Toman, supra note 21, at 287.
60. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of The Judge Advocate General, DAJA-IA
Memorandum 1985/7026 (23 Sept. 1985), Subject: Use of Expanding Ammunition by US
Military Forces in Counterterrorist Incidents. Hollow point or expanding small arms
ammunition is prohibited in international armed conflict by Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning
Expanding Bullets, The Hague, July 29, 1899, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,
supra note 9, at 64. The United States is not a State party to this treaty, but has taken the position
that it will adhere to its terms in its military operations in international armed conflict to the
extent that its application is consistent with the object and purpose of article 23(e) of the Annex
to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 20, which prohibits employment of "arms,
projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." See, for example,
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of The Judge Advocate General, DAJA-IO
Memorandum (May 19, 2000), Subject: 5.56mm, 77-grain Sierra MatchKing™ Bullet; Legal
Review.
6 1
.
For example, German counterterrorist Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG-9) and British Special Air
Service soldiers wore civilian clothing in the October 18, 1977 hostage rescue of Lufthansa Flight
181 in Mogadishu, Somalia; BARRY DAVIES, FIRE MAGIC (1994), photographs between 82-83;
Rolf Tophoven, GSG9: The German Response to Terrorism 66-73 (1985). The SAS wore
non-standard, fireproof uniforms during its hostage rescue operation in the Iranian Embassy at
Princes Gate in London on May 6, 1980; MICHAEL PAUL KENNEDY, SOLDIER T SAS (1989),
which contains photographs between pages 1 16-117; and SIR PETER DE LA BlLLIERE, LOOKING
FOR TROUBLE 319-337 (1994) and photographs between 296-97. Other examples are provided
in the State practice section of this paper, infra.
62. As the United States Supreme Court stated in The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900):
"International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice. . . [W]here there is no treaty and no controlling . . . judicial decision, resort must be had
to the customs and usages of civilized nations. . . ."
63. In an experience similar to that of US Special Forces in Afghanistan eighty-five years later,
Lawrence donned indigenous attire at the request of the Arab forces he joined, in part because
the only soldiers many Arabs had seen wearing khaki were Turkish, the enemy. Mindful of the
death of Captain William Shakespear the previous year because he wore his British uniform,
Lawrence obliged his hosts. WILSON, supra note 5, at 334-335.
As noted by James Maloney Spaight, Colonel Lawrence was not alone in wearing civilian
clothing on combat missions during World War I. SPAIGHT, supra note 29, at 273-74.
64. M. R. D. Foot, The IRA and the Origins ofSOE, in WAR AND SOCIETY, HISTORICAL ESSAYS IN
HONOUR AND Memory OF J. R. WESTERN, 1928-1971, at 57-69 (1973); M. R. D. FOOT,
RESISTANCE: EUROPEAN RESISTANCE TO NAZISM 1940-45, at 7 (1977).
65. These two publications were distributed free in the hundreds of thousands throughout
Europe and Southeast Asia during World War II, either in English or in translated form in
Burmese, Chinese, Czech, Danish, Dutch, French, German, Greek, Italian, Malay, Norwegian,
Polish, Serbo-Croat, Slovak, Slovene, and Thai. M. R. D. FOOT, SOE: THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Executive 14(1984).
The association of British thinking with Lawrence's success, the Anglo-Boer War, the Irish
War, and the Sino-Japanese War is acknowledged in J0RGEN FLESTRUP, EUROPE ABLAZE 38-39
(1978); FOOT, SOE IN FRANCE, supra note 25, at 2-4; FOOT, SOE: THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Executive, supra this note, at 1 1-15; David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance,
112
W. Hays Parks
1940-1945, at 19, 21 (1980); PETER WILKINSON & JOAN BRIGHT ASHLEY, GUBBINS & SOE 34, 36
(1993); W. J. M. MACKENZIE, THE SECRET HISTORY OF SOE: THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS
EXECUTIVE, 1940-1945, at 10, 38-39 (2000). The Mackenzie volume, the official "in-house"
history of the British Special Operations Executive, was compiled in the late 1940s. It remained
classified until 1998, and reached open publication in redacted form in 2000.
66. ELESTRUP, supra note 65, at 36, 76, 198. The "Geneva Conventions" were referred to as a
general reference to the law ofwar. Churchill's reference to the "Geneva Convention" otherwise
would have been to the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar, Geneva, July
27, 1929, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLCITS, supra note 20, at 421. Article 1 thereof
incorporated by reference Article 1 ofthe Annex to the 1907 Hague IV, supra note 20, to establish
criteria for prisoner ofwar status.
67. India Office Records L/WS/ 1/1296, as cited in CHARLES CRUICKSHANK, SOE OPERATIONS
IN THE FAR EAST 249 (1983).
68. STAFFORD, supra note 65, at 68.
69. Presidential Military Order (June 13, 1942), Subject: Office of Strategic Services; and JCS 67
(June 21, 1942), Subject: Office of Strategic Services. The latter stated in part that "Under direction of
the Joint US Chiefs of Staff . . . [OSS will] prepare plans for and . . . execute subversive activities." See
also R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence
Agency (1972); Edward Hymoff, The OSS in World War II (1972); Richard Dunlop,
Behind Japanese Lines: With the OSS in Burma (1979); William Casey, The Secret War
Against Hitler (1988); Roger Hilsman, American Guerrilla (1990); Tom Moon, This Grim
and Savage Game (1991); Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and
Tito's Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia (1993); Mills, Mills & Brunner, supra note 5; and
Dan Pinck, Journey to Peking: A Secret Agent inWartime China (2003).
70. Colonel Aaron Bank, in a paper done at The Presidio in 1986 entitled From OSS to Green
Beret [on file with author] , traces the OSS to US Army Special Forces lineage, as does ALFRED H.
Paddock, Jr., US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Rev. ed., 2002); and Ian Sutherland,
The OSS Operational Groups: Origin ofArmy Special Forces, 25 SPECIAL WARFARE 2,3 (Summer
2002). As indicated in the main text, the OSS also was a forerunner of the Central Intelligence
Agency. See THOMAS F. TROY, DONOVAN AND THE CIA (1981) and RICHARD DUNLOP,
Donovan: America's Master Spy (1982).
71. SOE/Special Operations (SO) became Special Forces Headquarters on May 1, 1944. British
SOE and US OSS components in the United Kingdom were amalgamated into the Special Projects
Operation Center (SPOC) on May 23, 1944. FOOT, SOE IN FRANCE, supra note 25, at 32.
72. PADDOCK, supra note 70, at 28.
73. This nationality mix became more the exception more than the rule. Of the 101 Jedburgh
teams deployed to France, only ten were so composed. Sutherland, supra note 20, at 13, n.ll;
Arthur Layton Funk, Hidden Ally: The French Resistance, Special Operations, and
the landings in southern france, 1944, at 141, 145 (1992).
74. robert mattingly, herringbone cloak-gi dagger: marines in the oss 140 (1989).
Another Marine, Captain Peter J. Ortiz, followed the SOE practice of parachuting in civilian
clothes, but carried his Marine Corps uniform. In a touch of bravado, he frequently wore it in
populated areas, thereby alerting the Germans and forcing his team to remain on the move. FOOT,
SOE IN FRANCE, supra note 25, at 357. On one occasion Captain Ortiz entered a cafe dressed in a
long (civilian) cape. Hearing a German soldier denigrate Americans, Ortiz drew his weapons—two
.45 pistols—then threw back his cape to reveal his Marine uniform before opening fire on the
Germans. MATTINGLY, supra at 116. For his OSS service, Captain Ortiz was awarded two Navy
Crosses, a Legion of Merit, made a member of the Order of the British Empire, and received the
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French Croix de Guerre. Captain Peter ). Ortiz, 18 FORTITUDINE 14 (Marine Corps History and
Museums Division Historical Bulletin), XVIII, 2 (Fall 1988); Benis Frank, "Colonel Peter Julien
Ortiz, US Marine," unpublished manuscript. [On file with author.]
75. Mills, Mills & Brunner, supra note 5, at 9; Milton E. Miles, A Different Kind of War
274,371 (1967);PlNCK,swpranote69,at 134; Dale Andrade, EveryMan a Tiger, NAVAL HISTORY
(VII, 6, Nov./Dec. 1994), at 16-21.
76. The French, Dutch, Belgian and Norwegian governments-in-exile expressed concern
over collateral civilian damage and injuries resulting from Allied air attacks. HENRI MICHEL,
The Shadow War: European Resistance, 1939-1945, at 212, 216-217 (1972). As it's
author notes, "The Allies undoubtedly committed a major error in disregarding such
appeals and in persisting to bomb Europe—including their friends in the Resistance." Id., at
2 1 7. Sabotage vis-a-vis air attacks did reduce civilian casualties. An example is the successful
SOE attack on the SCNF (French national railways) locomotive works at Fives, described as
one of the largest and most important in France, on June 27, 1943. The factory was in a
heavily populated area, and bombing would have caused many collateral civilian casualties.
Dressed as gendarmerie with the raid leader disguised as Gestapo, the factory was attacked
successfully with no loss of life. FOOT, SOE IN FRANCE, supra note 25, at 266. Another
example—the Peugeot factory at Sochaux near Montbeliard, which manufactured tank
turrets—was taken out of action by an SOE-delivered satchel charge after an earlier Royal
Air Force attack missed the target and resulted in heavy civilian casualties nearby. FOOT,
SOE: The Special Operations Executive, supra note 65, at 219-220. For a list of key SOE
industrial sabotage, see FOOT, SOE IN FRANCE, supra note 25, at 505-5 1 7. Benjamin F. Jones,
The Moon is Down: The Jedburghs and Support for the French Resistance, 40 (1999)
(unpublished MA thesis, University of Nebraska), describes the Resistance process for
infiltrating and attacking these targets. [Copy in author's files.] FOOT, SOE: THE SPECIAL
OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE, supra note 65, at 505, notes that the industrial sabotage listed was
accomplished with a total of approximately 3,000 pounds of explosive. In contrast, a single
Royal Air Force Lancaster bomber could carry 14,000 pounds ofbombs, with some modified
to carry the 22,000 pound Grand Slam bomb. SIR CFIARLES WEBSTER & NOBLE FRANKLAND,
The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945, Vol. 1,452-53 (1961). For
heavy bomber accuracy, see W. Hays Parks, "Precision" and "Area" Bombing: Who Did
Which, and When?., 18 JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 147 (March 1995). In contrast to
SOE accuracy through industrial sabotage, it took 9,070 bombs dropped by 3,024 US heavy
bomber aircraft to achieve a 90% probability of a single hit on a target 60 by 100 feet in size.
RICHARD HALLION, STORM OVER IRAQ 283, Table 2 (1992).
77. Distinction is the customary international law obligation of parties to a conflict to engage
only in military operations the effects of which distinguish between the civilian population (or
individuals not taking a direct part in hostilities), and combatant forces or military objectives,
directing the application of force solely against the latter.
The principle of distinction was acknowledged in Articles 20-23 of the 1863 US Army
General Orders No. 100 (the Lieber Code), supra note 20.
78. MACKENZIE, supra note 65, at 599, provides the following report from a French railway
engineer who reached England in December 1943:
Aircraft attacks on Locomotives. Since the beginning of 1943 650 locomotives have been
hit (an average of 70 a month) out of 10,200 in service. The damage is very slight and the
average period of repair is a fortnight. There are therefore on an average 35 locomotives
under repair, about 0.34% of the total. In order to achieve this derisory result 78
railwaymen have been killed and 378 wounded. . . .
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Sabotage ofLocomotives. 40 locomotives on an average were sabotaged each month, but
the repairs required were much more serious. The average time required has not yet
been established. But if we take it as six months, this means 240 locomotives under
repair, 2.40% of the total, eight times as many as those damaged by aircraft.
See also MICHEL, supra note 76, at 215-216, describing the SOE attack on the Vermork heavy
water facility in Norway.
79. MILLS, MILLS & BRUNNER, supra note 5, at 45, 47, 186-203 describe one such case in China.
The Yellow River Bridge carrying Ping-Han railway traffic had been attacked repeatedly but
unsuccessfully by the 311 (US) Air Force, with heavy friendly losses. OSS Operational Team
Jackal severed the bridge on August 9, 1945.
80. As a matter of policy, Great Britain prohibited area bombing attacks in Nazi-occupied
territories. WEBSTER & FRANKLAND, supra note 76, at Vol. I, 463; ROBIN NEILLANDS, THE
BOMBER WAR, 288-289 (2001).
81. See, for example, MICHEL, supra note 76, at 289, who notes that in Russia in the summer
of 1942, it was necessary for Germany to employ fifteen divisions in counter-partisan
operations.
82. FOOT, SOE: THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE, supra note 65, at 225-227; STAFFORD, supra
note 65, at 153-154; HAESTRUP, supra note 65, at 434-^135. The latter notes at 435, for example, that:
"On D-Day itself, about 950 actions were carried through, out of a planned 1,050, and German
Divisions which relied upon railway transport were delayed in their movements towards the [Allied]
bridgehead atNormandy for up to two weeks, bywhich time the bridgehead had been consolidated."
83. rTESTRUP, supra note 65, at 373-374; AlREY NEAVE, ESCAPE ROOM (1970); M. R. D. FOOT &
J. M. I. LANGLEY, MI9: ESCAPE AND EVASION 1939-1945 ( 1979).
84. For example, on August 13, 1944, a US Fifteenth Air Force heavy bomber attack on a bridge
across the Drome River in southern France missed the bridge and struck the town of Crest,
killing 280 civilians, wounding 200, and destroying 480 buildings in Crest. OSS Operational
Group ALICE arrived on the scene, and reported:
Upon arriving they were greeted by a very downhearted and somewhat belligerent
group of people. The damage consisted of destruction of about one-fourth of the
town. . . . Lt. Barnard and Lt. Meeks talked with the people, visited the hospital and
encouraged the people that the bombing was a mistake and would not occur again.
FUNK, supra note 73, at 79, 153; THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II, COMBAT
CHRONOLOGY 1941-1945, at 424 (Kit C. Carter & Robert Mueller eds., 1973).
85. LTESTRUP, supra note 65, at 9, 42 1-43 1
.
86. Id. at 7. At 42-43, the same author attributes emphasis on partisan warfare to several factors,
not the least of which were technical advances in aircraft and radios that facilitated partisan
operations.
87. Supra note 22.
88. Trial of Otto Skorzeny and Others, IX LRTWC (HMSO, 1949), at 90-94. SS-
Obersturmbannfuhrer (Lieutenant Colonel) Otto Skorzeny commanded a commando mission
during the last-ditch December 1944 German Ardennes Offensive to infiltrate US lines wearing US
Army uniforms. Eighteen members of his forty-four man team were captured in US uniform; each
was executed as a spy. Skorzeny was arrested in 1947. As he was not captured in flagrante delicto, he
could not be charged as a spy. Article 31, Annex to 1907 Hague IV, supra note 20. Nor, however,
was he charged with violation of Article 23(b) of that Annex, that is, "killing treacherously."
The court delivered its acquittal without explanation. Popular speculation has been that the
court accepted Skorzeny's claim that his men did not fight in US uniforms. Skorzeny's defense
was less that he and his men did not fight in US uniforms nor necessarily tu quoque ("you also"),
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but rather based upon the international law principle of rebus sic stantibus. A major contribution
to Skorzeny's acquittal was the testimony of Royal Air Force Wing Commander Forest Yeo-
Thomas, a highly decorated veteran of British Special Operations Executive service, who
acknowledged that British Special Operations Executive engaged in similar conduct. Other
evidence was offered of similar US, Russian and British operations. OTTO SKORZENY, My
COMMANDO OPERATIONS 450-451 (1995) and James J. Weingartner, Otto Skorzeny and the
Laws of War, 55 JOURNAL OF MILITARY HISTORY 207, 217-18 (1991).
89. Supra note 20.
90. Special Forces' wear of enemy uniforms is more common than generally known. For
example, summarizing the practice of the German special operations Brandenburg Regiment,
one study concluded: "Throughout the period 1941-1943, the usual operational technique was
the use of disguise in enemy uniforms." [Emphasis in original.] Edward N. Luttwak, Steven L.
Canby & David L. Thomas, A Systematic Review of "Commando" (Special) Operations 1939—
1980,11-188 (C8cL Associates unpublished report). [On file with author.] Efforts at summarizing
pre-Protocol I law as to the wearing of enemy uniforms are Valentine Jobat III, Wearing of the
Enemy's Uniform, 35 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 435 (July 1941) and R. C.
Hingorani, Prisoners of War 28-30 (1963).
Article 39, paragraph 2 of Additional Protocol I, supra note 23, states: "It is prohibited to make
use ofthe flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms ofadverse Parties while engaging in attacks
or in order to shield, favor, protect or impede military operations." This new law has not been tested.
In addition to the list, infra, there is considerable historical evidence to the contrary, including since
1977. See Parks, supra note 43, at 77 n. 259. The list that follows shows that this provision is new law
rather than a codification ofcustomary practice. Canada took a reservation to Article 39(2) upon it's
ratification of the Protocol. The Canadian reservation, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/
677558c021ecf2cl41256739003e6370/172fTec04adc80f2cl256402003fb314?OpenDocument, states:
"Article 39—Emblems of nationality (Enemy uniforms). The Government of Canada does not
intend to be bound by the prohibitions contained in paragraph 2 of Article 39 to make use of
military emblems, insignia or uniforms of adverse parties in order to shield, favor, protect or
impede military operations."
One may speculate on why the Diplomatic Conference supported this provision. Part of the
reason is that State practice was neither acknowledged nor well known. Aside from personal
accounts and the official works of M. R. D. Foot and Charles Cruickshank cited herein, OSS
records were not declassified until 1985, and the official SOE history (MACKENZIE, SECRET
HISTORY OF SOE, supra note 65) was not declassified until 1998. Speaking from this author's
experience, a "wall" between special operations forces and the negotiating process existed that
does not exist within the US government today. While US negotiation guidance was coordinated
within the Department of Defense, in all likelihood it did not reach the closed-door, Cold War
special operations environment that prevailed at that time. Even if it had, it is entirely probable
that the decision was taken not to comment. The author's work with counterparts in other
governments suggests that this wall persists to this day within many governments.
91. See also supra note 42.
92. FOOT, SOE: THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE, supra note 65, at 98; DOUGLAS DODDS-
PARKER, SETTING EUROPE ABLAZE 85, 124 (1983). This pessimism was confirmed in a number
of cases. Four uniformed British soldiers captured during a failed attack on the German heavy
water plant at Vermork, Norway, were executed in compliance with this order on November 20,
1942. Richard Wiggan, Operation Freshman: The Rjukan Heavy Water Raid 1942, at
81-82 (1986). During the night of March 22, 1994, a uniformed US Army special operations
team landed along the Italian coast about 60 miles north of La Spezia. Captured two days later,
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they were executed on the orders of General Anton Dostler who, in turn, was following Hitler's
Fiihrerbefehl (Commando Order) of October 18, 1942, which ordered all SOF to be executed,
even ifcaptured in uniform. Dostler was tried and convicted by a US Military Commission 8-12
October 1945, sentenced to death, and executed. In re Dostler, supra note 20, (cited in n.31).
The background to Hitler's Fiihrerbefehl is contained in FOOT, SOE IN FRANCE, supra note
25, at 186-187. The Fiihrerbefehl declared:
All enemies on so-called commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by
German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniforms or demolition
troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last
man. . . . Even if these individuals when found should apparently be prepared to give
themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them.
At a minimum, the Commando Order violated Article 23(d) (prohibiting denial of quarter),
of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 23. The Commando Order is
contained in its entirety in United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. ("High Command Case"),
XI TWC (GPO, 1951), at 73-75, 525-527, with additional implementing orders at 76-110. The
Court's judgment that the Fiihrerbefehl was "criminal on its face" is at 527. The Fiihrerbefehl
also is discussed in 1 1 International Military Tribunal (1946), at 26, and 15 International Military
Tribunal (1946), at 296-306, 403^110, the trial of major German war criminals.
In Operation Cold Comfort, two members ofa British SAS team captured in uniform in Italy in
February 1945 were executed. ROY FARRAN, OPERATION TOMBOLA 7-8 (1960); JOHN STRAWSON,
A HISTORY OF THE S.A.S. REGIMENT 275 (1984). Similarly, German Security Forces (SD) leader
Josef Keiffer was tried and executed for the murder of captured uniformed British Special Air
Service troops. FOOT, SOE IN FRANCE, supra note 25, at 305. See also Trial of Karl Buck, supra note
20, at 39-44, and Trial of Karl Adam Golkel and Thirteen Others, V LRTWC, at 45-53 (murder of
captured uniformed SAS pursuant to Fiihrerbefehl); Trial of Generaloberst Nickolaus Von
Falkenhorst, XI LRTWC (HMSO, 1949), at 18-30, and VI WCT (William Hodge, 1949) (murder
of captured uniformed British commandoes pursuant to Fiihrerbefehl); and Trial of Werner
Rohde and Eight Others, V LRTWC, at 54-59 (murder of captured female SOE).
The Japanese issued similar orders directing the execution of aviators and/or SOF. In 1944
members of a combined British-Australian SOF team captured in uniform were executed or
died as a result of illegal medical experimentation, pursuant to such an order. As a result of
postwar proceedings, Japanese General Dihihara was hanged, while other participants received
lesser sentences. LYNETTE RAMSAT SILVER, THE HEROES OF RlMAU: UNRAVELLING THE
Mystery of One of WorldWar H's Most Daring Raids 225 (1990). See also The Jaluit Atoll
Case, 1 LRTWC (HMSO, 1947), at 71-80, and Trial of Lieutenant General Shigeru Sawada and
three others, V LRTWC (HMSO, 1948), at 1-24 (execution/murder of three captured US
airmen); Trial of Lieutenant General Harukei Isayama and Seven Others, V LRTWC (HMSO,
1948), at 60-65 (murder of captured US aircrew).
93. Supra note 15.
94. For example, a heavily-armed Navy SEAL attired in a wet suit, fins and face mask would be
distinctive from the civilian population except, perhaps, in the annual zany Bay-to-Breakers foot
race in San Francisco.
95. Examples contained in this Table are documented in the Chicago Journal of International
Law version of this paper, supra note 1.
96. Where captured SOE personnel were executed without trial, those responsible were
prosecuted following World War II. See, for example, Trial of Wolfgang Zeuss, et al. (The
Natzweiler Trial), V WCT (HMSO, 1949).
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97. Ex parte Quirin, supra note 22. The eight German saboteurs were civilians. They wore
German naval uniforms when they boarded the submarine, and again at the time of their
landings in the United States. After landing, they changed into civilian clothing. The uniforms
were sent back to the U-boat. FISHER, supra note 22, at 23, 26, 35.
98. A detailed and fascinating account is contained in LESLIE C. GREEN, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN
LAW OF War 41-434 (2d ed. 1999) based upon Professor Green's participation in the post-war
trials. Later in his long and distinguished career, Professor Green was the Charles H. Stockton
Professor of International Law at the Naval War College. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ACROSS THE
Conflict Spectrum: Essays in Honour of Professor L. C. Green (Michael N. Schmitt ed.,
2001) (Vol. 75, US Naval War College International Law Studies).
99. Stanislaus Krofan & Another v. Public Prosecutor, [1967] 1 Malayan L J 133 Fed Ct Cr App
1966 (Singapore).
100. Osman bin Haji Mohammed Ali and Another Appellant v. The Public, Privy Council, 3 All.
E.R. 488, 3 W.L.R. 1076, 112 S.J. 802 (1968).
101. The Medal of Honor citation of Sergeant Drew D. Dix, USA, reads as follows:
Learning that a nurse was trapped in a house near the center of the city, Staff Sergeant
Dix organized a relief force, successfully rescued the nurse, and returned her to the
safety of the Tactical Operations Center. Being informed of other trapped civilians
within the city, Staff Sergeant Dix voluntarily led another force to rescue eight civilian
employees located in a building which was under heavy mortar and small arms fire.
Staff Sergeant Dix then returned to the center of the city. Upon approaching a building,
he was subjected to intense automatic rifle and machine gun fire from an unknown
number of Viet Cong. He personally assaulted the building, killing six Viet Cong, and
rescuing two Filipinos {sic). The following day Staff Sergeant Dix, still on his own
volition, assembled a twenty-man force and under intense enemy fire cleared the Viet
Cong out of the hotel, theater, and other adjacent buildings within the city. During this
portion of the attack, Army Republic of Vietnam soldiers inspired by the heroism and
success of Staff Sergeant Dix, rallied and commenced firing upon the Viet Cong. Staff
Sergeant Dix captured twenty prisoners, including a high-ranking Viet Cong official.
He then attacked enemy troops who had entered the residence of the Deputy Province
Chiefand was successful in rescuing the official's wife and children. Staff Sergeant Dix's
personal heroic actions resulted in fourteen Viet Cong killed in action and possibly
twenty-five more, the capture of twenty prisoners, fifteen weapons, and the rescue of
fourteen United States and free world civilians. The heroism of Staff Sergeant Dix was
in the highest tradition and reflects great credit upon the US Army.
Citation available at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/mohviet.htm (under Drew Dennis Dix).
102. This was the famous rescue by Lieutenant Thomas R. Norris, USN, of Lieutenant Colonel
Iceal E. Hambleton, USAF, commonly referred to as Bat 21, the designation of the B66 in
which Lieutenant Colonel Hambleton served as navigator. (Lieutenant Colonel Hambleton
actually was Bat 21B.). See DARREL D. WHITCOMB, THE RESCUE OF BAT 21 (1998). The
Vietnamese mentioned in Norris' citation was Nguyen Van Kiet, a South Vietnamese
frogman. For his actions, he became the only Vietnamese in the war to be awarded the US Navy
Cross. T.L. BOSILJEVAC, SEALS: UDT/SEAL OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM 213 (1990). The 1988
movie Bat-21 starring Danny Glover and Gene Hackman errs in depicting this as solely an Air
Force rescue. Lieutenant Norris' Medal of Honor citation clearly acknowledges his fighting in
civilian clothing, and the US Government's approval of his actions:
Lieutenant Norris completed an unprecedented ground rescue of two downed pilots
deep within heavily controlled enemy territory in QuangTri Province. Lieutenant Norris,
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on the night of 10 April, led a five-man patrol through 2,000 meters of heavily controlled
enemy territory, located one of the downed pilots at daybreak, and returned to the
Forward Operating Base (FOB). On 1 1 April, Lieutenant Norris led a three-man team on
two unsuccessful rescue attempts for the second pilot. On the afternoon of the 12' , a
forward air controller located the pilot and notified Lieutenant Norris. Dressed in
fisherman disguises and using a sampan, Lieutenant Norris and one Vietnamese traveled
through the night and found the injured pilot at dawn. Covering the pilot with bamboo
and vegetation, they began the return journey, successfully evading a North Vietnamese
patrol. Approaching the FOB, they came under heavy machinegun fire. Lieutenant
Norris called in an air strike which provided suppression fire and a smokescreen, allowing
the rescue party to reach the FOB. By his outstanding display of decisive leadership,
undaunted courage, and selfless dedication in the face of extreme danger, Lieutenant
Norris enhanced the finest traditions of the US Naval Service [Emphasis added.]
Citation available at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/mohviet2.htm (under Thomas R. Norris).
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Strategic Targeting and International Law:
The Ambiguity ofLaw Meets the Reality
of a Single-Superpower World
Jeffrey K. Walker1
Strategic Targeting in Recent Conflicts
My charge is to address strategic targeting and the law of war. And isn't thisan ironic moment in history for such a discussion? For just at the moment
when the evolution of the technology of aerial bombardment allows for the fulfill-
ment of Billy Mitchell's vision, we stand on the verge of jettisoning his underlying
theory as anachronistic and redundant. For 60 years, airmen have bemoaned that if
they but had pinpoint accurate, survivable, and reliable all-weather day/night weap-
ons, the vision of the strategic bombardment gurus would inevitably and inexorably
be proven correct. We now have the technology, but no longer the need.
As is surely evident in Afghanistan and Iraq, strategic bombardment just isn't
the main event anymore. Kosovo was the seeming fruition of the airman's years of
toil—a campaign limited from the outset to a purely air operation and therefore by
necessity heavily focused on strategic targets. The problem is that air power didn't
win the Kosovo campaign. The bombing showed little effect on Serbian ground
forces and the will of the Serb regime showed little signs of cracking in the face of
around-the-clock bombing—in fact, just the opposite. And ultimately, the precipi-
tating event that caused Slobodan Milosevic to fold his tents was the very public
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withdrawal of the support—brought about by diplomacy more than by bombs
—
of his long-time patron, Russia.
So in Kosovo, airmen hit the apparent high-water mark for strategic bombing
theory, but at the same time many failed to notice that the plug in the bottom of the
doctrinal bathtub had already been pulled. Which brings us to Afghanistan. The
Afghan campaign brought unreconstructed airmen face-to-face with a horrible
problem: how do you draw Colonel Jack Warden's concentric circles2 when there's
nothing attackable to draw them around? What do you do when strategic bombing
doctrine meets an enemy that would like nothing more than to be bombed back a
few centuries? To the Taliban, there wasn't much of value we could bomb in Af-
ghanistan, since they placed little or no value on the technological, industrial, or
economic trappings so dear to Western notions of modernity and progress. Al
Qaeda traveled light and could easily disperse and regroup after air attacks. So the
air war in Afghanistan took a decidedly different turn for air planners. What the air
arm of Operation Enduring Freedom became was that much-maligned role as-
signed them by Heinz Guderian, father of the blitzkrieg. Air forces became what air
doctrine purists most dreaded—"flying artillery" for the very thin, very light, and
very agile special operations ground forces supporting whatever indigenous forces
could be allied with us.
Iraq seemed to offer airmen a reprieve from this ignominy, but it didn't quite
pan out that way. Operation Iraqi Freedom became something of a laboratory for
the future non-strategic uses of air power, with five distinct and geographically de-
fined air sub-campaigns.
First, with the quick capitulation of all but a few pockets of resistance in the
southern quarter of Iraq, air forces assumed the role of airborne SWAT teams for
what was essentially peacekeeping work. Second, there was the Scud hunt and bor-
der patrol of the Western desert. Like in Afghanistan, this was a special operations
show, with air power acting as an airborne surgeon
—
precise applications of mea-
sured amounts of force against emerging or fleeting targets with tight control by
ground forces with eyes on target or from low and slow tactical drones. Third, there
was the Kurdish northern front. Reduced to a wait-and-see role by Turkish skit-
tishness and the lightness of US forces in the area, the role of air power became
mostly that of airborne cavalry, providing rescue as needed and exploitation of en-
emy missteps when possible. Fourth, there was the Big Show—the dual armored
thrusts up the river valleys. This was classic close air support and what used to be
called battlefield air interdiction. In this area of operations, air power was undeni-
ably cast in the role of airborne artillery—and to very great effect.
Finally, there were bombs over Baghdad. This was the classic strategic hammer
role for airpower wistfully dreamt of in its idealized form from Giulio Douhet to
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Jack Warden. However, this piece of Iraqi Freedom was, in comparison to Opera-
tion Desert Storm in 1991, a very small sideshow. Why was this? Unlike Afghani-
stan, Iraq was a modern country with a government and population that had
grown accustomed to the infrastructure of a modern economy—electrical power,
effective transportation, good telecommunications, urban living—so there were
certainly strategic targets available. However, Iraqi Freedom presented in clear fo-
cus the second tectonic shift that if not exactly sounding the death knell for strate-
gic bombardment has served notice that airmen better start rethinking strategic
doctrine. The primary reason why the strategic bombing campaign over Baghdad
was not more vigorous was because from the beginning ofplanning, everyone real-
ized that it would be foolhardy to break any more china than absolutely necessary
since we would be expected to fix most everything we broke. And high on the list of
the plates we wanted to remain unbroken was the good will ofthe Iraqi populace.
Military Objectives and Collateral Injury in a Non-Strategic World
So where does all this get us in terms of the law of war? On the one hand, the air
campaign is fragmenting and over-specializing, with the result that fewer and
fewer targets are now planned through the target planning cycle and air tasking or-
der (ATO). As a result, the opportunity for systematic review and analysis for col-
lateral damage effects and law of war compliance is rapidly fading. In the Iraq air
campaign, less than 20% of all targets struck ever appeared on an ATO. This means
that the business of operations lawyers is getting more complicated with less time
and more uncertainty. Lawyers will need to think outside the "JAG signs the legal
review line on the target folder" box—those days are mostly gone. And there is an
enormous amount of work being done right now on strategy tools, collaborative
software, and other air campaign planning tools that offer many opportunities for
innovative new approaches to target review and law ofwar compliance in air cam-
paigns. The legal community must take advantage of these opportunities to de-
velop future procedures.
On the other hand, the legal equation is being somewhat simplified in one im-
portant respect. Since the strategic bombing campaigns ofWorldWar II, one ofthe
messiest and most intractable questions to dog the law ofwar has been the issue of
dual-civilian/military use targets. Unfortunately, modern industrial warfare relies
upon essentially the same infrastructure as the modern industrial economy—rail-
roads, ports, marshalling yards, highways, telecommunications, and, above all,
electricity and oil. Therefore, striking strategic targets for maximum impact upon
the enemy's war-making capacity by necessity impacts greatly upon the enemy's ci-
vilian population. In addition, much ofthis dual-use infrastructure tends to cluster
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in and around urban areas—for completely logical reasons—and therefore strik-
ing these targets in densely populated areas heightens the risk of civilian collateral
injury and damage. More accurate weaponry helps to reduce collateral injury from
misdirected bombs, but the blast, heat, and fragmentation from a perfectly placed
bomb cannot be completely contained, so adjoining structures and nearby persons
cannot be completely spared from collateral effects. With the eclipse of the impor-
tance of "going downtown" and of the traditional infrastructure-centric strategic
bombing in general, we will be granted some relief from these thorny legal prob-
lems. It is a pity that after having finally gotten some serious tools for analyzing dif-
ficult urban and infrastructure targets—I am thinking of Bug Splat, 3 JMEM multi-
tiered analysis,4 and the ready availability of sophisticated computer modeling of
weapons effects—the need for them is declining.
Expanding the Notion ofLawful Targets?
However, the frustration borne from the slow realization ofhow ineffective or un-
important strategic bombing was in Kosovo and Afghanistan and Iraq has caused
some airmen to suggest that the problem lies not with the limitations of strategic
bombing itself, but rather with the artificial restrictions of international law. Why
should the will of the enemy's population not be a lawful target? Some have sug-
gested that the parameters of lawful objectives should be expanded to include ob-
jectives that if struck would discomfort or distress the civilian population. (To be
fair, everyone stops well short of advocating directly killing civilians.) For example,
why not target symbols of cultural pride like the national soccer stadium? Why not
acknowledge that making life difficult for the civilian population in the enemy cap-
ital is a lawful objective in that it will undermine political support for the enemy
leadership and sap their desire to continue the war? Of course, this was one of the
publicly articulated—and more regrettable—reasons why the electrical grids in
Baghdad in 1991 and in Belgrade in 1999 were attacked early in those bombing
campaigns. Some commanders from Desert Storm have stated at various times
that one goal of the initial wave ofbombing over Baghdad was to impress upon the
Iraqi people that they were now at war—most obviously evidenced by the lights go-
ing out for both the Iraqi military and civilians all over the city.
There is, of course, a problem with this expansive approach. First, it is arguably
illegal. Second, it should remain illegal. There are several reasons why.
First, targeting the will of the people—explicitly illegal but tacitly accepted as at
least a collateral purpose of nearly every bombing campaign—doesn't work. Never
has and probably never will. Killing, wounding, or displacing civilians just makes
them angry and generally more resolved to resist—it's a tragic-comic aspect of
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human nature that the more we get hurt the more we are willing to get hurt just to
spite the one who's doing the hurting. Even carpet bombing and fire bombing Ger-
man and Japanese cities didn't really break the resolve of the civilian populations.
We saw no evidence of this in Serbia in 1999 either.
Second, even a weak declarative norm is still better than nothing in that we at
least default to not attacking civilians. Eliminating or even reversing that default
could easily put us on the infamous slippery slope and become a race to the bot-
tom. Ifselecting targets to make the enemy population uncomfortable is lawful, the
parameters ofjust what constitutes discomfort will inevitably expand. Ifthe goal is
to sap the population's will without directly killing them—our consciences would
hardly allow that—then why not attack irrigation systems or grain elevators or
hospitals or mosques? Some commentators have even suggested this is exactly
what the United States did in the first GulfWar by hard killing the electrical genera-
tion systems in Iraq, resulting in prolonged famine. We have already engaged in ill-
advised expansions of the definition of "military object" even under the current
rules—television and radio stations and the infamous "crony targets" in Serbia are
good examples. It would be disastrous were we completely to jettison the presump-
tion that civilians—and the will of the people—are immune from direct attack.
Third, allowing direct targeting of the enemy civilian population in any way as-
sumes some sort of collective responsibility on the part of the enemy population.
This completely ignores the nature oftotalitarian or authoritarian regimes. A total-
itarian regime exercising a stern monopoly over the levers of power can stay in
place for a very, very long time with little or no direct support from the population.
In such States, the opportunities for dissent and resistance are generally very lim-
ited. In fact, the very regimes we most want to remove are generally those with the
least direct popular support—the Ba'ath regime in Iraq and the communist regime
in North Korea spring to mind. (Recall that even in the raucously democratic
United States, the first Bush "regime" initially enjoyed the support of a bit less than
half of the 52% of the population that even bothered to vote.) Deliberately target-
ing the will of the civilian population in these circumstances constitutes nothing
more than collective punishment and random reprisal.
The final and most significant reason whywe must avoid loosening the declara-
tive norm against directly targeting the civilian population is that we surely don't
want any further weakening of the admittedly less-than-effective existing legal
standards protecting civilians from the effects of armed attack. It is the sad history
ofthe documents that compromise the law ofwar that they were written predomi-
nantly by soldiers (or diplomatic surrogates afraid to offend soldiers) to the over-
whelming benefit of soldiers.
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Let us take the example of an important law of war concept, proportionality.
The law of war states "indiscriminate attacks are prohibited" and that an indis-
criminate attack includes one which "may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military ad-
vantage anticipated." 5 Thus says Additional Protocol I on the rule of proportion-
ality in the attack.
The problem of course is that the rule implicitly accepts that it is the attacker
who decides what is and is not excessive injury, damage, or death. And the determi-
nation of excessiveness turns on the equally ambiguous term "military advan-
tage"—or as further obfuscated in US practice, military advantage "when viewed
in the context ofthe campaign as a whole,"6 whatever on Earth that means. Except
in the most obvious or ludicrous marginal cases, this studied ambiguity yields a
systemic default to rendering any military advantage thrown into the balance by
the attacker as not excessive in relation to resulting civilian injury and death.
The baby elephant in the room that most of us choose to ignore is the inherent
and completely irreconcilable subjectivity built into this so-called balancing test.
I vividly recall reading the Kosovo post-conflict report by Human Rights Watch7
while working in the Pentagon. This thorough and well-substantiated report esti-
mated that 500 civilians had been killed during the 78-day bombing campaign.
The reaction of my colleagues and me was "not bad." The reaction of Human
Rights Watch was substantially different. In the report prepared for the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslovia prosecutor in response to al-
legations ofNATO war crimes in the Kosovo air war, the rapporteur stated,
The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or not it exists
but what it means and how it is to be applied .... For example, bombing a refugee
camp is obviously prohibited if its only military significance is that people in the camp
are knitting socks for soldiers. Conversely, an air strike on an ammunition dump
should not be prohibited merely because a farmer is plowing a field in the area.
Unfortunately, most applications of the principle of proportionality are not quite so
clear cut .... It is unlikely that a human rights lawyer and an experienced combat
commander would assign the same relative values to military advantage and to injury
to noncombatants It is suggested that the determination of relative values must be
that of the "reasonable military commander."8
So we are stuck with a rule of paramount importance that rests on comparing
two incomparable concepts, purports to subjectively quantify the basically un-
quantifiable notion of "military advantage," and defers all decision-making to the
party in interest with the least personal and most amorphous stake (soldiers) at the
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enormous expense ofthe other party in interest with the greatest and very tangible
personal stake (civilians) . To quote the immortal Yul Brenner, "Is a puzzlement."9
Sadly, I have come to believe this was a knowing and deliberate process all along.
The agenda worked by the major powers—led by the interests of their military es-
tablishments—during the negotiation of all the major law ofwar conventions was
to find a way to present a humane face to the world while avoiding any meaningful
restrictions on the use ofmilitary force. It is poignantly ironic to note that the most
historically effective niches in the law of war explicitly protect soldiers, not civil-
ians—bans on dum-dum bullets, glass projectiles, poison gas, and provisions con-
cerning the protection of the wounded and prisoners of war.
As a result of this studied creation of irreconcilable ambiguity into the critical
concept of proportionality, it will remain little more than an aspirational norm.
The very ambiguity of the rule has the perverse effect of offering significantly less
protection to the innocent victims than to those who enjoy a monopoly on the use
of force. Until such time as the law explicitly reapportions the greater risk of injury
and death—as a normative legal concept and a moral prescription—to those who
wield armed force and have voluntarily assumed the risks attendant upon its use,
civilians will continue to receive scant protection from the laws of war.
Why Does It Matter Who Bears the Risk?
Why, it may well be asked, am I distressed by the notion that the law ofwar dispro-
portionately benefits soldiers at the expense of civilians? Quite simply, because one
has willingly assumed the risk of death, injury, or capture and the other has not.
This requires a little explanation.
As the great British military historian John Keegan persuasively argues, since the
advent ofmeans and methods ofwarfare that allow the application offorce at a dis-
tance—basically gunpowder weapons—the mark of a great and valorous military
officer has ceased being the ability to inflict injury on the enemy with his strong
right arm. Rather, with distant means of killing, the mark ofthe courageous officer
has become an indifference to personal safety, a scorn for injury or death. This
reached its most ludicrous extreme in World War I, when young lieutenants fresh
from Oxford or Cambridge went over the top with nothing but an umbrella or rid-
ing crop or soccer ball. However, this is a very clear manifestation of the most fun-
damental characteristic of the profession of arms—the willingness to engage in
self-sacrifice up to and including death. Military men and women often say, "It's
not about the money." The military profession has traditionally and still does fancy
itselfa unique calling. It must not be all about the money, otherwise you could sim-
ply contract out for infantry to the lowest bidder.
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As the United States continues to engage in conflict marked by its vast technologi-
cal superiority and with its leadership's aversion to friendly casualties—almost al-
ways at the expense of higher civilian casualties—what will it mean to this culture of
self-sacrifice, to the ultimate defining characteristic of the profession of arms? Mi-
chael Ignatieff, in a New Yorker article soon after the end of the Kosovo air campaign
in 1999, asserted, "It was a virtual war, fought in video teleconference rooms, using
target folders flashed on screens ... [it] never reached deep into the psyche of a peo-
ple .. . [did] not demand blood and sacrifice." 10 Even the wars of the post-9/1 1 era
have demanded little of the American people—indeed, immediately after 9/11 the
President's call for "blood and sacrifice" consisted for most people of shoe removal
in airports and an enjoinder to spend more money shopping. Hardly the stuff that
will render us the next "Greatest Generation."
Assumption of the Risk
So soldiers have willingly assumed the heightened risk of death or injury as
members of the profession of arms. This is not to say that I am all-over warm and
fuzzy about every civilian. Just as soldiers assume risk, there has long been a tacit
but universal acceptance within the law ofwar regime that in some circumstances
civilians also assume a heightened risk. For example, although the blanket prohibi-
tion against making civilians the direct object of attack still applies, there are few
who would argue that the killing of war workers busily assembling tanks inside a
munitions factory is a war crime. Likewise, the torpedoing of civilian merchant
vessels laden with war materiel is not a war crime. On the other hand, few would be
so bold as to assert that night area bombing of the housing estate where the tank
factory workers sleep is lawful—although soldiers asleep in their barracks do bear
this risk. The difference is that the law of war tacitly acknowledges that civilians
willingly present within a lawful military target assume the risk of being attacked.
The concept seems to be that although one should not go out of your way to kill
them, this category ofcivilian quite simply weighs quite lightly in the proportional-
ity equation when attacking an otherwise lawful military target. Again, I can find
no explicit statement of this in law—it just seems to be a generally accepted princi-
ple of application.
Voluntary human shields are another category ofpersons that assume the risk of
death or injury by willfully placing themselves in harms way at a lawful military ob-
jective. Ofcourse, the law is only the law, and as we saw in Kosovo, policy consider-
ations can render immune from attack otherwise lawful targets protected by
volunteer civilians.
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Perhaps of more moment for US forces, contractor or civilian employees ac-
companying US forces in the field logically fall into the category ofassumers ofthe
risk. The law of war hints at this in 1949 Geneva Convention III 11 by extending
some protections to these civilians if they fall into the hands of an enemy force.
Both defense contractors and the government have tacitly acknowledged this by
paying significantly higher wages to such civilians. As more and more functions
heretofore performed by uniformed soldiers are contracted out—and lest anyone
be uninformed on this subject, huge swathes of traditional military functions are
being contracted—the very notion of what constitutes a combatant versus a civil-
ian is being thoroughly muddled.
The Issue ofImpunity
One final factor—and this is a big one—is rapidly undermining what we all were
taught as the positivist legal regime regulating armed conflict. From the earliest
conferences in St. Petersburg, there was a very rough equivalency ofthreat amongst
the major powers who created the law ofwar treaty regime. Be it the Great Powers
of the 19th century, Democracies versus Fascists in the inter-war years, or the US
bloc versus the Soviet bloc of the Cold War, there was always a rough equivalency
in the damage each could do to the other. This more or less balanced military threat
produced a mutuality of self-interest amongst the major players who most influ-
enced the development ofthe law ofwar treaties. If all your potential enemies have
the wherewithal to do to you what you can do to them—be it take prisoners or stra-
tegically bomb or sink merchant shipping—then everyone faced a somewhat tar-
nished Golden Rule: don't do some things unto others or they just might do the
same unto you. And this was until recently the positivistic enforcement mecha-
nism—admittedly less than totally effective—that underpinned whatever success
the law of war regime may have enjoyed in theory and application.
But with the emergence ofthe United States as the last superpower left standing,
we are faced with a significant threat to this implicit enforcement mechanism
—
impunity. Now I don't intend to use this word with any of its negative connota-
tions. I mean plain old impunity—the ability to act without constraint. This is after
all what the Holy Grail of air campaign planners, air supremacy, means—the abil-
ity to act with impunity over the entire area of operations. And in a military
sense—although not a political one—the United States and its usual allies find
themselves in this position. Militarily, we can pretty much do whatever we want
with little reciprocal risk of an enemy doing much back at us.
That said, any positivist notions—and you will notice that I don't count the
marginally effective international criminal tribunals in this mix—ofthe laws ofwar
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are basically gone. They have become what the more cynical among us have always
suspected—merely an admirable collection ofdeclaratory and aspirational norma-
tive statements, to be obeyed or not as the exigencies of the situation dictate.
Where Do We Go from Here?
So I have painted us into a corner—the law is inherently ambiguous, is more
aspirational than effective, and was never really intended to protect civilians much
in the first place. With one enormous military power now ruling the international
roost, the self-interest and reciprocity of threat that served to shore up what com-
pliance there was has evaporated. But the law ofwar regime as it exists today is all
we've got. Can we do any better with it?
I'm not really sure, although I'm willing to give it some serious thought and
hope the readers will as well. The law of proportionality is hardly unique in its in-
herent ambiguity—a lot of domestic law falls into the same category. If you're a
full-blown critical legal studies disciple, all law is inherently ambiguous because
law is a creature of language and all language is inherently ambiguous. And in in-
ternational law we get the added confounding factor of equally authentic texts in
several languages. What's a lawyer to do?
Step one may be to simply acknowledge that we need to make clear policy
choices rather than tortured legal justifications as to the allocation of risks from the
use of military force. As lawyers, we need to stop hiding behind pseudo-positivist
"black letter" arguments—there really is very little if any truly black letter law in
this area. And in modern democracies, there is already a mechanism for making
these policy-driven allocations of risk
—
political control of the military. Much as
soldiers grind their teeth at what is often perceived as niggling interference from
the political masters, this is the most effective way to allocate risk in an open and
coherent fashion. And as professional soldiers doing the dirty work of democracy,
you might as well stop carping about it and acknowledge this is not only the way
things are, it is the way things should be.
Notes
1
.
Lieutenant Colonel Walker is a retired US Air Force judge advocate.
2. John A. Warden, The Enemy as a System, AlRPOWER JOURNAL 40 (Spring 1995). Colonel
Warden's five rings are ( 1 ) the command ring—the enemy command structure, which may be
a civilian at the seat of government or a military commander; (2) the enemy's organic
essentials—those facilities or processes without which the State cannot maintain itself, e.g., in
many instances, electricity and petroleum products; (3) the infrastructure ring containing the
enemy State's transportation system, including rail lines, airlines, highways, bridges, airfields,
130
Jeffrey K. Walker
ports, and other similar systems; (4) the enemy State's population; and (5) the enemy's fielded
military forces.
3. A mathematically based software program that predicts a munition's fragmentation pattern
based on the angle and direction at which the munition is falling.
4. The Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals provide methodologies to permit standardized
comparison ofweapon effectiveness against a variety of targets.
5. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection ofVictims ofInternational Armed Conflicts, art. 57.2(b), June 8, 1977, 1 125 U.N.T.S.
3, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OFWAR 422 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d
ed. 2000).
6. See Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Standing Rules ofEngagement for U.S. Forces, CJCS Inst.
3121.01A (series).
7. Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign (Feb. 2000), available at
www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/.
8. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
1257, f 48 (2000), available fltwww.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm.
9. Yul Brenner in Oscar Hammerstein and Richard Rogers' The King and J (1951).
10. Michael Ignatieff, The Virtual Commander: How NATO Invented a New Kind of War, THE
New Yorker, Aug. 2, 1999, at 31.
11. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 5, at 244.
131

VIII
Air Power, Accuracy,
and the Law of Targeting:
Why No Brave New World?
Adam Roberts 1
Jeffrey Walker's paper on "Strategic Targeting and International Law" is clear,
punchy, and splendidly heretical. I agree with much of it. It is indeed useful to
focus a discussion of targeting on one dimension of warfare. Today it is undoubt-
edly air power that is the driver ofrevolutionary changes in the conduct ofwar, and
that presents some of the most difficult and challenging problems as regards the
implementation or adaptation of existing legal norms. As Mr. Walker notes, for
generations airmen have yearned for accurate, survivable and reliable all-weather
day/night weapons. Now they have got them. He and I agree that this situation is
strewn with hazards, and that there is no brave new world ofprecise and legally un-
controversial bombing. I suspect that this situation reminds both of us of that an-
cient and clever curse: "May your wishes be granted."
However, as will be seen from what follows, I disagree with his main conclusions.
Specifically, I disagree with him about why, despite improvements in accuracy, the
role of bombing in contemporary warfare remains costly in civilian lives and de-
struction. In addition, I do not share his extreme pessimism about the role ofthe laws
of war in imposing some limits on bombing. As regards his proposed solution
—
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more effective political control of the military—I am all in favor of it, but for reasons
indicated below it does not solve the particular problems he identifies.
In responding to his paper I will focus on four main issues relating to air power.
First, the significance of the technical developments that have made possible a
greater degree of accuracy and discrimination in bombing than in earlier eras. Sec-
ond, the provisions ofthe laws ofwar that relate to targeting, and the ways in which
they have shaped and reinforced the tendency toward discrimination in bombing.
Third, certain problems that remain, that help to explain why air bombardment is
far from achieving perfect precision and discrimination. Fourth, the special diffi-
culties that have arisen regarding the obligations on the defender to distinguish
military activities from civilian objects. Finally I will attempt to draw some
conclusions.
In each of the sections below, my discussion of the issues, like Mr. Walker's, will
focus on four wars:
• The War over Kuwait (1990-1)
• The War over Kosovo (1999)
• The War in Afghanistan (200 1-)
• The War in Iraq (2003-) 2
These wars have certain similarities. In all ofthem there have been United States-
led coalitions—though the coalitions have involved combat forces from progres-
sively fewer countries. 3 In all, the US-led forces had more or less complete command
ofthe air, and used air power (including precision-guided munitions) extensively. In
all, they were fighting against one essentially third-world State that was more or less
isolated diplomatically and had been subject to economic sanctions. In all, there was
at some stage a civil war or regional rebellion ongoing in the country concerned, as
well as an international war. In short, these were all thoroughly unequal contests.
The bombing in these wars has been a mixture of strategic (intended to bring
about change on its own) and tactical (in support of ground operations). Mr.
Walker says of strategic bombardment: "We now have the technology but no lon-
ger the need." 4 Ifone interprets this to mean, as much ofhis paper suggests, that the
actual uses of air power in recent wars have been very different from any ofthe clas-
sic visions such as those of Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell, I have no problem
with his statement. However, if he takes this to suggest that air power today is a
would-be solution in search of a non-existent problem, then while I sympathize
with the spirit of his remarks I have difficulty in accepting the analysis. He is right
that there is a danger of using air power, as a default option in situations where, for
whatever reason, it is not appropriate. However, for better or for worse, some situ-
ations arise in which the application of air power is capable of achieving significant
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results—usually in combination with other armed forces, whether on the ground
or at sea. Further, we live in an age in which the implementation of international
norms, including resolutions ofthe UN Security Council, sometimes depends on a
capacity for strategic coercion, i.e., the use of military and other pressures against a
State to secure its compliance with specific demands: in this process, the threat and
actuality of air power may have some part to play.
As in Mr. Walker's paper itself, the main focus here is on the laws ofwar (jus in
hello) aspects of these wars. The focus is not on the lawfulness ofthe resort to force
(jus ad helium). This subject, while in principle entirely separate, is not always so in
practice. As regards the use of air power, there is particular cause for concern about
a possible overlap between jus ad helium and jus in hello. If air power were believed
(even if erroneously) to be a precision surgical instrument that can be applied at
low risk to the United States and with a strong likelihood of success, that could in-
cline the government to use it in circumstances in which, in earlier periods, it
would have hesitated to use force. In actual cases, of course, other considerations
have entered in to decisions to use force. In the first three wars under consider-
ation, the resort to force by the US-led coalitions was widely viewed as justifiable in
the circumstances, the most contentious ofthese three being Kosovo. The Iraq War
in 2003 was and remains much more problematical. In this case the United States
and partners relied on one principal legal justification for the action: implementa-
tion of earlier UN Security Council resolutions. This justification for the resort to
force in Iraq was based on serious considerations, but its application was under-
mined by several difficulties: flawed assessments of Iraqi capabilities, a question-
able denigration of the ongoing inspection process, failure to secure explicit
Security Council support, and a failure to plan for the occupation of Iraq. 5 How-
ever, in principle any problems that may exist under thejus ad helium regarding the
international legal validity of an intervention do not affect consideration of the jus
in hello aspects.
Because air power in general, and bombing in particular, played a significant
part in these four wars, it does not follow that they are necessarily keys to victory
in all modern wars. For example, in the 1982 Falklands War the United Kingdom
used air power in a much more restricted and limited way than in these four more
recent wars. A major bombing campaign against Argentina and its armed forces
would have been hard to sustain, of limited relevance to the situation, and highly
questionable on moral and political grounds. Such considerations will apply to
many future campaigns. The extensive use of air power is particularly question-
able in pacification operations, for example in support of a friendly government
or an occupation regime, because it risks antagonizing the very people whose
support or neutrality is needed. In these and other cases, the reasons for avoiding
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the use of air power, or for exercising discrimination in how it is used, are not
narrowly legal in character: they also involve considerations of interest, common
sense and prudence. As Mr. Walker notes, everyone involved in planning the
bombing of Baghdad in 2003 "realized that it would be foolhardy to break any
more china than absolutely necessary." 6 Taking all these reasons into account,
Mr. Walker's skepticism about the use and utility of strategic bombardment,
even if presented in broad-brush terms, is a healthy antidote to Douhet-like ex-
cesses in devotion to bombing.
The Impact of Technical Developments
Since the Second World War there has been a slow evolution ofthe means of deliv-
ery of so-called conventional weapons. The United States has been at the forefront
of this process. At the same time, concern about the indiscriminate use of air
power, including by the United States, has endured. The US bombing of North
Vietnam from 1964 to 1972, and also the use of air power within South Vietnam,
reflected certain improvements in technology but also reinforced this concern.
That was one basis for the development of the law of targeting contained in 1977
Geneva Protocol I.
At first glance, the dramatic improvement in the accuracy of air-delivered weap-
ons would appear to have improved the prospects of certain air campaigns being
conducted in a manner that is compatible with long-established law-of-war princi-
ples, especially the principle of discrimination. 7 It has even encouraged the hope
that, at least in some instances, air war can comply with the more specific rules
about targeting contained in Protocol I. Indeed, engineers could be seen as having
contributed at least as much as international lawyers to improving the possibilities
of discrimination in the use of air power.
The principle that the use of air-delivered weaponry should be discriminate was
frequently repeated in all four wars, particularly by senior US government and mil-
itary decision-makers. The remarkable improvement in accuracy compared to ear-
lier eras was widely noted in the 1991 Iraq War. Subsequent US bombing
campaigns, right up to the 2003 Iraq War, reflected both quantitative and qualita-
tive developments in the use of accurate air-delivered weapons. The way in which
many citizens ofBaghdad went about their business in the midst of a major bomb-
ing campaign in March-April 2003 indicates that they seemed to have some under-
standing of the US attempt to apply the principle of discrimination.
In all four wars, civilian casualties among the population of the territory be-
ing bombed were significantly lower than many forecasts made before the com-
mencement of military hostilities. For example, in the United Kingdom the
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"Stop the War Coalition" published an advertisement in March 2003 in which
it stated: "We want to stop a war which will result in an estimated 50,000 civil-
ian deaths, 500,000 injured and 2 million refugees." 8 In the subsequent Iraq
War—at least in its intense phase in March-April 2003—casualties and refugee
movements were, by any count, far below these levels. This is not to say that
they were not worryingly high, and cause for major concern. 9 In summary, I
agree with Mr. Walker that civilian casualties in these wars, and in particular ca-
sualties ofbombing, have been comparatively low by historical standards; and I
also agree with him that this fact does not change everything. Thus there is a
need to explore why, despite developments in the law and in weaponry, civilian
damage and casualties have continued. These themes are explored in the next
two sections.
The Law on Targeting
Probably the law's most important contribution in these four wars has been the
part it has played in the larger overall process of improving discrimination in
targeting, especially targeting of airborne weapons. Since at least 1868 the laws
of war have required that only armed forces and military targets should be at-
tacked. This apparently simple rule is in fact hugely problematical. It has now
been given much greater specificity in the rules on targeting contained in 1977
Geneva Protocol I.
On this matter, my emphasis differs from Mr. Walker's. He is a skeptic about the
value ofthe rules on targeting. There is still, as he says, an "inherent and completely
irreconcilable subjectivity" 10 built in to the balancing test when decisions have to
be made as between military advantage and protection of civilian life. Human
Rights Watch sees certain issues one way, while the Pentagon has a different spin
on them. He even implies that there may have been a deliberate and ongoing collu-
sive process by which we have ended up with a body of combat law that seeks only
ostensibly to balance the two "incomparable concepts" 11 of military advantage and
civilian protection. As he puts it:
Sadly, I have come to believe this was a knowing and deliberate process all along. The
agenda worked by the major powers—led by the interests of their military
establishments—during the negotiation of all the major law ofwar conventions was to
find a way to present a humane face to the world while avoiding any meaningful
restriction on the use of military force. It is poignantly ironic to note that the most
historically effective niches in the law ofwar explicitly protect soldiers, not civilians
—
bans on dum-dum bullets, glass projectiles, poison gas, and provisions concerning the
protection of the wounded and prisoners of war. 12
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This is quite an accusation, but it neglects a basic fact. It is in the very nature of
things that combat is extremely hard to regulate; and therefore that some of the
more effective parts of the laws ofwar should be those that deal, not with combat as
such, but with the treatment of individuals who are hors de combat or have fallen
into the hands ofthe adversary. Against this background, it is remarkable that there
is any significant body oflaw at all that regulates combat. The most detailed rules of
this type are those in 1977 Geneva Protocol I. The fact that the United States has se-
rious disagreements with parts of this treaty, which it has not ratified, does not ne-
gate the importance of these rules.
Mr. Walker's analysis is short of concrete examples. He is not to be blamed
for this. To prove beyond doubt that the law has a benevolent influence on tar-
geting, it would be necessary to report in detail on the process by which the de-
cision was made whether or not to attack particular targets; and, if so, with what
weapon, at what time, and in what way. Most people, even specialists in strate-
gic matters, simply do not have access to such information. Information of this
kind might confirm the substantial positive contribution oflaw in the decision-
making process. In this context, there is a particular need for evidence of plans
or missions that were abandoned or modified because of undue risk to civilians
and civilian objects.
What are the main rules oflaw that are applicable to targeting? The rules in 1977
Protocol I are contained in its Part IV, which is on "Civilian Population," and in
particular in its Section I on "General Protection Against the Effects of Hostilities."
Within this section, eleven articles—48 to 58—contain all the main rules. Article
52.2 is particularly important:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned,
military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose
or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage.
Article 52 has to be read, and implemented, in conjunction with other provi-
sions of Protocol I. Among the most important of these is Article 57 on precautions
in attack, which establishes a strong set of procedures and criteria that must be sat-
isfied in the conduct of all military attacks. For example, as regards so-called "dual-
use" facilities—a term not used in the conventions—Article 57.2(b) sets out strin-
gent criteria on the basis of which many planned attacks on such facilities might
have to be canceled or suspended. 13
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These rules on targeting in 1977 Protocol I are well known to present prob-
lems for certain States. For example, Article 52, cited above, has been the sub-
ject of interpretative declarations by a number of parties to the Protocol. 14 The
UK's sixteen statements made at the time of ratification of the Protocol include
no less than eight that relate to Articles 50 to 57. All eight articles, and all eight
UK statements, relate in one way or another to targeting. A key theme of these
eight UK statements is that the commander must necessarily act on the basis of
the knowledge that was available at the time, as distinct from information that
might have been available to others, or might have emerged later. In short, the
commander should not be judged by an unrealistic standard. Other NATO
member States have made some similar interpretative statements about Arti-
cles 51 to 57.
What is the official US line on the rules on targeting in 1977 Protocol I? Even
though it is not a party to the Protocol, the United States has indicated that it ac-
cepts and applies many of its provisions. In one major official publication it has
stated: "The US views the following GP I articles as either legally binding as cus-
tomary international law or acceptable practice though not legally binding." 15
The US list includes the following articles that relate directly to targeting:
• Article 5 1 except paragraph 6
• Article 52
• Article 54
• Articles 57-60
The fact ofUS acceptance in principle ofthese articles does not mean that there
are no problems regarding the US understanding of them. US interpretations,
while basically along similar lines to some ofthe statements made by NATO mem-
bers when ratifying Protocol I, sometimes go further. For example, official US defi-
nitions of "military objectives" use language that is significantly broader than that
ofArticle 52.2 as quoted above. One US version (with italics added here for empha-
sis) reads:
Military objectives are combatants and those objects which, by their nature, location,
purpose, or use, effectively contribute to the enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining
capability and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization would
constitute a definite military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the
time of the attack. 16
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In one subsequent US version of this definition, namely Military Commission
Instructions issued in 2003, the word 'definite' has been omitted. 17 This would ap-
pear to represent a further departure from the text of Article 52(2).
Some legal experts in the US armed forces have expressed serious concerns
about Article 52. For example, Major Jeanne Meyer, co-editor of the Operational
Law Handbook, stated in 2001 that this article "tries to constrict the use of air power
to the specific tactical military effort at hand" and "ignores the reality that a na-
tion's war effort is composed ofmore than just military components." 18 While not
suggesting total rejection ofthe provision, she urged the United States to "resist the
pressure to accept restrictive interpretations of Article 52.2." 19 In general, the
United States is anxious to retain some legal justification for attacks on certain tar-
gets that may not themselves be purely military, but which may, for example, con-
tribute to the military effort or constitute key parts of a regime's infrastructure.
All in all, it is not surprising that some commentators have indicated concern
about US interpretations ofwhat constitutes a military objective. They see the US
interpretation as differing significantly from Article 52, and as tending towards a
more permissive definition. 20 Are such expressions of concern well founded? One
could question the extent to which the current US position really represents, as is
sometimes claimed, a shift as compared to earlier US positions; and also whether
the US positions generally have not been similar in their meaning to some ofthe in-
terpretative declarations on Article 52 made by certain other States. However, it is
clear beyond doubt that the definition of military targets in Article 52 poses certain
problems for the United States despite its general acceptance of this article. More-
over, there are some differences of national approach on these matters, including
between the United Kingdom and the United States; and these can cause problems
during coalition military operations.
Is the law as it stands satisfactory? Mr. Walker suggests that it is not. He may be
right that the provisions of 1977 Protocol I are not as strong as many would wish;
and that when it comes to actual decisions on actual targets, they sometimes leave
considerable scope for interpretation and even for a necessarily subjective balanc-
ing process. However, he does not suggest specific changes, and he goes too far
when he states that "there really is very little if any truly black letter law in this
area." 21 The real problem may be, not the weakness of the law itself, but the very
broad official US interpretation of it. Although Mr. Walker is critical ofUS prac-
tice, especially the danger it poses to civilians, he does not explicitly note the
above-quoted US statements that, arguably, stretch almost to breaking point that
very scope for interpretation of which he is critical. There are serious arguments
both for and against the US emphasis oh concentrating attacks on the enemy re-
gime's sources ofpower and war-sustaining capability—and the debate about the
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adequacy or otherwise of the existing law needs to take account of this critically
important debate.
My main disagreement with Mr. Walker's treatment of the law on targeting re-
lates, not to the law's content or interpretation, but to its effect. In the four wars un-
der consideration there is evidence that, so far as the United States is concerned, the
effect of all the provisions on targeting contained in Protocol I, and even ofthe more
restricted list ofthose provisions accepted by the United States, has been much more
than the vague and subjective requirement for proportionality mentioned in Mr.
Walker's paper. This is not the place to elaborate on this point, or go into the many
relevant sources.22 At this stage it may be enough simply to assert that the process of
identifying and attacking targets in these four wars has been influenced by legal re-
quirements, including those of 1977 Protocol I. The fact that the US armed forces
have to defend their actions by the criteria established in the law ofwar has had more
effect on target selection and on policy generally than Mr. Walker allows. However, it
has had less effect in mitigating the horrors of war than might have been hoped.
Some of the reasons for this are explored in the next section.
Continuing Problems in the Use ofAir Power
The increased accuracy of air-delivered weapons, while undoubtedly a momen-
tous development in the history of war, is no cure-all. Even when coupled with
attempts to observe legal restrictions on targeting, it cannot guarantee either suc-
cess or no deaths ofinnocents. In the course ofthese four wars, figures for civilian
deaths have apparently not decreased in proportion to the increase in the use of
precision-targeted weapons. Why is this so?
Despite the improvements in accuracy, all four bombing campaigns aroused in-
ternational concern, largely on account of the danger to non-combatants. There
were reports of many attacks causing significant civilian casualties and damage.
Accuracy in hitting the intended target area did not itself necessarily eliminate such
problems. The US bombing of the Amiriya bunker in Baghdad on February 13,
1991 caused approximately 300 civilian casualties. In the Kosovo war in 1999, a
railway bridge was bombed when a passenger train was crossing it, with heavy loss
of life. In Afghanistan, the International Committee ofthe Red Cross warehouse in
Kabul was hit twice, on October 16 and 26, 2001; and there were numerous subse-
quent incidents in which large numbers of villagers were killed.
The question is: what are the specific reasons why the combination of increased
accuracy of air-delivered weapons and increased acceptance of certain rules relat-
ing to targeting have not produced a more dramatic change for the better? Mr.
Walker suggests that the main problem is that the relevant body of law is weak,
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especially as regards protection of civilians; and that the United States, as the last
superpower left standing, is in a situation of impunity. 23 However, a broader range
of factors is at work, many but not all of which are recognized in his paper. In the
hostile relations between adversaries in the four wars, at least eleven types ofopera-
tional problems can be identified:
1
.
No weapon is more accurate than the intelligence on which its use is based, and
this may sometimes be wrong or out ofdate, resulting in civilian damage and deaths.
2. Many targets are selected at very short notice, for example by ground-based
personnel in radio contact with aircraft overhead. This can mean that targets are
sometimes attacked without being subjected to cross-checking of information, or
lengthy legal and policy consideration. As Mr. Walker states, "fewer targets are now
planned through the target planning cycle and air tasking order."24
3. Precision-guided weapons are generally better at hitting fixed objects, such as
buildings, than moving objects that can be concealed, such as people and tanks.
This could lead to a perverse prioritization in favor of targeting buildings. (How-
ever, preliminary evidence from the 2003 war suggests effective use of air power
even against tanks that had been concealed under tree cover.)
4. In all countries, some military targets, whether fixed or mobile, are likely to be
in close proximity to civilians and civilian objects. Thus, even when a military tar-
get is accurately hit, there may be significant "collateral" damage, including de-
struction of houses and deaths of civilians.
5. As a response to the increased accuracy of targeting, the "receiving State" may
deliberately co-locate military objects close to civilians and civilian objects—thus
making it harder to attack them without harming civilians and incurring interna-
tional criticism on that account. (This problem is discussed further below.)
6. So-called "dual-use targets," such as a power station producing electricity for
both military and civilian uses, are sometimes attacked—often with serious short -
and long-term effects on the infrastructure of society.
7. Weapons, even if delivered with great precision, may themselves be of such a
nature as to cause serious and indiscriminate damage. For example, it is notorious
that cluster bombs frequently pose a hazard to civilians, including children—and
may continue to do so long after a war is over.
8. Malevolence, callousness, incompetence, and poor or inappropriate training
can also lead to attacks on the wrong places or people.
9. The greater accuracy of weapons risks creating a high level of anger against
those individuals and States responsible for target selection. If it is perceived
(whether rightly or wrongly) that what is hit is what a targeter intended to hit, there
may be a greater sense of outrage among the population of the target State and in
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international opinion generally. There is ample scope for conspiracy theories as to
why a particular target was attacked.
10. The greater accuracy of bombing makes possible certain forms of action,
such as targeted killings of individuals, that maybe exposed to a wide range of legal
and other criticisms. One example is a targeted killing that risks deaths of large
numbers of civilians (e.g., the Baghdad restaurant attack intended to kill Saddam
Hussein at the start ofthe 2003 Iraq War). Another example that could incur criti-
cism, mainly on human rights and jus ad bellum grounds, would be a targeted kill-
ing (e.g., of an alleged terrorist) in the territory of a foreign country when there is
no state ofwar with, or within, that country. Absence of formal consent of its gov-
ernment would aggravate the problem.
11. In an era marked by frequent threats of "strategic coercion" against certain
States to change their policies or even their regimes, there is sometimes tension be-
tween the perceived need to make an impressive threat (such as that of "shock and
awe" against Iraq in the run-up to the 2003 war) and then, ifforce is actually used, the
need to observe certain limitations on its use. An actual military campaign may be at
risk ofconforming more to the preceding threats than to the legal and other consid-
erations that might point in the direction of using force discriminately.
The problem of "friendly fire" confirms that the reasons for disasters often re-
late particularly to poor intelligence and hasty decision-making. In many cases in
the two wars in Iraq and in the Afghan war, US bombings led to casualties among
coalition forces. It appears that in most instances the target was incorrectly identi-
fied or a weapon incorrectly "locked on" to the wrong target. "Friendly fire" is not a
laws-of-war issue as such. However, it is a legal issue under the national law of the
States concerned, and can lead to national legal action—as it has done in the
United States as a result of an incident involving the death of Canadian soldiers in
Afghanistan. 25 Incidents of US "friendly fire" have also caused considerable con-
cern in the United Kingdom, especially as a result of the 2003 Iraq War. 26 The fre-
quency of such incidents confirms the thesis of this commentary, that modern
means ofwar can lead to disaster not because the law is weak, but because the fog,
chaos, confusion and sheer malevolence ofwar have survived into a new era.
A further problem with the new type of US bombing campaign concerns per-
ceptions ofthe balance of risk. In the eyes of third parties, it can easily look as if the
United States puts a lower value on the lives of Iraqis, Serbs or Afghans—even if ci-
vilian—than it does on its own almost-invulnerable aircrews. Mr. Walker seems to
share this view when he refers to "conflict marked by its [the United States'] vast
technological superiority and its leadership's aversion to friendly casualties—al-
most always at the expense ofhigher civilian casualties."27 1 am skeptical about this
proposition. It is far from proven that there is any straightforward link between the
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safety of US aircrew and higher civilian casualties. It might just as easily be argued
that the capacity to make decisions and to release (or refrain from releasing) weap-
ons in relative safety may contribute to the careful and discriminate use of
airpower. However, the hostile perception has some plausibility. Bombing from
high altitude must sometimes increase the risk of a target being inaccurately identi-
fied; and must also increase the time a weapon takes to reach its target on the
ground—by which time, for example, a previously empty bridge may have a pas-
senger train running across it. The perception of invulnerable warriors risking the
lives of civilians underneath feeds those hostile views ofthe United States that form
a background against which terrorism can flourish.
Perhaps the most profound problem of all regarding the use ofbombing is that
the United States and its allies have developed a concept ofwar aimed at targeting
the sources of an adversary's power, not all of which may be strictly and narrowly
military in character. Mr. Walker appears to equate this with "targeting the will of
the people."28 He is rightly opposed to the idea of a policy aimed at civilians, criti-
cizing it on both legal and practical grounds. However, the US doctrine is not nec-
essarily one of targeting the will of the people. Rather, it aims principally at
targeting the key sources and instruments of a regime's power—something that
may in particular cases be very different. This is the biggest single challenge to the
existing legal regime on targeting.
The debate about the bombing ofthe TV station in Belgrade in 1999 exemplifies
the difficulty ofdetermining what is a legal target. Mr. Walker calls this an example
of "ill-advised expansions of the definition of 'military object' even under the cur-
rent rules." However, it is not clear that what is involved is an expansion ofthe defi-
nition of military object. On the basis of the pre- 1977 law, especially the 1954
Hague Cultural Property Convention, Article 8(1) (a),29 a serious argument can be
made that attacks on a broadcasting station are not necessarily illegal. The question
is rather whether 1977 Protocol I drastically changed this situation by narrowing
the definition of "military object." It may or may not be relevant that in the Yugo-
slav revolution of September/October 2000 the resisters to the Milosevic regime
treated the same TV station as a high-priority target. One thing is certain: it will al-
ways, and quite properly, be difficult to persuade TV reporters that television sta-
tions are legitimate targets!
The Kosovo War raised many other issues indicating how easily a bombing
campaign can conflict with the targeting provisions of the laws of war. For exam-
ple, there were debates about what NATO should do when it started to run out of
military targets: should it then abandon the bombing campaign, or move on to
other targets? There is also the closely related analytical question: did attacks on
dual-use targets, and/or a perceived threat of further attacks directed at civilians and
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civilian objects, play a major part in the Yugoslav decision of June 3, 1999 to accept
the terms that were being pressed upon it?30 It is difficult to provide a definite answer
to that last question. One can certainly doubt whether any "single-factor" explana-
tion is adequate. However, while agreeing with Mr. Walker that Russia's abandon-
ment of Serbia was of crucial importance, I cannot agree with his strong assertion
that "air power didn't win the Kosovo campaign."31 At the very least it was one im-
portant contributory factor. The more difficult question is whether the potential
threat to specifically civilian objects and people was a part of the equation that con-
tributed to Serbia's defeat.
Defender's Obligation to Distinguish Military Activitiesfrom Civilian Objects
There are extensive requirements that apply as much to defenders as to attackers,
including the requirement not to locate military forces and equipment in civilian
areas or in protected buildings such as hospitals or mosques. 32 In these four wars
it appears that these legal requirements were deliberately violated by adversaries
in order to induce the US-led coalition to engage in an attack that caused civilian
casualties and destruction. On several occasions the United States asserted that
its opponents had faked civilian damage or, by illegally locating military assets in
or close to civilian ones (for example putting gun emplacements next to
mosques), had willfully created a situation in which US bombing, if it went
ahead, would be likely to cause civilian damage and incur international criticism.
Some evidence from the 2003 IraqWar in particular suggested that this may have
been happening systematically.
In this reading of events, the laws of war are being cynically misused in order to
make the attacker's actions appear indiscriminate and disproportionate. Such con-
duct, if it were proved to have the intention imputed here, would ofcourse constitute
a tribute of sorts to the practical importance of the principles of proportionality and
discrimination. Such conduct is all part of what Brigadier General Charles Dunlap
has called "lawfare," or "the strategy of using—or misusing—law as a substitute for
traditional means to achieve an operational objective."33
Why is there such a tendency of States subjected to coalition bombing to locate
military assets in or near civilian objects such as schools and mosques? Part of the
answer may be that it is a logical if deplorable reaction to the situation created by
effective US dominance of the air. If the United States and its partners can see and
strike anywhere, or at least it is believed that they can do so, it is not surprising that
its adversaries should locate their military assets in a place where any US attack
would be open to condemnation in the court ofworld opinion. Similarly, the very
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dominance the United States exerts on the battlefield generally may induce adver-
saries to other illegal forms of response, including international terrorism.
Conclusions
There is no denying some obvious truths about the impact of technological devel-
opments. The increased accuracy in the delivery ofweapons has had significant ef-
fects; ought to improve possibilities that bombing can bear a reasonable relation to
the law ofarmed conflict; and may contribute to a reduction in numbers of civilian
casualties in the territory being bombed. However, as this survey has suggested,
none of this means that we are in a brave new world of casualty-free warfare. In-
deed, the new accuracy in bombing poses a range of difficult and even threatening
problems, many of which relate to the rules on targeting in the laws of war. Such
problems contribute to Mr. Walker's pessimistic conclusion that "any positivist
notions . . . of the laws ofwar are basically gone. They have become what the more
cynical among us have always suspected—merely an admirable collection of de-
claratory and aspirational normative statements, to be obeyed or not as the exigen-
cies of the situation dictate."34
I cannot agree with this conclusion. Mr. Walker admits that he has "painted us
into a corner." 35 Yet his account of the corner is not completely convincing. He is
right to focus on the uniqueness of the situation where there is only one Great
Power. However, what he says about the supposed impunity of the United States
and its allies does not reflect accurately the full range of constraints on decision-
makers. True, US decision-makers are protected from the attentions of the Inter-
national Criminal Court (though in theory their British counterparts are not);
and in some measure they are protected from military reprisals as there is no ad-
versary of remotely equal military power. However, US decision-makers in-
volved in such matters as targeting must always have in mind the possibility of a
wide range of adverse consequences. Any actions which fly in the face of the de-
cent opinions ofhumankind, or which plainly violate the laws ofwar, may result in
adverse publicity, internal US legal procedures, local opposition in the area of op-
erations, and a loss ofsupport both domestically and internationally that could un-
dermine ongoing US policies. In the twentieth century the United States acquired a
unique international role thanks largely to its success in building, maintaining and
leading coalitions of States. That success is now in jeopardy, as the diminishing
number of member States in the coalitions between the 1991 and the 2003 Iraq
wars perhaps indicates.
What, if anything, can the United States and allies do in regard to the existing
(and admittedly modest) body of law as it applies to the use of air power in war? In
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principle three courses ofaction are possible. All three have strengths, and the pru-
dent conduct of policy must involve elements of all of them.
1. Adhere strictly to the existing black-letter law on targeting, especially the law as
outlined in 1977 Geneva Protocol I. This course has serious merits, and Mr. Walker,
despite his conclusion that there is "very little black letter law," shows his sympathy
for it, advocating strongly a default rule of not attacking civilians. 36
2. Recognize some right to interpret and adapt the rules in practice. The fact that
many States have made interpretative declarations in respect ofsome of these rules
suggests the strength ofthis approach. It indicates that the rules can properly be in-
terpreted to take account ofchanging circumstances and the legitimate interests of
States. In principle some degree of flexibility in treaty interpretation can have an
important function if the law is not to be seen as rigid and irrelevant. However,
there is a difference between a legitimate interpretation of the rules and an unac-
ceptable departure from them. Any actual departure needs to be managed carefully
if it is to be accepted by other States. A purely unilateral US departure from the tar-
geting provisions of Protocol I would be problematical. A possible difficulty of this
course is that different States might want to adapt or weaken the rules in different
ways, until very little was left of the treaty regime.
3. Revise the law. In general, there is remarkably little pressure to change or
amend the basic rules on targeting, including those in 1977 Geneva Protocol I.
There has been a dearth of specific proposals for formal agreement on these mat-
ters—whether to strengthen the law by making it more restrictive, or alternatively
to dilute it in order to bring regime-supporting activities and institutions more ex-
plicitly into the category oflegitimate targets. The main impetus for new law, so far
as the use ofweapons is concerned, is focused on such highly specific tasks as limit-
ing or prohibiting the use of cluster bombs.
Perhaps because he senses the difficulty of all these courses, Mr. Walker con-
cludes with a plea for political control ofthe military, which he sees as "the most ef-
fective way to allocate risk in an open and coherent fashion."37 1 am all in favor of
political control of the military, but to imagine that it is a solution to the problems
addressed in his paper is sheer escapism. The track record, including recently, sug-
gests that on the particular issue that concerns us here—effective implementation
ofthe law ofarmed conflict
—
political control often leads to confusion and failure.
We have heard eloquent testimony at this conference suggesting that in early 2003
it was political control that contributed to the remarkable failure of the Pentagon
to make plans for the occupation phase in Iraq. Similarly, in January 2002 it was
largely at the political level that a number of confusing statements were made
about the status and treatment of detainees at Guantanamo. Unfortunately both
the US and UK governments are somewhat distrustful of their own bureaucracies
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and those in the bureaucracies with specialist skills (including the law) sometimes
suffer in consequence.
My conclusions are that despite dramatic improvements in accuracy we are not
in an era in which the use of air power offers an escape from the cruelties and disas-
ters of war; that, albeit alongside a wide range of other considerations, the law as it
currently exists does offer a useful practical guide to targeting; that no country, not
even the United States, can afford to ignore basic legal provisions applicable to tar-
geting; that the interpretation to be placed on the law of targeting poses problems
for many countries, and not just the United States; that the law faces a major chal-
lenge in doctrines based on attacking the adversary regime's sources ofpower; that
implementation of the laws of war, while certainly a matter for political control,
must also remain central to the activities, planning and ethos of the armed forces;
and, finally, that recent air campaigns show how complex and paradoxical imple-
mentation of the law can be—but not that it has ceased to be an important stan-
dard for guiding the conduct of military operations.
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Targeting and Humanitarian Law:
Current Issues
Michael N. Schmitt1
In the 21st century, the art and science of targeting, particularly in the aerial
environment, has become extraordinarily complex. So too has compliance
with humanitarian law. Battlefields of centuries past were linear in character,
with opposing forces facing each other across a FEBA (forward edge of the bat-
tle area). This positioning, together with the limited range and mobility of
weapons systems, rendered civilian populations relatively immune to the direct
effects of warfare. Civilians were either distant from the battlefield or fled as
hostilities drew near.
The advent of long-range strike capability led to a revolution in military-legal
affairs. 2 Civilian populations and objects were not only placed at greater risk due to
their proximity to lucrative, and now viable, military and infrastructure targets,
but civilians and civilian objects became objectives themselves in various strategic
bombing doctrines. 3 Humanitarian law reacted by affirming their immunity from
direct attack, most notably with the 1977 codification ofthe distinction principle in
Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions.4
Today, technological advances in range, precision, and stealth, as well as the trans-
parency resulting from advanced C4ISR technologies,5 have again transformed the
nature ofwarfare. Entire countries now comprise the battlespace. And the technologi-
cal "haves" can strike the assets of their ill-equipped adversaries with near total
Targeting and Humanitarian Law: Current Issues
impunity. For instance, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition forces lost only one
fixed wing aircraft to enemy fire.6 Such asymmetry has momentous consequences, not
only for combat operations, but also for the application of humanitarian law.
This article explores several of the more pressing legal issues involving tar-
geting during 2 l st-century armed conflict—targeting doctrine, targeting an op-
ponent's leadership, targeting terrorists, the use of human and civilian object
shields, treating military installations as a unitary target, and computer net-
work attack. Each is especially relevant given the likely use of "lawfare" by op-
ponents of the United States and its coalition partners, most recently
demonstrated during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 7 Humanitarian law has be-
come a permanent fixture on the modern battlefield. Those who ignore this re-
ality do so at their own risk.
Targeting Doctrine, Compellance Campaigns, and Military Objectives
Effects-based operations (EBO) have replaced attrition targeting in US doctrine.
In attrition warfare, extensive pre-planned target lists are developed and targets
are then destroyed serially, while engaging targets of opportunity as located. Re-
duced to basics, the enemy is defeated by progressively weakening its military
forces. In contrast, effects-based operations represent "the maturation of . . .
technologies merged with the theory oftargeting for systematic effect rather than
absolute destruction." 8 The confluence of three factors makes EBO possible: ad-
vanced technologies; effects-based planning; and parallel warfare, a new concept
of operations. 9
Technological advances enable effects-based operations by generating new op-
tions for attack. For example, the use of low-observable (stealth) technologies in
the F- 1 1 7 Nighthawk or B-2 Spirit aircraft permits smaller attack packages because
stealth aircraft need no escorts. 10 This frees systems that would otherwise be tasked
for escort duties to conduct attacks themselves. It also heightens the likelihood of
mission success by making attacks less detectable than would be the case with pen-
etration by a large package.
Advances in precision also facilitate effects-based operations. The Joint Direct
Attack Munition (JDAM) constitutes the great leap forward in this regard. JDAMs
are guidance tail kits that use an inertial navigation system and global positioning
system satellite (GPS) linkage to achieve a CEP (circular error probable—radius of
a circle within which Vi of the bombs will strike) of approximately 20 feet when at-
tached to free-fall 1,000 and 2,000-pound bombs. 11 A 500-pound variant entering
the inventory will improve accuracy and allow aircraft to carry more weapons per
sortie. Nearly all attack aircraft can carry the JDAM, and each weapon is
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independently targetable. Thus, even single-seat fighters such as the F-16 can now
strike multiple targets during a single sortie. JDAM's bargain price tag of approxi-
mately $2 1 ,000 per tail kit makes it an affordable option against the vast majority of
targets. Combined, these characteristics dramatically increase the number of tar-
gets that can be struck in a very short period with a high degree of accuracy. 12 The
net result is the capability to conduct "shock and awe" campaigns, i.e., campaigns
that stun opponents into confusion and dismay.
Advances in information technology also enable effects-based operations. In-
formation systems now make it possible to "rapidly collect, share, access, and ma-
nipulate information," while sometimes linking the sensor directly to delivery
system. 13 By doing so more quickly and comprehensively than an opponent (and
by using information technology to blind the enemy), friendly forces can operate
inside his OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop. 14 Paralysis eventually results.
The second element ofEBO is effects-based planning. This method of planning
seeks to achieve specific effects with the least risk, in the shortest time possible, and
with minimal expenditure of resources by considering both direct and indirect ef-
fects. Direct effects are "immediate, first order consequences," 15 i.e., the damage
directly caused by the weapon. Classic attrition warfare emphasizes direct effects.
However, effects-based planning also factors in indirect effects—"the delayed and/
or displaced second- and third-order consequences of military action." 16 A typical
example is loss ofsupport for a regime that appears inept or impotent in the face of
repeated enemy attacks. 17
Both direct and indirect effects have three fundamental characteristics. The first
is the cumulative nature of individual effects. This occurs when the overall impact
of various attacks is greater then the sum of the individual attacks themselves; the
attacks operate synergistically. Loss of support for the regime in the example cited
above exemplifies this phenomenon.
Cascading effects are "indirect effects [that] ripple through an adversary target
system, often influencing other target systems as well." 18 Typically, they occur
when striking targets at a higher level of conflict. For instance, damaging a national
level command and control net will influence lower levels ofthe conflict as the abil-
ity to receive intelligence and direction from above, and to coordinate operations
with other units, diminishes. Targeting leadership represents perhaps the pinnacle
of a cascading effects focused mission.
Collateral effects are the unintended consequences of an attack. 19 To the extent
that foreseeable collateral effects affect civilians or civilian objects, the humanitarian
law principle of proportionality requires balancing them against the military advan-
tage that accrues from attacking the target.20 Further, although it is sometimes
153
Targeting and Humanitarian Law: Current Issues
questioned whether reverberating effects must be assessed during proportionality
calculations, US doctrine affirmatively requires planners to consider them. 21
Effects-based planners deconstruct target systems to identify that element
thereof the neutralization or destruction of which best achieves the desired effect.
Sensitivity to the typology of effects expands the universe of possible attacks likely
to yield that result. Moreover, targeting only components of the target system gen-
erating the desired effect means tasking fewer sorties, thereby increasing the avail-
ability of weapons systems for missions against other targets. EBO also creates
opportunities to avoid causing collateral damage and incidental injury. In the
words of one Pentagon briefer, "The best way to mitigate collateral damage is only
strike the stuffyou need to strike—or affect the stuffyou need to affect." 22
As to the objects or individuals against which EBO is most effective, one must
understand that the effect sought determines the precise target; categories of tar-
gets cannot be assessed in the abstract. That said, because Colonel John Warden's
strategic rings concept continues to resonate in airpower circles, political leader-
ship, economic systems, supporting infrastructure, population, and military forces
remain attractive targets to planners. 23 Focusing on these key target sets does not
imply that civilians or civilian objects should be attacked directly, although, as will
be discussed later, some commentators are suggesting exactly that. Instead, EBO
creatively identifies targets likely to affect, but not necessarily harm, these strategic
centers of gravity.
In addition to a fresh planning approach, EBO leverages a new concept of opera-
tions, Parallel Warfare and Simultaneous Attack. 24 Traditionally, warfare was serial
and sequential. In an oversimplified example, because planners usually deemed it es-
sential to establish air superiority before conducting a concentrated bombing cam-
paign against other targets, the enemy air defense system typically dominated air
tasking orders in the early days of a conflict. Within that target set, the attack plan
tended to be sequential—early warning radars, then interceptor operations centers,
followed by airfields and surface-to-air missiles. To a measurable degree, this ap-
proach dominated planning during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
Serial and sequential attack evolved into parallel and sequential attack, in which
elements of a single target system are struck simultaneously, but systems are hit se-
quentially. For instance, Operation Allied Force, the 1999 NATO conflict against
Yugoslavia, was planned as a phased air campaign: Phase —deploy; Phase 1—air
superiority over Kosovo; Phase 2—military targets in Kosovo; Phase 3—high value
military and security forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and Phase 4
—
redeploy. Once operations began, however, the seemingly bright lines faded. With
air superiority attacks underway, political pressure mounted to stop the ongoing
slaughter of the Kosovar Albanians. When the weight of attack shifted to military
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targets in Kosovo in response to such pressure, calls for attacking regime targets
grew louder in the belief that Milosevic held the key to ending the conflict on ac-
ceptable terms.
Inevitably, a new concept ofoperations emerged, one that leverages the techno-
logical superiority of US forces and fits neatly with effects-based planning ap-
proaches
—
parallel and simultaneous attack. Illustrated by Operation Iraqi
Freedom, this concept calls for simultaneous attack on every element of a target
system, as well as on all systems, from the initiation of hostilities. The beauty ofthe
concept is that it encourages treating the enemy as a single system, thereby taking
advantage of cascading and cumulative effects occurring across what were for-
merly treated as separate systems. This frees up weapons systems for other attacks,
which in turn increase the intensity and speed of the campaign.
The dilemma with EBO from the humanitarian law point ofview is that it coin-
cides with an era in which technological advances and dramatic asymmetries in
military capabilities make possible coercive strategies that seek to compel (a
compellance strategy) an opponent to engage in, or desist from, a particular course
of conduct.25 The archetypal example was Operation Allied Force, which was de-
signed to compel President Milosevic to return to the bargaining table and end sys-
tematic mistreatment of the Kosovar Albanian population.
If one is trying to conquer an enemy absolutely, destroying its military through
attrition warfare, albeit less efficient and effective than EBO, makes some sense;
given the objective, the military is a logical center of gravity. But if the objective is
compellance, force must be applied surgically, striking at centers ofgravity likely to
alter the opponent's cost-benefit analysis, without imposing costs so great as to
render him either intransigent or irrational. 26 Because the objectives underlying
the use of force determine centers of gravity, they may shift from the enemy's
armed forces to non-military targets dear to the civilian population or leadership. 27
Indeed, as Allied Force demonstrated, striking military targets may actually em-
bolden the civilian population.28
Since effects-based targeting involves precisely this sort of search for effects tied
to both military and political objectives, it subtly suggests an expansive view of the
appropriate targets and target sets in a conflict. For instance, dual-use facilities be-
come particularly appealing targets because the attacker not only benefits from de-
struction or neutralization of the target's military value, but also from cumulative
effects on the civilian population.
Lieutenant General Michael Short, Air Component Commander for Operation
Allied Force, made it clear that this is how commanders tasked with compellance
missions think. In a controversial interview, General Short was reported as saying "I
felt that on the first night the power should have gone off, and major bridges around
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Belgrade should have gone into the Danube, and the water should be cut off so the
next morning the leading citizens of Belgrade would have got up and asked 'Why are
we doing this?' and asked Milosevic the same question."29 A crescendo of criticism
followed, for he seemed to be suggesting that in a compellance campaign it was ap-
propriate to attack civilian targets because this would hasten victory.
General Short backtracked somewhat at a 2001 US Naval War College
conference on the Kosovo campaign. After stating that the center of gravity was
"Milosevic and the men and women around him who depend upon him and who
he, in turn, depends upon," he stated,
I do not think that you are so naive that I do not say to myself and to my planners that
this will also make the Serb population unhappy with their senior leadership because
they allowed this to happen. But that is a spin off—a peripheral result—ofme targeting
a valid military objective.30
The problem is that Article 57 of Protocol Additional I, which the United States
accepts as reflective ofcustomary international law, provides that " [w]hen a choice
is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar military ad-
vantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be ex-
pected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects." 31 Thus,
collateral damage and incidental injury are only lawful when they are unavoidable
consequences of an otherwise proportionate attack selected as the most "humani-
tarian" option from among equally militarily advantageous alternatives.
In fact, we are seeing these sorts of fissures in the guise ofboth interpretive dis-
agreement and revisionist claims ofthe inadequacy ofthe humanitarian law defini-
tion of"military objectives." Article 52 defines military objectives as "objects which
by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the cir-
cumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage." 32 Protocols II
and III ofthe Conventional Weapons Convention33 and the Second Protocol to the
Cultural Property Convention,34 as well as many military manuals and training
material (including those of the US), 35 repeat this formula.
While even the United States accepts this as the correct articulation of the legal
concept of "military objective," explanations of the standard differ. Most notably,
the United States takes an expansive stance. For instance, the authoritative US
Navy's The Commanders Handbook on the Law ofNaval Warfare includes "war sus-
taining" activities within the scope ofthe phrase. 36 Similarly, US joint doctrine pro-
vides that " [c] ivilian objects consist of all civilian property and activities other than
those used to support or sustain the adversary's warfighting capability."37
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This interpretation has generated some negative reaction, particularly within
the non-governmental organization (NGO) community and academia. For in-
stance, one respected academic has opined that
Acts of violence against persons or objects of political, economic or psychological
importance may sometimes be more efficient to overcome the enemy, but are never
necessary, because every enemy can be overcome by weakening sufficiently its military
forces. Once its military forces are neutralized, even the politically, psychologically or
economically strongest enemy can no longer resist. 38
Such assertions are overly simplistic. First, they assume that both sides of a con-
flict are willing to commit the resources necessary to conquer the enemy. Operation
Allied Force demonstrates that this is not always the case. It may well be that one side
is seeking limited objectives and therefore only prepared to employ (or risk) forces
necessary to achieve those specific objectives. In the campaign against the Federal
Republic ofYugoslavia, NATO explicitly ruled out the use ofground forces, thereby
effectively pre-announcing its unwillingness to commit all the resources at its dis-
posal to fully neutralize the Yugoslavian military. Instead, NATO's strategy was to
successively impose costs on Milosevic until his cost-benefit calculations shifted
enough to force him into compliance with its demands.39 Indeed, given 21 st-century
attitudes towards the use of force, and despite the conquest ofboth Afghanistan and
Iraq by the United States and its partners, most States initiating a conflict are likely to
seek limited objectives not involving conquest, and therefore will be unwilling to risk
the forces that would be required to fully "neutralize" its opponent. Any attempt to
convince States to narrowly interpret "military objective" because "every enemy"
can be overcome by sufficiently weakening its military forces (albeit probably true),
fails to take cognizance of the realities of modern conflict.
The explanation offered above also rather optimistically assumes that neutral-
ization of enemy forces is sufficient to achieve one's objectives. However, United
States and coalition forces have suffered more casualties in Iraq since President
Bush declared hostilities at an end than during the preceding period in which they
"neutralized" the Iraqi military as an organized armed force. Clearly, victory re-
quires much more than simply defeating one's opponents on the field of battle.
Humanitarian concerns may actually auger against an overly restrictive defini-
tion of military objective. Consider, again, Operation Allied Force. Had NATO
limited its attack to Yugoslavia's military forces, Milosevic might never have
yielded, for he could have simply sheltered his forces while waiting for NATO re-
solve to dissolve. In the process, identifying and destroying military forces would
have become more difficult as attacks reduced the number of unambiguous and
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vulnerable targets. The likelihood of collateral damage and incidental injury would
resultantly have increased. Many analysts feared exactly this would happen once
the decision not to mount a ground campaign became public—that Milosevic
would wait out NATO while his centers of gravity remained intact and the Yugo-
slav population suffered (and his support grew). Without doubt, limiting the target
sets to enemy military forces can paradoxically sometimes be less humanitarian
than embracing a broader interpretation of military objectives.
Although few States explicitly accept the overt US extension to "war sustaining"
targets, the definition of military objectives is nevertheless generally applied con-
textually. The Report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on the NATO bombing campaign provides, for in-
stance, that
When the definition is applied to dual-use objects which have some civilian uses and
some actual or potential military use (communications systems, transportation
systems, petrochemical complexes, manufacturing plants of some types), opinions
may differ. The application of the definition to particular objects may also differ
depending on the scope and objectives ofthe conflict. Further, the scope and objectives
of the conflict may change during the conflict.40
That there is a gray area regarding the meaning of military objectives was per-
haps best illustrated in the controversy generated by the NATO attack on the Bel-
grade's Radio Televisija Srbije (RTS) facility. The ensuing litigation in the
European Court ofHuman Rights focused on whether the facility was a civilian ob-
ject. 41 Although the Court eventually dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds,
and despite the fact that the ICTY prosecutor found that there was insufficient ba-
sis to indict,42 many in the humanitarian law community believe the attack was un-
lawful under the circumstances. This despite a prominent military law expert's
inclusion of "broadcast and television stations" in an illustrative list of military ob-
jectives in his award-winning book,43 something the ICRC had done decades ear-
lier in a proposed list of military objectives it offered in 1956.44
Application of the concept of military objective clearly expands or contracts
based on the scope and goals of the conflict. Interestingly, when one compares the
academic commentary on the subject to application of the principle, the practical
differences narrow. For instance, a premier legal thinker in the field has stated that
the US approach "goes too far." But, a review of air campaigns conducted by the
United States, the country that coined the term "war-sustaining," reveals that
strikes in which the military nature of the target is questionable are extraordinarily
rare. Instead, criticism of US attacks tends to center on their proportionality or
compliance with the requisite duty of care. 45 That said, EBO has the capacity to put
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greater substance into the debate. After all, if one, in a Clausewitzian manner, fo-
cuses on effects during a conflict intended to coerce and compel an opponent
rather than conquer him, the war sustaining verbiage looks very attractive.
Interestingly, it is arguably not interpretive disagreement that presents the
greatest threat to humanitarian law, but rather revisionism on the part of those
who argue that the principle itself needs to be adjusted. Most significant in this re-
gard are the fascinating writings of Brigadier General Charles Dunlap, a US Air
Force judge advocate who serves as senior legal adviser for the Air Force's Air Com-
bat Command. In a very thoughtful—and very provocative—2000 Strategic Re-
view article, he argues that
We need a new paradigm when using force against societies with malevolent
propensities. We must hold at risk the very way of life that sustains their depredations,
and we must threaten to destroy the world as they know it if they persist. This means
the air weapon should be unleashed against entirely new categories of property that
current conceptions ofLOAC put off-limits.46
General Dunlap limits this deviation from current principles ofhumanitarian
law to conflicts with "societies whose moral compass is wildly askew." Moreover,
he does not advocate targeting either noncombatants or objects that are "genu-
inely indispensable to the survival of the noncombatant," although "almost ev-
erything else would be fair game."47 As an example, he suggests "reducing the
middle and upper classes to a subsistence level through the destruction of all but
essential goods" might pressure the very groups best positioned to effect the de-
sired change.48 In General Dunlap's view, doing so is just because the population
bears some culpability for supporting the government, or at least failing to fulfill
a duty to oppose it.49 To an extent, he is a 21 st-century adherent to the views of
Giulio Douhet, the Italian air war theorist who, in his 1921 classic Command of
the Air; suggested that the civilian population and its morale were important cen-
ters of gravity. 50
Although not addressing it directly, the Dunlap proposal takes EBO to the ex-
treme. Indeed, General Dunlap suggests that the purpose behind the use of force is
not punishment, but rather "eviscerating the disposition of the adversary to conduct
objectionable activities." 51 His views resonate with many. For instance, another
thoughtful active duty officer, in a 200 1 Air Force Law Review article, has suggested
that it might be more humane to attack civilian property if doing so would demoral-
ize the population and contribute to conflict termination, than to protect property at
the expense ofprolonging hostilities. 52 What General Dunlap and his supporters are
calling for appears to be nothing less than a fundamental rejection of a major
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element of the principle of distinction, a principle that the International Court of
Justice labeled "intransgressible" in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. 55
Effects-based operations, focused as they are on effects vice targets, enliven the
debate over the distinction principle's effectiveness in infusing humanitarian ends
into armed conflict. But suggesting civilian objects can be legitimate targets of at-
tack risks the spiral of violence against innocents that humanitarian law, such as
that prohibiting certain reprisals, seeks to prevent. Moreover, suggesting that at-
tacking civilian objects is appropriate when there is a moral imbalance between
belligerents would effectively mean malevolent leaders could deprive innocents
among their population of humanitarian law's protection against the ill-effects of
war. Although an "ends justify the means" philosophy may be appealing in the
short term, it will ultimately prove a very slippery slope.
The appropriate balance lies between the extremes. As General Short correctly
noted above, there is nothing wrong with striking legitimate military objectives
in a manner intended to affect the enemy's will to continue the fight or the civil-
ian population's support for the government. For instance, in order to demon-
strate that they controlled the air during the Korean conflict, US forces dropped
leaflets pre-announcing strikes on legitimate military targets. 54 US air forces suc-
cessfully employed this tactic again during Operation Desert Storm, when warn-
ings of impending B-52 strikes led to mass surrender by Iraqi forces. There is
nothing inherently immoral or illegal about targeting the will of the people or
their leader. That said, humanitarian law does, and should, dictate how that may
be accomplished.
Moreover, one must be careful what one wishes for. Opponents of advanced
militaries have far more to gain from a relaxation ofthe distinction standard than
those capable of fielding state-of-the-art forces. The disadvantaged side in an
asymmetrical fight has every incentive to strike at civilians and civilian objects
because it cannot hope to prevail on the field of battle. Thus, its sole chance of
victory (or chance offending off defeat) lies in striking a center of gravity other
than the military. This being so, a restrictive reading of military objective actually
benefits the advantaged side by allowing it to leverage its superior military capa-
bilities. It is only when mixing ad helium and in hello principles by labeling one
belligerent malevolent (as suggested by General Dunlap), that it makes any sense
for the militarily advantaged side to adopt a less restrictive standard; so long as its
cause is just, it need not fear attacks against its civilians or civilian objects. This is
naive. The difficulty of objectively determining that a belligerent is in the wrong
(consider the case of Iraq) means that in practice any shift in the law will apply
equally to both sides.
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Relaxing the principle of distinction would also deprive the advantaged side of
the opportunity to use what General Dunlap has labeled "lawfare."55 To the extent
the enemy begins targeting civilians and civilian objects, it can be publicly branded
criminal, thereby potentially undercutting both domestic and international sup-
port. Thus, lawfare can impose costs on an adversary's attempt to compensate for
militaryweakness by shifting the center ofgravity he is attacking. What proponents
of relaxing humanitarian law norms seem to have missed is that the question, from
a purely practical point of view, is not whether relaxation of a norm benefits your
side; rather, it is the relative costs and benefits of doing so vis-a-vis likely oppo-
nents. Therefore, adopting an effects-based operations doctrine should not neces-
sarily lead to support for any relaxation of the principle of distinction, because
doing so might well enhance the opponent's ability to achieve enhanced effects
with his own operations.
Targeting Leadership
Always an appealing target set, EBO doctrine and the growing emergence of
compellance as a campaign objective have heightened the desire to strike directly at
enemy leadership. During Operation Allied Force, for instance, government min-
istries were included as strategic targets, ostensibly because ofthe "longer term and
broader impact on the Serb military machine."56 Of late, killing the enemy leader
himself has become an open objective of military operations; failure to do so is
sometimes even deemed operational failure—consider the survival of Osama bin
Laden. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the media was actually reporting at-
tempts to kill Saddam Hussein in nearly real time. 57 Contrast this with the removal
ofthe US Air Force Chiefof Staffin 1990 for suggesting Saddam's death was an aim
of the Operation Desert Storm air campaign. 58
Targeting leadership is often mislabeled "assassination." In fact, the lineage of
the humanitarian law prohibition on assassination (e.g., Article 148 of the 1863
Lieber Code) demonstrates that the term is best interpreted as the "treacherous
killing ofone's enemy,"59 for example by perfidiously feigning protected status.60 It
is not the target's status that determines whether a wartime assassination has been
conducted, but rather the method by which he or she is attacked.
Recall that humanitarian law requires distinguishing between combatants (and
illegal noncombatants) and civilians in conducting attacks. With regard to target-
ing enemy leadership, therefore, the determinative issue is the status ofthe individ-
ual in question; those who are combatants or wrongfully taking a direct part in
hostilities, i.e., illegal combatants, may legally be attacked.
Article 5 1 of Protocol Additional I sets forth the relevant principle:
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Art. 5 1 .2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the
object of attack ....
Art. 51.3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.
Violations are grave breaches under Article 85 of the Protocol, and, therefore,
States party to the Protocol are obligated to search for individuals alleged to have
targeted civilians (or ordered them to be targeted) and either try them for the of-
fense or turn them over to another State party willing to do so.61 An analogous ban
for non-international armed conflict appears in Protocol Additional II,62 while the
Statute ofthe International Criminal Court contains prohibitions along these lines
for both international and non-international armed conflict. 63
Since "civilians" enjoy immunity from attack, it is necessary to define the term.
Under Article 50 of Protocol Additional I, a protected civilian is someone who does
not fall into the categories enumerated in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention
of 1949 and Article 43 of Protocol Additional I.64 Excluded as civilians are members
of the armed forces; militia, volunteer corps, or members of an organized resistance
commanded by a person responsible for subordinates, who wear a distinctive sign or
uniform, carry weapons openly, and are subject to a disciplinary system capable of
enforcing the law of armed conflict; and members of a levee en masse. Article 44 re-
duces the requirement to carry arms openly and wear distinctive emblems or cloth-
ing, but not in situations likely to have much bearing on whether a member of the
enemy leadership can be targeted.65 Combatant organizations can include paramili-
tary or armed law enforcement agencies when incorporated into the armed forces if
other parties to the conflict have been formally notified of the integration.66
There is little doubt that any member (except chaplains and medical personnel)
of such organizations can be targeted, although not directly applying force them-
selves. For instance, a public affairs officer in the military is a legitimate target de-
spite the fact that he or she does not perform typically military functions.67 Even
heads of State or government who are active members of the armed forces may be
targeted; humanitarian law provides them no specially protected status.68
Senior leaders who are not members of the armed forces, but lie in the chain of
command, are more difficult to categorize. Their legitimacy as a target must be as-
sessed contextually and holistically. For instance, wearing military uniforms, carry-
ing weapons, or using military rank suggest combatant status, but are not dispositive.
The Queen of England wears a uniform and carries a ceremonial dagger during the
"trooping of the colours," but is hardly a combatant by virtue of doing so.
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A more telling indication is the proposed target's role in the command of the
armed forces. Civilians often fill dejure positions relative to the armed forces. As an
example, by Article II of the US Constitution, the President is the "Commander-in-
Chief."69 Similarly, the Queen ofEngland is the British Commander-in-Chiefpursu-
ant to the unwritten constitution of the United Kingdom, and each of the royals
serves as a regimental "Colonel-in-Chief." In fact, British officers swear an oath of al-
legiance to the Queen, not the State, and it is the Queen who issues their commission.
It would be incongruous to suggest that all such individuals are legitimate targets.
Obviously, ifa post is purely ceremonial, or otherwise solely dejure in nature, i.e., if it
involves no military decision-making, then the incumbent is a civilian who enjoys
protected status. State practice would also suggest that decision-making at the strate-
gic level ofwar does not render the participant a combatant (legal or illegal), because
such decisions are in essence political. As an example, attempting to build an inter-
national coalition would not alone suffice. However, ifan individual occupying a de
jure position makes decisions affecting the operational or tactical level of war, he or
she is sufficiently involved in military operations to become legitimately targetable. 70
At times, individuals without a de jure position in the chain of command also
exercise influence over military operations. For example, Congress must approve
all military funding in the United States. This makes Senators and Congressmen,
particularly those on committees dealing with the military, enormously influential
vis-a-vis defense policy. Or consider individuals tied to a dictator who exercise
great influence over particular aspects of a conflict, such as certain members of
Saddam Hussein's family or other highly placed members ofhis tribe from Tikrit.
In such cases, the critical issue is whether they are taking a direct part in hostili-
ties as envisaged by Article 51.3 of Protocol Additional I (see text above). As to the
meaning of the term "direct part," the Commentary to the Protocol states that
" [d] irect participation in hostilities implies a direct causal relationship between the
activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy at the time and place where the
activity takes place." 71 If a leader makes combat decisions at the tactical level such
as target selection, then he or she would certainly be directly participating. Argu-
ably, the same is true for those who act in a like manner at the operational level. Es-
sentially, leaders who decide how and where to use military force are directly
participating in hostilities.
As an aside, note the Article 51.3 "unless and for such time" qualifier. Some
have suggested that this allows direct participants who are not formally part of
the armed forces to opt in and out of "direct participant" status, and, as a result,
susceptibility to attack. This position runs counter to the underlying purposes of
humanitarian law because it would encourage a lack of respect for the principle
of distinction on the part of the victims of those moving back and forth through
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the revolving door. A much more logical and practical standard provides that
once an individual has opted into the hostilities, he or she remains a valid military
objective until unambiguously opting out. This may occur through extended
non-participation or an affirmative act of withdrawal. 72 Since the individual who
directly participated did not enjoy any privilege to engage in hostilities in the first
place, it is reasonable that he or she assumes the risk that the other side is unaware
of such withdrawal.
Obviously, gray area situations exist in which the sufficiency of the causal rela-
tionship to the conduct of hostilities is unclear. Indeed, the issue of the scope of di-
rect participation is the subject of an ongoing international project sponsored by
the International Committee of the Red Cross. In uncertain cases, it is prudent to
interpret the concept narrowly, since striking directly at an opponent's leadership
can be highly destabilizing. This is especially so where the proposed target is not in
the chain ofcommand, for the absence ofa position in an armed force or its civilian
control structure creates a rebuttable presumption that he or she enjoys protected
status as a civilian.
As should be apparent, applying the humanitarian law bearing on leadership
targeting can prove difficult in practice. With the exception of situations in which
the leaders are members of the armed forces, decapitation operations inevitably
risk condemnation on legal, or even moral, grounds. Consider the Israeli targeted
killing strategy. 73 Although the operations are clearly legal in many cases, 74 they are
widely condemned as violations of international law. 75
Non-legal reasons also militate against mounting decapitation strikes. They
may strengthen enemy resolve or morale, particularly if the target becomes a mar-
tyr in the eyes of the enemy population. Leadership attacks also risk retaliation
against one's own leadership or other high value targets like the civilian popula-
tion. When the target has ties to terrorist groups, this possibility is especially acute.
Targeting leadership may further be perceived as escalation, an upping of the
stakes which increases the level of violence and complicates conflict termination.
Indeed, an individual aware of being targeted may become intransigent, even irra-
tional, thereby rendering his military operations less predictable.
Of course, there is always the chance that targeted individuals may be replaced
by less acceptable alternatives. And ifthey had civil responsibilities, their death may
limit the ability ofthe State to recover from conflict, thereby presenting the victori-
ous occupying forces with greater occupation challenges. The simple fact is that
quite aside from normative barriers, targeting an enemy leader may be insensible
from a practical point of view.
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Targeting Terrorists
In the aftermath of the tragic attacks of September 11, the use of force against ter-
rorists has been fervently debated, particularly as the preferred response paradigm
shifted from law enforcement to military action. Unfortunately, the analysis has
tended to be overcomplicated.
During armed conflict, whether international or non-international in nature,
the issue ofterrorism is irrelevant vis-a-vis targeting. All combatants and individu-
als taking direct part in hostilities are targetable regardless of their motive or the
object or persons they attack.
The quandary surfaces in cases ofterrorism occurring outside armed conflict. As a
matter of law, the issue is one of self-defense. Article 51 of the UN Charter sets forth
the codified law on the subject. It provides, in relevant part, that "[n]othing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right ofindividual or collective self-defense
ifan armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations "76 The ques-
tion is whether non-State actors such as terrorists can commit an "armed attack" that
allows the victim State to respond with military force as if it had been attacked by an-
other State.
It is incontrovertible that since 9/11 the international community has ac-
cepted just such an interpretation of the law of self-defense. Virtually no State
voiced any opposition to the US and coalition attacks on al-Qaeda forces in Af-
ghanistan that began October 7, 2001. Indeed, two pre-October 7 th Security
Council resolutions specifically cited the right to self-defense with reference to
the 9/11 attacks, 77 NATO and other international organizations invoked the col-
lective defense provisions oftheir constitutive treaties,78 and many States either con-
tributed forces to the effort or provided other forms of support. 79 Following com-
mencement of hostilities in Afghanistan, international support for the coalition
operations remained strong and widespread. 80 Clearly, international law is now
interpreted as permitting military operations in self or collective defense against
terrorist acts committed by non-State actors. However, when may those defensive
operations occur?
Self-defense is obviously permissible in response to an ongoing attack; that
much is clear from Article 51 on its face. When armed action follows an attack, its
legality becomes murkier. Some have suggested that since the attack is over, the ap-
propriate responses are law enforcement {vis-a-vis the terrorists) or diplomacy and
sanctions (vis-a-vis State support). Negative reaction to past responses to terrorist
attacks, such as the near universal criticism of Operation El Dorado Canyon that
followed the 1986 bombing of the La Belle discotheque in Berlin, 81 demonstrates
that States have tended to be uneasy with counter-terrorist actions that smack of
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retaliation or retribution. Yet, denying the possibility ofpost-attack military action
would surrender the initiative to non-State terrorist actor's intent on continuing
their campaign of violence against the target State and its citizens.
A much more effective and appropriate way to analyze terrorism and military
responses thereto is to ask whether an attack was part of a continuing campaign
conducted by the terrorist group against the responding State. If so, the individual
actions constituting it are no more separate and distinct than tactical engagements
in a military campaign. For instance, al-Qaeda has been attacking US targets for
over a decade in a regular and very violent campaign. In the face ofsuch campaigns,
defensive actions may continue until it is reasonable to conclude the terrorist cam-
paign has ended.
By this approach, the defending State may conduct strikes against those who would
carry out subsequent attacks, not in retaliation or retribution and not in anticipation of
future acts ofterrorism, but rather because the terrorist campaign is underway. As with
all defensive actions, the two requirements of self-defense apply. First, defensive action
has to be necessary, i.e., non-forceful measures (such as law enforcement, diplomacy,
economic sanctions, etc.) would not suffice to deter further attacks making up the ter-
rorist campaign. Second, the use of force must be proportional.82 Proportionality does
not refer to the relationship between the force against which one is defending and that
used in self-defense. Rather, proportional force is that amount offeree necessary to ef-
fectively defend against the attack, and no more. Assessed on a case-by-case basis, it
may either exceed or fall short of that used by the attacker.
Characterizing individual terrorist attacks as a part of a single integrated campaign
clarifies the legality ofresponses thereto. For instance, when a CIA-controlled Predator
attacked a car carrying Qaed Senyan al-Harthi, al-Qaeda's senior operative in Yemen,
in 2002, there was much discussion about targeted killings, the nature of the conflict,
and so forth. Yet, al-Harthi had been tied to the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole
and was still active in a terrorist group against which law enforcement had proven inef-
fective and which had vowed to carry out more terrorist strikes against the United
States in the aftermath of their highly successful attacks of September ll.83 Addi-
tionally, the CIA conducted the operation with the cooperation of the Yemeni intelli-
gence service.84 The only debatable issue from a self-defense perspective was whether
al-Harthi could have been arrested instead of killed. Although ultimately a question of
fact, it appears reasonable for US officials to have concluded that there was a possibility
he would elude capture, thereby necessitating the lethal attack.
An analogous analysis applies to Israel Defense Force operations targeting specific
Palestinians. To the extent the targets are clearly involved in an ongoing campaign of
terrorism, and in the absence of other reliable means of neutralizing them, they may
be attacked in self-defense when there is a "specific and imminent" threat.85 Thus, in
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such cases, the operations are legal quite aside from the separate issues ofwhether an
armed conflict is underway and, if so, its character under humanitarian law.
A third possibility is mounting counter-terrorist strikes before the initial terror-
ist attack has taken place. The seminal legal issue here is neither necessity nor pro-
portionality, but rather imminency, for the weight ofauthority in international law
requires that an attack be imminent before acting in self-defense. In the immortal
words of Secretary of State Daniel Webster in correspondence with Lord Ash-
burton following the 1837 Caroline incident, the need for defensive actions must be
"instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice ofmeans, and no moment for delibera-
tion."86 Webster's verbiage has matured over time into a requirement that the de-
fending party wait until the last possible moment before acting anticipatorily. 87
Professor Yoram Dinstein has rejected the term "anticipatory" in favor of "in-
terceptive" on the basis that Article 5 1 requires an armed attack, not the possibility
thereof. He propounds a standard that requires the attacker to have "committed it-
self to an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way." As Professor Dinstein ex-
plains, "[t]he crucial question is who embarks upon an irreversible course of
action, thereby crossing the Rubicon." 88 By this approach, no shot need be fired
prior to the defensive action, but the attack operation must have been launched.
Professor Dinstein's analysis is an insightful balancing of the practical need to
deliver a defensive blow before the opponent strikes (lest it be too late to mount an
effective defense) with the apparent clarity of the Article 5 1 requirement that an
armed attack have occurred. The one difficulty with his approach is the require-
ment of irrevocability, a criterion that may be too difficult to judge except ex post
facto. A more workable tack may be to appraise the attacker's commitment to fol-
low through, the nature of the acts already performed, and the extent to which the
defensive action occurs during the last viable window of opportunity to mount an
effective defense.
If a State initiates defensive action before being attacked, the evidence of the
pending attack (or follow-on attacks in case of a terrorist campaign), the need to
militarily defend oneself, and the perpetrator's identity, must be very credible. This
was the unambiguous lesson of the widespread criticism of the US strikes into Su-
dan in 1998 following terrorist bombings of its embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and
Nairobi. Compare the muted criticism of related strikes against terrorist camps in
Afghanistan. Since the two operations were conducted simultaneously and in re-
sponse to the same terrorist attacks, the logical explanation for the dramatically
different international reactions was a pervasive belief that in the case of the attacks
into Khartoum, the United States got it wrong by striking a pharmaceutical plant
with no ties to terrorism.
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Evidentiary issues again surfaced in the aftermath ofUS and allied operations in
Iraq in 2003. Failure to locate convincing evidence of any Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction programs or Iraqi ties to al-Qaeda generated significant criticism ofthe
decision to attack. 89 As in the Sudanese case, concern that the attack was based on
insufficient and faulty intelligence was pervasive.
Given that terrorists intentionally seek to mask their activities, evidence in ter-
rorism cases will seldom be unassailable; therefore, to demand perfect evidence of
future attacks and their source would be to render victims defenseless. A better
threshold is one that requires evidence on which counterterrorist operations are
justified to be "clear and compelling." The United States proffered this standard in
its notification to the Security Council that it was acting in self-defense when at-
tacking al-Qaeda and Taliban assets in Afghanistan. It articulated the same crite-
rion when briefing the North Atlantic Council on the complicity of the two groups
in the 9/11 attacks. 90 Both the Security Council and North Atlantic Council appear
to have accepted the standard as sufficiently high, for neither criticized the ensuing
military operations. A mere preponderance standard would certainly be too low to
justify resort to military force, the most significant act in international relations,
whereas a beyond a reasonable doubt standard would clearly be too high in the
shadowy world of terrorism.
Finally, the issue of who can legally conduct counterterrorism operations in-
volving armed force has drawn some attention. Specifically, must operations be
mounted by combatants or can others, such as members of intelligence agencies or
law enforcement personnel, conduct them?
If the operations are conducted during an international armed conflict, and the
terrorists are taking part in the conflict, then combat operations may be conducted
only by combatants. Article 43 of Protocol Additional I codifies this point of cus-
tomary international law. 91 As noted earlier, combatants are members of the
armed forces and paramilitary or armed law enforcement agencies incorporated
into the armed forces.92
No such limitation applies in a non-international armed conflict. On the con-
trary, intelligence and law enforcement agencies are regularly involved in attempt-
ing to maintain law and order during an internal conflict. The latter are often the
lead agencies in such conflicts, as was the case, for example, during the distur-
bances in Macedonia in 2001.
In cases of violence between a State and transnational terrorists unrelated to an
ongoing armed conflict, humanitarian law, with the exception of general principles
pervading all uses of force (such as discrimination, proportionality, unnecessary suf-
fering), does not apply. The applicability of the humanitarian law to international
armed conflict depends on the participation of at least one State on each side,93 while
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that applicable to non-international armed conflicts requires a situation resembling
classic civil war. With respect to the latter, Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conven-
tions envisions a "Party in revolt against the dejure Government [that] possess an or-
ganized force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate
territory."94 Protocol Additional II requires a conflict "which takes place in the Terri-
tory of a high contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces
[that] . . . exercise control over part of its territory."95 In any case, and as noted above,
the humanitarian law of non-international armed conflict imposes no limitation on
the participation of other than members of the armed forces.
Therefore, except in an international armed conflict, intelligence or law en-
forcement agents may conduct counter-terrorist strikes such as occurred in Ye-
men. Thus, President Bush's authorization to the Central Intelligence Agency to
target specific al-Qaeda members outside the confines ofarmed conflict did not vi-
olate humanitarian law,96 nor did the creation ofa CIA Special Operations Group
of several hundred officers to conduct this type of missions. 97
Finally, where may operations in other than an armed conflict be conducted?
Obviously, they may take place on the territory ofthe State conducting them or, as
in the case of the strike in Yemen, on the territory of any State that has consented.
The more difficult question is when may counterterrorist operations be mounted
without the consent of the State of situs.
States enjoy the right of territorial integrity under international law, a custom-
ary right enshrined within Article 2(4) of the Charter. 98 At the same time, interna-
tional law recognizes a right of self-defense, itselfenshrined within Article 5 1 ofthe
Charter. When legal rights appear to conflict, an effort must be made to best bal-
ance them in the context in which they are to be applied.
In this situation, recall that States have a duty to "use due diligence to prevent
the commission within its dominions of criminal acts against another nation or
people." 99 This duty plainly includes keeping one's territory free from use for ter-
rorist ends. 100 In light ofthis obligation, the only sensible balancing ofthe territo-
rial integrity and self-defense rights is one that allows the State exercising self-
defense to conduct counterterrorist operations in the State where the terrorists
are located ifthat State is either unwilling or incapable of policing its own terri-
tory. A demand for compliance should precede the action and the State should be
permitted an opportunity to comply with its duty to ensure its territory is not be-
ing used to the detriment of others. 101 If it does not, any subsequent
nonconsensual counterterrorist operations into the country should be strictly
limited to the purpose of eradicating the terrorist activity (purpose and propor-
tionality), and the intruding force must withdraw immediately upon
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accomplishment of its mission since the necessity for these specific defensive op-
erations evaporates at that point. 102
Human Shields and Shielding with Civilian Objects
The US Defense Intelligence Agency has framed this issue as "the placement of any
category of non-combatant personnel, or of civilian equipment, vehicles, or mate-
rial at or near a recognized or suspected military or government facility immedi-
ately before or during hostilities." 103 It would also include placing military objects
or personnel near protected individuals, objects, or locations. In technical terms,
such activity falls into the category of "counter-targeting," i.e., "preventing or de-
grading detection, characterization, destruction, and post-strike assessment." 104
The goals of using human or civilian object shields include complicating an oppo-
nent's military planning, reducing the effectiveness of its strikes, preserving key
military forces and facilities such as command and control assets, and/or generat-
ing a strategic incident by creating the impression that the attacker is careless, in-
competent, or, most significantly in the CNN age, lawless. 105
Sadly, there have been many instances of the use of human or civilian object
shields in recent history. All have been uniformly condemned. For instance,
Iraq's use ofhuman shields during the first GulfWar was labeled by the UN Gen-
eral Assembly as a "most grave and blatant violation of Iraq's obligations under
international law." 106 A dozen years later, Human Rights Watch, in Off Target, its
report on the conduct of the second Gulf War, condemned Iraqi use of civilians
both to protect Iraqi forces during hostilities and to advance on US and British
forces. 107 Similarly, the use of human shields was widespread during the 1999
NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Even UN
peacekeepers have been used as human shields, most infamously with the seizure
of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) personnel by the Bosnia
Serbs in 1995. 108
As a matter of law, the use of shields presents two issues: Can shields be targeted
directly (discrimination) and, if not, how do they factor into the proportionality cal-
culation? In considering these questions, it is useful to note that US targeting doc-
trine closely tracks the principles set forth in Protocol Additional I. For instance,
Joint Publication 3-60 (discussed above) adopts the proportionality formula con-
tained in Articles 51.5(b) and 57.2 verbatim. 109 With regard to discrimination, the
Joint Publication requires US forces to "engage only in military operations the effects
of which distinguish between the civilian population (or individual civilians not tak-
ing a direct part in hostilities) and combatant forces, directing the application of
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force solely against the latter. Similarly, military force may be directed only against
military objects or objectives, and not against civilian objects." 110
Without question, using human or civilian object shields violates humanitarian
law. Article 28 ofthe Fourth Geneva Convention provides that " [t]he presence of a
protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from
military operations." 111 The analogous Protocol Additional I provision is even
more explicit.
The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not
be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in
particular attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or
impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement
of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military
objectives from attacks or to shield military operations. 112
The International Criminal Court Statute includes these prohibitions as war
crimes in Article 8. 113
Uncertain, though, are the effects ofsuch misconduct on an opponent's military
operations. To address this issue, it is necessary to distinguish between involuntary
shields and those who volunteer to serve in this role. Beginning with the former,
Article 51 ofProtocol Additional I explicitly provides that " [a] ny violation of these
prohibitions [which includes the prohibition on shielding] shall not release the
Parties to the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian popu-
lation and civilians. . . ," 114 Therefore, an attacker continues to be bound both by
the prohibition on directly attacking civilians and the proportionality principle.
Taking these requirements together, the attacker must consider the deaths and in-
juries shields might suffer when determining whether the military advantage ac-
cruing from attack on the military objective they are shielding outweighs likely
collateral damage and incidental injury.
Few have suggested that an attacker should be released from the obligation not
to directly target human shields. However, there is far less satisfaction with pure
application of the principle of proportionality, for some are concerned that a ma-
levolent opponent might turn the use of human shields into a significant military
advantage. Specifically, by using shields, an opponent could so alter the extent of
likely civilian death and injury resulting from a strike, that the military objective is
rendered immune from attack. Thus, the 1976 US Air Force law of armed conflict
manual states that " [a] party to a conflict which places its own citizens in positions
of danger by failing to carry out the separation of military activities from civilian
activities necessarily accepts, under international law, the results of otherwise
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lawful attacks upon valid military objectives in their territory." 1 15 And no less a dis-
tinguished scholar and practitioner than A.P.V. Rogers has suggested that
... a tribunal considering whether a grave breach has been committed [a disproportionate
attack] would be able to take into account when considering the rule ofproportionality the
extent to which the defenders had flouted their obligation to separate military objectives
from civilian objects and to take precautions to protect the civilian population The
proportionality approach taken by the tribunals should help to redress the balance which
would otherwise be tilted in favour of the unscrupulous. 116
Despite such calls, the prevailing practice appears to be unqualified fidelity to
the principle of proportionality; this is the position taken in US doctrine. In ad-
dressing use by the enemy of human shields, Joint Publication 3-60 states that:
"Joint force responsibilities during such situations are driven by the principle of
proportionality. . . . When an adversary employs illegal means to shield legitimate
targets, the decision to attack should be reviewed by higher authority in light of
military considerations, international law, and precedent." 117 The US Air Force, in
its own doctrine, acknowledges the shields dilemma, but likewise retains the pro-
tection civilians enjoy under humanitarian law. Air Force Pamphlet 14-210 points
out that
[a] state's failure to segregate and separate its own military activities and to avoid
placing military objectives in or near a populated area may greatly weaken protection
of its civilian population. Such protection is also compromised when civilians take a
direct part in hostilities or are used unlawfully in an attempt to shield attacks against
military objectives. 118
Note that protection is "weakened," not canceled; in other words, 14-210 recog-
nizes that such practices have a de facto effect of weakening protection of civilians
and civilian objects because their proximity to military objectives increases their like-
lihood of being incidentally injured or collaterally damaged—but there is no dejure
relaxation of the proportionality standard.
Perhaps the best guidance on the subject is that set forth in the Air Force's Oper-
ations and the Law text:
[Sjtandards of conduct should apply equally to the attacker and defender. In other
words, that the responsibility to minimize collateral injury to the civilian population
not directly involved in the war effort remains one shared by the attacker and the
defender; and that the nation that uses its civilian population to shield its own military
forces violates the law ofwar at the peril ofthe civilians behind whom it hides At the
same time, however, targeteers and judge advocates should consider the necessity of
172
Michael N. Schmitt
hitting the particular target, the expected results versus expected collateral damage,
and ways to minimize civilian casualties, if possible." 119
An approach which refuses to release one side from its full obligations under hu-
manitarian law when the other violates it is consistent with the underlying purpose
ofthat body oflaw
—
protection ofthose who are not engaged in the conflict from its
effects. While humanitarian law takes account of the practicalities of warfare (the
principle of proportionality being perhaps the best example), it is not intended nor
designed to ensure a "fair fight." Suggestions that the wrongful behavior of one side
justify a revision of the other's obligations under humanitarian law in order to re-
dress the balance between the two appear under girded by concerns over the inequity
of the malevolent side achieving de facto immunity for its military objectives. Yet,
even the highly controversial law of reprisals is justified solely on the basis that repri-
sals (otherwise unlawful acts) can compel the other side back into compliance with
its humanitarian law obligations; it has never been justified on the basis that it is un-
fair for one side to be limited by humanitarian law when the other ignores it. 120
The issue becomes more contentious when human shields volunteer. As with
the use of involuntary shields, there has been a marked increase in the readiness of
civilians to willingly shield military objectives. Recent examples include Iraqis
flocking to various locations when coalition forces threatened force to enforce the
UN weapons inspection regimes in 1997; 121 Serb civilians standing on bridges dur-
ing Operation Allied Force in 1999; and international volunteer shields traveling to
Iraq in anticipation of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 122
Although there is no explicit distinction between voluntary and involuntary
shields in targeting doctrine, some States, including the United States, assert a dif-
ference. In their view, voluntary shields of military objectives lose their protected
status as civilians. 123 Human Rights Watch, inter alia, takes the opposite position.
In a February 2002 Briefing Paper, it opined that
[l]ike workers in munitions factories, civilians acting as human shields, whether
voluntary or not, contribute indirectly to the war capability of a state. Their actions do
not pose a direct risk to opposing forces. Because they are not directly engaged in
hostilities against an adversary, they retain their civilian immunity from attack. They
may not be targeted, although a military objective protected by human shields remains
open to attack, subject to the attacking party's obligations under IHL to weigh the
potential harm to civilians against the direct and concrete military advantage of any
given attack, and to refrain from attack if civilian harm would appear excessive. 124
The more defensible view is that adopted by the United States. Human Rights
Watch wrongly equates voluntary human shields with munitions workers, which they
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correctly characterize as only indirectly contributing to the war-making capabilities of
a State. The contribution of human shields is, by contrast, very direct—they are at-
tempting to deter an actual attack on a valid military objective. In a sense, they are no
less involved in defending a potential target than air defenses.
As discussed earlier, civilians may lose their protected status by, in the termi-
nology of Protocol Additional I, taking "a direct part in hostilities." When they
do, immunity from attack vanishes for such time as that participation contin-
ues.
125 The Statute of the International Criminal Court adopts this standard by
making it a war crime to intentionally attack civilians unless they are "taking di-
rect part in hostilities." 126
There is much uncertainty regarding the meaning of direct participation. The
Commentary to Protocol Additional I states that the term "implies a direct casual
relationship between the activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy at the
time and place where the activity occurs." 127 Elsewhere, the Commentary describes
direct participation as "acts which by their nature and purpose are intended to
cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the armed forces." 128 Seem-
ingly, these comments support the Human Rights Watch position that shields
must pose an immediate risk to the enemy before they can be directly attacked.
Such a narrow position does not fit well into the architecture of humanitarian
law. Recall the definition of military objective. Military objectives are "objects
which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage." 129 By
acting to render a military objective immune from attack (or contributing to the
enemy's hesitancy to attack it), voluntary human shields contribute to the survival
of an object that by definition contributes to military action; thus, they themselves
contribute to that action in a very direct way. Indeed, by immunizing the military
objective against attack as a matter of law, in many cases shields would more effec-
tively defend it than would traditional defenses such as anti-aircraft artillery or sur-
face-to-air missiles, which have proven highly ineffective against air forces
equipped with state of the art weaponry.
When viewed in the context ofhumanitarian law generally, the most reasonable
characterization ofvoluntary shields is that they are directly participating in hostil-
ities and, resultantly, lose their protected civilian status. 130 Consequently, volun-
tary human shields can be legitimate targets. Further, because they no longer enjoy
protected status, death or injury to voluntary shields should not be considered in
any proportionality analysis. Practically speaking, though, their military contribu-
tion only emerges at the point that they are shielding the military objective; thus,
they enjoy no military significance distinct from the objective itself. This being so,
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there is no military necessity for attacking them when they are not engaged in
shielding. Further, even when they are shielding a target, there is no military ratio-
nale for attacking them directly instead of, or in addition to, the actual military ob-
jective. Therefore, the only practical impact oftheir willingness to serve as shields is
that they need not be included in proportionality calculations.
An exception to this analysis involves children. For instance, Palestinian mili-
tants have used child shields to protect themselves because they know the Israel
Defense Forces have been ordered not to use live ammunition against children. 131
As a matter oflaw, children should be deemed incapable offorming the intent nec-
essary to "directly participate" in hostilities, particularly in light of humanitarian
law's increasing recognition oftheir unique predicament in armed conflict. 132 Even
beyond the legal aspects of the phenomenon, as a practical matter it would usually
be impossible to determine whether a child present at a prospective target is there
of his or her own volition.
Finally, there is the issue of using civilian objects to shield military objectives.
What is often forgotten in the debates is that civilian objects can become military ob-
jectives when their use makes an effective contribution to military action and their
total or partial destruction or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in
the circumstances. 133 When one side intentionally places military objectives near ci-
vilian objects or places civilian objects close to military objectives in order to shield
them (a wrongful act as discussed above), those objects may take on a status analo-
gous to "military objective." Their use contributes directly to defense of the target
and iftheir role as shields could be neutralized, a military advantage would accrue to
the attacker. That said, and like voluntary shields, because their sole use is as a mili-
tary shield, there is no need to attack them directly unless they physically impede at-
tack on the intended target. Of course, they are vulnerable to damage during attack
on the target, but, having taken on the character of a military objective through use,
such damage should not be included within the proportionality calculation.
Note that the case of intentionally using civilian objects as shields differs from
that of the civilian object unintentionally located near a military objective. To sug-
gest otherwise would create an exception that would swallow the rule of propor-
tionality. Obviously, objects near the intended target incur the heaviest collateral
damage. Therefore, ifmere proximity to a target transforms a civilian object into a
military objective, there would be no need for the rule because there would be few
civilian objects to protect.
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Area Targets
An emerging issue in targeting involves attacking military installations on which
civilian facilities exist. In the past, this issue rarely presented itself. First, civilian fa-
cilities seldom existed at military bases. However, with the demise of conscription,
the average age of military personnel has increased, and a greater percentage is
married. Thus, military installations increasingly contain facilities meeting the
needs of military families. Further, in the era of all-volunteer forces, quality of life
has become an important factor in recruiting and retaining military personnel. To-
day, for instance, the typical US base offers family housing, schools, child care cen-
ters, youth sports fields, stores, post offices, pools, and even the inevitable
American fast food restaurant.
Second, weapons systems of the past did not have the range to strike at military
bases far from the front. Today, by contrast, some systems have global capabilities.
Globalization itself, with increasingly borderless travel, has made it possible to
conduct special operations thousands of miles from the front. Simply put, in the
21st century most military installations lie "within range" of enemy action.
The question is whether an entire area or installation can be treated as a single
unitary whole during an attack. To some extent, this defense was mounted in the trial
of Major-General Stanislav Galic, former commander of the Sarajevo Romanija
Corps, before the ICTY. The case involved allegations that troops under his com-
mand conducted a sniping and shelling campaign against the civilian population of
Sarajevo intended to spread terror. The defense argued that the presence of some
40,000 Bosnian Muslim troops spread throughout the city rendered the entire area a
target and the fact that only 3,000 civilians died out of an original population of ap-
proximately 300,000 meant the attacks were not disproportionate. After carefully re-
viewing the facts, the Trial Chamber determined that the attacks on the civilians were
intentional and sentenced the general to 10 years imprisonment. 134 While not ruling
out the possibility of treating an entire area or installation as a unitary whole, the
Chamber's meticulous focus on the facts of individual deaths demonstrates that, in
its view, questions of discrimination are resolved on a case-by-case basis. 135
This approach comports well with Article 51's characterization of "an attack by
bombardment . . . which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly
separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other
area containing a similar concentration of civilians and civilian objects" as indis-
criminate. 136 By parallel logic, the presence of a clearly distinct civilian area, such as
a shopping complex or housing area, on a military installation precludes treating
the entire installation as targetable.
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Further, Article 57 requires belligerents to employ reasonable steps to verify that
the target is military in nature and to "take all feasible precautions in the choice of
means and methods ofattack with a view to avoiding, and in any event minimizing,
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects." 137
Therefore, whether an attack is discriminate enough depends both on the extent to
which the attacker used information assets to confirm the nature of the target and
selected weapons and tactics designed to avoid causing harm to civilians and civil-
ian objects. Again, these requirements auger against treating military installations
as a single entity for targeting purposes.
At any rate, military planners are now able to more accurately refine the choice of
targets and aimpoints. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system im-
provements have made it far easier to distinguish between military and civilian objects,
whereas advances in precision have made striking the intended target with great surety
more practicable. 138 In fact, since installations are fixed, most missions against them
will be preplanned. This allows a highly complex and in-depth planning process that
considers such factors as maximum effective range ofweaponry and their circular er-
ror probable, likely collateral damage, and aim point, fusing, and azimuth of attack al-
ternatives. Perhaps most importantly, it is poor airmanship (or soldiering) to treat
areas in which discrimination is possible as a single target because doing so, in an age of
precision, would be wasteful; it violates the principle of economy of force.
That said, in those cases where it is impossible to verify that individual facilities
on an installation are military objectives (e.g., does the warehouse contain muni-
tions or school supplies?), a presumption that they are military attaches. This is be-
cause the Protocol Additional I, Article 52, presumption that a prospective target is
not making an effective contribution to military action, and therefore not
targetable, applies only to objects "normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as
a place ofworship, a house or other dwelling, or a school." 139 The presence of a fa-
cility on an active military installation, combined with the fact that it does not, after
reasonable steps have been taken to ascertain its status, appear to be normally dedi-
cated to civilian purposes, makes striking it consistent with the principle of distinc-
tion. For instance, hangar facilities often line runways. In most cases, they are used
for traditional military purposes such as aircraft maintenance. However, if one is
the community gymnasium, as is the case at an actual US military facility, an at-
tacker should be permitted to strike it after exhausting reasonable measures under
the circumstances to determine its nature. The attack may, ex postfacto, be shown
to have been a mistake, but that mistake will have been reasonable.
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Computer Network Attack
Targeting one's enemy through computer networks is a relatively new method of
warfare that raises a number ofcomplex legal issues. 140 Many derive from thejus ad
helium and have been addressed elsewhere. 141 With regard to the jws in hello, and
specifically the law of targeting, three merit mention. 142
The first centers on the requirement of precautions in attack. As noted above,
humanitarian law imposes a duty on the attacker to select methods and means of
warfare "with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects." 143 This is a signifi-
cant obligation because it means that even if a target is a lawful military objective
that can be attacked with a particular weapon without causing disproportionate
collateral damage or incidental injury, a different weapon must be employed if it
could achieve a comparable military advantage with less. Of course, the require-
ment is subject to a rule of reason that would take into account such factors as the
inventory of available weapons, particularly in light ofthe anticipated length of the
conflict, and any increased risk to those executing the mission.
This obligation may increasingly drive armed forces possessing CNA capabilities
to employ them in lieu of kinetic weapons. The precision of computer network at-
tack (in which particular systems can be isolated and attacked), the generally low risk
to the attacker, and the fact that attacks do not expend "ordnance" that might be
needed later in the conflict, all lend themselves to selecting CNA in place ofmore tra-
ditional weaponry. For instance, typical goals in air campaigns include destroying air
defense networks, blinding intelligence capabilities, and disrupting command and
control. Doing so might involve hundreds of sorties by aircraft dropping or launch-
ing explosive munitions with significant risk of collateral damage and incidental in-
jury. However, all such target systems now rely heavily on computers of some sort,
thereby making them vulnerable to computer network attack.
A related humanitarian law requirement is that "[w]hen a choice is available be-
tween several military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the ob-
jective to be selected shall be that the attack on which maybe expected to cause the
least danger to civilian lives and civilian objects." 144 Again, the fact that many pro-
spective targets rely on computer systems in some fashion opens up opportunities
to avoid striking targets in ways that might cause harm to civilians and civilian ob-
jects. As an example, one might wish to destroy an enemy air force by bombing air
bases. However, in an age of computer network attack, it may be less collaterally
destructive to feed the enemy false information that causes enemy aircraft to un-
knowingly travel into aerial ambushes. Alternatively, consider the bombing of the
media station in Belgrade during Operation Allied Force that resulted in the
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Bankovic litigation before the European Court ofHuman Rights. 145 Using CNA, it
might have been possible to target that aspect of the electrical grid providing the
station electricity, thereby simply taking it off the air during offending program-
ming. In an increasingly networked age, the possibilities of computer network at-
tack grow exponentially.
The second issue posed by computer network attack is that of the targets against
which it may legallybe directed. The requirement that parties to a conflict "direct op-
eration only against military objectives" 146 would seem to imply that CNA launched
against civilians or civilian objects would be unlawful. A careful reading of Protocol
Additional I, most ofwhich is characterized by even non-Party States as reflective of
customary law, reveals that it is "attack" on civilians which is forbidden, not opera-
tions directed against them writ large. Thus, the "civilian population . . . shall not be
the object of attack"; 147 "civilian objects shall not be the object of attack"; 148 "indis-
criminate attacks are forbidden"; 149 "attacks shall be limited strictly to military ob-
jectives"; 150 and so forth.
In Article 49, the Protocol defines "attacks" as "acts of violence against the ad-
versary, whether in offense or defense." 151 The Commentary on Article 48 echoes
the centrality of violence by describing the term "operations" as "military opera-
tions during which violence is applied." 152 Utilizing this definition, the prohibition
is actually on attacking other than military objectives through the application ofvi-
olence, that is, force which injures, kills, damages, or destroys.
This interpretation does not imply that all CNA is lawful merely because kinetic
force is absent. Instead, the term "attack" can best be understood as prescriptive
shorthand for a particular set of consequences, specifically the type of consequences
violence would cause—injury to humans and damage to objects. 153 The prohibition
would also reasonably extend to intentionally creating severe mental anguish, partic-
ularly in light of humanitarian law's prohibition on terrorizing the civilian popula-
tion. 154 However, conducting computer network attacks that merely inconveniences
the civilian population, harasses them, or causes a decline in their quality of life is
permissible. This interpretation does not represent a relaxation of humanitarian law
in any way; indeed, the law already countenances such results through, for example,
non-violent psychological operations directed at the civilian population.
Finally, there needs to be greater sensitivity to who can conduct computer net-
work attacks. Obviously, military personnel who possess the privilege to apply ki-
netic force during an armed conflict may do so. However, many countries rely on
either civilian defense employees or contractors for their computer network attack
capabilities. Any civilian who launches a CNA "attack," as that term has just been
described, is directly participating in hostilities and thus an unprivileged belliger-
ent. So too are those who conduct computer network attacks that do not damage
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or injure, but nevertheless affect the enemy's immediate war-fighting capabilities.
Typical examples would include directing a computer network attack against en-
emy command and control facilities, air defense networks, and combat communi-
cations nets. Simply put, to the extent that a computer network attack neutralizes
or diminishes the capabilities of a military objective, the individual launching it is
directly participating in hostilities.
Concluding Thoughts
In A Manfor All Seasons, Sir Thomas More and William Roper engage in the fol-
lowing now familiar exchange on the law.
Roper: So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law.
More: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil?
Roper: I'd cut down every law in England to do that.
More: Oh? And when the law was down—and the Devil turned round on you—where
would you hide? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake. 155
To some degree, each of the targeting issues addressed in this article illustrate
similar contradictions. Targeting doctrine that seeks particular effects subtly
incentivizes attacking protected persons or objects when facing a malevolent op-
ponent or when doing so might operate to lessen likely collateral damage and in-
cidental injury. Similarly, many argue that it is acceptable to strike at a wicked
leader, even if he or she does not meet the requirements for combatant status or
direct participation. Others suggest that humanitarian law should be relaxed in
meeting the new phenomenon of catastrophic transnational terrorism. Similar
concerns underlie suggestions that involuntary shields should be treated differ-
ently from civilians or that military installations or other areas where the enemy
has positioned military and civilian objects in close proximity may be treated as a
unitary whole when targeting. Finally, computer network attack opens entirely
new targeting options, some which enhance the protections ofhumanitarian law,
others that challenge them.
What is remarkable throughout the discussions of these complex issues, how-
ever, is the extent to which humanitarian law resolves them. In the vast majority of
cases, application of the law, interpreted with sensitivity to both the context in
which it is to be applied and its underlying purposes, meets the concerns of the
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William Ropers who assert its insufficiency in meeting the challenges of 21 st-century
conflict. The law hardly needs to be "cut down"; on the contrary, it still effectively
shelters non-participants from the effects of hostilities, while adequately meeting
the practical concerns of the warfighters. Most importantly, Sir Thomas More's
words remain prescient, for in these troubling times we must preserve the law . .
.
for our own sake.
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(www.icrc.org/ihl/nsf), is reprinted in paragraph 39 of Report to the Prosecutor, supra note 40.
The Report to the Prosecutor failed to take a firm position on the attack (and on attacks against
media facilities generally).
The media as such is not a traditional target category. To the extent particular media
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media does have an effect on civilian morale. If that effect is merely to foster support for
the war effort, the media is not a legitimate military objective. Ifthe media is used to incite
crimes, as in Rwanda, it can become a legitimate military objective. If the media is the
nerve system that keeps a war-monger in power and thus perpetuates the war effort, it
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Id. 555.
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Operation Iraqi Freedom. Operation Iraqi Freedom—By the Numbers, supra note 6. Yet, the
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causing civilian casualties. Human Rights Watch, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian
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library/index/ENGEUR700 182000; Report to the Prosecutor, supra note 40.
46. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The End ofInnocence: Rethinking Noncombatancy in the Post-Kosovo
Era, STRATEGIC REVIEW 14 (Summer 2000). He further suggests that current technology allows
the United States to apply "tremendous destructive power . . . discreetly and efficiently against a
wide range of objects that opportunistic, materialistic societies like Yugoslavia value." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. He continues,
[ajdditional targets under this proposal could include selected cultural,
educational, and historical sites whose existence provides support—to include
psychological sustenance—to the malignant ideology that stimulates the behaviors
the use of force is intended to support.. Furthermore, resorts, along with other
entertainment, sports, and recreational facilities could be slated for destruction. Of
course, government offices and buildings of every kind would be subject to
eradication, even if they do not directly support military activities (except those
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noncombatant survival). Finally, to the extent it is feasible to do so, the personal
property of the sentinent, adult population ought to be held at risk so long as it is
not, again, indispensable to human survival. Milosevic's bank accounts would be
high on the target list under the revised model.
Id.
49. Id.
This proposal openly acknowledges an intent to inflict hardship upon the sentient,
adult (albeit putatively noncombatant) populace who must be held responsible for the
deeds of their military forces. It includes even those who may oppose their
government's policies. Given the tremendous scale of atrocities that are infecting the
world, not to mention the globalization ofWMD technology, ethical norms should
place an affirmative duty on a nation's citizenry to actively frustrate their government's
actions when they become patently inhumane.
Id.
50. DOUHET, supra note 3.
51. Dunlap, supra note 46, at 15. Arguably he contorts the principles of necessity and
proportionality to support this effects-based objective: "The scope and severity ofthe attacks must
bear a reasonable relationship to the egregiousness ofthe conduct sought to be prevented, and the
level offorce necessary to purge the enemy society of its perverse beliefs." The classic articulation of
military necessity is drawn from the case of United States v. List "The destruction ofproperty to be
lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war .... There must be some
reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy
forces." United States v. List, 11 Trials of the Major War Criminals before the Nuremberg
Tribunals 1253 (1950).
52. Jeanne M. Meyer, TearingDown the Facade: A Critical Look at the Current Law on Targeting
the Will of the Enemy and Air Force Doctrine, 51 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 143 (2001).
53. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J 78,
79 (July 8) . He partially rejects the principle ofdistinction by treating civilian objects as a military
objective and the principle of necessity is transformed by measuring it against need to reeducate
the enemy population. Doing so ignores the preambular language of the 1868 St. Petersburg
Declaration, a foundation of modern humanitarian law: "The only legitimate object which
States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the
enemy." St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive
Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens 474-5, reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 54. It also flies in the face ofArticle 22 ofthe
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foundational document of humanitarian law:
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individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in
arms. The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is
to be spared in person, property and honor as much as the exigencies ofwar will admit.
War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, art. 22 (Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in THE LAWS
OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004).
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Additional I requirement that Parties "shall direct their operations only against military
objectives." Protocol Additional I, supra note 4, art. 48. Of course, this principle assumes a legal
fiction, albeit a defensible one, because if the civilian population opposes the war effort, there is
little doubt that the State's ability to wage war will be seriously degraded.
54. ROBERT F. FUTRELL, THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN KOREA 1950-1953, at 516 (1983).
55. See supra note 7.
56. Lord Robertson, Kosovo One Year On: Achievement and Challenge 13 (Mar. 21, 2000),
www.nato.int/Kosovo/repo2000/index.htm.
57. Indeed, the first attack sortie of Operation Iraqi Freedom was an attempt to kill Saddam
Hussein. Mark Kinkaid, The First Shot, AIRMAN MAGAZINE, July 23, 2003, available at
www.af.mil/news/airman/0703/air.html.
58. Bruce van Voorst, Ready, Aim, Fired, TIME, Oct. 1, 1990, at 55. Also recall the controversy
surrounding Operation Phoenix, the CIA's program to neutralize the Vietcong civilian
infrastructure (resulting in nearly 20,000 deaths). Michael Ratner, The Bob Kerry Case, Crimes of
War Expert Analysis (July 2001 ), www.crimesofvvar.org/expert/rather.html. The High Command
Case of 1 948 was based in part on Hitler's order to kill Soviet Commissars (political leaders). The
judgment labeled the order "notorious" and the case yielded multiple convictions. United States
v. Von Leeb (High Command Case), 1 1 Trials ofWar Criminals before the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, at 1 (1950).
59. Lieber Code, supra note 53, art. 148. For a fuller explanation of this analysis, see Michael N.
Schmitt, State Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law, 17 YALE JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL Law 609 (1992). See also W. Hays Parks, Memorandum ofLaw: Executive Order
1233 and Assassination, THE ARMY LAWYER 4 (1989).
60. The British Manual of 1958 is illustrative: "assassination, the killing or wounding of a
selected individual behind the line of battle by enemy agents or partisans . . . and the killing or
wounding by treachery of individuals belonging to the opposing nation or army, are not lawful
acts ofwar." War Office, The Law ofWar on Land, Being Part III of the Manual of Military Law,
art. 115 (1958), reprinted in 10 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968).
6 1
.
Protocol Additional I, supra note 4, art. 85.3(a).
62. Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 4.2, 1 125 U.N.T.S.
609, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 483 [hereinafter Protocol
Additional II].
63. Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9*
(1998), arts. 8.2(b)(i) & (e)(i) reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at
671 (hereinafter ICC Statute].
64. Protocol Additional I, supra note 4, art. 50.1.
65. The exception applies in "situations in armed conflict where owing to the nature of hostilities
an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself." In such cases, he need only distinguish
himself during each military engagement and while engaged in "a military deployment preceding
the launching of an attack" during such time as he is visible to the adversary. Id., art. 44.3.
66. M., art 43.3.
67. The Commentary to Article 43 of Protocol Additional I makes it clear that only religious and
medical personnel enjoy a spcual status in the armed fortes:
In lad, in the army there are numerous important categories of soldiers whose
foremost or normal t.isk has little to do with firing weapons. These include auxiliary
services, administrative services, the military legal service and others. Whether they
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actually engage in firing weapons is not important. They are entitled to do so, which
does not apply to either medical or religious personnel ....
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, f 1677, at 515 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarki & Bruno
Zimmerman eds., 1987) [hereinafter PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY].
68. The Rome Statute specifically makes them subject to prosecution, another indication that
humanitarian law carves out no special regime for heads of State. ICC Statute, supra note 63, art.
27. On targeting heads of States, see also Thomas Wingfield, Taking Aim at Regime Elites:
Assassination, Tyrannicide, and the Clancy Doctrine, 22 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (1999); Robert F. Turner, It's Not Really "Assassination": Legal and
Moral Implications of Intentionally Targeting Terrorists and Aggressor-State Regime Elites, 37
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW 787 (2003); Nathan Canestaro, American Law and
Policy on Assassinations of Foreign Leaders: The Practicality of Maintaining the Status Quo, 26
Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 1 (2003); Louis Beres,
Assassinating Saddam Hussein: The Viewfrom International Law, 13 INDIANA INTERNATIONAL &
Comparative Law Review 847 (2003).
69. US Constitution, art. II, sect. 2, cl. 1 . Casper Weinberger has suggested that a head of State or
government who serves as commander ofthe armed forces is a combatant. As a matter oflaw, he
overreaches. Casper Weinberger, When Can We Target the Leaders?, STRATEGIC REVIEW 21
(Spring 2001). See also Chris A. Anderson, Assassination, Lawful Homicide, and the Butcher of
Baghdad, 13 HAMLINE JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 306 (1992).
70. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms offers the
following definitions for the levels of war:
Strategic Level ofWar: The level ofwar at which a nation, often as a member of a group of
nations, determines, national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives
and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives.
Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence
initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of
national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and
provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.
Operational Level ofWar. The level ofwar at which campaigns and major operations are
planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or
other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing
operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to
achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about
and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension oftime or space than
do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support oftactical forces, and provide
the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.
Tactical Level of War: The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned
and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.
Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat
elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.
Joint Pub 1-02, supra note 26.
71. PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 67, f 1678, at 515. In the context of non-
international armed conflict, the Commentary to Protocol Additional II provides: "Direct
participation in hostilities implies that there is a sufficient casual relationship between the act of
participation and its immediate consequences." Id. f 4787, at 1453.
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1 1 For a full discussion ofthe issue of direct participation in hostilities, see Michael X. Schmitt,
"Direct Participation in Hostilities" and 21st CenturyArmed Conflict, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR DIETER
FLECK 505 'Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2004), available at www.michaelschrnitt.org/
Publications.html. Israel takes the position that Protocol Additional I, .Article 51(3), which
provides that civilians taking part in the hostilities can only be targeted Tor such times as they
take a direct part in hostilities," should be broadly construed such that those who participate
remain targetable throughout the entire period of their involvement in the conflict. Yuval Shanv,
Israeli Counter-Terrorism Measures: Are They "Kosher" under International Law, in TERRORISM
D International Law- Challenges and Responses 96, 104 Michael X. Schmitt & Gian
Luca Benito eds., 2003).
1 3 .Although Israel has acknowledged killing over 30 Palestinians pursuant to the policy, non-
governmental organizations estimate that nearly three times that number have been targeted.
Techniques include using snipers, bombs, and airstrikes. Most of the strikes have occurred in
Palestinian controlled territory and have been mounted against mid- or high-level militants
involved in attacks against Israeli targets. Id, at 103. On the policy oftargeted killings, see also Orna
Ben-Xaftali and Keren R. Michaeli, mVit Must notMake a Scarecrow ofthe Law": A Legal Analysis of
the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL Law JOURNAL 233 2003).
1 - The Israel Defense Forces Judge Advocate General has set four conditions for conducting such
stri-
1) well-supported information showing the terrorist will plan or earn' out a terror
attack in the near future; 2) after appeals to the Palestinian Authority calling for the
terrorist's arrest have been ignored; 3 1 attempts to arrest the suspect by use of IDF
troops have failed; 4 1 the assassination is not to be carried out in retribution for events
of the pasL Instead, it can only be done to prevent attacks in the future which are liable
to toll multiple casualties.
H IBE1Z 7r: 4 1J02.
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See, e.g., Amnesty International, Israel, and the Occupied Territories: State .Assassinations and
Other Unlawful Killings | Feb. 21, 2001 ), atwww.anmesly.org/hbran7index. EXGMDE 1 50052001
.
UN CHARTER, art. 5 1
.
77. S.C. Res. 1368, UN SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., UN Doc. S/ RES/1368 (2001 1; S.C. Res.
1373, UN SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
" NATO—North Atlantic Treat)-, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.X.T.S. 243,
246; Xorth Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO , Press Release No. 124, Statement by the
North Atlantic Council 'Sept. 12, 2001), www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01 -124e.htm.
O.AS—Inter-American Treat).* of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 3.1, 62 Stat.
1681, 1700, 21 U.N.T.S 77 f3; Terrorist Threat to the Americas, Res. 1, Twenty-Fourth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Acting as Organ of Consultation in
Application of the Inter-American Treaty- of Reciprocal Assistance, OEAVSer.F/II.24, RC.24/
RES. 1/01 ( Sept. 21,2001).
ANZUS—Security Treaty- between Australia, Xew Zealand, United States, Sept. 1, 1951, art.
IV, 3 U.S.T. 3420, 3423, 131 U.X.T.S. 83, 86; 'by Australia;, Prime Minister John Howard,
Government Invokes ANZUS Treaty-—Press Conference ^Sept. 14, 2001', available at
aiistralianrx>htics.com.au/foreign/aiizus/0 1 -09- 1 4anzus- invoked. shtml.
79. Russia, China, and India agreed to share intelligence with the United States, while Japan and
South Korea offered logistics support. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia broke off
diplomatic relations with the Taliban, and Pakistan agreed to cooperate fully with the United
States. Twenty-seven nations granted overflight and landing rights and 46 multilateral
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declarations of support were obtained. White House, Fact Sheet: Operation Enduring Freedom
Overview, Oct. 1, 2001, www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/200 1/5 194.htm.
80. In addition to United Kingdom participation in the initial strikes, Georgia, Oman, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan provided airspace and
facilities. China, Egypt, Russia, and the European Union publicly backed the operations, while
even the Organization for the Islamic Conference limited itself to urging the United States to
restrict its campaign to Afghanistan. Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom offered ground troops.
Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of "Armed Attack" in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
43 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 41, 49 (2002); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 96 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 237, 248 (2002).
81. With the exception of the United Kingdom and Israel, many of the closest US allies
criticized the airstrikes against government and terrorist targets in Libya. The General Assembly
passed a condemnatory resolution following the attack. GA Res. 41/38, UN GAOR, 41st Sess.,
78th plen. mtg. at 34, UN Doc A/RES/41/38 (1986). See W. Michael Reisman, International Legal
Responses to Terrorism, 22 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 33-34 (1999) for a
detailed description of international reaction. See also Stuart G. Baker, Comparing the 1993 US
Airstrike on Iraq to the 1986 Bombing ofLibya: The New Interpretation ofArticle 51, 24 GEORGIA
Journal of International and Comparative Law 99 (1994).
82. Proportionality and necessity have specifically been cited as customary international law by
the International Court of Justice. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. US), 1986 I.C.J.
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XCoalition Operations and the Law
M. H. MacDougalT
This paper addresses the practical side of the application of the law of armed
conflict and domestic law requirements during coalition combat opera-
tions; highlighting areas where different legal structures or divergent national in-
terpretation of the applicable international framework may have significant
impact. I am going to do this by briefly canvassing three such areas in the context of
Operation Enduring Freedom. Two of these are directly related to the topic of
combatants and civilians. The third is a completely distinct topic—the conduct of
coalition investigatory boards.
Coalition Boards ofInquiry
The first area I would like to discuss is coalition boards, using the Coalition Board
that was convened by the United States Air Force to investigate the Tarnak Farms
Range friendly fire incident and the Canadian Board ofInquiry that was ordered by
the Minister of National Defence (MND) to investigate the same incident as a fo-
cus. I do not intend, however, to comment on any substantive findings of either
board. Rather, my emphasis will be on the procedural issues that arose during the
conduct ofthe concurrent boards that were investigating the incident and the reso-
lution of those issues.
The facts are undisputed. On the evening ofApril 17, 2002, soldiers from Alpha
Company, Third Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry were
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engaged in a night live fire training exercise at Tarnak Farms Range just south of
Kandahar, Afghanistan. While the Canadian soldiers were training, two US F-16
fighter aircraft were returning from an on-call mission to support coalition ground
forces. As the aircraft passed south of Kandahar, the flight leader observed what he
described as fireworks coming from an area a few miles south of Kandahar. Per-
ceiving this as surface-to-air fire, the pilot asked for and received permission from
the mission crew of a US Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft
to determine the precise coordinates of the surface-to-air fire. While attempting to
obtain the coordinates, the pilot of the second aircraft, the wingman, requested
permission to fire on the location with his 20-millimeter cannon. The AWACS
crew told him to stand by, and later requested that the wingman provide additional
information on the surface-to-air fire while directing him to hold fire. The pilot
immediately responded "I've got some men on a road and it looks like a piece of ar-
tillery firing at us. I am rolling in in self defense." The pilot then called "bombs
away" as he released one 500-pound GBU- 12 laser-guided bomb. The bomb struck
a Canadian fire position at Tarnak Farms. Four Canadians were killed, eight were
wounded.
As a result of this tragic incident, two boards, one exclusively Canadian and one
American with a Canadian co-chairman (Coalition Board), were convened to in-
vestigate the incident.
However, although each Board was investigating the same incident, the primary
purpose for the respective investigations was quite different. As will be highlighted
later, this difference in purpose had significant impact on the procedural processes
applicable to each board.
The primary purpose for the Coalition Board was of a disciplinary nature. This
board was convened with the specific mandate to make disciplinary recommenda-
tions, if such were warranted. The Canadian Board of Inquiry was convened under
Section 45 ofthe National Defence Act whereby theMND may convene such a board
when it is appropriate for the MND to be informed on a matter connected with the
Canadian Forces or that affects a member thereof. The primary purpose ofthe Cana-
dian board was quite different than that of the Coalition Board. It was convened for
administrative/safety purposes and was designed to meet the Canadian public expec-
tation that this tragic incident would be investigated in a balanced and transparent
manner. Recommendations as to potential disciplinary action were never contem-
plated and under Canadian jurisprudence, the conduct of the investigation could
have, in fact, prejudiced future criminal/disciplinary action.
The conduct of simultaneous investigatory boards into the same incident, with
different purposes, poses unique challenges. The first is that ofsharing and disclosure
of information. This issue has two facets: first, how to ensure both boards had access
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to the necessary information to reach informed conclusions and recommendations;
and second, what information could be publicly disclosed once the respective boards
had completed their investigation and made their recommendations.
Because the co-chairman of the Coalition Board was Brigadier General Marc
Dumais, a Canadian, one obvious option for the sharing ofthe requisite information
would have been to use General Dumais as a conduit ofinformation between the two
boards. This option was not a viable one because ofthe significant impact such an ar-
rangement could have on the perceived independence and impartiality of each
board. The second option, and the one that was utilized, was the establishment of a
protocol for the release of information to the boards. This protocol established the
process for requesting documentary evidence and witnesses and set out the parame-
ters under which the information could be released. In the case ofrequests by the Ca-
nadian Board of Inquiry for information from US authorities, these parameters
formed part ofthe legal basis for the determination ofwhat information could be re-
leased publicly. In light ofthe raison d'etre (a balanced and transparent investigation)
for the Canadian Board of Inquiry and the fact that it had been Canadian soldiers
who had been injured or died, as much public disclosure as possible was of great im-
portance. Equally important, however, was the desire not to release classified infor-
mation, personal information protected from release under privacy legislation or
information the release ofwhich could impact on potential disciplinary proceedings.
Balancing these conflicting priorities takes a great deal ofcoordination and coopera-
tion between national authorities to ensure consistent and coordinated public re-
lease of information. One of the most important lessons learned in this whole
process is never assume full knowledge of the legal and political constraints a coali-
tion partner may be operating under, particularly when dealing with such an emo-
tion charged issue as the death ofcoalition soldiers as a result offriendly fire. Even for
Canada and the United States, who share such similar legal, political and cultural
foundations, reaching a compromise that addressed both countries concerns took
significant effort and coordination and, I might add, a lot of late nights, last minute
panics and very senior intervention.
Returning to the initial theme ofthe impact of procedural processes adopted by
the respective boards as a result of their differing primary purposes, I'd like to
touch briefly on the issue of compellability ofwitnesses. As I understand it, no wit-
ness could be compelled to testify before the Coalition Board. In contrast, the Ca-
nadian board could compel anyone subject to Canadian law to testify, but their
testimony could not be used as evidence in a legal proceeding (civil, disciplinary or
criminal), save for perjury charges. This striking difference in procedural process is
directly linked to the primary purpose for the convening of the board. In the Cana-
dian context, because no evidence given to a Board ofInquiry can be used in future
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legal proceedings, witnesses can be compelled to testify because it does not impact
on their fundamental right "not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings
against oneself." Because the purpose of the investigation is an administrative one,
tied primarily to safety issues, the balance is tipped in favor of compelling the wit-
nesses to testify in the interests of a full exploration of the facts.
Having now identified in a very cursory manner some of the legal
interoperability issues related to coalition boards let me close this issue by saying
that I believe that none of these challenges are insurmountable. In fact, in this in-
stance I believe these differences in process, dictated largely by different national
legal standards, actually enhanced the credibility ofthe findings and recommenda-
tions of the respective Boards. In the case of the Tarnak Farms tragedy, the struc-
tured process that evolved for disclosure of information to the respective boards,
ensuring that there was no collusion or collaboration between the boards, led to
the public perception that there had been a balanced and transparent investigation
into the matter. A closer relationship between the two boards during the investiga-
tive process may not have resulted in the same perception.
Transfer ofDetainees
The second area where different legal structures or divergent national interpreta-
tion of the applicable international framework may have an impact on operations
is that ofthe transfer of detainees to another coalition partner. Let me again paint a
briefbackground of the issue in the context of Operation Apollo, Canada's contri-
bution to Operation Enduring Freedom. Throughout the campaign against terror-
ism, the tasks and capabilities of Canadian Forces (CF) units, as well as some other
coalition partners, deployed in the theater of operations did not permit the long-
term detention of persons detained by the CF. Persons detained by the CF were ei-
ther released or evacuated from the point of capture to a facility where proper
screening, long-term treatment and security could be ensured. For Operation En-
during Freedom, the United States assumed the responsibility of establishing and
maintaining the coalition's short- and long-term detention facilities in Afghani-
stan and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Government of Canada has noted several
times that Canada, as a coalition partner, will, as a general rule, transfer persons de-
tained by the CF, and who are suspected members of the Taliban and al-Qaida, to
the United States.
I would like to highlight some of the legal issues that may impact on the decision
of a coalition partner whether or not to transfer detainees to another coalition
partner. As with so many other issues related to international law these are not
"black letter law" issues and different coalition partners will likely have different
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interpretations of the applicable law or even what is the applicable law. This, of
course, is one of the significant challenges of coalition operations.
Before addressing the specifics ofthese legal issues, let me provide an example of
how fundamental these different interpretations can be. As part of the overall
campaign against terrorism, Canada and its coalition partners are engaged in an
armed conflict and are exercising their inherent right of collective and individual
self-defense against the al-Qaida and the Taliban. But what is the legal regime ap-
plicable to these hostilities? Generally, where a State is entitled to use force in an
armed conflict, it must conduct hostilities in accordance with international law,
particularly the law ofarmed conflict. However, al-Qaida is a non-State entity (not
qualifying as a "national liberation movement") and prior to September 1 1th most
States rejected the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan (previous
legitimate governments of Afghanistan had signed and ratified the Geneva Con-
ventions of 19492 ). This has led to a debate as to whether the coalition partners are
engaged in an international or non-international armed conflict and, ifone accepts
that it is an international armed conflict, whether the Geneva Conventions and the
1977 Additional Protocol I3 apply as a matter ofconventional law to the conflict. For
example, on February 7, 2002, the United States announced that although it has
never recognized the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan Government, the President
determined that the Taliban members are covered by the Geneva Conventions be-
cause Afghanistan is a party to them. Other coalition partners may have taken the
view that the Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol I may not tech-
nically apply to the conflict as a matter of strict conventional or treaty law. However,
regardless of the legal position adopted by coalition partners, all coalition partners
are applying the same standards, either as a matter of law or policy.
What is the legal authority for one coalition partner to transfer detainees to
another coalition partner?
Turning now to the specific issue of transfer of detainees from one coalition part-
ner to another, one issue that legal advisors may have to analyze prior to a decision
being made is whether there is legal authority for such a transfer. Geneva Conven-
tion (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar provides for the transfer of
prisoners ofwar to other nations who are willing and able to abide by the Conven-
tion's obligations for the handling and treatment of such persons. In particular,
Article 12 states: "Prisoners ofwar may only be transferred by the Detaining Power
to a Power which is a party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has
satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the
Convention." (Emphasis added.) There are no specific provisions for those de-
tained persons who have taken part in hostilities but are not entitled to prisoner of
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war status (i.e., unlawful combatants) and therein may be the rub for some coali-
tion partners.
In the context of Operation Enduring Freedom, a review ofUS treatment of de-
tainees at Kandahar and Guantanamo Bay and statements made by President
Bush, indicate the United States is willing and able to apply the appropriate inter-
national law standards. In particular, on February 7, 2002, the White House clari-
fied the US position on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to members of
the Taliban and al-Qaida. 4 The White House Spokesman's comments can be sum-
marized as:
• The United States is committed to applying the principles of the Geneva
Conventions;
• The United States applied the Geneva Conventions (including Article 4 of
Convention III) to the Taliban and made a blanket determination that members
of the Taliban are not prisoners of war;
• The United States has decided not to apply the Geneva Conventions to
members of al-Qaida because they do not represent any State that is a party to the
Geneva Conventions. Accordingly, they cannot have prisoner ofwar status under
the Geneva Conventions;
• The United States will treat all detainees humanely and consistent with the
principles of the Geneva Conventions; and
• The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been allowed,
and will continue to have, access to facilities and detained persons.
In circumstances such as this, it maybe reasonable to argue that a coalition partner
can transfer these unlawful combatants to the United States in accordance with
standards analogous to the provisions of Article 12 of Geneva Convention III.
Are blanket determinations ofPW status permissible under international law?
Even if a coalition partner is satisfied that the receiving State is willing and able to
apply the Geneva Conventions and other appropriate international legal stan-
dards, the issue ofthe reasonableness of a blanket determination that members of a
group are not entitled to prison ofwar status may be problematic. This was poten-
tially an issue for coalition partners during the campaign against terrorism. On the
one hand, you have the position that such blanket determinations are supportable
under international law if based on appropriate evidence. (The United States
decided that members of the Taliban and al-Qaida are not entitled to prisoner of
war status. This was based on its determination that al-Qaida met none of the re-
quirements for prisoner of war status—a responsible commander, a distinctive
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and visible insignia, the open bearing of arms and compliance with the laws and
customs of war. The Taliban failed to meet the last requirement.)
On the other hand, you have the argument that Article 5 ofGeneva Convention
III requires a case-by-case evaluation ofthe status ofdetained persons ifprisoner of
war status is not being conferred, based on the plain reading of Article 5. Article 5
addresses the issue of the legal status of a captured or detained person who has
committed a belligerent act. It notes that a person who is classified as a "combat-
ant" under Article 4 will be treated in all respects as a prisoner ofwar. Ifthere is any
doubt about whether a detainee is entitled to prisoner ofwar status, Article 5 delin-
eates the requirement to conduct a status determination tribunal as follows:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and
having fallen into the hands ofthe enemy, belong to any ofthe categories enumerated in
Article 4 [i.e., combatants], such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present
convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
One could argue that a simple way for a coalition partner to solve this debate is to
conduct its own status determination hearing prior to transfer, but there is no re-
quirement at law to do so and this approach ignores the reality of the operational
situation where it may be impossible to do so in a timely and effective manner.
What is the impact on the decision to transfer if it is known at the time of
transfer that a detainee is likely to be charged and may be subject to the death
penalty and/or judicial proceedings that may not meet minimal fair trial
guarantees under international or domestic law?
This, of course, is the thorny issue of transferring detainees to a State whose penal
code authorizes the death penalty or has a judicial system with less procedural
guarantees than those found under the coalition partner's law. International law,
including the law ofarmed conflict, contemplates that detainees, including prison-
ers ofwar and unlawful combatants, maybe subject to judicial proceedings and ul-
timately sentenced to death. 5 International law imposes minimum legal standards
on the conduct of these proceedings. Unlawful combatants may be prosecuted as
criminals for having taken part in hostilities. Prisoners of war could be liable for
prosecution if they committed violations of the laws of war.
The real legal issue for coalition operations, however, is likely to be how the do-
mestic law of the respective coalition partners impacts on the transfer of detainees
to a.coalition partner, who could potentially subject the detainee to the death pen-
alty. Unlike the United States, most other western nations' domestic human rights
standards have some extraterritorial application to aliens. For example, Section 7
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ofCanada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees individuals the right not to
be deprived of their life, liberty or security of the person except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that
extradition to face the death penalty6 or immigration removal where there is a sub-
stantial risk of torture7 would violate Section 7 in all but exceptional circum-
stances. Arguably the issue of transfer of detainees in the context of a military
operation abroad is quantifiably different than the extradition or immigration re-
moval of a person who is on Canadian territory, but the application of the Charter
to such operations has yet to be addressed by Canadian courts. In a similar vein, the
European Court ofHuman Rights ruled in Bankovic8 that while Article 1 ofthe Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights9 contemplates the ordinary and essentially
territorial notion ofjurisdiction, extra-territorial jurisdiction by a contracting state
is possible in exceptional circumstances depending on the particular circum-
stances of each case.
Additional Protocol I—Article 51 (3)
The final issue I would like to touch on today is what Hayes Parks calls the "revolv-
ing door" for certain civilians provided by Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I.
As a trade-off for the protection they enjoy against the dangers arising from mili-
tary operations, civilians should not directly participate in hostilities. According to
Article 51(3) ofAdditional Protocol I, their direct participation in hostilities auto-
matically entails loss of immunity from attack "for such time as they take a direct
part in hostilities" In principle, the trade-off does not appear to be problematic,
particularly in the context of those armed conflicts where there is no difficulty in
precisely defining combatant and civilian status. But in the context of Operation
Enduring Freedom, the practical application of this temporal limitation could be
problematic, particularly from a targeting perspective. How can the period during
which a civilian who directly participates in hostilities loses immunity from attack
be defined in practical terms? Does it mean that civilians only lose their protected
status and become lawful targets while they carry a weapon and they revert to their
protected status once they throw down their weapon or return home from a day in
the trenches? Or do they continue to be lawful targets so long as they perform the
functions of combatants, such as planning and command as well as the actual con-
duct of operations? There is no international consensus on this issue and these are
not academic questions, the answer to which is ofno practical import. Nor are they
only relevant to those nations who are parties to Additional Protocol I. Targeting
decisions will remain subject to legal review as part of the accountability process
that is integral to the principle of command responsibility. There will be an effect
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on the whole coalition as a result of each partner's interpretation on this issue as
each nation's position on this issue may have a direct impact on the targets as-
signed to each partner by the coalition commander.
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PART III
MARITIME OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

XI
Current Legal Issues in Maritime Operations:
Maritime Interception Operations in the
Global War on Terrorism, Exclusion Zones,
Hospital Ships and Maritime Neutrality
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg 1
Preliminary Remarks
With the adoption oftheUN Law ofthe Sea Convention in 1982 2 there was
a strong belief that with that "constitution of the world's oceans" all the
disputed issues relating to coastal State rights on the one hand, and to freedom of
navigation on the other hand, had been settled for good. Since 1982, however,
coastal State legislation has frequently had a negative impact on the latter. The US
Freedom of Navigation Program gives ample proof of excessive maritime claims
ranging from restrictions of the rights of innocent passage, transit passage, and
archipelagic sea lanes passage, to the establishment of illegal baselines and mari-
time security zones, all ofwhich have no basis in either the LOS Convention or in
customary international law. 3 The problem of "creeping jurisdiction" has gradu-
ally been reinforced by national legislation on the protection of the marine envi-
ronment. Many coastal States have understood that when a deviation from the
established rules and principles of the law of the sea is justified on environmental
grounds, it creates enormous difficulties for those States that are prepared to coun-
ter these claims. The general public will all too easily accept them as reasonable and
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legitimate. Still, for countries like the United States and the member States of the
European Union,4 in view oftheir dependence on the freedom of navigation for se-
curity and economic reasons, it is of tantamount importance to preserve the
achievements of the LOS Convention.
At the same time, these very States are confronted with new challenges. There al-
ready exists reliable intelligence information that transnational terrorists may tar-
get ships and ports. Moreover, transnational terrorism may well seek to take
advantage of navigational freedoms by transporting weapons, including weapons
of mass destruction, by sea. In order to prevent them from reaching their destina-
tion it is necessary not only to establish effective control mechanisms in ports 5 but
also to interfere with international shipping on the high seas if there is no such ef-
fective control mechanism in the port of origin, or if the flag State is unwilling to
comply with its obligations under treaties in force6 or under the respective resolu-
tions of the UN Security Council. 7
The dilemma the target States of transnational terrorism find themselves in seems
to be obvious. On the one hand, there is a necessity to interfere with foreign shipping,
thus restricting the freedom of navigation. On the other hand, these measures may
be precedents for a modification ofthe law which would, ifgoing too far, be contrary
to the vital interests of these States whose economies depend on the free flow of
goods by sea and whose security interests presuppose that their navies remain in a
position to exercise power projection whenever and wherever necessary.
The first section of this paper will deal with the question ofwhether and to what
extent the law as it stands provides a sufficient legal basis for Maritime Intercep-
tion/Interdiction Operations (MIO) 8 in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).9
If the answer to this question is affirmative, the said dilemma will prove to be less
dramatic than it seems to be at first glance.
The second part of this paper will be devoted to three further current legal issues
in maritime operations that, although dealing with the law of naval warfare and
neutrality at sea, are not in toto unrelated to the issues dealt with in the first part.
Firstly, the establishment of "exclusion/operational zones" during an international
armed conflict will, in any event, interfere with the freedom of navigation of "neu-
tral" and innocent shipping. Secondly, the threat posed by transnational terrorism
will not vanish or even decrease during an international armed conflict. Rather,
transnational terrorists may consider warships and hospital ships perfect targets,
be it only for propaganda reasons. 10 Hence, the question arises as to which mea-
sures belligerents may take in order to effectively protect their units. Thirdly, and
finally, in view of the persisting terrorist threat during an international armed con-
flict, the traditional rules and principles of the law of (maritime) neutrality, if
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applied in a strict manner, may prove to be a considerable obstacle for non-bellig-
erent States in their contribution to the GWOT.
War on Terrorism
Developments following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have led to a
broader understanding of the right of self-defense. 11 It not only applies to situa-
tions where a State, either with its armed forces or in some other way attributable to
it, has attacked another State. It also comes into operation if an armed attack is
launched against a State from outside its borders 12 by persons whose acts cannot,
or for the time being cannot, be attributed to another State. Moreover, the target
State, or the potential target State, and its allies do not have to adopt a wait-and-see
policy but they may take all measures reasonably necessary to prevent future at-
tacks as early and as effectively as possible.
MIO in the GWOT
In the maritime context such preventive measures may comprise, inter alia:
Surveillance and control of sea traffic;
Providing for freedom and safety of navigation;
Protection of endangered vessels;
Disruption of lines of communication;
Visit, search (boarding) and capture;
Diversion;
Establishment of security zones and of restricted sea areas;
Capture/arrest of cargos and persons.
Self-defense
However, ifmaritime interception/interdiction operations 13 are solely based upon
the right of self-defense there needs to be a sufficiently clear link to the threat posed
by transnational terrorism. This will, for example, be the case if there are reason-
able grounds for suspicion that a given vessel is involved in the carrying of terror-
ists and/or of weapons destined for an area known to serve as a hiding place or
training ground for terrorist groups. In any event, the generally accepted legal limi-
tations of the right of self-defense—immediacy, necessity, proportionality—have
to be observed. 14 Indiscriminate MIO exercised in vast sea areas would be dispro-
portionate and, hence, not justified by the right of self-defense.
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It may be added in this context that if a vessel can be connected to the persisting
threat posed by transnational terrorism no further conditions have to be met. Es-
pecially, any form of consent—be it by the flag State or by the ship's master—is ir-
relevant. The right of self-defense has never been made dependent upon the will of
third States or of individuals. The UN Security Council alone would be in a posi-
tion, by taking effective measures, to terminate the exercise ofthat inherent right. 15
Law of the Sea
While MIO could be based upon the rules of the law ofnaval warfare on prize mea-
sures (measures short of attack) 16 and on targeting 17 this would presuppose the ex-
istence of an international armed conflict. While the United States is, at present, a
party to an international armed conflict (Iraq), the exercise of the right of visit and
search and the targeting ofvessels could be based on these rules. However, transna-
tional terrorism poses an ongoing threat that will not disappear with the termina-
tion of the hostilities in Iraq. Hence, the question is whether there are—apart from
the right of self-defense and the law of naval warfare—other rules of international
law that could serve as a legal basis for MIO on the high seas.
Of course, the law of the sea, as embodied in the LOS Convention and in
customary international law, recognizes the right of warships and of other State
ships to take measures against a merchant vessel, including visit and search, 18 if
• the vessel is flying the same flag as the intercepting warship;
• the vessel is "stateless";
• there are reasonable grounds for suspicion that the vessel is engaged in
(a) piracy, 19
(b) slave trade, or
(c) unauthorized broadcasting.
Accordingly, the boarding of the So San20 was justified not merely according to
the right of collective self-defense, but also according to Article 110 of the LOS Con-
vention because, at the time of the interception, it could be considered stateless and
because it did not give satisfactory information about its origin and about its destina-
tion. Hence, all measures, including visit and search (boarding, including opposed
boarding), undertaken for the purpose of verifying the true character, function, and
destination of the vessel were admissible. 21 The fact that, after the boarding, the na-
tionality of the vessel proved to be North Korean and that it was engaged in the "in-
nocent" shipping of missiles does not justify a different legal evaluation.22
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Against allegations to the contrary it is, however, doubtful whether it would be
admissible to draw an analogy between transnational terrorists and pirates. While in
some cases acts of transnational terrorism may be characterized as piratical, or at
least similar to piracy, it must be remembered that, according to the consensus of
States, there still is a clear distinction between terrorism on the one hand and piracy
on the other.23 Therefore, according to the law as it stands, the rules on piracy can not
be applied to terrorists, unless their acts qualify as piracy proper.
It may be added that, according to the LOS Convention, coastal States may take
action against foreign merchant vessels to enforce their domestic laws. This right to
enforce varies and decreases with the sea area in question. While it would be in
accordance with international law to enforce domestic immigration and security
regulations in the internal waters, in the territorial sea and in the contiguous
zone,24 especially if the vessel affected is believed to be involved in acts of
transnational terrorism, the law of the sea does not provide for such enforcement
measures in the costal State's sea areas beyond the 12-nm territorial sea or the 24-
nm contiguous zone. In the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) coastal States are only
entitled to prescribe and enforce rules that are designed to regulate the exploration
and exploitation ofthe natural resources and to protect the marine environment of
that sea area.25 With regard to activities of foreign vessels not affecting these
"sovereign rights" nor resulting in severe damage to the marine environment, the
flag State principle has precedence over the coastal State's rights. Hence, Article
110 of the LOS Convention provides a legal basis for MIO on the high seas.
Other Legal Bases for MIO?
There remains one legal aspect that seemingly has not been made use of in the cur-
rent discussion on the legality ofMIO in the GWOT, i.e., countermeasures and/or
reprisals. In this context, it is of great importance that the UN Security Council, in
Resolution 1373,26 has decided—in a legally binding way (!)—that with regard to
transnational terrorism States shall, inter alia:
Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from
making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related
services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or
attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of
entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and
entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons;
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(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or
persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members
of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;
(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by
provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information;
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or
provide safe havens;
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using
their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens;
(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation
or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice
and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts
are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that
the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;
(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border
controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and
through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity
papers and travel documents.
Hence, if a State either assists transnational terrorism or has knowledge that its na-
tionals or merchant vessels are engaged in such assistance, etc., but still remains inac-
tive, that State is in clear violation of its obligations under the UN Charter.27
Of course, if the assistance rendered amounts to direct participation in an
armed terrorist attack or if the terrorist attack is in some other way attributable to
the sponsoring State, the target State will be entitled to take self-defense measures.
Whether the armed response qualifies as an "on-the-spot reaction" or a "defensive
armed reprisal" 28 is merely a matter of the modalities of the exercise of the right of
self-defense. In any event, the target State will have the right to respond by the use
of armed force.
But what if the assistance by the sponsoring State or its inactivity does not
amount to assistance in an armed attack? On the one hand, the sponsoring or
inactive State would still be in violation of its obligations specified in Resolution
1373. Even more, the inactivity would be supportive of acts of transnational terrorism
and could, therefore, constitute a prohibited use of force, not amounting, however, to
an armed attack or an act of aggression ("smaller scale use of force"). In such a
situation the target State, on the other hand, would not be under an obligation to
remain inactive. Rather it would be entitled to take all necessary countermeasures or
reprisals in response to the illegal acts ofthe sponsoring State. To some surprise this has
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recently been expressly acknowledged by Judge Simma who is far from being a
supporter of a broad understanding of the law governing the use of force. In his
separate opinion to the Court's judgment in the Oil Platforms case29 Judge Simma
stated, inter alia:
In my view, the permissibility of strictly defensive military action taken against attacks
of the type involving, for example, the Sea Isle City or the Samuel B. Roberts cannot be
denied. What we see in such instances is an unlawful use of force "short of an armed
attack ('agression armee') within the meaning of Article 51, as indeed "the most grave
form ofthe use of force." Against such smaller-scale use offeree, defensive action—by
force also "short of Article 51—is to be regarded as lawful. In other words, I would
suggest a distinction between (full-scale) self-defence within the meaning ofArticle 51
against an "armed attack" within the meaning of the same Charter provision on the
one hand and, on the other, the case of hostile action, for instance against individual
ships, below the level ofArticle 51, justifying proportionate defensive measures on the
part of the victim, equally short of the quality and quantity of action in self-defence
expressly reserved in the United Nations Charter.30
Applied to the GWOT, the target State of acts of transnational terrorism would
be entitled to take defensive countermeasures "short ofArticle 51" against the State
that is, actively or passively, assisting or otherwise furthering transnational
terrorism. Accordingly, countermeasures/reprisals involving visit and search
could be taken against vessels for the mere reason that they are flying that State's
flag (genuine link). However, in view of the importance of the freedom of
navigation such measures must be necessary and strictly proportionate. That will
only be the case if there are reasonable grounds for suspicion that the vessels
affected are indeed engaged in activities of—or in assistance of—transnational
terrorism, e.g., ifthe State in question fails to prevent the merchant vessels flying its
flag from transporting terrorists or objects that are designed to further
transnational terrorism.
The Use of "Zones" in the Context ofAnti-Terror/Force Protection
When it comes to "zones" in a maritime context there are a number of misunder-
standings due to connotations to "war zones" known from the two World Wars31
or to "exclusion zones" known from the Falklands/Malvinas War (1982) 32 and
from the Iran-IraqWar ( 1980-1 988). 33 As a method ofnaval warfare such a zone
—
whatever its purpose or legality may be—cannot be made use of in times other than
international armed conflict.
"Defense bubbles" or rather warning zones established around warships or
naval units are also to be distinguished from "operational," "exclusion" or other
zones. Such warning zones merely serve to protect the naval vessels from attack or
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from other illegal activities and are generally recognized as in accordance with
international law. 34 Shipping and aviation are notified of potentially hazardous
conditions and are requested to clearly identify themselves if they are approaching
the warning zone. The extent of these zones and the measures taken cannot be
determined in abstracto. Rather, it will depend on the circumstances of each single
case, especially on a known threat and on the location of the ships concerned,
whether the extent of the warning area may be reasonable or excessive. 35 As the
attack on the USS Cole clearly demonstrates, the threat posed by terrorist activities
is obvious but will vary according to the region of operation and to the general
security environment. If, however, the extent of the defensive/protective/warning
zone is proportionate to that threat, the inconveniences imposed upon sea and air
traffic will not amount to a violation of the freedom of navigation. This holds true
for times ofpeace and during periods of international armed conflict. Still, it needs
to be kept in mind that, unless the threat is overwhelming and leaves no choice of
deliberations, such warning zones will have to be based upon some form of an
agreement with the respective coastal State, if the warships or naval unit are
deployed, or are operating, in the internal waters or territorial sea of that State.
In addition, warning zones are not to be equated with "special warnings" which
are merely a tool for implementing the warning zone and for notifying it to other
States and to international shipping and aviation. For example, US forces are
presently operating under a heightened state of readiness. Accordingly,
approaching aircraft and ships are requested to maintain radio contact and are
warned that the US forces will exercise appropriate self-defense measures, without,
however, impeding freedom of navigation. 36
The question remains whether zones may also be made use of in the GWOT for
purposes other than force protection. Certainly, in view of the importance of the
freedom of navigation for international trade and security, the closure of larger areas
of the high seas to international navigation and aviation would be illegal. Up to the
present, assertions by some States of a right to extend their sea areas for security
reasons beyond the 12-nm territorial sea have regularly met protests and have, thus,
never been recognized. 37 Older concepts, like the so-called "pacific blockade," 38 or
singular precedents, like the "quarantine" of Cuba,39 would not justify such far
reaching infringements of the freedom of navigation either. Although, in theory,
the establishment of an "exclusion zone" could be based upon the right of self-
defense there is but one realistic scenario this author can conceive of in which such
a measure would meet the test of immediacy, necessity and proportionality: A
group of transnational terrorists gains control over a submarine with launching
capabilities for intermediate-range missiles and there is sufficient intelligence
information that they will attack from a given sea area. Then it may be in
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accordance with the right of self-defense of the threatened State to close that sea
area to all underwater vehicles.
Apart from such a scenario, however, the extensive use of a given sea area in the
GWOT will always be in conformity with international law, when approached from
a different perspective. If the target States of terrorist attacks and their allies are al-
lowed to conduct MIO worldwide on the high seas, clearly a decision to restrict such
operations only to certain limited seas areas is lawful, particularly ifthe sea areas con-
cerned are known to be used for the transport of terrorists and ofweapons destined
to terrorist groups. The States cooperating in the framework of Operation Enduring
Freedom have been doing exactly this by restricting MIO to the sea areas surround-
ing the Arabian Peninsula. Up to the present, no State seems to have protested or
otherwise contested the legality of these measures. Accordingly, and subject to the
principles of necessity and proportionality, an operational area—that is to be distin-
guished from any form of "zone"—may be established in the context of the fight
against transnational terrorism in order to enable the target States and their allies to
identify and control international shipping and aviation or, ifreasonable grounds for
suspicion of an activity supportive of transnational terrorism exist, to prevent them
from approaching the coastline of a State that has proved to be either unwilling or
unable to comply with its obligations under the UN Security Council resolutions on
transnational terrorism.
Law ofNaval Warfare and Maritime Neutrality
While the San Remo Manual in most of its parts reflects customary international
law, three aspects of the law of naval warfare addressed therein either remain dis-
puted or, in view ofnew threats and exigencies, seemingly need to be reconsidered:
maritime exclusion/operational zones, technical equipment of hospital ships, and
maritime neutrality.
Maritime Exclusion/Operational Zones
There is general agreement that the "war zones" established by the belligerents of the
two World Wars were, and remain, illegal.40 No zone, whatever its denomination or
alleged purpose relieves the proclaiming belligerent of the obligation under the law
ofnaval warfare to refrain from attacking vessels and aircraft which do not constitute
legitimate military objectives. 41 In other words, a zone amounting to a "free-fire-
zone" has no basis in the existing law. Considerations of military necessity—e.g.,
from a submariner's point ofview—do not justify a conclusion to the contrary.42
Still, in view of State practice, the discussion on the legality ofsome other kind of
"zone" has not ceased. On the one hand, modern weapons are far more
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discriminating than any means of naval warfare used during World War II. On the
other hand, modern weapons have brought about over-the-horizon targeting
capabilities. At the same time, naval platforms, in view of their construction and
technical equipment, are rather vulnerable and can suffer severe damage inflicted
by comparatively "primitive" means. Moreover, the number of the world's
merchant vessels has increased considerably. They may be engaged in innocent
trade but they may also be integrated into the enemy's war-fighting or war-
sustaining effort, thus constituting a threat to the overall effort to bring the armed
conflict to a successful end without suffering unreasonable damage. Therefore,
naval armed forces are forced to control large sea areas in order to remain in a
position to effectively protect their units and to achieve their military goal.
Before dealing with the legality of such exclusion/operational zones under the
law of naval warfare it needs to be stressed that they must be distinguished from
warning zones43 and from the customary belligerent right to control the immediate
area or vicinity of naval operations. It is generally acknowledged that belligerents
are entitled to take all measures necessary against neutral vessels and aircraft whose
presence may otherwise jeopardize naval operations in that area.44 While in many
cases such measures will consist of a belligerent's control over the communications
of these vessels and aircraft, they may, depending on the circumstances, include the
closure of the sea area in which naval operations are conducted.45
State Practice
After the condemnation of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal, the first precedent of an exclusion zone obviously occurred during the
Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982. On April 7, the United Kingdom proclaimed a
"maritime exclusion zone" around the islands. Argentina followed on April 8 by
proclaiming a "maritime zone." On April 23, the British Government proclaimed a
"defensive bubble"46 limited to the protection of the British forces against Argen-
tine warships and Argentine military and civilian aircraft. However, on April 28,
the United Kingdom proclaimed a "total exclusion zone" (TEZ) that came into ef-
fect on April 30:
[T]he exclusion zone will apply not only to Argentine warships and naval auxiliaries
but also to any other ship, whether naval or merchant vessel, which is operating in
support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentine Forces. The zone
will also apply to any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is operating in support of
the Argentine occupation. Any ship and any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is
found within the zone without authority from the Ministry of Defence in London will
be regarded as operating in support of the illegal occupation and will therefore be
regarded as hostile and will be liable to be attacked by British Forces.
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In view ofthe wording ofthe proclamation that clearly indicates the British were
prepared to attack any vessel or aircraft encountered within the TEZ, it is rather
astonishing that one commentator has characterized the TEZ as a "reasonable
temporary appropriation of a limited area of the high seas."47 This conclusion is
mainly based on the fact that the zone had been adequately notified, that it had
been established in a remote sea area without significant sea traffic, and that it had
not resulted in any casualties to neutral ships or aircraft. 48 While these arguments
are without doubt reflecting reality, they do not alter the wording of the
proclamation. On the other hand, due to other rather obscure statements of the
British government it may well be that, in reality, the British forces were not
allowed to target just any contact within the TEZ—at least not without prior
authorization from the highest political level. Therefore, the United Kingdom was
either lucky that its naval units were not forced to really enforce the TEZ vis-a-vis
neutral vessels and aircraft or, what is more likely, the proclamation ofthe TEZ was
nothing but a most effective ruse ofwar because it obviously induced the Argentine
forces to avoid the area. If the latter holds true, the British measure was not illegal
under the law ofnaval warfare. At the same time, however, the British TEZ may not
serve as a legal precedent for the—alleged—legality of exclusion zones as a method
of naval warfare.
During the Iran-Iraq War both belligerents made use of zones. The Iranian
government issued guidelines for the safety of merchant shipping in the Persian
Gulf obliging vessels to transit the Strait ofHormuz south and east of a designated
line, declaring a "war zone" covering all Iranian waters, and prohibiting all
transportation of cargo to Iraqi ports.49 The Iraqi government declared the area
North of29-30N a prohibited war zone and warned all vessels appearing within the
zone to be liable to attack. The Iraqi government further warned that all tankers,
regardless of nationality, docking at Kharg Island were targets for the Iraqi air
force. 50 In contrast to the practice of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict both
belligerents ofthe Iran-Iraq conflict, by attacking neutral tankers, did enforce their
zones thus providing sufficient evidence that they regarded them as "free-fire
zones." Since the attacks were not directed solely against legitimate military
objectives, 51 the zones of that conflict are generally considered illegal. 52
Military Manuals and Expert Opinions
In view of the general condemnation of the zones established and enforced during
the two World Wars and during the Iran-Iraq War, States that are prepared to
characterize exclusion zones as a legitimate method of naval warfare take a rather
cautious approach. The respective parts of their military manuals53 all stress that
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• the establishment of such a zone does not relieve the proclaiming belligerent
of the obligation under the law of armed conflict to refrain from attacking vessels
and aircraft which do not constitute lawful targets,
• the zone may not unreasonably interfere with neutral commerce, and that
• the geographical area covered, the duration, and the measures taken within
the zone should not exceed what is strictly required by military necessity and the
principle of proportionality.
Accordingly, those States agree that the same body of law applies both inside and
outside the zone and, moreover, that the establishment of an exclusion zone is in
conformity with the law as an exceptional measure only. If all these conditions are
met, exclusion zones are accepted as in conformity with the law of naval warfare
both in the San Remo Manual54 and in the International Law Association's Hel-
sinki Principles. 55
Still, the question remains what object and purpose an exclusion zone is to serve. To
that end, the San Remo Manual is ambiguous. 56 According to the US Navy
Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations an exclusion zone may
either contain the geographic area of the conflict or it may keep neutral shipping at a
safe distance from areas ofactual or potential hostilities.57 A similar approach underlies
the German Navy Commander's Handbook that refers to "comprehensive control
rights" and to the denial of access to a given sea area "in order to protect [vessels and
aircraft] from the effects of armed conflicts."58 The Helsinki Principles also contain a
reference to particular risks to which neutral shipping is exposed. 59 Hence, if not
designed to contain or restrict the area ofnaval operations60 and ifnot a—legitimate
—
ruse of naval warfare, an exclusion zone may either serve the protection of neutral
navigation and aviation or it may imply that a belligerent, in a given area, will
extensively exercise the control rights already conferred on it by the law of naval
warfare and of maritime neutrality. Then, however, the zone will rather resemble a
geographical restriction of belligerent rights of control—the establishment of the zone
would merely indicate that in sea areas not covered by the zone the belligerent may
refrain from exercising these rights. Be that as it may, if serving these purposes, and if
the further conditions set out above are met, there can be no doubt about the legality of
exclusion zones.
Hospital Ships: New Necessities and Threats
At the time of their adoption, the rules on hospital ships laid down in Articles 22 et
seq. of the 1949 Second Geneva Convention (GC II) were a well-balanced compro-
mise between considerations ofhumanity and of military necessity and were adapted
to the weapons technology of that time. However, the rapid technological
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development soon gave rise to concerns. At first, the rules on the marking ofhospital
ships proved no longer sufficient to ensure their effective identification as specially
protected platforms under the law of naval warfare.61 Then it became clear that the
rules regulating the technical equipment of hospital ships for communication pur-
poses had become outdated in view ofmodern forms ofcommunication via satellite
and other means. Today there is a realistic danger that a hospital ship, although ex-
clusively employed in its humanitarian role, may be attacked by transnational terror-
ists who will consider it an easy and very effective target. Therefore the question
arises whether and to what extent hospital ships, during an international armed con-
flict, may be equipped with secure communications devices and with an armament
enabling them to effectively defend themselves against illegal attacks.
Secure Communications
Article 34, paragraph 2, ofGC II emphasizes that "hospital ships may not possess or
use a secret code for their wireless or other means ofcommunication." This provi-
sion appears to imply a prohibition on possession and use of secure communica-
tion equipment for both sending and receiving encrypted communications,
However, the English version is not the only authoritative text of the Convention.
The equally authentic French and Spanish texts prohibit only the sending of en-
crypted traffic ("les navires-hopitaux ne pourront posseder ni utiliser de code se-
cret pour leurs emissions par T.S.F. ou par tout autre moyen de communication").
According to Article 33, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, "the terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each
authentic text."62 Therefore, the conclusion is justified that only the possession or
use of secure communications equipment for transmitting, not for receiving, mes-
sages in secret code is prohibited.
While some States, like the United Kingdom during the Falklands/Malvinas
conflict,63 hesitate to share this interpretation, others, like the United States64 and
Germany,65 obviously are prepared to provide hospital ships with equipment that
would enable them to receive messages in secret code. Indeed, that would not only
be in accordance with the generally accepted rules on the interpretation of
multilingual treaties, it would also guarantee the effective performance of the
genuinely humanitarian function of hospital ships. If hospital ships were not
allowed to receive encrypted messages, the enemy would be in a position to
intercept messages sent to them and to deduce from that message the location of a
possible naval or military operation.66 If a "Red Cross Box" is not a feasible
alternative, the hospital ship would be prevented from performing its
humanitarian function because the respective flag State would be forced to, at least,
delay the message in order not to jeopardize the military operation in question. 67 In
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view of the overall importance of the protection of the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked, an interpretation leading to such a result would be manifestly absurd
or unreasonable. Hence, it is no surprise that the San Remo Manual provides in
paragraph 171: "In order to fulfill most effectively their humanitarian mission,
hospital ships should be permitted to use cryptographic equipment. The
equipment shall not be used in any circumstances to transmit intelligence data nor
in any other way to acquire any military advantage."68
This statement implies that hospital ships should be permitted to also use
cryptographic equipment for the sending of messages. Indeed, in the explanations
to the San Remo Manual,69 the commentators state:
The participants were of the opinion that as the inability to receive encrypted information
jeopardises the ability of hospital ships to operate effectively, the rule ought to concentrate
on the sending of military intelligence. Therefore, in order to fulfil their humanitarian
mission effectively, hospital ships should be permitted to use cryptographic equipment
(modem terminology for a secret code) which in modem technology is an integral part of
most communications systems. This cryptographic equipment may not be used for any
purpose other than the humanitarian tasks of the vessel, obviously not to transmit
intelligence data, nor for any other incompatible purpose.
Seemingly, according to the San Remo Manual, hospital ships would not be
prohibited from sending encrypted messages as long as they are strictly related to
the humanitarian function of the hospital ship and not used for any militarily
useful purposes. In view of the importance of the humanitarian function and in
view ofmodern communications technology, it would indeed make sense ifArticle
34, paragraph 2, GC II could be interpreted in that way. In this context it needs to
be kept in mind that the prohibition of a "secret code" is solely designed to
reinforce the prohibition of committing acts harmful to the enemy in Article 34,
paragraph 1, GC II. Moreover, according to Article 35 (1) GC II, a hospital may
have on board an "apparatus exclusively intended to facilitate navigation or
communication." Today, however, modern means of communication necessitate
the use of equipment that could be considered as violating the "secret code"
prohibition of Article 34, GC II. The same holds true for navigation equipment,
e.g., if using the military Global Positioning System (GPS). The rules on medical
aircraft in Article 28.2 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I take that development into
account. While medical aircraft are prohibited to "be used to collect or transmit
intelligence data" this implies that they are allowed to receive and transmit
messages in a secret code as long as the data are not of a military nature.
Hence, an extensive interpretation would certainly be in accordance with the
object and purpose of Article 34, paragraph 2, GC II. However, every
220
WolffHeintchel von Heinegg
interpretation finds its limits in the "ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty." These terms merely justify an interpretation allowing hospital ships the
use ofequipment for the receiving, not for the sending, ofencrypted messages. The
San Remo Manual together with the explanations does not serve as evidence for a
view to the contrary. In the explanations it is made clear that paragraph 171 does
not reflect the law as it stands. Rather, the majority view was that "the present law
still prohibits the use ofsuch equipment and that this law has not fallen into desuetude.
[Therefore the majority was] ofthe opinion that the text needed to reflect this fact and
that the participants were encouraging a change in the law."70
Since the sending ofencrypted messages by hospital ships cannot be based upon
the lex lata, States whose interests are specially affected should endeavor to
contribute to a modification of the law. While a codification conference is not a
realistic option, those States should focus on convincing other States to recognize a
deviating practice as reasonable in order to safeguard the specially protected
humanitarian function of such ships under lexferenda. Numerous statements to
that effect would certainly contribute to a modification ofthe law as it now stands.
Protective Arming ofHospital Ships
The provisions ofGC II on hospital ships neither expressly prohibit the arming of
hospital ships for self-defense purposes nor expressly provide for such protection
or defense. Article 35(1), according to which a hospital ship is not deprived of its
special protection ifthe "crews ofships or sick-bays are armed for the maintenance
of order, for their own defense or that of the sick and wounded," is restricted to an
exclusively personal scope ofprotection. As such it does not seem to allow any con-
clusion with regard to the protection or defense of the hospital ship itself. Rather,
the said provisions are based on the assumption that the special protection pro-
vided for hospital ships is sufficient to ensure that they will not be captured or at-
tacked. That may have been true in the past but it is more than doubtful whether
under present conditions that assumption is still valid. 71
Still, the manuals of the US Navy and of the German Navy,72 as well as the San
Remo Manual, reflect a strict position with regard to the protective/defensive arming
ofhospital ships. While they either expressly or implicitly refer to Article 35(1) GC II,
they prohibit all arms other than light, portable, individual weapons such as pistols
and rifles.73 Only the German Manual and the San Remo Manual acknowledge the
right of hospital ships to take defensive measures against erroneous or arbitrary at-
tacks, especially by missiles, and they conclude that they "may be equipped with
purely deflective means of defence, such as chaff and flares."74
Indeed, it is more than likely that the respective enemy belligerent will not be
prepared to any longer respect the special protection of a hospital ship whose crew
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is armed with other than small pistols and rifles. And as the provision of the San
Remo Manual referred to above clearly shows it would be nearly impossible to
reach consensus on the criteria that would make possible a distinction between the
offensive or defensive character of such arming. The reference to chaff and flares
was the utmost the participants felt able to agree upon.
The United Kingdom, during the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, decided that they were
unable to effectively protect hospital ships and that it was preferable to abandon
the special protection altogether. Hence, RFA Argus, which was equipped with
light air defense systems, was not a hospital ship proper but a "primarily casualty
receiving ship" that also served for the transportation of troops. 75
If the British practice were copied by other States the special protection of
hospital ships would become obsolete. This, however, would be detrimental to the
humanitarian function of such ships and certainly politically inopportune. States
feeling unable to directly contribute to a multinational military operation would
be deprived of the possibility of indirectly participating by deploying a hospital
ship. The deployment of a hospital ship would not be a merely symbolic act. It
would imply a most valuable contribution for all States and parties involved. On
the one hand, the belligerents would equally profit from making use of the
impartial humanitarian service. On the other hand, the deploying State would be
in a position to prove its credibility and to contribute to confidence building that
would facilitate a future return to normal relations.
These considerations do not, of course, rule out the basic legal problem of the
admissibility of the defensive arming of hospital ships, the interest in which has re-
cently increased considerably in view of the worldwide terrorist threat. Moreover,
it is quite probable that in an asymmetric war environment at least one "party to
the conflict" will disrespect the fundamental protection of such vessels under the
law of naval warfare.
It is doubtful whether the drafters ofGC II were at all aware of this new threat. As
already stated above, they started from the assumption that all parties to an
international armed conflict will respect and protect hospital ships as long as they are
employed in their normal role and as long as they do not commit acts harmful to the
enemy. Then, however, an attack against a hospital ship will in any event be in
violation of the law. The drafters ofGC II may have been under the belief that no
belligerent would consider such illegal behavior and that, if it occurred after all, the
parties to the conflict would find a solution expostfacto. Ifone party to the conflict,
or the attacker, is not a State or other recognized subject of international law, such
as transnational terrorists, any remedy provided for by the law of naval warfare will
be void. Moreover, the law ofnaval warfare contains no rule or other provision that
would justify the conclusion that a belligerent is obliged to suffer an illegal attack or
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other illegal act and to remain passive. In other words, the inherent right of self-
defense that is not abolished by any known legal order is also implicitly recognized
by the law of naval warfare. Accordingly, if there exists reasonable grounds for
suspicion that hospital ships will be the target of an illegal attack, a belligerent is
entitled to take all necessary measures to effectively prevent or counter that attack.
If the only means available to achieve that aim is the—defensive—arming of a
hospital ship, then this would not constitute a violation ofthe law ofnaval warfare.
This, however, is a solution to the problem that is far from having passed the test
of practice. As already indicated above, the enemy belligerent may well consider
the arming of a hospital ship a hostile act. Hence, even if the arming of a hospital
ship is, in the circumstances ruling at the time, a necessary measure of protection
or of self-defense there is no guarantee for a continuing respect and protection by
the opposing belligerent. In addition, it would imply a deviation from a rather
settled interpretation of the existing law76 that only provides for small and light
weapons for strictly personal protection. Any State that is willing to deviate from
that interpretation must be prepared to take the consequences and "to live with the
precedent." This may lead either to the total abolishment of the protection of
hospital ships or to the deployment of hospital ships whose "employment in an
innocent role" and, consequently, whose specially protected status, could no
longer be determined with the certainty necessary.
(Maritime) Neutrality
The Law of Neutrality is laid down in two of the Hague Conventions of October
18, 1907:
• Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Case
ofWar on Land [hereinafter Hague V];77
• Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in
Naval War [hereinafter Hague XIII] , 78
There is no international treaty—apart from the 1977 Additional Protocol I (AP
I) 79—dealing with aerial warfare, neutrality in aerial war or with the legal status of
neutral airspace. The only authoritative document dealing with these issues is the
Hague Rules on Air Warfare of 1923 80—a private draft whose customary character
remains an unsettled matter.
In view ofthe limited time and space available we do not intend to deal here with
the law of neutrality in a comprehensive way. Still, it is clear that, if applied to an
international armed conflict, such as the current hostilities in Iraq, that body oflaw
would imply far-reaching obligations of abstention and of prevention on part of
those States that have decided not to take part in the hostilities.81 It needs to be
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emphasized, however, that allegations of an absolute duty of neutral States to
intern all members of belligerent armed forces present on their territory have no
basis in the traditional law of neutrality. According to Article 11, paragraph 1, of
Hague V, such an obligation presupposes that the neutral State "receives on its
territory troops belonging to the belligerent armies." This does, therefore, not
apply to members of the belligerent armed forces whose presence on the neutral
State's territory is due to a status of forces agreement. Additionally, escaped
prisoners of war and prisoners of war "brought by troops taking refuge in the
territory of a neutral Power" shall be left at liberty. Finally, according to Article 5,
paragraph 1 (in conjunction with Article 2) of Hague V, a neutral State "must not
allow" the movement of belligerent "troops or convoys of either munitions ofwar
or supplies" across its territory. This means that the neutral State is under an
obligation to prevent such movements but it does not necessarily imply an
obligation to intern the persons engaged in such transports. Hence, the duty of
internment only applies to members of the belligerent armed forces who have
already actively taken part in the hostilities and who, thus, have to be prevented
from reentering the war from the territory of the neutral State concerned.
Scope ofApplicability of the Law ofNeutrality
It is a well-known fact that the applicability of the law of neutrality has always been
a highly disputed issue. While some assert that it applies only in the context of a
state of war,82 others maintain that that determination depends upon the more or
less unrestricted decision of the non-participating States.83
There is, however, only one situation in which the law of neutrality clearly does
not apply—the authoritative determination by the UN Security Council that one
party to an international armed conflict is the aggressor. 84 If the Security Council
merely refers to its powers under Chapter VII, without expressly identifying the
aggressor, it will remain unclear which State has breached the law and which State
is the victim of an act of aggression or of a breach of the peace. A fortiori, this holds
true if the Security Council remains inactive.
Still, despite the unsettled scope of applicability of the law of neutrality, and apart
from situations in which the Security Council has identified the aggressor, State
practice since 1945 gives sufficient evidence that that body oflaw has not become ob-
solete. That very State practice also reveals, however, that there is no longer any room
for an automatic application of that law to every international armed conflict in the
sense ofcommon Article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
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Current State of the Law ofNeutrality
The parties to post-World War II international armed conflicts, as well as those
States not actively taking part in those conflicts have, by their actual behavior,
shown that they were not prepared to accept the automatic and comprehensive ap-
plicability of the law of neutrality, even if the situation in question, either materi-
ally or formally, amounted to a "war" proper. 85 On the other hand, international
armed conflicts that were not characterized as "wars"—either by the parties to the
conflict or by non-participating States or by international legal scholars—have cer-
tainly had an influence on the conduct of States not being parties to those con-
flicts.86 Therefore, the doctrine of the necessity of a state ofwar proper, as well as
the doctrine of "status mixtus," lack authoritative substantiation by State practice.
During international armed conflicts since 1945, the conduct of non-participating
States at least indirectly gives evidence of their belief that the law of peace is not in
toto replaced but is partially modified by the law of neutrality. It is also clear from
that conduct that the legally binding effects of that body of law does not depend
upon an individual decision ofthe non-participating States but upon the mere ex-
istence of an international armed conflict. Either those States have refrained from
providing arms and other war material to the belligerents altogether, have denied
providing such supplies officially, or have provided them clandestinely.
Hence, modern State practice gives proof of a functional and differential ap-
proach. As far as the relationship between States (that is to be distinguished from the
relations between belligerents and neutral nationals) is concerned, the law of neu-
trality automatically comes into operation only insofar as the applicability of its rules
is strictly necessary for the achievement of the very object and purpose of that body
oflaw. Accordingly, during an international armed conflict, non-participating States
are obliged to refrain from any act that may escalate that conflict. Especially, they are
prohibited from assisting one party to the conflict in a way that may lead to a tempo-
ral, territorial or other expansion ofthe armed hostilities.87 The delivery ofweapons
and ofother war material by States is prohibited. Activities ofprivate persons who at-
tempt such deliveries must be prevented according to domestic laws and regulations
already in effect. The territory, including the territorial sea and archipelagic waters,
and the superjacent national airspace, may not be made available as a base of opera-
tions to any party of the conflict.88 Moreover, non-participating States must take all
measures necessary to prevent one of the belligerents from gaining military advan-
tages by abusing their neutral status. Any permissions or restrictions with regard to
the use of neutral territory must be applied and enforced impartially. The parties
to the conflict, on their part, are obliged to respect the sovereignty of the non-
participating States, as well as their territorial integrity and their economic rela-
tions with other States. The economic relations with the opposing belligerent to the
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conflict may be interfered with only according to, and within the limits of, the law of
maritime neutrality. In other words, the law of neutrality sets an upper limit to the
rights of the belligerent States.89
As far as these essentialia neutralitatis are concerned, there is no room for a
facultative stance on behalf of a non-participating State if, and as long as, it does
not wish to become directly involved in the armed hostilities. Neither does their
applicability presuppose the existence of a "war" or of a "state of war." These
fundamental obligations apply to every international armed conflict. It has to be
kept in mind, however, that in case of a violation of these fundamental obligations
of the law of neutrality by a non-participating State, the aggrieved belligerent
remains free to assert its rights. 90
The functional and differential approach, which leaves aside the admissibility of
belligerent measures under the law of neutrality, is based on the consideration that
an effective prevention of unlawful activities of non-participating States, as well as
of an escalation of an ongoing international armed conflict, can be achieved only if
these upper legal limits are observed by all States concerned. As regards the further
rights and duties of neutral States, their applicability will not depend upon a
unilateral decision but rather on whether the belligerents are willing and able to
enforce the law of neutrality that goes beyond the said essentialia neutralitatis. Ifthe
belligerents decide—for whatever reason—not to enforce the law of neutrality in a
comprehensive manner, that abstention will have no impact upon the material
contents of that body of law. Modern State practice has merely led to the
abolishment of a comprehensive automatism regarding its applicability. Only this
approach enables us to explain why States continue to maintain that the material
contents of the traditional law of neutrality have not been modified.
Concluding Remarks
While there can be no doubt about the "reactive" character ofany legal order, it has
been one of the purposes of the present paper to show that an early call for a modi-
fication of the existing rules in view ofnew threats and necessities is not always the
correct way of approaching the solution of—allegedly—new problems. Rather, a
sober and not too formalistic scrutiny of the law as it stands will in most cases help
identify the way in which a given situation should be addressed. Of course, it is not
always comfortable or convenient to comply with the law. Considerations of mili-
tary or political necessity and the need to rapidly react to new threats may suggest
and justify a deviation from the law. It is, however, one of the most important
achievements of civilized nations that they adhere to the law and, thus, show their
respect for the rule oflaw even in situations in which this complicates things. In the
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context of international law it should, moreover, not be left out of consideration
that any deviation from the law will be a precedent closely observed by other States
which may, in the near future, adopt a similar conduct. Although the precedent
may have served a different, and legitimate, purpose, it may prove impossible to
prevent those other States from referring to it and claiming their conduct to be in
conformity with the modified law.
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in International Law and the War on Terror 255-73 (Fred L. Borch & Paul S. Wilson
eds., 2003) (Vol. 79, US Naval War College International Law Studies). See also Wolff Heintschel
von Heinegg & Tobias Gries, Der Einsatz der Deutschen Marine im Rahmen der "Operation
Enduring Freedom ," 40 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 145-182 (2002).
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under public international law. Note that in its resolutions the Security Council has steadily
referred to "international" terrorism.
13. Note that the above list of measures is rather comprehensive. In practice, the term
"Leadership Interdiction Operations" (LIO) is also used in order to distinguish between
measures taken against persons and those taken against objects. This is not useful because it
implies that there are two distinct (legal) concepts. However, when it comes to interference with
foreign vessels it does not make a difference whether this is aimed at persons or at objects.
14. See YORAM DlNSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 207 (3d ed. 2001).
15. See Article 51 UN Charter: "[U]ntil the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security." For an evaluation, see DlNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 185.
16. It suffices here to refer to SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA W 1 12-117 (Louise Doswell-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO
MANUAL]. For a detailed analysis, see the commentary in Explanations, id., at 187-95.
17. Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval
OPERATIONS, chap. 8 (A. R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, US Naval War
College International Law Studies) [hereinafter ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT]. SAN REMO
MANUAL, supra note 16, 5 38-77.
18. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 110. See also UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA 1982, A COMMENTARY (Vol. Ill) 237 (Myron H. Nordquist ed., 1995).
19. It needs to be stressed that "piracy" is rather narrowly defined in Article 101 of the LOS
Convention and does not cover any form of "armed robbery at sea."
20. On December 11, 2002, the So San, was seized by a Spanish frigate—acting on information
from US sources—600 miles (965 km) offthe Horn ofAfrica in the Indian Ocean. The vessel was
found to be carrying 15 Scud missiles that were being shipped from North Korea to Yemen.
21. See LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 1 10.2.
22. Note that Article 110.3 of the LOS Convention provides: "If the suspicions prove to be
unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded has not committed any act justifying them, it shall
be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been sustained" (emphasis added).
23. As for the treaties on terrorism, see supra note 6. In view of those treaties, it is more than
doubtful whether there exists a lacuna at all. Moreover, being consensual in character, public
international law only in rare cases is open for analogies.
24. Note that in its contiguous zone the coastal State, according to LOS Convention, Article
33.1(a), may only "punish infringements of [its] laws and regulations committed within its
territory or territorial sea."
25. LOS Convention, supra note 2, arts. 73 and 213.
26. UNSCR 1373 of September 28, 2001, at 5 1(d) and W 2 (a) and (e).
27. The Security Council has been criticized for having acted as a "quasi-legislator." However,
in view of the wide margin of discretion it undoubtedly has when it comes to its primary
responsibility for international peace and security and to enforcement measures under Chapter
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VII, this criticism is not justified. The legally binding effect of this resolution, under Article 25 of
the UN Charter, therefore allows no conclusion to the contrary.
28. For these concepts, see DINSTEIN, supra note 14, at 192.
29. Oil Platforms (Iran v. US), 2003 LC.J. (Nov. 6) (Judgment (Merits)).
30. Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, id. 5 12.
31. For an overview of the practice of "war zones" during the two World Wars, see William J.
Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone Device in the Law ofNaval Warfare, 24 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (1986); E. Schmitz, Sperrgebiet im Seekrieg, 8 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 641-71 (1938); L.F.E. Goldie,
Maritime War Zones & Exclusion Zones, in THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 156-204 (H. B.
Robertson ed., 1991) (Vol. 64, US Naval War College International Law Studies); Karl Zemanek,
War Zones, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (VOL. 4) 337 (R. Bernhardt ed.,
2000); JURGEN SCHMITT, DIE ZULASSIGKEIT VON SPERRGEBIETEN IM SEEKRIEG (1966); George
P. Politakis, Waging War at Sea: The Legality of War Zones, 38 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL
LAW REVIEW 125-172 (1991/2); WolffHeintschel von Heinegg, Exclusion Zones, Mines, Abuse of
Neutral Flags and Insignia, Booty in Naval Warfare, in THE GLADISCH COMMITTEE ON THE LAW
OF NAVAL WARFARE 39-59 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1990).
32. R. P. Barston & P. W. Birnie, The Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas Conflict—A Question of
Zones, 7 MARINE POLICY 14-24 (1983); T. Orford, Exclusion Zones at Sea: Some Observations on
the Conduct of the Falkland War 1982, 2 SEA CHANGES 91-120 (1985).
33. M. Jenkins, Air Attacks on Neutral Shipping in the Persian Gulf: The Legality of the Iraqi
Exclusion Zone and Iranian Reprisals, 7 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
LAW REVIEW 517-549 (1985); R. Leckow, The Iran-Iraq Conflict in the Gulf: The Law of War
Zones, 37 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 629-644 (1988).
34. See, inter alia, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 17, f 2.4.4; KOMMANDANTEN-
HANDBUCH (Commander's Handbook of the German Navy), no. 115 (2002).
35. The US Navy established a 5nm warning zone around its warships in the Persian Gulf
during the Tanker War in the 1980s to contend with suicide craft laden with high explosives. See
George K. Walker, The Tanker War, 1980-88: Law and Policy 57-8 (2000) (Vol. 74, US
Naval War College International Law Studies). Following the Iraqi air-to-surface missile attack
on USS Stark on May 17, 1987, the fixed distance criterion (i.e., 5nm) was deleted from the
warning zone published in the Notice to Mariners. Id. at 61-2. While a 5nm zone in those waters
may be reasonable vis-a-vis a small craft suicide threat, a zone broad enough to deal effectively
with an air-to-surface missile threat would likely have been excessive in that setting, which may
explain why the 5nm criterion was deleted rather than expanded.
36. International shipping and aviation was informed about this condition by the following
"special warning":
1. Due to recent events in the Middle East and the American homeland, US Forces
worldwide are operating at a heightened state of readiness and taking additional
defensive precautions against terrorist and other potential threats. Consequently, all
aircraft, surface vessels, and subsurface vessels approaching US Forces are requested to
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2. US Forces will exercise appropriate measures in self-defense if warranted by the
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3. US Forces, especially when operating in confined waters, shall remain mindful of
navigational considerations of aircraft, surface vessels, and subsurface vessels in their
immediate vicinity.
4. Nothing in the special warning is intended to impede or otherwise interfere with the
freedom of navigation or overflight of any vessel or aircraft, or to limit or expand the
inherent self-defense rights of US Forces. This special warning is published solely to
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37. See ROACH & SMITH, supra note 3, and F. C. Leiner, Maritime Security Zones: Prohibited Yet
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to be dealt with accordingly.
THE TIMES (London), Apr. 26, 1982, at 5.
47. Fenrick, supra note 3 1 , at 92.
48. See also references cited supra note 32. .
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231
Current Legal Issues in Martime Operations
62. Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, May 22, 1969, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 331. For an equal
consideration of the other authentic texts, see J. Ashley Roach, The Law ofNaval Warfare at the
Turn of Two Centuries, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 64, 75 (2000);
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1262-63 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
63. The British did not want to send messages in the clear because they did not want the
Argentine forces to get advance information about the possible movements of their forces.
Instead, they created so-called "Red Cross Boxes" where the hospital ships were deployed and
where they waited to receive wounded soldiers.
64. COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, 5 8.2.3: "Use or possession of cryptographic means
of transmitting message traffic by hospital ships is prohibited under current law" (emphasis added).
65. KOMMANDANTEN-HANDBUCH, supra note 34, no. 357: "Devices designed for the reception
of encrypted messages should also be permitted when they are employed solely for the effective
performance of humanitarian tasks."
66. As early as 1970 the late Professor D. P. O'Connell noted that dilemma. See D. P. O'Connell,
International Law and Contemporary Naval Operations, 64 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF
International Law 19, 59 (1970).
67. During the Falklands/Malvinas conflict the "Red Cross Box" created considerable problems
because the hospital ships were not informed prior to the arrival of the wounded and were thus
not well prepared to treat them efficiently. See S. S. Junod, La protection des victims du conflit
arme des ties Falkland—Malvinas (1982), in DROIT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE ET ACTION
HUMANITAIRE 26 (2d ed. 1985).
68. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 16, 5 171.
69. Id.1 171.4.
70. Id. 5 171.5. Therefore, the participants could not agree on the formulation "may" but
merely on the formulation "should be allowed to."
71. For an early analysis of this problem, see S. L. Oreck, Hospital Ships: The Right ofLimited
Self-Defense, 1 14 UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 62-66 (Nov. 1988).
72. COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 53, f 8.2.3: "Hospital ships may not be armed
although crew members may carry light individual weapons for the maintenance of order, for
their own defense and that of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked." Accord KOMMANDANTEN-
HANDBUCH, supra note 33, no. 357.
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XII
The Legal Efficacy
ofFreedom ofNavigation Assertions
Dale Stephens
1
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention2 (1982 LOS Convention) is a quintessen-
tial product of the modernist period. The emphasis of the 1982 LOS Conven-
tion is decidedly communitarian and its content is fully influenced by an evolved
institutionalization of process. It is thus typical of the co-operative pragmatism of
current approaches to international law. 3 The interaction of sovereign interests in
exploiting and utilizing the sea and its resources are "managed" within its frame-
work, and potential conflicts concerning such rights are intended to be resolved
through emphatic utilization ofdispute settlement mechanisms which will pay "due
regard" to the sovereign participants.4 The 1982 LOS Convention continues the cod-
ification process of its antecedents, especially the 1958 Conventions,5 though it sets a
"progressive" course with the inclusion ofnew concepts hitherto not recognized un-
der the law including, in particular, the archipelagic concept as a juridical entity.
Given the holistic character of the 1982 LOS Convention, it is ironic, although
not surprising, that security issues are not directly tackled. When it comes to such
issues, the potential for a clash of sovereignty, or at least conceptions of the doc-
trinal substance of sovereignty, is likely. It is within this context that questions con-
cerning the efficacy of freedom of navigation rights are, naturally, most
pronounced. The United States, a notable absentee6 from the Convention, is the
most significant proponent of exercising navigational freedom through use of its
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naval and air forces. This has been driven from a measured agenda to ensure that it
is instrumental in creating advantageous customary norms. 7 Additionally, the US
Freedom of Navigation Program is designed to influence interpretations ofambig-
uous provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention as a whole. In this latter respect espe-
cially, the concerns of the United States are shared by a number of other maritime
powers who have either commenced their own navigational assertion programs8
or have otherwise relied upon US practice.9
It is a critical time for preserving international navigational freedom. The in-
creasing ratification ofand accession to the 1982 LOS Convention means that nav-
igational regimes are being established that will have a permanent impact upon
political and strategic realities. The "game" is not necessarily being played accord-
ing to established rules by many coastal States. There are discordant voices in op-
position to maritime State strategies and the stakes for all remain impossibly high,
thus the need for precise and resolute action. Naval and air forces remain at the
forefront of this critical campaign and are the principal instruments for ensuring
effective and peaceful resolution of these threats.
The Freedom of Navigation Program which was first authorized by the United
States Government in the late 1970s has been criticized in both legal and normative
terms. 10 Arguments have been rendered which criticize the legal efficacy of the
program and question the apparent provocative nature of such assertions as un-
necessary exercises ofhegemonic power projection. Moreover, such criticism con-
tends that the preservation of navigational freedom can be more effectively
achieved through other, less invasive, means. 11 Indeed these arguments suggest
that the exercise of the operational assertions may offend general principles of in-
ternational law concerning "abuse of rights." 12 It is contended that such arguments
are misplaced and that the freedom of navigation assertions undertaken by the
United States and others do provide the most effective means ofpreserving the bal-
ance of interests reflected in the legal architecture of the 1982 LOS Convention.
The current cacophony of claims made by some coastal States collectively to limit
navigational freedom is strident in both frequency and depth. In this dynamic
world of strategic norm creation and suppression, it is contended that navigational
assertions are an essential means of addressing these suspect claims. More criti-
cally, such assertions are undertaken in concert with the jurisprudence ofthe Inter-
national Court of Justice that has repeatedly endorsed the principle of navigational
freedom and recognized the legitimacy of asserting such rights. This paper argues
for the continued maintenance ofthe Freedom ofNavigation Program as an essen-
tial means of preserving the integrity of the 1982 LOS Convention and seeks to
demonstrate the risks involved in failing to be vigilant to contrary strategies de-
signed to limit the freedoms so desperately won.
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Law ofthe Sea Legal Regime
The 1982 LOS Convention is a very well subscribed treaty. As of this writing, 145
States have ratified or acceded to the Convention, 13 which list includes four of the
permanent five members of the Security Council. Following the resolution of issues
associated with Part XI of the Convention dealing with deep seabed mining, 14 Presi-
dent Clinton submitted the 1982 LOS Convention, together with the 1994 Agree-
ment Relating to the Implementation of Part XI, to the United States Senate on
October 7, 1994 for its consent, respectively, to their accession and ratification. 15
Notwithstanding its broad acceptability, the 1982 LOS Convention is not yet univer-
sally subscribed and thus is not, in its terms, binding on all. Moreover, the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law ofthe Sea (UNCLOS III) 16 debates that led to
the drafting of the 1982 LOS Convention were conducted under the aegis of a con-
sensus negotiation practice that ensured that the convention was, in many respects, a
"package deal" of concessions which resulted in a number of constructive ambigu-
ities in the text. 17 Unlike the previous 1958 Conventions dealing with maritime regu-
lation, 18 the 1982 LOS Convention does not permit the making of general
reservations 19 and was intended to be a discrete enunciation ofmaritime regulation,
thus further ensuring a compromised language in the text. Indeed, a recent com-
mentary has identified over 60 terms, a dozen ofwhich are critical, included within
the 1982 LOS Convention that are either ambiguously used or not fully defined.20
Significantly, the issue ofthe use offorce in the maritime environment is barely tack-
led, which is not altogether surprising given the cold war environment prevailing at
the time of negotiation. Accordingly, military subjects do not loom large within the
text ofthe Instrument and assessment ofState actions must be undertaken more spe-
cifically under general principles of international law.21
The Issue ofSovereignty
Article 2 of the 1982 LOS Convention confirms that coastal States exercise sover-
eignty over their territorial sea "subject to [the] Convention and other rules of in-
ternational law."22 That article provides a reliable touchstone for the
conceptualization of nuanced "sovereignty" applicable in the territorial sea. Fol-
lowing the conclusion of the negotiating process it was evident that coastal State
sovereignty over newly expanded territorial sea limits would be "subject" both to
the positively stated terms ofthe Convention, especially the rights of innocent pas-
sage, and other, more general rules of international law. International legal dis-
course does not admit to a unified theory of sovereignty. 23 Since the treaties of
Westphalia in 1648, both courts and publicists have wrestled with the significance
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of the concept. The writings of Henry Wheaton24 in the nineteenth century, and
the determination of the Permanent Court of Justice of the early twentieth century
in the Lotus case, 25 have recognized an absolute quality to the concept of sover-
eignty, upon which infringements could not be presumed. 26 Alternatively, the ju-
risprudence of the US Supreme Court of the early nineteenth century27 and writers
in the current period28 equate "sovereignty" more with a collection or "bundle" of
rights to which there are concomitant rights enjoyed by other "sovereign" States. 29
Within this paradigm, the enduring challenge of international law is the reconcilia-
tion of such rights. Modern theoretical conceptions seek to demystify the character
of sovereignty in order to address questions of international community structure
comprehensively. Hence, the theorist Hans Kelsen tackled the nature of sover-
eignty by positing that it was a conception premised upon an authority of order
and nothing more. 30 However, as a manifestation of order he was able to perceive
the international community equally possessing the mechanics of an order
through an expression of collective will and thus was able to conclude that based
upon its coercive predicate, international law exists as an equally binding legal or-
der by which State sovereignty is necessarily limited. 31
The monolithic and "mystical" nature of sovereignty expressed in the vocabu-
lary of defense ofmeasures to restrict and hamper navigational freedom, especially
of warships, can be seen as representative of a particular schism of absolutist atti-
tudes towards the legal nature of sovereignty. This essentialism seems to brook no
heresy on the character ofsuch claims. Notwithstanding this approach, it is evident
that the sovereignty expressed to exist in the territorial sea of a coastal State is, in
accordance with Article 2 of the 1982 LOS Convention, a disaggregated sover-
eignty. International law is now replete with authoritative expressions on the frac-
tured nature of this sovereignty. 32 It was this realization within the Corfu Channel
case that prompted Judge Alvarez to acknowledge the social interdependence be-
tween States and to conclude that sovereignty carried with it both rights and obli-
gations, stating in his individual opinion that "we can no longer regard sovereignty
as an absolute and individual right of every State as used to be done under the old
law founded on the individualist regime." 33 The relationship between the coastal
State and the navigating State is thus a relationship of intersecting rights and obli-
gations. Accordingly, it is not possible to conclude that under either customary law
or the 1982 LOS Convention, there is necessarily a "weighted" significance to be
accorded the sovereign status of the territorial sea of a coastal State based upon ap-
peals to mystical conceptions of what underpins the nature of sovereignty,34 a fortiori
with respect to international straits and archipelagic sea lanes.
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The 1982 Law ofthe Sea Convention
UNCLOS III was ambitious in its goals. Addressing age old doctrinal antagonisms
concerning theories of mare clausum and mare liberum naturally meant that there
would be deep divisions between coastal State preferences, which sought to expand
maritime jurisdiction, and those of the maritime States who sought to emphasize
more liberal navigational regimes. 35 The 1982 LOS Convention itself is a statement
par excellance in affirming a general theme of "balance" throughout its provisions.
The Convention pits one principle against another in repeated provisions through-
out its text. Thus coastal States were able to win consensus for a greatly expanded
territorial sea limit (from three to twelve nautical miles) in exchange for rights of
concisely defined innocent or transit passage. Similarly, the archipelagic concept
was recognized in exchange for rights of archipelagic sea lane passage, as were
rights of high seas navigation and freedoms within the newly established exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). It is this thematic goal of "balance" that especially under-
pins the nature of the freedom of navigation programs.
Excessive Claims
As a result of the ambiguity in the language contained within the 1982 LOS Con-
vention, and in conjunction with independent strategies designed to shape the de-
velopment ofthe law, there have been a multitude of claims made by coastal States
concerning their sovereign or jurisdictional rights within maritime areas, the legal
basis ofwhich is suspect. Thus, the broad language ofthe Convention regarding the
drawing of baselines36 has led a number of States to adopt an excessively generous
approach to designating such co-ordinates. In this regard, for example, Vietnam
draws it baselines in a manner that extend up to 50nm37 around islands within the
South China Sea and cannot, under any reasonable interpretation, be regarded as
"generally following the direction of the coastline" as provided for in Article 7 of
the 1982 LOS Convention38 and supporting customary international law. 39 Simi-
larly, a United Nations publication from 199440 identified a number of States that
acted inconsistently with the terms of the 1982 LOS Convention. Such countries
included Myanmar which adopted excessively long straight baselines (including
one 222 nautical miles long),41 as well as the Democratic People's Republic of Ko-
rea which had drawn straight baselines that did not follow the direction of the
coast.42 Moreover, the report noted a number of States that purported to require
prior notification or authorization pending the exercise of innocent passage by
vessels, especially warships. Such countries included, inter alia, Bangladesh, China,
India, Iran and Maldives. 43 Critically, the report noted that such restrictions on
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navigational freedom were inconsistent with the right of innocent passage for all
vessels as guaranteed under the 1982 LOS Convention.44
States such as North Korea45 assert that special "security zones" may be imposed in
adjoining maritime areas which purportedly enable them independently and selec-
tively to restrict navigational freedom on self-conceived terms relating to "security."
Countries such as Brazil, India, Malaysia and Pakistan all seek to restrict naval activities
within their EEZ's in terms not readily recognized under the 1982 LOS Convention.46
The catalogue of"excessive maritime claims" is quite large. The following non-exhaus-
tive list provides a representative outiine of the types of claims made:
• Excessive and very broad claims for historic bay status,47
• Territorial sea limits beyond the 12nm range,48
• Imposition of a multitude of environmental or safety conditions on
"innocent passage" which effectively denies the right,49 and
• Denied transit passage rights within international straits. 50
Perhaps the most striking challenge to navigational freedom comes from the re-
cent adoption of legislation by the Indonesian Government in December 2002 51 that
purported to restrict all passage through its archipelago to three north/south
archipelagic sea lanes. Passage from east-west through the Indonesian archipelago is
permitted, on the face of the legislation, to be with Indonesian Government permis-
sion only. 52 The legislation also provided that archipelagic sea lanes passage was only
exercisable within a limited number of north-south archipelagic sea lanes that had
been partially designated with the International Maritime Organization. 53
Such legislation is inconsistent with a general right to engage in innocent passage
through archipelagic waters as outlined in the 1982 LOS Convention. 54 Moreover,
with respect to both innocent passage and the partial designation of archipelagic sea
lanes, the legislation is contrary to the terms of the 1998 Resolution of the Maritime
Safety Committee ofthe International Maritime Organization (IMO) which said, re-
spectively, that "[ejxcept for internal waters within archipelagic waters, ships of all
States enjoy the right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters and the terri-
torial sea"55 and "[w]here a partial archipelagic sea lanes proposal has come into ef-
fect, the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage may continue to be exercised through
all normal passage routes used as routes for international navigation or overflight in
other parts of archipelagic waters in accordance with UNCLOS."56 The Explanatory
Note to the Indonesian Regulations declared that designation of routes under which
innocent passage could be exercised was a right reserved to the Indonesian Govern-
ment notwithstanding the provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention. 57
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175 Freedom ofNavigation Program
The US Freedom of Navigation Program was established in 1979 and has enjoyed
bipartisan political support since that time. 58 Developed against the background of
the debates at UNCLOS III, the program was conceived as a means to shape the de-
velopment of the law in a manner consistent with ensuring the maintenance of
navigational freedoms so desperately won through the negotiations. 59 American
economic and strategic policy goals are ad idem in relation to ensuring maximiza-
tion of maritime freedom60 and such coalescence of interests are naturally similar
with other maritime State goals. Such freedom critically underpins61 existing US
and coalition military strategy of deterrence, forward defense and alliance solidar-
ity.62 The Freedom ofNavigation Program is a composite policy ofboth diplomatic
exchange and physical operational assertion.63 Moreover, the program is to be seen
as an important element in an overall process ofUS supported bilateral and multi-
lateral military efforts to foster consistency in recognition of maritime freedoms.
Such efforts are contextualized in the transparency ofthe international military ex-
ercise programs which are conducted in all regions ofthe world. 64 The agreed mar-
itime legal framework and associated rules ofengagement issued for the conduct of
such exercises seek to reinforce the strategic balance of interests reflected in both
the 1982 LOS Convention and equivalent customary law. 65
The thematic focus of the Freedom of Navigation Program is to consolidate US
and, collaterally, coalition rights ofglobal maritime mobility, particularly in relation to
contentious "choke points" within strategic waterways (e.g., Strait ofMalacca, Strait of
Hormuz, etc.). The program is mandated by Presidential Directive to be "non-provoc-
ative," "even-handed" and "politically neutral" in its application.66 In this regard,
"non-provocative" does not necessarily equate with "non-confrontational" as the very
essence ofthe program is to contest excessive claims.67 As will be subsequently argued,
such actions do not in themselves constitute a violation of United Nations Charter
prohibitions under Article 2(4) 68 nor other norms proscribing intervention within the
domestic jurisdiction of a State.69
The Freedom ofNavigation Program is a critical part of an overall strategic focus
of US policy with respect to maritime freedom. While not a party to the 1982 LOS
Convention, President Reagan declared in 1983 that the United States would act
consistently with the provisions of the Convention with respect to navigation and
overflight rights, acknowledging that they were representative ofcustomary interna-
tional law.70 Significantly, President Reagan counseled that the "United States will
not . . . acquiesce in unilateral acts of other States designed to restrict the rights and
freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other re-
lated high seas uses.'71 Critically, US policy perceives its Freedom of Navigation
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Program as an instrumental aspect of preserving the integrity of the 1982 LOS Con-
vention. Thus the actions ofUS naval forces are rationalized as representing not only
US strategic interests but also those of the international community generally. 72 As
the commentator Richard Grunawalt has opined, "[t]o that end, the Freedom of
Navigation Program encourages nations to modify their domestic laws and regula-
tions so as to bring them into conformity with the Convention."73
Australian Freedom ofNavigation Program
In the mid-1990s, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) adopted an informal policy of
asserting lawful navigational rights under the 1982 LOS Convention. The focus of
this policy was specifically within the South Pacific/Southeast Asian region. Akin to
the US program, the Australian approach is an amalgam of navigational assertion
coupled with coordinated diplomatic exchange.
Australia's geographic proximity demands that it have free regional maritime
mobility capacity. A key feature of that mobility is assured access through the Indo-
nesian Archipelago so as to access important regional ports within Southeast Asia as
well as North Asia. While access through the Indonesian Archipelago is necessarily a
critical aspect, it is not the sole focus of the Australian program. In April 2001, an
Australian naval task force ofthree ships transited the Taiwan Strait in order to travel
efficiently between Hong Kong and South Korea. The Taiwan Strait lies within the
so-called Chinese "security zone" which led to a non-violent confrontation with
Chinese naval units.74 Australian diplomatic responses to Chinese protests relied
upon conventional rights contained within the 1982 LOS Convention and the mat-
ter was not permitted by either side to escalate beyond an oral diplomatic exchange.
Legal Critique ofFreedom ofNavigation Program
The approach taken by the United States in undertaking freedom of navigation as-
sertions seeks to achieve two principal legal goals. Firstly, as a non-party to the 1982
LOS Convention, the United States is bound to ensure that customary international
law develops in a manner consistent with its own strategic interests. The stated secu-
rity goals of the United States in ensuring free access through maritime "choke
points" and unencumbered exercise of navigational freedom do accord with the
goals of almost all maritime States. To that end, such navigational assertions seek to
create a "practice" necessary to shape the evolution of customary norms recogniz-
able in accordance with Article 38 (1) (b) ofthe Statute of the International Court of
justice. 75 Such practice is accompanied by statements concerning US convictions as
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to the state of opinio juris concerning the establishment of a permissive regime of
transit through contested areas.76
The actions taken by those coastal States that maintain excessive maritime
claims or that otherwise seek to impose restrictions on free navigation do not ap-
pear to have been taken in concert. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has de-
clared that freedom of navigation, in the form of a right of innocent passage
through territorial seas and more generally through other foreign maritime zones,
is a right possessed under customary law. 77 The Court has opined that the right is
guaranteed to include "all the freedom necessary for maritime navigation" 78 which
was not to be hindered by the coastal State. The 1982 LOS Convention, in the opin-
ion of the Court, "does no more than codify customary international law on this
point." 79 Having regard to the ICJ's pronouncements therefore, it seems an en-
tirely vacuous process for such countries to be seeking to set a contrary "practice"
which should crystallize into a rule of customary international law. Contemporary
theory posits that in the face of a generally established rule of customary interna-
tional law (as has been declared by the ICJ in this instance), there is a need for a
"great quantity of practice to overturn existing rules of customary international
law." 80 With a strong presumption against the change in law81 there would need to
be demonstrated an extremely widespread and uniform82 practice in opposition to
the existing rule for there to be any opportunity for even beginning an assessment
as to the emergence of a contrary rule. The brief survey of the multifarious claims
by some coastal States indicates that there is no such uniformity, but rather a spo-
radic and somewhat disjointed array of challenges. It is notable that during the lat-
ter stages of the UNCLOS III debates there was an unsuccessful attempt by
approximately 29 States to impose a requirement for prior notification and/or au-
thorization for innocent passage into the Convention. 83 Had such countries been
uniform in their continued insistence on this requirement in subsequent years,
there may well have been afforded a basis to assert that such a proposition had crys-
tallized into a rule of customary law (assuming, of course, evidence of opinio juris
and acquiescence by other States) but this has not been the case. While some States
persist with claims for either prior notification or authorization, there is no wide-
spread uniformity in practice on either element or indeed any particular claim or
principle of law that would act to undermine the guarantees of navigational free-
dom contained within the 1982 LOS Convention relating to warships.
Alternatively an argument might be advanced that rather than relying on the
specificity of claims regarding the restriction on navigation (i.e. security zones, prior
permission etc.), opposing States maybe able to frame a broader enunciation of the
opposing "rule"84 to collectively bring it within a single normative framework. Thus
it might be contended that the rule is simply that "navigational freedom is
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constrained by a number of factors" and the multifarious actions by coastal States
would all be consistent with such a broadly stated rule. Such an approach would,
however, be disingenuous. The reasoning employed by the ICJ in the North Sea Con-
tinental Shelfcase insisted that a level of exacting uniformity was required before de-
termining the existence of a new rule, especially one that seemed to be in conflict
with an existing rule. 85 In the current scenario, coastal States which seek to restrict
navigational freedom do so in widely inconsistent ways. Thus, some States purport
to have discretion to deny innocent passage where others simply seek to be provided
with information beforehand of an impending passage so as to "ensure" that such
passage is innocent while not denying outright the "right" ofinnocent passage. In his
analysis ofcustomary law formation, Michael Akehurst has noted "practice which is
marked by major inconsistencies at all relevant times is selfdefeating and cannot give
rise to a customary rule."86 On any level of analysis therefore, the development of a
general customary rule contrary to the existing customary status quo concerning
freedom of navigation is fraught with considerable difficulty.
Persistent Objectors
If there is little likelihood that there will develop a contrary general customary rule
restricting navigational freedom, what then is the efficacy of the US Freedom of
Navigation Program? Given that navigational freedom exercised in accordance
with the terms of the 1982 LOS Convention is not yet a norm ofperemptory status
("jus cogens") the existing international legal structure does permit individual
States the right to opt out ofthe application ofprevailing general international cus-
tomary law. While strictly defined, the so-called "persistent objector" theory per-
mits a particular State the opportunity to resist the application of customary
international law but only in relation to that State. To qualify, a State must express
a protest to a developing rule during its formulative stages (i.e., protest ah initio)
and must be vigilant in maintaining its opposition to a developing rule. 87
In view of the "persistent objector" principle, the utility of the US Freedom of
Navigation Program can best be understood as testing the resolve of those States
who may seek to develop opposition to the application of customary international
law to them. It is notable that the 2000 International Law Association (ILA) Com-
mittee Report on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law relies
upon the actual physical actions of States in the maritime environment to provide
the most effective demonstration of State intent. Hence, the ILA uses the example
of a State purporting to restrict navigational rights through its territorial sea as an
illustration ofthe general need to discern the nature ofthe express or implied claim
and response as to the applicability of a norm of international law. Thus the
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authors ofthe report note that "if State A expressly claims the right to exclude for-
eign warships from passing through its territorial sea, and State B sends a warship
through without seeking the permission ofA . . . [and] ... A fails to protest against
this infringement, this omission can, in its turn, constitute a tacit admission of the
existence of a right of passage after all."88
It is in this context that "actions" do indeed speak louder than "words." Some
interpreters of sources doctrine have traditionally been insistent on pointing to
"deeds" over "words" as the critical "practice" of a State for determining the le-
gitimacy of a new rule ofcustomary international law. In support ofthis proposi-
tion, the publicist Anthony D'Amato notes that "acts are visible, real and
significant; it crystallizes policy and demonstrates which of the many possible
rules of law the acting State has decided to manifest."89 Such arguments have
been diluted by other commentators who have opined that more general means
are available to gauge State practice. 90 Akehurst, for example concludes that
statements, in either abstract or concrete contexts, may also be constitutive of
State practice. 91 This latter view is surely the correct one, indeed it has been ob-
served that the ICJ in the Nicaragua case itself appeared to conclude that both
State practice and sufficient opinio juris can be gauged from public statements
made by States, or even international organizations in circumstances where such
entities are purporting to declare the state of the law. 92
While diplomatic statements may be acceptable for discerning the formulation of
norms, the principal difficulty remains in identifying the specificity ofthe norm cre-
ated. It is as much a matter of probative value than anything else in discerning the
quality and content ofa rule, and in the absence ofa clearly directed public statement
there is little value in its evidentiary effect.93 Blanket verbal protests by maritime
States could be met with equally blanket ripostes from coastal States contending their
enduring resistance. In this flurry of statements and counter-statements it may be
difficult to assess the cogency ofanynew rule or exception to a rule. As recognized by
the ILA Committee, the matter only becomes truly tested when a transit is under-
taken through contested waters and reactions gauged. Such a practical demonstra-
tion is necessary to determine the coherency of claims, especially in circumstances
where a well subscribed multilateral instrument has established a rule in conflict. In-
deed, as the ILA Committee report notes, the persistent objector rule is useful in an
exceptional sense by allowing "the convoy of the law's progressive development . .
.
[to]. . . move forward without having to wait for the slowest vessel."94 Such an ap-
proach can be supported upon a utilitarian basis in the maritime context, especially
given the sophisticated level of the balance struck in the 1982 LOS Convention be-
tween coastal and maritime State rights and obligations.
245
The Legal Efficacy ofFreedom ofNavigation Assertions
It is in this context that the "relative normativity" theory95 of interpretation of
international legal "sources" finds useful application. The development of both
"hard" and "soft" arguments within customary normative discourse concerning
coastal State/maritime State interaction does require attention to the "more or
less" calculus so resisted by traditional approaches. Accordingly, specific physical
State action and counter-action in a very public and concrete manner plays a
much more compelling role in the establishment of international legal norms. In
essence, navigational assertions do carry with them greater normative signifi-
cance with respect to this issue than only diplomatic exchange of notes.
The 1982 Convention and Legal Framework ofNavigational Rights
As outlined in the introduction of this paper, the 1982 LOS Convention is a well-sub-
scribed treaty. Given the widespread nature of its support, it may be wondered why
the rights concerning freedom of navigation that are contained within the Conven-
tion are sought to be denied by some coastal States. The answer to this question is
varied. Plainly, in the face of "constructively ambiguous" provisions, a coastal State
may seek an interpretation that is advantageous to that State. Hence, arguments may
be proffered in the case of innocent passage, for example, that read much into the
terms of Article 19(1) that "Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coastal State." Such terminology is on its face ab-
stract enough96 to permit a wide array of challenges, especially to warships. Such rea-
soning is, however, quite disingenuous. Article 3 1 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law ofTreaties97 prescribes that "A Treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accor-
dance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their con-
text and in light of its object and purpose."98 With respect to the issue of warships
and innocent passage, it is evident that the abstract propositions concerning "peace,
good order or security" are necessarily informed by the detailed terms of Article
19(2) of the 1982 LOS Convention which provides a very specific contextual outline
of those activities that a warship must observe to come within the definition of "in-
nocent."99 As with the remainder of the treaty, this prescriptive catalogue was the
necessary "price" for expanded territorial sea jurisdiction and obviously provides a
reliable basis for legal interpretation. As the Indian commentator Shekhar Ghosh ac-
knowledged at the time ofthe UNCLOS III debates, " [t] he scope ofcoastal discretion
has been undeniably reduced to an unavoidable minimum" 100 under this provision.
In essence, the rights of navigational freedom were "won" in the context of ensuring
a necessary balance with coastal State interests.
Beyond a textual interpretation of the terms of the 1982 LOS Convention, it is
open to a coastal State to observe the positively stated obligations while still relying
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upon "gaps" in the terms ofthe Convention to advance a restrictive agenda. In this
context so called rights to insist upon prior notification before undertaking inno-
cent passage might be asserted consistently with primary obligations under the
Convention. Thus, under this paradigm, the "right" of innocent passage has not
been infringed by insisting upon prior notification, rather it is contended to be
merely a procedural "condition precedent" necessary to give effect to that right.
Such an approach would, however, deny, in practical terms, a substantive right. 101
In asserting such a claim, a coastal State may seek to rely upon Article 31(3)(b) of
the Vienna Convention 102 that provides that interpretation of a treaty's terms may
be determined by "subsequent practice in the application ofthe treaty which estab-
lishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." Compliance with
"prior notification" demands might therefore constitute a "practice" which will ce-
ment an interpretation of the 1982 LOS Convention that necessarily undermines
navigational freedom by indirectly denying a unilateral right of passage. Such ac-
tions would be akin to the process ofcustomary norm formulation, though they do
not require the demonstration of opinio juris, merely acquiescence with respect to
"subsequent practice." This article's reliance upon "practice" anticipates a level of
State interaction. Accordingly, the demands of a coastal State in limiting freedom
of navigation through its maritime zones if met with indifference by other States
parties could conceivably permit the establishment of a specific interpretation to
the Convention. While diplomatic protest is obviously a means of challenging such
a development, the normally bilateral and confidential nature of such action
means that there is a lack ofvisibility by all States party to the process. The assertion
of navigational rights in a contentious zone remains a publicly visible event, which
tangibly constitutes a "subsequent practice" that other States parties may overtly,
or tacitly support, thus shaping an interpretation consistent with the underlying
balance of preserving navigational freedom.
Criticism ofthe US Freedom ofNavigation Program
In his analysis of US navigational assertions, William Aceves 103 takes issue with
the manner in which the United States undertakes these assertions. His criticism
stems from a reading ofthe constituent elements ofcustomary norm generation and
he argues that the program is overly provocative and inconsistent with more general
requirements of international law to settle disputes peacefully. 104 He cites the re-
quirements ofArticle 279 ofthe 1982 LOS Convention that in turn refers to Article
2(3) ofthe United Nations Charter, which mandates that all international disputes
are to be settled in a peaceful manner. Additionally, he contends that US naval ac-
tions undertaken in the context of a freedom of navigation assertion have the
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potential to offend general principles of international law, particularly the "abuse
of rights" doctrine 105 by adopting an unnecessarily militarily confrontational ap-
proach to the resolution of points of law.
The critique by Aceves that navigational assertions are unduly confrontational,
and thus potentially violative of Article 279 of the 1982 LOS Convention, as well as
Articles 2(3) and (4) the UN Charter, is curious. As Aceves himself notes, 106 the is-
sue of navigational assertions and innocent passage was considered by the ICJ in
the Corfu Channel case which determined that a British transit of a naval squadron
in full battle readiness in order to assert a right of innocent passage that Albania
had sought to resist was justified as a mission designed to affirm a right which had
been unjustly denied. 107 Admittedly, the Court subsequently condemned a later
British transit through the channel to sweep for mines, however the reasoning em-
ployed by the Court was not predicated upon the fact ofthe transit, but rather, con-
centrated upon the number of ships and the manner in which the transit had been
undertaken. Indeed, the Court expressly noted that the British government itself
admitted that the transit was not innocent and thus the Court found that the tran-
sit was an impermissible intervention. 108
The broader implications of the decision have been subject to significant con-
troversy in subsequent years. While it may be fairly argued whether the ratio of the
decision is broad enough to permit a general exception to the prohibition on the
use of force, there does seem to be a consensus as to the significance ofthe ability to
affirm rights operationally in the maritime context. Thus, the eminent publicist
Ian Brownlie, who rejected any general implication of the decision, did feel con-
strained to acknowledge the import of the decision as to its facts, namely the right
to use force to assert a right unjustly denied in the maritime context. 109 As such,
even on its narrowest construction, the case stands as a specific precedent in sup-
port of the legality of the Feedom of Navigation Program, at least in circumstances
where "innocent passage" is sought to be unlawfully denied.
The issue received indirect consideration some 40 years following the delivery ofthe
judgment in the Corfu Channel case, in the 1986 decision of the ICJ in the Nicaragua
case.
1 10 The decision of the Court in the Nicaragua case reviewed contemporary juris-
prudence concerning the prohibition against intervention under international law that
has significance for assessing the confrontational nature of navigational assertions.
The majority opinion of the Court in the Nicaragua decision confirmed that the
principle of "non-intervention" did relate to the question of the use of force. Signifi-
cantly, the Court determined that the central criterion for determining whether this
prohibition had been violated turned upon a determination of the existence of "co-
ercion." 1 ' ' The Court's assessment of this concept was somewhat holistic in seeking
an objective assessment of whether the internal choices made by a State had been
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influenced as a result of "coercion" by another State. 112 Such a formulation may in-
deed have an impact upon a navigational assertion and thus come within the terms
of objections raised by Aceves in circumstances where it is the intention of the
transiting State to "coerce" or intimidate a State to adopt behavior that it otherwise
would not freely adopt. Such an interpretation does not arise, however, in the con-
text ofa "normal" freedom ofnavigation assertion. The purpose ofsuch an assertion
is not to intervene in the manner contemplated by the Court where it spoke ofspon-
soring armed bands or financing internal disruption. 113 The interplay of maritime
and coastal States, particularly those that have ratified the 1982 LOS Convention, is
quite the opposite, relating to an "external" settlement ofrights concerning maritime
areas. This is not to suggest that the maritime State should not be cognizant of inter-
nal political machinations at the time of a programmed transit, as such an assertion
may have a destabilizing significance in the context of specific internal fractures. It is
contended though that such circumstances are not typical. Moreover, where a State
does have internal concerns regarding security issues, it may (if a party to the 1982
LOS Convention) temporarily and legitimately suspend all innocent passage
through its territorial sea on a non-discriminatory basis. 114
The criticisms raised as to the inherently threatening behavior of a navigational
assertion are imprecise. This was particularly reinforced in the Nicaragua case
where the majority opinion determined not only that innocent passage was a well
established right of customary international law, but so were other navigational
freedoms extending beyond the territorial sea. Indeed, the Court in that instance
determined that the conduct of US naval exercises just beyond the territorial sea
limits of Nicaragua was not, in itself, a violation of the prohibition of the threat to
use force which Nicaragua had expressly contended, but rather was consistent with
the exercise of maritime freedoms. 115
Abuse ofRights
A further criticism of the Freedom of Navigation Program relates to the con-
frontational nature of such assertions as potentially constituting an "abuse of
right" contrary to both Article 300 ofthe 1982 LOS Convention 116 and more gener-
ally under "general principles" of international law, of a type recognized under Ar-
ticle 38(1 )(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 117
The general principle of "abuse of rights" may reasonably be regarded as having
a settled place within the doctrine of sources comprising international law. 118 The
principle essentially seeks to restrict a State from exercising its rights in a manner
which significantly impedes the enjoyment by other States of their own rights or is
exercised for an end different from that which the right was created in a manner
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that causes injury to another State. The doctrine is an essential one to the function-
ing of international legal society ifthe notion of sovereignty is not to be regarded as
being absolute. In his separate opinion in the Corfu Channel case, Judge Alvarez
was able to give judicial expression to his theory of disaggregated sovereignty that
he had been advocating for some twenty years. Hence, if sovereignty is to be ac-
cepted as a "bundle" of rights and duties, then a method for their reconciliation
among States was essential. Premised upon a foundation of "social justice," Judge
Alvarez advanced a theory of limitation on the "absolute nature" of the exercise of
untrammeled sovereignty and considered that such an approach was mandated by
the authority of the United Nations Charter. 119
In the context of navigational freedom, it is unclear how the doctrine of "abuse
of rights" might apply in a manner to impinge the assertion of navigational rights
prescribed by the 1982 LOS Convention and reflected in customary international
law. As has been outlined above, the jurisprudence ofthe ICJ has provided a frame-
work for testing whether such transits could violate more general principles of in-
ternational law concerning the prohibition on intervention which is determined
on the basis of coercion. This element is singularly lacking in the context of the
simple exercise ofinnocent passage or transit passage provided the criteria for such
methods of passage are observed. Ironically, during the drafting of the predecessor
Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1920, it
has been noted that the Italian commissioner to the negotiations expressly consid-
ered that the doctrine of "abuse of rights" had its place in the context of ensuring
that coastal States actually recognized the principle of freedom of the seas. 120 It has
been observed that the doctrine of "abuse of rights" is based upon conceptions of
reasonableness in the exercise of rights. 121 In that regard, it seems to be a remark-
able invocation of the doctrine to assert the legality of actions designed to extend
the breadth of maritime zones beyond what the 1982 LOS Convention prescribes
or to otherwise impose unilateral conditions on the exercise of navigational rights
contrary to the terms of the Convention. While positivist theory does not ascribe a
formal hierarchy among sources of international law, 122 principles of good faith
(pacta sunt servanda) in accepting the balance of rights and duties under the 1982
LOS Convention surely dictate that the exercise of navigational rights in accor-
dance with the tenor ofthe Convention must be accepted and cannot ofthemselves
be a violation of the principle of "abuse of rights."
Conclusion
It is possibly an irresistible human impulse that compels States to be extremely pro-
tective about the sanctity of their maritime areas. Most assuredly what is "one man's
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distant water is another man's maritime backyard" 123 and this has created what one
author has termed "psycho-legal boundaries" 124 in popular perception. Such a senti-
ment does not accord with modern legal analysis of the nature of the "sovereignty"
exercisable in offshore areas, which is ofa disaggregated kind and which is necessarily
limited by equally compelling rights of navigational freedom. This historical doc-
trinal struggle between freedom of the seas and protection of sovereign interests has
found its most recent incantation within the terms ofthe 1982 LOS Convention and
supporting, indeed largely identical, customary international law.
The 1982 LOS Convention does reflect the necessary balance of coastal and
maritime interests throughout its composition. It provides for an extended sover-
eign range for coastal States through their adjacent maritime areas, yet preserves
the necessary freedoms sought by maritime States to traverse these areas, thus
achieving the economic and security priorities that were necessary for such States.
The entry into force of the 1982 LOS Convention does provide a level of certainty
for the realization ofgoals, yet notwithstanding high hopes 125 on the normative po-
tential of the Convention, it was never going to be the last word on the reconcilia-
tion of interests. 126 As a result of both the ambiguity within the terms of the
Convention and the determination of some States to press claims that are plainly
contrary to its terms, it is necessary for those relying upon the integrity of lawful
rights of free navigation to demonstrate an equal resolve. The operational aspect of
the Freedom ofNavigation Program has its place, indeed as has been argued in this
paper, its critical place in the dynamic of international legal rule determination.
The Program draws considerable support from ICJ jurisprudence and has been
successful in ensuring conformity to legal standards. 127 It is ironic that interna-
tional law is sometimes derided as being too ephemeral for realist approaches to in-
ternational relations theory, yet the operational assertion aspect of the Freedom of
Navigation Program reflects the very vibrancy of international legal discourse and
ultimately is a testament to the power of the law.
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XIII
Military Activities in the
Exclusive Economic Zone:
Preventing Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict
Hyun-Soo Kim 1
Coastal States have jurisdiction over the establishment of artificial islands, in-
stallations and structures under the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (hereinafter the LOS Convention). 2 On the other hand, foreign
States enjoy freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, and freedom to lay sub-
marine cables and pipelines in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of coastal
States. 3 The contemporary issue in the LOS Convention is whether foreign States
have the right to conduct military activities, including naval task force maneuver-
ing, flight operations, military exercises, surveillance, intelligence gathering, and
weapons testing or firing, in coastal States' EEZs.
It is argued that the foreign States' military and missile exercises may result in vi-
olating the LOS Convention in two fundamental respects: first, it will interfere with
reasonable use ofthe high seas by others; and, second, it will violate the prohibition
against use of the high seas for non-peaceful purposes.4 Thus, foreign States' mili-
tary activities in the EEZs ofcoastal States would be inconsistent with the principles
and norms governing States' military actions at sea under international conven-
tions or customary law. 5
Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone
As a result, the legal question concerning military activities conducted at sea has
become much more complicated since the establishment of the legal regime of the
EEZ. This is so mainly because Article 58 of the LOS Convention provides that:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy,
subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article
87 of navigation and overflight and ofthe laying ofsubmarine cables and pipelines, and
other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those
associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and
compatible with the other provisions of this Convention. (Emphasis added)
2. Articles 88 to 1 1 5 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive
economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.
During the negotiation of the LOS Convention, agreement on the above itali-
cized wording was perceived as vital by the maritime powers because in their inter-
pretation it implied the legality of naval maneuvers in a coastal State's EEZ as an
activity "associated with the operation of ships." The cross-reference to Article 87
is also important to the maritime nations because it lists the major freedoms of the
high seas, which include freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, and free-
dom to lay submarine cables and pipelines. Accordingly, other States' freedoms in
a coastal State's EEZ are the same as those in the high seas. Moreover, the phrase
"and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms" implies
that other States may enjoy other, unspecified freedoms in a coastal State's EEZ in
addition to the ones listed in Article 58.1.
Furthermore, Article 58.2 makes a general cross-reference to Articles 88-115
and other pertinent rules of international law as applying to the EEZ in so far as
they are not incompatible with Part V (the EEZ articles) of the LOS Convention.
However, some coastal States interpreted Article 58 much more narrowly, arguing
that it does not authorize other States to carry out military activities in a coastal
State's EEZ, and that the consent of the coastal State is required before conducting
such activities.6
The question of whether a foreign country has the right to conduct military ac-
tivities in a coastal State's EEZ was a controversial issue in the negotiations of the
text of the LOS Convention and continues to be in State practice. 7 The maritime
powers argued for a broad range of military activities consonant with traditional
high seas freedoms. Consequently, they believe the right to naval maneuvers in the
EEZ of a coastal State is implied in the freedom of navigation and overflight. 8 That
is, they interpret the phrase "other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to
these freedoms" contained in Article 58.1 as including military activities such as
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task force maneuvering, flight operations, military exercises, naval surveys, intelli-
gence gathering, and weapons testing and firing.
During the negotiations, some States9 expressed strong opposition to military
activities 10 in the EEZ because such activities can result in threats to coastal States.
However, nowhere in the LOS Convention does it clearly state whether a third
State may or may not conduct military activities in the EEZ ofa coastal State. 11 Ab-
sent clarity in the text of the Convention, resolution of this issue is very compli-
cated and controversial. Despite the apparent ambiguity, it seems that the general
understanding of the text of the LOS Convention would permit such activities to
be conducted. 12
Nevertheless, due to the ambiguity found in Article 59, and the absence of any
compulsory judicial settlement of disputes concerning military activities in the
EEZ, it is very difficult to render an authoritative legal interpretation whenever dis-
putes arise. The question of whether naval maneuvers and exercises within a
coastal State's EEZ are permissible under international law will remain. No author-
itative legal rulings will be made unless actual international disputes arise, and the
parties contest the issue before the International Court of Justice or the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
The question concerning the legality of laying military-related submarine ca-
bles, pipelines, and/or devices by a State in another State's EEZ is also subject to dif-
ferent interpretations of, and application to, the relevant provisions of the LOS
Convention. The coastal State should have the exclusive right in its EEZ to con-
struct, and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of artifi-
cial islands, installations and structures for economic purposes, and installations
and structures which may interfere with the exercise ofthe right ofthe coastal State
in the EEZ. Accordingly, other States should obtain consent before laying military-
related submarine cables, pipelines, and/or devices in the EEZ of the coastal State.
Therefore, the subsequent practices of States will become particularly important
for determining the proper interpretation of the LOS Convention's provisions.
Some States argued that "the right of the coastal State to build and to authorize
the construction, operation and the use of installations and structures in the EEZ
and on the continental shelf is limited only to the categories of such installations
and structures as listed in Article 60 ofthe LOS Convention." Accordingly, they ar-
gue that it is not necessary to obtain consent from a coastal State ifanother State in-
tends to lay military-related submarine cables, pipelines, and/or devices in the EEZ
or on the continental shelfofthe coastal State. It should be remembered that under
Article 58.3 "other" States, when exercising their rights in the EEZ of a coastal State,
are required to "have due regard to the rights . . . of the coastal State" in accordance
with the provisions ofthe LOS Convention. Ifthe military activities conducted by a
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foreign country in a coastal State's EEZ interfere with the lawful resource rights and
interests of that coastal State, the latter's rights and interests would prevail.
In the future, no matter how international disputes concerning the issue of na-
val maneuvers and other military activities conducted in the EEZ of a coastal State
might be generated, or how the disputes are settled, the possibility of this kind of
dispute arising could be avoided entirely or at least reduced. This is possible if the
State conducting military activities in the coastal State's EEZ shows "reasonable re-
gard" for the interests of that coastal State and other States. 13 In other words, if the
coastal State's rights and interests in relation to exploration, exploitation, conser-
vation and management of natural resources; the establishment and use of artifi-
cial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research; the protection
and preservation ofthe marine environment in its EEZ; and other States' rights and
interests in the coastal State's EEZ, such as freedoms of navigation and overflight
and freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, 14 are not affected by the mili-
tary activities of another State, these kinds of military activities are permissible un-
der the LOS Convention.
Article 58 ofthe LOS Convention should be applied in order to answer the ques-
tion of whether foreign States have the right, under international law, to conduct
military- related activities in the coastal State's EEZ. The answer will depend on the
nature and purposes of the activities. Because the operation of foreign States' intel-
ligence gathering ships in the coastal States' EEZ involve no use ofweapons and ex-
plosives, and is thus considered to be "associated with the operation ofthe ships" in
exercising freedom of navigation in the coastal State's EEZ, it can hardly be main-
tained that the foreign States' activities violate international law. As a matter of law,
if "due regard" indeed has been given to the coastal States' rights and interests, the
foreign States do have the right to conduct military activities, including weapons
testing or firing, in the coastal State's EEZ. Of course, if any live-fire military exer-
cises are to be conducted, the establishment of a warning or exclusion zone to pro-
tect others using the affected ocean area is required because engaging in any live-
fire military exercises creates dangers. 15
In addition, military intelligence-gathering is different, because it is not related
to the construction, operation and the use of installations in the EEZ and also
would not normally be published or disseminated. Intelligence-gathering activities
can also take many forms, and activities that involve "drilling into the continental
shelf, the use of explosives, or the introduction of harmful substances into the ma-
rine environment" 16 would certainly implicate concerns of the coastal State and
should require its consent.
In light of the foregoing analysis, foreign States are allowed, under international
law, to conduct military activities in the EEZ, provided that the coastal State's
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resource rights and interests are not affected by the activities, and provided that the
purpose for conducting the activities is not to intimidate the coastal States by threat
or use of force. However, it would be considered a violation of international law if
foreign States were to fire missiles into a water area in the coastal State's EEZ without
giving due regard to the resource rights and interests ofthe coastal States and/or if it
affected other States' freedoms ofnavigation and overflight in the coastal State's EEZ,
or had an adverse impact on other States' national interests concerning maintenance
ofpeace and stability in the coastal States' region. In these circumstances, the legality
of the foreign State's military activities should be examined in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the LOS Convention, in particular Articles 58 and 301, and
other international legal instruments, such as the Charter of the United Nations.
In conclusion, even if all States have navigational and overflight rights in the
EEZ of a coastal State under the LOS Convention, these rights should be balanced
against the resource interests of the coastal State. If there is interference in the
coastal State's economic utilization of its EEZ, limitations on the above mentioned
freedom ofnavigation and overflight should be accepted. Conflicts between coastal
and maritime States regarding military activities in the EEZ ''should be resolved on
the basis ofequity and in the light of all relevant circumstances, taking into account
the respective importance ofthe interests involved to the parties as well as to the in-
ternational community as a whole." 17
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XIV
The Unique and Protected Status of Hospital
Ships under the Law ofArmed Conflict
D. L. Grimord
and G. W. Riggs 1
Hospital ships have long enjoyed a unique position under the law of
armed conflict. The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition ofWounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces
at Sea (GWS-Sea) 2 codifies the protection afforded hospital ships that are serv-
ing in an area of hostilities during international armed conflict. In light of the
deployment of USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) in support ofOperation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF), the protected status of hospital ships and the maintenance of that status
remain important topics. The import is even more pronounced in light of the
sweeping changes in technology since the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the
modern-day terrorist threat from non-State actors who do not adhere to the
law of armed conflict.
Background
Article 22 of GWS-Sea provides that military hospital ships may in no circum-
stances be attacked or captured, but shall at all times be respected and protected.
This provision extends to hospital ships the immunity conferred on the wounded,
sick and shipwrecked. 3 Article 3 1 ofGWS-Sea provides the means by which parties
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to a conflict can verify that hospital ships are abiding by the provisions of GWS-
Sea, specifically that they are not committing acts outside their humanitarian du-
ties and harmful to the enemy. It includes the right for parties to the convention to
control and search the vessels, direct their movement or even detain them for a
limited period of time. Parties may place a commissioner on board to ensure com-
pliance. Additionally, the parties may also arrange for the placement on board of
neutral observers who shall verify "the strict observation of the provisions con-
tained in the present Convention."4 Article 34 of GWS-Sea provides that the pro-
tection to which hospital ships are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to
commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy. 5 In short,
hospital ships must refrain from all interference, direct or indirect, in military op-
erations.6 In addition, the second paragraph of Article 34 provides that hospital
ships may not possess or use a secret code for their wireless or other means ofcom-
munication. Article 35 of GWS-Sea enumerates conditions that shall not be con-
sidered as depriving hospital ships of the protections afforded. Specifically, the
arming of crews for the maintenance of order or self-defense, the presence on
board ofapparatus exclusively intended to facilitate navigation or communication,
and the storage of arms taken from the sick and wounded are not actions that de-
prive a hospital ship of its protected status. Two points that must be reassessed in
light of modern conditions are the use of secure communications aboard hospital
ships and the arming ofhospital ships beyond the traditional "small arms" paradigm.
Secure Communications
Article 34 ofGWS-Sea has been viewed as prohibiting the use of secure communi-
cations equipment on hospital ships during international armed conflict.
Changing technology and the practical necessity to communicate in a manner con-
sistent with present-day technology requires that the prohibition against hospital
ships using secure communication equipment be reevaluated. While the intent of
the prohibition (the right of belligerents to be assured that hospital ships do not
commit "acts harmful to the enemy") must be maintained, the realities of modern
communications and navigation technology should also be taken into consider-
ation. In today's highly technological environment where most computer and sat-
ellite communications are routinely encrypted, hospital ships should be able to
utilize these state-of-the-art communications assets in order to operate safely and
accomplish their humanitarian mission. 7 In today's highly technological operating
environment, the ship's capacity to operate safely and fulfill its humanitarian mis-
sion during armed conflict would be degraded without access to encrypted
communications.
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Since 1949, discussions among international legal authorities have recognized
the need to reevaluate the use of secure communications equipment that may vio-
late, or appear to violate, the "secret code" prohibition of Article 34.
As early as the close of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, there was
concern among the Conference participants that the ability of hospital ships to
communicate efficiently with warships and military aircraft was in jeopardy and
needed further study. 8
More recently, paragraph 171 of the 1994 San Remo Manual on International
Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea9 recommends a different rule than Arti-
cle 34. Paragraph 171 provides: "In order to fulfill most effectively their humani-
tarian mission, hospital ships should be permitted to use cryptographic
equipment. The equipment shall not be used in any circumstances to transmit in-
telligence data nor in any other way to acquire any military advantage."
The Explanation to the San Remo Manual10 details the reasons for this new rule,
that being, the general wording of Article 34 has caused difficulties. The British,
during the Falklands War, found that transmitting to or from their hospital ships
in the clear risked giving away the positions or planned movements of combat
forces. The participants in the San Remo process evidently thought that, since Arti-
cle 34 jeopardizes the ability of hospital ships to operate effectively, the rule ought
to concentrate on the sending of military intelligence and that in order to fulfill
their humanitarian mission effectively, hospital ships should be permitted to use
secure communication equipment that in modern technology is an integral part of
most communications systems. 11
Given the interpretation ofArticle 34 ofGWS-Sea, the use of encrypted communi-
cations equipment on board hospital ships is problematic. It is clear that as technology
has changed, the terms ofparagraphs 2 ofGWS-Sea Article 34 have been rendered ob-
solete. Nonetheless, States parties to the GWS-Sea arguably remain bound by its terms.
One possible approach to effecting a change in the law is the premise that an accepted
change in practice by parties can be utilized to further interpret and modify a treaty.
This concept is reflected in Article 3 1 ofthe Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties
which states, "any subsequent practice in the application ofthe treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties" can be used to interpret the meaning of that treaty. 12
The prohibition against the use of secret codes by hospital ships was born in a by-
gone era. In the past, use of encrypted communications was not needed for safe navi-
gation or for affecting the humanitarian mission ofhospital ships, rather, only for mili-
tary operational reasons such as receiving or transmitting intelligence. Paragraph 171
of the San Remo Manual, as well as varied other international sources, 13 illustrate the
widespread recognition that, in concert with the necessities ofmodern technology, the
use of encrypted communication equipment on hospital ships in furtherance of their
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humanitarian mission and safe navigation should be permitted. Encrypted communi-
cation equipment necessary for safe operation and efficient long-range communica-
tion is now in common use at sea. The necessity for this now commonplace use of
encrypted communications equipment should apply equally to hospital ships, as long
as they commit no act harmful to the enemy. The modification of existing treaty obli-
gations between parties envisioned by Article 3 1 of the Vienna Convention could be
applied to the practice of using encrypted communications by hospital ships.
Accordingly, use of encrypted communications should be permissible when its
purpose is to facilitate the navigation 14 or communication 15 of the hospital ship in
furtherance of its humanitarian mission and is not employed in a manner that is
harmful to the enemy. Under such circumstances, the presence and use of such
equipment violates neither the spirit nor the intent of GWS-Sea.
Defensive Arming ofHospital Ships
The arming of a hospital ship for self-defense against terrorists and other non-State
actors must also be reconsidered. The Geneva Conventions by their own terms
only apply during "declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise be-
tween two or more ofthe High Contracting Parties." Terrorists and their organiza-
tions (the threat against which hospital ships are now defending themselves) are
not States party to the Geneva Conventions and their tactics (attacking "soft" tar-
gets normally protected under the law of armed conflict (LOAC)) fall outside the
traditional definition of international armed conflict. Although it is doubtful that
the Geneva Conventions apply to self-defense measures that hospital ships may
take against terrorist acts, an analysis of this issue is required based on the US policy
position reflected in Department of Defense(DoD) Directive 5100.77 (DoD Law of
War Program) that US forces will apply the LOAC to all military operations.
GWS-Sea does not directly address weapons systems for hospital ships. As noted
above, Article 34 provides that the "protection to which hospital ships and sick-
bays are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their hu-
manitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy." Article 35 provides that the fact the
crews of ships or sick-bays are armed for the maintenance of order, for their own
defense or that of the sick and wounded, shall not be considered as depriving hos-
pital ships or sick-bays of vessels of their protected status.
While it is clear that crews of hospital ships may be armed for their own defense,
GWS-Sea does not specify what are permissible weapons. The accepted norm for
arming medical personnel ashore has been "small arms" such as pistols and rifles,
and that norm was equally applied to the crews of hospital ships. Traditionally, it
was thought that light, portable, individual weapons such as pistols and rifles were
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all that was needed for personal defense on hospital ships. 16 Crew-served weapons,
such as machine guns, were presumed to go beyond the need for use in self-de-
fense, given that belligerents were bound to not attack hospital ships under the
provisions of GWS-Sea.
However, current-day suicide-style terrorist tactics against so-called "soft-tar-
gets," exemplified by the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, US
embassies in Africa, and on the USS Cole, demonstrate the need for enhanced de-
fenses against individuals or groups not complying with the law ofarmed conflict. In
this new threat environment, where large-scale, deadly, and indiscriminate attacks
on civilians and civilian objects have become part of terrorists' modus operandi,
mounted machine guns have become by necessity standard elements of defensive
force protection systems for naval vessels. Such weapons have offensive capability
when installed on helicopters and small boats, but in the context of being
mounted on board a large, relatively slow and not- easily-maneuverable ship, any
offensive capability is greatly diminished (if not lost altogether) and the weapon
becomes purely defensive in nature. To that end, hospital ships should be able to
employ machine guns and similar armament solely for self-defense against terror-
ists and other persons who do not recognize or follow the law of armed conflict.
This interpretation is consistent with the long-standing US Army interpretation of
self-defense permissible under Article 22 of Geneva Convention I 17 (pertaining to
wounded and sick forces on land) as "personal defense and for the protection of
the wounded and sick under their charge against marauders and other persons vio-
lating the law of war." 18 Such weapons would not be used in an offensive capacity
nor against lawful belligerents complying with the law of armed conflict and who
are exercising their rights under GWS-Sea. It is only as a result of the emergent
threat to targets traditionally protected under the law of armed conflict (such as a
hospital ship) that it is necessary to enhance the defensive measures available to
these protected platforms. Although the Geneva Conventions would not likely ap-
ply, the use of machine guns in self-defense against non-State actors is consistent
with Articles 34 and 35 ofGWS-Sea, as well as the underlying principles governing
the protected status of hospital ships under the law of armed conflict.
Notes
1. Captain Grimord is the Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General, Navy International and
Operational Law Division. Major Riggs is the Head of the Operational Law Branch, Navy
International and Operational Law Division. The opinions expresses herein are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect thsoe of the Department of the Navy or Department of Defense.
267
The Unique and Protected Status ofHospital Ships
2. Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members ofArmed Forces at Sea, Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, reprinted in DOCUMENTS
ON THE LAWS OF WAR 222 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000).
3. Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, II Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 157 (Jean S. Pictet et. al. eds., i960).
4. This provision dates from the draft Additional Articles Relating to the Condition of the
Wounded in War, Geneva, Oct. 21, 1868, which did not enter into force. See THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
369 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004). The wording was only somewhat
modified to take its present form as found in GWS-Sea.
5. Additionally, hospital ships must be warned of the offending action and given a reasonable
amount of time to comply before their protected status can be violated. Harmful acts are, for
example, transporting combatants or arms, transmitting military intelligence via radio or
providing cover for a warship.
6. Commentary, supra note 3, at 191.
7. A secondary, but important additional consideration, is the current standards relating to the
privacy of medical records pursuant to the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). The Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable
Health Information ("Privacy Rule") establishes, for the first time, a set of national standards for
the protection ofcertain health information. The US Department ofHealth and Human Services
issued the Privacy Rule to implement the requirement of HIPAA. The Privacy Rule standards
address the use and disclosure of individuals' health information—called "protected health
information" by organizations subject to the Privacy Rule—called "covered entities," as well as
standards for individuals' privacy rights to understand and control how their health information
is used.
8. See Resolution 6 of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva, 1949, reprinted in The LAWS OF
Armed Conflicts, supra note 4, at 691.
9. Sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and completed in June
1994 by a group of legal scholars and naval practitioners, the Manual serves as a contemporary
restatement of international law applicable to armed conflict at sea and comprehensively
addresses the subject for the first time since the 1913 Oxford Manual. In most respects, the
Manual correctly states the law and, with the exception of some portions, is consistent with US
practice. The San Remo Manual is reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 4, at 1 153. The
1913 Oxford Manual is reprinted in id. at 1123.
10. San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea
236-37 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995).
11. It is important to note that the San Remo Manual recommendation is consistent with the
rules regarding the use of secure communications equipment by medical aircraft and vehicles.
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, June 8, 1977, art.
28, 1 125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2, at 422.
Unlike hospital ships, other medical transports are not restricted from using encryption
equipment. They are, however, bound by the same requirement that they commit no acts
harmful to the enemy. International law permits medical aircraft and vehicles to possess and use
encrypted communications equipment "solely to facilitate navigation, communications, or
identification." Hospital ships have the same or similar navigation, communication, and
identification requirements as medical transport aircraft.
268
D. L. Grimord & G. W. Riggs
12. Convention on the Law of Treaties,Vienna, May 22, 1969, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 331.
13. In The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, the German equivalent
to the US Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of
NAVAL OPERATIONS (A. R. Thomas & James C Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, US Naval War
College International Law Studies), Professor Heintschel von Heinegg recommends that the San
Remo rule be adopted. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) senior legal advisor
Louise Doswald-Beck notes that the San Remo Manual's recommended change in Article 34
derives from the British experience during the Falklands conflict. See Louise Doswald-Beck, San
Remo Manual on International Law, 309 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 583, 593
(1995). Phillip Eberlin, Merchant Navy and Maritime Security Officer, ICRC, in his modern
Commentary to the 1923 Hague Rules for the Control ofRadio in Time ofWar, argues that rules
should be clarified to allow the use of modern communications equipment by hospital ships.
14. Military Global Positioning System (GPS) is encrypted.
15. Video teleconferencing of real time medical procedures and other patient information would
by necessity have to be encrypted in order to utilize the necessary satellite communications.
16. See COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 1 94. See also ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1 3, at
5 8.2.3.
17. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 Aug. 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2, at 197.
18. US Army Field Manual 27-10 J 223b (1956).
269

PART IV
THE FUTURE OF LAW IN WAR:
DIFFERENT APPLICATION
OR DIFFERENT RULES?

XV
Legal and Tactical Dilemmas Inherent
in Fighting Terror:
Experience of the Israeli Army
in Jenin and Bethlehem
(April-May 2002)
Alan Baker l
Introduction
One of the major challenges presently facing the international community
is the extent to which the laws of armed conflict, as understood today,
maybe applied to conflict scenarios oftoday's world realities, and specifically in a
situation in which the international community finds itself in a concerted global
campaign against terror. 2 In other words, is the law of armed conflict, as articu-
lated, understood and applied in what we have grown up to understand to be to-
day's world, capable of guiding States in the fight against today's terror?
When faced with legal issues arising in a "standard situation" of armed con-
flict—whether in regard to ground operations, air or naval targeting opera-
tions—the legal parameters are usually relatively clear. This is because the laws
and customs ofwar and international humanitarian law—which constitute inte-
gral components of international law—set out the norms and standards by which
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States are obligated to act and armed forces required to operate. The term "stan-
dard situation" assumes that the clearly-defined armed forces of the two sides
—
usually belonging to States—confront one another on a defined or clear battle-
field, and engage in such actions as are necessary to conduct the armed conflict.
The term "armed conflict," as understood up to now, thus serves as a code-word
or form of algebra, indicative of a series of norms, rules, articles, principles, rights,
prohibitions and requirements, obligating the forces, and the governments send-
ing them, in guiding the military conduct of the war. The assumption is, in most
cases, that armed forces—on both sides—will indeed conduct themselves in accor-
dance with such rules and norms. More important, the assumption is also that each
relies on the fact that the other will indeed observe the requisite norms and rules.
That is, perhaps, the underlying assumption of any logical and viable armed con-
flict situation in today's international legal system.
This is a somewhat idealistic and even simplistic description ofany normal legal
system—both civil and international—in which the individual components within
the system are able to live and conduct themselves within the orderly parameters of
the system, on the assumption that the other components of the system will com-
port themselves in the same way. Departure from such parameters and behavior in
violation of such a normative system undermines and threatens the very existence
of the system and raises the question as to the need to review the system, adjust the
norms or adapt them to meet the new realities or developments.
Thus, as long as the conduct of armed conflict includes the accepted compo-
nents and follows the accepted normative guidelines—whether from the point of
view of the parties to the conflict or as to the modes of behavior and the theater of
war—then the "standard situation" prevails. To conduct a war in Iraq against the
Iraqi army, or in Afghanistan against organized armed forces fighting for the re-
gime in Afghanistan, or even a collective NATO action against organized Serbian
military forces in Yugoslavia, would generally fall within the parameters of the
"standard situation," even if, during the course ofsuch conflict, the necessity might
arise to deal with exceptional occurrences, including terror, violations ofthe law of
armed conflict, war crimes, crimes against humanity and other irregular events.
Today's international community is faced with a dichotomy, because what is cur-
rently known and acknowledged to be "the law of armed conflict," by which States
and their armed forces are supposed to function, developed over the years, and was
set out in clear terms in the late 1800's and early 1900's, 3 amended in the post-Sec-
ond World War years (1949),4 and again in the 1974-7 timeframe5 in the back-
ground of the Vietnam War, and has since not really been touched (apart from
specific instruments to reflect the need for protection of cultural property in time of
war,6 as well as instruments reflecting technological developments in conventional7
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and non-conventional warfare. 8 ) However, it is questionable whether the law of
armed conflict as it exits today, incorporating as it does, international humanitarian
law, is really capable ofproviding legal as well as operative answers to the practical is-
sues arising out of today's struggle, directed not necessarily against a defined and
identifiable armed force of a State, but rather against terror as a concept and a phe-
nomenon. This may not necessarily be confined to the territory of a particular State,
and certainly, by its very definition, is not necessarily directed against military forces
of a State in the reality of today.
"Global War on Terror"
While the concept of "war" or even "global war" maybe clear, while the phenome-
non of "terror" is rapidly and ever-increasingly becoming understood to more and
more countries, and while the challenge placed before the international commu-
nity may be patently evident, the concept of a "global war on terror" in interna-
tional legal terms nevertheless raises innumerable questions. Can such a war legally
take place? Is the existing law ofarmed conflict, based as it is on well-defined crite-
ria, capable ofidentifying, categorizing and recognizing the needs and components
of such a war, especially when considering that the parties to the conflict are not
necessarily States, and the geographical boundaries of the war are not necessarily
within the confines ofone State? Similarly, as the tactics and the weapons needed to
deal with terror are not necessarily the same as those used vis-a-vis a conventional
enemy in a standard war, are the law ofarmed conflict and international humani-
tarian law equipped to deal with this?
To fight against Iraqi or Afghani armed forces, or in Israel's case, a Syrian or
Lebanese army, is theoretically and legally relatively simple, and can indeed be ad-
dressed in terms of the existing rules and sanctions of warfare. But as has become
evident, to fight against al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Fedayeen
Saddam, and other such nebulous and vague terrorist opponents, may be quite a
different kettle offish for a number of very significant reasons:
• They openly and demonstratively shun and violate the accepted norms and
rules of armed conflict. Their very modus operandi and inherent functioning
philosophy are built, and rely as a tactical assumption, on the fact that the
organized, western armies—as well as the society that they defend—will indeed
abide by the norms and rules. Thus, they utilize civilian locations, homes, churches,
mosques, medical facilities and ambulances, and schools as shields for placement
and concealing of weapons, bases, headquarters, laboratories and training camps,
assuming that an organized army of a State obligated by the law of armed conflict
and international humanitarian law, will not risk causing collateral civilian damage
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to civilians and civilian facilities by responding and targeting such blatantly civilian
objects, and will not wish to be accused of using disproportionate military force
against groups of apparently unorganized civilians.
• They target civilians as a distinct, deliberate and concerted means to
demoralize and terrorize the civil population and to pressure organized
governments and society. This is their tactical modus operandi.
• In so doing, they knowingly violate, and operate outside the law of armed
conflict and thereby place themselves outside the bounds of any accepted norms
entitling them to protection or combatant status and privileges. This in itself
undermines and abuses the basic assumption of an organized society, functioning
pursuant to legal norms and obligations—both in its civil legal system as well part
of its international conventional and customary obligations.
• Such modus operandi undermines and abuses the humanitarian sense of
responsibility and obligation instilled into the psyche of soldiers, whether in
military training and academies, or whether stemming from the basic sense of
decency and morality emanating from home, childhood, family values, education,
Sunday school, church, synagogue and upbringing.
• This phenomenon produces the impossible and paradoxical predicament in
which, on the one hand, organized armed forces or police forces of the State are
obliged to function within the limitations of the law and the accepted norms,
while on the other hand, the terrorists openly, deliberately and proudly violate
such law and norms. This is perhaps the essence of terror.
Israel Defense Force (IDF) Case Studies—Jenin and Bethlehem
Following are two pertinent case studies and other examples from Israel's own ex-
periences of the blatant abuse by Palestinian terrorists of the laws and accepted
norms of armed conflict, and the sometimes tragic moral and humanitarian di-
lemma that this creates in the psyche of the field commanders, soldiers, as well as
the political leadership that holds responsibility. This is no less of a dilemma for the
judiciary that is often called upon to judge the actions of the government or the
armed forces during real time conflict.
These studies are also indicative of a certain element ofhypocrisy and dual stan-
dards within parts of the international community, which to a certain extent
would, for reasons of political interest, appear to prefer to sit on the side and rush
to judgment rather than seek to unify efforts and engage in the fight against terror.
The situations covered are:
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• The IDF operation, between April 3-10, 2002 to overcome an armed and
fortified terrorist infrastructure in the Jenin refugee camp and to prevent its
conversion into a training and exit base for suicide terrorism.
• The 37-day occupation and violation by Palestinian terrorists of one of the
holiest sites to Christianity—the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, between
April 2 and May 8, 2002.
• Other pertinent examples.
Scenario
The refugee camp in Jenin occupied a corner of the south-eastern outskirts of the
town. The refugee institutions (schools, clinics and related facilities) were under
the administration and responsibility of the United Nations Refugee and Works
Agency (UNRWA), within the general context of the United Nations' responsibil-
ity for handling refugees.9
In fact, this camp (together with others in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip)
had, for a considerable period oftime prior to the hostilities in the area, been over-
run and controlled by the Hamas and Islamic Jihad terror organizations, which
had established a series of terror training centers, explosive-producing laborato-
ries, suicide-belt sewing workshops, metal-working facilities and foundries to pro-
duce, cut and sharpen metal shavings, ball bearings, screws, bolts and related
objects comprising part of the "suicide kits," and related equipment. This despite
clear United Nations requirements prohibiting use of refugee camps under its ad-
ministration for military purposes, including a call by the United Nations Secre-
tary-General establishing that "[rjefugee camps should be free of any military
presence or military equipment, including weapons and munitions . . . the neutral-
ity and the humanitarian nature of the camps must be meticulously kept," 10 and
despite a series of very clear obligations undertaken by the Palestinian Authority,
and witnessed by the international community, to dismantle terrorist infrastruc-
ture and arrest and prosecute those involved in all forms of terror. 11
The schools and kindergarten facilities—ostensibly under the administration of
the United Nations—were used to train terrorists, replete with posters covering the
classrooms and nurseries depicting the shaheeds ("martyrs") suicide bombers, as
folk heroes, and as role-models for the children. Children's playing cards depicted
the faces of these "folk-heroes." 12
The presence and control by the various terror organizations was no secret and
was not done in a covert manner. 13 Jenin was proudly dubbed in the Palestinian
propaganda apparatus as "capital of the shaheeds," having produced over 20 suc-
cessful suicide bombings within Israel.
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During the course of the armed activities prior to the entry of IDF into the
camp, the terror organizations had evacuated the majority of the refugees, sending
them into the town of Jenin, and proceeded to booby-trap buildings within the
camp, disperse small mines connected to piping along the narrow streets, and
booby-trap doorknobs, toys, household utensils and other objects.
The Legal Situation
In strict legal terms, in the context of the law of armed conflict, the Jenin refugee
camp had been turned into a military objective/location, which openly and clearly
served and rendered an effective contribution to the Palestinian unique form of
military action. The camp served as a purveyor and chiefsupply depot and training
base for acts of terror
—
predominantly suicide bombings both during the days im-
mediately preceding the military action, as well as having supplied an unknown
number of potential future suicide bombers, the neutralization of which was
clearly required in order to gain military, psychological and tactical advantage. 14
Despite the obvious factors pointing to this case as being a classical "military ob-
jective" by all criteria of international humanitarian law, and despite the lack ofany
doubt that might place it within the "grey area" set out in paragraph 3 of Article 52
ofAdditional Protocol I, 15 the legal and moral dilemma facing the IDF was whether
indeed to treat it as such, or whether, in light of its overall denomination as a refu-
gee camp and the protected status to which such camps are entitled, nevertheless to
grant it immunity as a civilian object.
The Action
In reaching the decision to enter the camp, consideration was given to the fact that
most of the civilian population had been sent out of the camp and virtually all re-
maining persons were presumed to be terrorists (about 200). The extent ofthe for-
tification of the camp as ascertained through intelligence and aerial photographs,
subsequently became evident from a series of statements made by the Palestinian
terrorists who fought in the camp:
• "The fighting forces, from all the factions in the camp, have been equipped
with explosive belts and grenades." 16
• "Our fighters are blowing themselves up in front ofthe soldiers and planting
explosive devices on the roads." 17
• "We had more than 50 houses booby-trapped around the camp. We chose
old and empty buildings and the houses of men who were wanted by Israel
because we knew the soldiers would search for them. . . ." "We cut off lengths of
main water pipes and packed them with explosives and nails. Then we placed
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them about four meters apart throughout the houses—in cupboards, under sinks,
and in sofas " "They were lured there. We all stopped shooting and the women
went out to tell the soldiers that we had run out of bullets and were leaving. The
women alerted the fighters as the soldiers reached the booby-trapped area." 18
However, due to the cramped nature of the building, the narrow and winding
streets and the possibility that some refugees remained, or were nevertheless being
held as hostages or human shields within the camp, a tactical decision was made
not to use artillery, tank or aerial targeting, with their concomitant potential of in-
discriminate or collateral damage to civilian life and property, but rather to send
ground forces into the camp and to move from house to house with a view to limit-
ing offensive action strictly to armed terrorists and to military objectives.
During the action, IDF forces suffered heavy casualties as a result of the booby-
trapped buildings and suicide bombers who exploded themselves within and close
to buildings that collapsed on to the soldiers. 23 soldiers were killed (10 in one
house). This required introduction of heavier equipment to enable acquisition of
control by widening the narrow routes for heavier military equipment. By the end
of the action, a total of 59 terrorists had been killed in the entire action—most of
whom were discovered together with their weapons.
International Reaction
In the immediate aftermath of the action, Israel and its forces were widely accused
of carrying out a "massacre" and of killing hundreds of innocent civilians. Senior
United Nations officials came out with televised statements describing the situa-
tion in such terms as "horrific" and "morally repugnant." 19 The United Nations
Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and
others determined that Israel had committed war crimes. 20
Pursuant to consultations between the Israeli leadership and the US Adminis-
tration, Israel agreed to the sending of a team composed ofUS military experts, un-
der United Nations auspices, to ascertain the situation on the ground and to view
the terrorist infrastructure prevalent in the camp and the terrorist activity that ren-
dered the camp a military target. The Secretary-General ofUnited Nations, through
the United Nations Security Council, converted this into a fully-fledged interna-
tional fact-finding commission21 with the substantive components of an interna-
tional tribunal (headed by the ex-President of Finland who had previously served as
an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, ex-President of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, ex-United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
and a US retired general, with legal, political and technical staff and advisers) with an
extended mandate to interview witnesses and officers, to attribute blame, place
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responsibility, and to extend the commission to cover other areas ofthe West Bank ter-
ritory, rather than the initial intention to analyze the Jenin situation.
The Government of Israel objected to the extended format of the Fact Finding
Commission. The team was subsequently disbanded by the Secretary-General, espe-
cially after it became publicly and internationally evident that no massacre had been
perpetrated; that those killed were terrorists; and that the camp had become a military
object to all intents and purposes. The Secretary-General subsequently issued a report
acknowledging the misuse by the Palestinian terrorists of the civilian infrastructure in
the camp and affirming the fact that only 59 Palestinians had been killed, specifically
rejecting the claim by Palestinian leaders and echoed by several senior United Nations
and other international personalities that 300-500 had been massacred.22
IDF Operation in Bethlehem—the Church of the Nativity (2 April-8 May 2002)
Scenario
The Church of the Nativity is one of the major holy sites for all of Christianity
(Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Armenians and others). It is the site at which the na-
tivity scene, as described in the New Testament, took place. It is the site of the an-
nual pilgrimage by all the various Christian sects and general public to Bethlehem
to conduct the Christmas Eve midnight mass. It contains a complex of chapels and
altars serving the various Christian sects. 23
The Abuse
On April 2, 2002, some 220 armed Palestinian terrorists belonging to the Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Al
Aksa Martyrs group, entered the main church areas with weapons and ammuni-
tion, barricaded themselves inside the Church, used the roofs and balconies as
shooting positions, held priests, monks, religious officials serving in the church, as
well as ordinary citizens who happened to be there, as hostages and human shields,
and abused holy artifacts (chalices, baptismal fonts, altars, carpets, tapestries). 24
The Moral, Military and Legal Dilemma
Clearly this was not merely a simple combat situation of the use of a municipal or
local holy site for shielding hostile action, or the occupation by enemy forces of a
neighborhood church or mosque (which in itself is no less a violation ofthe laws of
armed conflict). This situation centered within one of the world's major holy sites
revered by over one billion Christians throughout the world, from as far afield as
Italy, Spain, Greece, Russia, Germany, Scandinavia, Central and South America,
the Philippines, South Korea, Ireland, and Africa. The Holy See immediately issued
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stern warnings to Israel to ensure the integrity and holiness of the site. 25 Whether
any admonishment was passed on to the Palestinian authorities for encouraging
and supporting the terrorist overrunning of the site, is unknown.
The moral and tactical dilemma faced by the IDF and the Israeli government
was clear. Both Article 4 of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cul-
tural Property in the Event of an Armed Conflict,26 as well as Article 53 of Addi-
tional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions,27 regarding the protection of cultural
objects and places of worship, prohibit acts of hostility against the historic monu-
ments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual
heritage of peoples, and prohibit the use of such objects in support of the military
effort and as objects ofreprisals. While indeed the immunity ofthe site, as a place of
worship, had been clearly prejudiced and abused, and technically and legally the
circumstances (including the intense publicity worldwide and concomitant psy-
chological warfare) were such that there existed an imperative element of military
necessity as a criterion for active intervention against those who had occupied the
Church, in order to bring the stand-off to an end, could Israel, the lewish State, of
all countries, nevertheless afford to bring upon itself the ire of all of Christendom
by responding to this provocation and undertaking any military action that might
prejudice the status of or damage the Church?
Action by the Israeli Army
Apart from responding to sniper fire emanating from the terrorists using the Church
as cover (sometimes leading to casualties), and pressuring the terrorists through the
withholding of supplies, the matter was handled by negotiation between officers
comprising a special negotiating unit, and a group of priests held hostage within the
Church who negotiated
—
principally by cell phone—on behalf of the terrorists.
Ultimately, after twenty five days, an agreement was negotiated, with assistance
from such foreign actors as the Italian government and the Vatican, whereby the
majority ofthose occupying the Church were able to leave for their homes in the vi-
cinity of Bethlehem, while twenty six were transferred to Gaza and thirteen wanted
men were deported to a number of European countries that undertook to host
them in restrictive conditions.
Additional Examples ofAbuse
While the case studies analyzed above clearly exemplify on a large scale the modus
operandi ofterror organizations in utilizing and abusing accepted civil and human-
itarian norms and institutions, other less grandiose, but no less serious examples of
such abuses abound on a daily basis, all ofwhich involve some manner of element
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shielding and perfidy in violation of, and abuse by, the terrorists of central compo-
nents of international humanitarian law norms and instruments. The use of civil-
ian ambulances for carrying arms and terrorists under recognized humanitarian
emblems; the use of mosques, churches and schools as storage space for weapons and
explosives; travel by wanted terrorists in vehicles accompanied by children and family;
location of offices and headquarters in dense residential areas; and the use of innocent
vehicles to approach and attack roadblocks are illustrative examples.
The techniques developed for rendering the weapons of terrorism more lethal
cynically and blatantly utilize normal civilian objects in order to enhance the extent
ofthe damage caused by a suicide bomber. For instance, sharpened metal shavings,
rusty screws and ball bearings are added to the "concoction" of explosive materials
and placed into the suicide belts in order to increase the damage to internal organs
and to increase infection, germ impregnation and other such inventive and horrific
means—all clearly in violation of basic humanitarian principles.
Legal Dilemma
The irony of the situation is that despite the fact that the accepted rationale of such
terms as "combatant," "legitimate target," "defended locality" and "human
shield," as well as the situation of "military necessity," have become blurred in the
context of a war on terror, the international community is still geared to somewhat
anachronistic conceptions of armed conflict between States, and presumes to
judge those fighting terror by such criteria and standards. Hence, in some cases, re-
action in international fora to actions by Israel and the United States (as well as
others) takes a more critical view of the actions taken against the terrorists, while
overlooking the terrorist acts that have themselves given rise to the need for re-
sponse. This dilemma is compounded by a situation in the various international
political fora in which automatic majority resolutions are adopted condemning
those that fight terror while unwittingly (or deliberately) giving encouragement to
those supporting and perpetrating the terror, instilling them with the confidence
that their actions are indeed achieving their intended political ends.
Conclusion
Clearly, the international community must come to terms with the existence of
modern-day terror and the need to deal with it both militarily and legally. To do so
requires addressing the motivation driving terror—especially the religious, educa-
tional and social element inherent in the vast rate of incitement feeding terror from
the youngest of ages. This might require some reevaluation ofhuman rights concepts
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in the context of dealing with terrorist infrastructures. It also requires addressing the
capability ofterrorists to act, including dealing with those States and organizations that
finance, support, encourage, and glorify terror, and thereby grant the terrorists the
green light to continue with their activities.
Here the international community in its most developed and organized form—the
United Nations and its related organs, as well as the major human rights and interna-
tional humanitarian law bodies
—
political, social, as well as legal—must re-evaluate
the way in which they address the problem. Rather than systematically criticize those
that fight terror through allowing a parliamentary majority to dictate resolutions that
are viewed as encouraging terrorism, this community must tackle that aspect of the
problem and not allow itself to be abused and utilized for furthering terror.
Both from the case studies and situations examined in this article, it is clear that
the international community is presently experiencing a period of acute change
and evolution in what has up to now been accepted morality and behavior in
armed conflict and warfare. The enemy is different—in nature, definition, geogra-
phy, modus operandi, and in terms of morality and responsibility.
In order to be capable of dealing with international terror, and overcoming it,
the civilized world is going to have to adapt legal concepts and modes of behavior
to the exigencies and challenges that modern-day terrorism poses.
Tragically,—so far—this is being achieved by a system of default and trial and
error. Sometimes it works and lives are spared. Sometimes it does not. Practically,
the trial and error is taking on the character ofa new mode ofinternational practice
that is obliging the international community to adjust itself accordingly and to
consider reviewing the old rules with a view to their possible rejuvenation in light
oftoday's terrorism. The question remains ifthe international community is capa-
ble and prepared to take up the challenge.
Time—and terror—will tell.
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XVI
International Humanitarian Law:
Should It Be Reaffirmed,
Clarified or Developed?
Jean-Philippe Lavoyer
1
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to give an overview ofsome concrete problems of ap-
plication of international humanitarian law (IHL) and then to look towards
possible future remedies. This will be done from the practice oriented, operational
perspective of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
The ICRC is mandated by States, in particular through the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols, as well as the Statutes ofthe Interna-
tional Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, to act as promoter and "guardian"
of IHL. This role has many facets. It ranges from the promotion ofIHL treaties, the
monitoring of respect ofIHL by the parties to armed conflicts, the dissemination of
IHL, to preparing developments of IHL. 2
For the ICRC, an institution present in almost all the "hot spots" of the world, the
main challenge is ^vithout any doubt the proper application of IHL in today's armed
conflicts. Extensive research into recent armed conflicts has led the ICRC to conclude
that, on the whole, the existing rules are adequate enough to deal with today's armed
conflicts. While the main problem is therefore not a lack of rules, this does not mean
that the law is perfect. Like any law, IHL is the result of careful and difficult compro-
mises, in this case between considerations ofhumanity, military necessity and the need
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to protect the security of the State. It must be stressed that the ICRC's conclusion on
the adequacy of IHL does not mean that it would in any way ignore the many chal-
lenges with regards to the application of the law, including those relating to the fight
against terrorism, nor the need for IHL to evolve together with the realities of war.
Especially following the attacks of September 1 1, 2001, questions have been
raised about whether IHL was still adequate to respond to today's challenges. The
debate has taken various forms. At the beginning of 2003, the Swiss Government
and the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research orga-
nized an informal expert meeting on contemporary challenges ofIHL for a group
of States and independent experts, as well as the United Nations and the ICRC.
The experts identified a number of topics deserving further examination and
clarification. But at the same time they also strongly reaffirmed the validity of
current humanitarian law and the necessity to apply it. 3 A second meeting was
held in June 2004. 4
The ICRC for its part has taken a number of initiatives that will be mentioned
later in this paper, with a view to reaffirm, clarify or develop IHL.
The first part of this paper will highlight some of the current challenges. It will
address two aspects: first, some important general obligations under IHL will be re-
called, and second, some special challenges linked to the "war on terror" will be
briefly discussed.
Challenges OfA General Nature
The more general challenges facing IHL can be subdivided very roughly according
to the following timeline: obligations in peacetime, obligations during armed con-
flict and obligations after the armed conflict. Even if these different phases will of-
ten overlap, these distinctions provide a useful analytical framework.
Before addressing some concrete obligations, a word should be said about the
importance for States to widely ratify IHL treaties. Indeed, broad ratification of
IHL treaties confirms the validity ofthe rule and, therefore, contributes to improv-
ing compliance. A look at the list of the State parties to the main IHL treaties shows
that there is still a great effort to be undertaken to promote these treaties in order to
obtain—ideally—universal adherence. 5
Obligations in Peacetime
Many States have still not fully incorporated IHL treaties into their domestic law. It
is not sufficient to ratify a treaty; it must also be implemented, i.e., integrated, at the
national level. One particularly important area is the adoption ofdomestic law that
makes it possible to prosecute grave breaches and other serious violations of IHL,
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based on the principle of universal jurisdiction. There is also a need to adequately
protect, inter alia, the red cross and red crescent emblems.
The ICRC's Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, created pur-
suant to a proposal by the 26th International Conference ofthe Red Cross and Red
Crescent in 1995, promotes national implementation and gives technical advice to
States through its legal advisers based in Geneva and in several field delegations.
Practice in the last few years has shown that "National Committees on IHL" are
a very successful tool for the promotion of IHL generally, and for national imple-
mentation measures in particular. There are at present more than 70 such inter-
ministerial committees.
In order to assist States, the ICRC has put many examples ofnational legislation
on its website. 6 In addition, it has recently set up an electronic forum open to na-
tional committees on IHL. Its aim is to facilitate contacts between national com-
mittees and between them and the ICRC. This forum will also allow these
committees to engage in an interactive debate.
Another important obligation even in peacetime is the dissemination and teach-
ing of IHL, especially to the armed forces. It should be acknowledged that in recent
years, States have undertaken increasing efforts in this respect. At the same time, it is
also obvious that much more needs to be done. It is indeed crucial that the principles
and rules of IHL are fully incorporated into military courses and training.
Obligations during Armed Conflict
Ifwe look at the different phases—obligations in peacetime, during armed conflict
and after the conflict is over—it is clearly respect of IHL during armed conflicts
that is the most important challenge. It is on this phase that States should concen-
trate their efforts, whether or not they are involved in an armed conflict.
In this regard, special attention should be drawn to the obligation not only to re-
spect, but also to "ensure respect" for IHL, as stated in Article 1 common to the
1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 1 of 1977 Additional Protocol I. 7 A further
reference should be made to Article 89 of Additional Protocol I. 8
However, the notion of "ensuring respect" is vague and its substantive content
difficult to grasp. This notion definitely needs to be clarified. This issue will be ad-
dressed in more detail in the second part of this paper.
How to apply the law in internal armed conflicts is likely to remain a major chal-
lenge in the future, especially in situations where the conflict is exacerbated by reli-
gious and ethnic components. Furthermore, particular challenges for respect of
IHL are situations where State structures have disintegrated, where chains ofcom-
mand are disrupted, where there is a general breakdown of law and order and
where law in general has ceased to be a relevant reference.
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In the recent past, a new challenge has emerged, a challenge referred to as
"asymmetric warfare," i.e., situations where due to the availability of high technol-
ogy weapons in the hands of one of the parties to an armed conflict, there is a clear
imbalance between the belligerents. This situation tends to force the adversary that
is overwhelmed by the other party to the conflict to use means and methods ofwar-
fare that are prohibited under IHL. The implications of this challenge must still be
fully examined, but it is likely that in future military operations, this imbalance of
power will tend to increase.
Finally, it has to be recognized that all too often, violations ofIHL are not due to
a lack ofknowledge of IHL, but rather to lack of political will to apply that law. The
difficult challenge ahead of us will be how to generate political will among the par-
ties to armed conflicts.
Obligations after the Armed Conflict
The prosecution ofthose suspected to have committed grave breaches ofIHL is es-
sential. It is regrettable that States have only rarely applied the principle of univer-
sal jurisdiction, although it was established through the Geneva Conventions in
1949. 9 In the last ten years, important developments have taken place at the inter-
national level, with the creation of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, of the mixed tribunals for Sierra Leone and Cambodia, as well as of
the International Criminal Court.
As already indicated, the prosecution ofwar crimes at the national level is linked
to the existence of appropriate domestic legislation.
States have additional obligations once the hostilities are over: prisoners ofwar
must be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostili-
ties. 10 Likewise, civilian internees must be released after the close of hostilities and
States shall endeavor to facilitate their repatriation. 11
A Special Challenge: The "War on Terror"
The use of force by groups operating transnationally is certainly another key chal-
lenge. What legal qualification must be given to terrorist acts committed by trans-
national groups on the one hand—and to counter-terrorist activities on the other
hand? Regrettably, this debate has led to some confusion and uncertainty about
IHL. This body of law has been criticized for not being adequate to deal with the
"war on terror." It has to be acknowledged that violent activities by transnational
groups raise many difficult challenges—including in the legal field.
It has been asserted that terrorist attacks—including the attacks of September
11, 2001—as well as counter-terrorist activities were part of a global "armed
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conflict" in the legal sense, an armed conflict that started years ago and that will
continue until the end ofterrorist activities. Such a conclusion would have consid-
erable consequences in practice, especially if it is used to justify that States could
theoretically strike the transnational group at any time and everywhere—without
having to obtain any kind of approval, e.g., from those States on whose territories
the military interventions take place.
This debate has shown that there is all too often confusion between jus in hello
and jws ad helium. This confusion is extremely regrettable, asjt/s in hello (interna-
tional humanitarian law) has to be separated from the question ofthejus ad helium
(use of force). The latter is not regulated by IHL, but by the United Nations Char-
ter. It therefore becomes problematic if the notion of armed conflict—a typical
IHL notion—is employed to justify the use of force. This justification, as well as
brushing aside the traditional law enforcement paradigm, is a risky undertaking
that could adversely affect international relations.
The ICRC has done considerable legal research into the question ofwhether the
"war against terror" should be considered in toto as an armed conflict in the sense
of IHL. For the time being, and based on its long practice of IHL throughout the
world, it feels uncomfortable with the notion that the different attacks and reac-
tions thereto are part of a worldwide armed conflict. The "war on terror" does not
fit well into the existing categories of armed conflict.
First, in the ICRC's view, terrorist and counter-terrorist activities cannot be
viewed as an international armed conflict. Such a conflict can occur only between
States. 12 Second, could the "war on terror" be a non-international armed conflict? 13
This would raise a number of questions—when and where does the conflict take
place? Who are the parties to the conflict? What is the beginning and what is the
end of such conflict? In the view of the ICRC, no satisfactory answers have so far
been given to these and other questions.
One fundamental requirement ofIHL should be recalled here: during an armed
conflict, all the parties to the conflict have the same rights and obligations. To qual-
ify the "war on terror" as an armed conflict would give legitimacy to the transna-
tional groups as a party to the armed conflict, with rights and obligations, an effect
that is probably not intended by States. So far in the debate on the "war on terror,"
those advocating that it represents an armed conflict have indeed given the impres-
sion that this balance no longer exists.
The "war on terror" can very well take the form of an armed conflict in the tradi-
tional IHL sense. The military operations that started in Afghanistan on October 7,
2001 were clearly an international armed conflict, and generally understood to be
causally related to terrorism. Likewise, no one questioned the qualification ofthe more
recent military campaign in Iraq as an international armed conflict, although its
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relationship to terrorism and counter-terrorism has been controversial. In the mean-
time, the armed conflicts both in Afghanistan and Iraq became non-international in
character after the establishment of national authorities.
Terrorism is a complex issue that must be faced with a variety of tools, depending
on the results to be achieved. Experience has shown that armed conflict—and IHL
—
are usually not the best tool to fight terrorism, since force as such will often not lead
to the most adequate solution to the problem. Among the more effective tools are in-
ternational cooperation between States, e.g., sharing of intelligence, police and judi-
cial cooperation, domestic law enforcement, financial investigations and freezing of
assets belonging to terrorist groups, and improved control of arms trade and of the
proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction. Finally, it has to be said that terrorism
is unlikely to disappear if its root causes are not properly addressed.
Terrorist acts are foremost crimes that a series of international conventions
have criminalized. The further development of international law in this field could
be an important contribution to the fight against terrorism.
This question of legal qualification has, of course, implications on the legal sta-
tus ofthose captured during the fight against terrorism. This issue will be dealt with
only very briefly here.
First, there is a presumption of prisoners of war (POW) status for combatants
captured on the battlefield in an international armed conflict. 14 If there is a doubt
about that status, competent tribunals as foreseen in the Third Geneva Convention
should come into action. 15 To make a blanket determination and to disqualify
from the start all captured combatants from POW status raises serious concerns.
Rather, a case-by-case examination must take place if there is a doubt whether a
person is a POW or not. Therefore, it would be logical to have given POW status to
all combatants captured by coalition forces in the war in Afghanistan, 16 unless de-
cided otherwise by competent tribunals.
Such tribunals may have had good reason to recognize POW status for members
of the Taliban armed forces, but the situation may be different for members of al
Qaeda, even though one would have to take into account the factual situation
what was the exact relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban? Could acts of
members of al Qaeda be attributed to the Taliban armed forces? 17
The extent of legal protection to which "unlawful combatants" are entitled has
become an important issue. For the ICRC, IHL provides a comprehensive pro-
tection—a person is protected either by the Third Geneva Convention or by the
Fourth Geneva Convention. And in addition to IHL, international human rights
law and domestic law also provide protection to all those detained. There is no le-
gal vacuum.
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Ifan "unlawful combatant"—or better, "unprivileged belligerent"—is not cov-
ered by the Fourth Geneva Convention (e.g., because of his or her nationality18 ),
there exist additional safeguards, which are common Article 3 to the Geneva Con-
ventions and Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, 19 which is regarded as reflecting
customary law, including by the United States.
One further challenge of the "war on terror" is the question ofhow long "un-
lawful combatants" may be detained. As already indicated above, both the Third
and the Fourth Geneva Conventions contain specific rules about release and re-
patriation. To detain persons that are protected under IHL not just until the end
of hostilities with Afghanistan or with other countries, but until the end of the
"war on terror" (that could easily be many years ahead of us) would certainly
raise serious difficulties.
To come back to the more general question of how to qualify the "war on ter-
ror," it is suggested that IHL applies to terrorism and counter-terrorism when the
level of force used amounts to an armed conflict. This approach limits the scope of
IHL to those situations it has been intended to regulate. Acts of terrorism and the
responses thereto must therefore be qualified on a case-by-case basis.
IHL is well equipped vis-a-vis terrorist activities committed in the context ofan
armed conflict. It prohibits all acts commonly considered as "terrorist." As an ex-
ample, both Additional Protocols of 1977 prohibit "acts or threats of violence the
primary purpose ofwhich is to spread terror among the civilian population."20 IHL
also prohibits attacks against the civilian population, be they direct or indiscrimi-
nate.21 It protects goods that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian popu-
lation (like food, agricultural areas, livestock, drinking water installations,
irrigation works), cultural objects and places of worship, works and installations
containing dangerous forces, as well as the natural environment.22 The taking of
hostages is prohibited.23 Furthermore, persons that find themselves in the hands of
the enemy enjoy special protection. 24
If an attack is carried out by a civilian—who thus becomes an "unlawful com-
batant"—that person loses his/her protected status as a civilian during the time of
the "direct participation" in the hostilities and becomes a legitimate military target.
Also, civilians having participated directly in the hostilities can be punished for
having done so. IHL is by no means an obstacle to justice, as some commentators
have asserted. In fact, quite the opposite is the case.
These are difficult questions, and there is no doubt that more work has to be
done on the different facets ofthe "war on terror." The dialogue must continue. In
the meantime, it is extremely important that persons suspected of having commit-
ted terrorist acts are not denied individual basic rights and due process of law.
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Any development of IHL at present or in the future should build on existing
standards and should not undermine a solid body oflaw that has taken more than a
century to develop.
Having said this, it would seem that the solution to the legal questions around
the "war on terror" has to be looked for not so much within IHL, but rather in the
jus ad helium, as it appears that the fundamental problem is about the recourse to
force. To change the rules in that field would, however, necessitate an amendment
of the UN Charter.
The Future ofInternational Humanitarian Law
The second part of this paper deals with challenges in three very specific ways:
which parts of IHL need to be either reaffirmed, clarified or developed? This is not
supposed to be an exhaustive enumeration, but rather, a suggestion of examples
that could provide a useful basis for discussion.
The Need for Reaffirmation of IHL
Generally speaking, existing IHL needs to be vigorously reaffirmed. As already in-
dicated, IHL is not perfect, but its rules represent a careful balance between mili-
tary imperatives and considerations of humanity. It is of utmost importance to
reaffirm in particular the obligations referred to earlier. However, reaffirmation is
also urgent in some more specific fields that will be enumerated below.
In the ICRC's opinion, it is for example important to strongly reaffirm the
prohibition of use of poisons or infectious disease in armed conflict. This con-
cern is based on the fact that important and rapid advances are taking place in life
sciences and in particular in the field ofbiotechnology. These advances will bene-
fit humanity in several ways, like the production ofnew vaccines, ofnew cures for
diseases or for increasing food production. But at the same time, there is a grow-
ing risk that the same advances could be used for hostile purposes, to poison or
deliberately spread disease. These concerns have increased following the attacks
of September 1 1 , 200 1 and also by the failure of States to strengthen the 1972 Bio-
logical Weapons Convention through the adoption of a compliance monitoring
mechanism. The implication ofthe misuse ofbiotechnology could be devastating
for humanity.
In response to its grave concerns about the capacity of misuse of new advances
in biotechnology and the lack of effective controls at an international level, the
ICRC launched an Appeal called "Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity." The
launch took place in Montreux, Switzerland on September 23, 2002, coinciding
with an informal meeting ofgovernment and independent experts. 25 The Appeal is
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addressed to the political and military authorities, to the scientific and medical
communities, and to the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries.
The Appeal focuses on the risks, rules and responsibilities in relation to ad-
vances in biotechnology being used for poisoning or deliberate spread of disease. It
describes the risks by giving concrete examples, calls for the reaffirmation, imple-
mentation and reinforcement ofthe 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological
Weapons Convention, and calls on governments, the military, the scientific and
medical communities as well as the pharmaceutical and biotechnological indus-
tries to ensure that advances in biotechnology are not diverted for use as weapons
or for other hostile purposes.
In addition, the Appeal calls for a high-level political declaration, to be adopted
at a ministerial level. In January 2004 the ICRC hosted a meeting with States about
beginning a process to explore how the international community could adopt such
a declaration. At the same time the ICRC has started to reach out to the key target
groups, i.e., medical researchers, academic scientists, scientists working in indus-
tries, defense scientists, etc.
Another issue that in the view of the ICRC needs to be reaffirmed is the protec-
tion of cultural property in situations of armed conflict. It is important that States
become party to the relevant instruments, in particular the 1954 Convention and
its 1999 Protocol, which further develops the Convention. Recent conflicts have
shown that the protection of cultural property is crucial in the sense that through
attacking cultural property, the attacker destroys the very heart of a civilization.
Concerning the need to reaffirm the validity of IHL, the 28th International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Conference that took place in Geneva from December 2-6,
2003 was an important opportunity. The International Conference is a unique fo-
rum to discuss humanitarian issues. It meets every four years. The participants are
the States party to the Geneva Conventions, the National Red Cross or Red Cres-
cent Societies, their International Federation and the ICRC.26 This mixture be-
tween States and non-State entities is certainly one of the noteworthy features of
the International Conference.
The International Conference adopts resolutions that are as such not legally
binding. They are nevertheless important documents that are often cited. A good
example are the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Move-
ment that describe the tasks of the components of the Movement. They were
adopted by consensus and have therefore become a very authoritative statement.
IHL is always high on the agenda of the International Conference.
The overall theme of the last International Conference was "Protecting Human
Dignity." It was attended by more than 1,700 delegates from 153 States and 176
National Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies, by the International Federation and
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the ICRC. There were also 64 observers. Never before had their participation been
so important.
The Conference opened with a welcoming ceremony, followed by plenary meet-
ings and meetings in commissions. In parallel, the Drafting Committee met. At the
end of every day, workshops took place that were not part of the official program,
but that allowed informal discussions. The participants also had the possibility to
make individual or collective pledges. More than 360 such pledges were made, thus
reinforcing the impact of the International Conference.
The 27th International Conference in 1999 had adopted a Plan ofAction for the
Years 2000 to 2003. This time, the Conference adopted two important documents:
a Declaration highlighting the continued relevance of IHL and an Agenda for Hu-
manitarian Action. 27
The Declaration with the title "Protecting Human Dignity" is a short text oftwo
and a half pages. It reaffirms forcefully what "protecting human dignity" actually
means. This makes this document so important. The Declaration contains a clear
reaffirmation of States' obligation to respect and ensure respect for humanitarian
law. It calls upon the parties to an armed conflict to make all efforts to reduce inci-
dental, and prevent deliberate injury, death and suffering of civilian populations.
The need to protect women and children is highlighted.
The Declaration recalls that IHL is applicable to all situations of armed conflict
and foreign occupation. It vigorously condemns all acts or threats of violence
aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population. Furthermore, it stresses
that all detainees must be treated with humanity and that all persons alleged to
have committed crimes must be granted due process oflaw and fair trial. The Dec-
laration also firmly states that humanitarian workers must be respected and pro-
tected in all circumstances. Their independence from political and military actors
must be reaffirmed.
Finally, the Declaration commits the participants to reduce the risks and effects
of disasters on vulnerable populations, as well as to reduce their vulnerability to
disease due to stigma and discrimination, particularly that faced by people living
with and affected by HIV/AIDS.
Whereas the Declaration is held in a rather general way, the Agenda for Human-
itarian Action is very focused and deals with concrete issues. It comprises an intro-
duction, 4 General Objectives, 15 Final Goals and 64 Proposed Actions. In this
paper, only highlights of some aspects of IHL will be provided.
The first two General Objectives deal with humanitarian law: the first is about miss-
ing persons, whereas the second deals with weapons.
The title of the first General Objective is "Respect and restore the dignity of per-
sons as a result ofarmed conflicts or other situations ofarmed violence and of their
296
Jean-Philippe Lavoyer
families." This objective is based on the observations and recommendations of an
international conference that the ICRC had organized in Geneva in February 2003.
The Agenda for Humanitarian Action covers a broad range of activities linked to
missing persons, starting with the prevention of persons becoming missing. The
Agenda then recalls that Article 32 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 refers to the
right of families to know the fate of their relatives.
In addition, the following topics are covered by the Agenda: the management of
information and process files on missing persons; the management ofhuman re-
mains and information about the dead; the support of families of missing persons;
and an encouragement of organized armed groups to resolve the problem ofmiss-
ing persons, assist their families and prevent persons from becoming missing.
The title of the second General Objective is "Strengthen the protection of civil-
ians in all situations from the indiscriminate use and effects of weapons and the
protection of combatants from unnecessary suffering and prohibited weapons
through controls on weapons development, proliferation and use." The following
issues are dealt with in this General Objective:
• End the suffering caused by antipersonnel mines. States, in partnership with
the components of the Movement, will provide assistance for the care,
rehabilitation, social and economic reintegration of war wounded, including
mine victims, as well as for mine-awareness and clearance programs. States will
also pursue the ultimate goal of the eventual global elimination of antipersonnel
mines. They are encouraged to consider adhering to the Ottawa Convention.
States party to the Convention should develop in time for the First Review
Conference that will take place in Nairobi, national programs for clearance,
stockpile destruction, mine awareness and victim assistance consistent with the
Convention's deadlines. The Agenda also reaffirms the ICRC's lead role in the
implementation of the Movement Strategy on Landmines. National societies, in
partnership with the ICRC and States, will maintain mine action among their
priorities and develop their capacity in this regard.
• Minimize suffering from weapons that may he extremely injurious or have
indiscriminate effects. The Agenda warmly welcomes the adoption of a new
Protocol on "Explosive Remnants of War" to the 1980 Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons, and encourages States to consider its ratification as soon
as possible. States are encouraged to adhere to the 1980 Convention and to the
extension of the Convention's scope of application to non-international armed
conflict that occurred in 2001. States are also encouraged to consider measures to
minimize the risk of explosive ordnance becoming explosive remnants ofwar and
to reduce the human costs ofmines other than anti-personnel mines. In addition,
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States will rigorously apply the rules on distinction, proportionality and
precautions in attack, in order to minimize civilian deaths and injuries resulting
from certain munitions, including sub-munitions.
• Reduce the human suffering resulting from the uncontrolled availability and
misuse of weapons. States should take concrete steps to strengthen controls on
arms and ammunition. In particular, States should urgently enhance efforts to
prevent the uncontrolled availability and misuse of small arms and light weapons.
They should make respect for humanitarian law one of the fundamental criteria
on which arms transfer decisions are assessed. States, with the support ofthe ICRC
and national societies, should ensure that armed, police and security forces receive
systematic training in international humanitarian law and human rights law, in
particular concerning the responsible use of weapons.
• Protect humanity from poisoning and the deliberate spread of disease. States
party to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention are encouraged to continue
their efforts to reduce the threat posed by biological weapons. They are invited to
work with the ICRC to develop a ministerial-level declaration that would support
efforts within the framework of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, on
preventing the hostile use of biological agents as called for in the ICRC Appeal on
Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity. States are encouraged to consider
becoming party to the 1925 Gas Protocol, the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. They are called upon
to monitor closely advances in the field of the life sciences, taking practical action
to effectively control biological agents that could be put to hostile use, and to
improve international cooperation.
• Ensure the legality ofnew weapons under international law. States are urged to
establish review procedures to determine the legality ofnew weapons, means and
methods ofwarfare in accordance with Article 36 ofAdditional Protocol I of 1977.
Reviews should involve a multidisciplinary approach, including military, legal,
environmental and health-related considerations. States are encouraged to review
with particular scrutiny all new weapons, means and methods of warfare that
cause health effects with which medical personnel are unfamiliar.
The titles of the third and fourth General Objectives are "Minimize the impact
of disasters through implementation of disaster risk reduction measures and im-
proving preparedness and response mechanisms" and "Reduce the increased vul-
nerability to diseases arising from stigma and discrimination and from the lack of
access to comprehensive prevention, care and treatment."
This Agenda for Humanitarian Action is the continuation of the Plan of Action
that was adopted by the 27th International Conference in 1999.
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The ICRC submitted to the 28th International Conference a report "Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts"
containing its analysis of some major challenges in the field of international hu-
manitarian law. 28 This report provides the ICRC's analysis on the following topics:
IHL applicable in international armed conflicts, IHL applicable in non-interna-
tional armed conflicts, IHL and the fight against terrorism, and how to improve
compliance with IHL. Many of the comments made in this paper also appear in
that report.
The Need for Clarification ofIHL
There are a number of domains where there exist rules of great significance, but
that are formulated only in a very general way. This can make it difficult to apply
the rule. There may be cases where the law should be further developed in response
to such situations. However, this may often not be the most appropriate reaction
(risk of difficult and lengthy negotiations, uncertainty about the outcome, possi-
bility that the result undermines existing standards, etc.).
To try to clarify a provision can be more promising, but also raises questions, in
particular concerning the concrete form a clarification should take. In some cases,
clarification could also lead at a later stage to a normative development. Some ex-
amples will be given here, where attempts for clarification are being made.
The basic concepts underlying the rules concerning the conduct of hostilities
—
in particular the rules on targeting—are phrased in a rather general way and tend
to be therefore difficult to apply. The ICRC does not see a need to change the rules,
which have kept their relevance since they were incorporated into the 1977 Addi-
tional Protocols. However, to clarify the provisions about the definition of a "mili-
tary objective," the principle of "proportionality" and the "precautions" to be
taken in an attack would render these rules more operational. 29 Such clarification
would assist the belligerents in their concrete implementation. It would therefore
be very useful if a consensus on the interpretation of these notions could be found.
Particular attention could be given to "high-tech" warfare, as well as asymmetric
warfare. The ICRC plans to conduct consultations in order to clarify if it would be
useful to work on these concepts.
Another example is the notion of "direct participation in hostilities"30 that was
discussed at the beginning of June 2003 in The Hague, during a meeting jointly or-
ganized by the ICRC and the Asser Institute with the participation of renowned
IHL experts. This seminar showed the need for clarification of this important con-
cept—especially having in mind the debate about "unlawful combatants." In 2004
and 2005 the ICRC organized two other expert meetings in The Hague and in
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Geneva with a view to find a shared understanding of "direct participation in hos-
tilities." A further meeting is planned in Geneva later in 2006.
In addition, at the beginning of 2004, the Harvard Program on Humanitarian
Policy and Conflict Research launched an important initiative on "Air and Missile
Warfare." Its aim is to clarify and to restate the applicable law and to draft a manual
similar to the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Con-
flicts at Sea, which was adopted in June 1994. A series of expert meetings were sub-
sequently held in Lucerne, Heidelberg, Oslo, and Brussels between 2004 and 2006.
The ICRC is also promoting and clarifying mechanisms of IHL implementa-
tion. In 2003, it organized five regional expert meetings on how to improve com-
pliance with IHL, with the active participation of government representatives,
academics, National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and other organiza-
tions. These meetings took place in Cairo, Pretoria, Kuala Lumpur, Mexico City
and Bruges between April and September 2003. 31
In particular, the ICRC wanted to make common Article 1 to the Geneva Con-
ventions more operational. What does "ensure respect" mean concretely? What
can be expected from States? The regional expert meetings have generated many
ideas about how to improve compliance with IHL. During these meetings compli-
ance by organized armed groups was also high on the agenda.
The participants in the regional meetings regretted that existing IHL mecha-
nisms suffer from a lack of use. The International Fact-Finding Commission was
considered to have a very promising potential. 32 The participants were, however,
divided on the question of whether new mechanisms should be created, although
some interesting proposals were made (e.g., periodic reporting, individual com-
plaints mechanism, IHL Commission). Participants in all the regional seminars
commended the ICRC for its work, including its multi-faceted role as promoter
and "guardian" of IHL. It was even proposed that the role of the ICRC should be
strengthened, more particularly in non-international armed conflicts.
Concerning common Article 1, the participants in these regional meetings first
acknowledged that there was an obligation not to encourage a party to a conflict to
violate IHL nor to assist in such violations. It was also recognized that States not in-
volved in an armed conflict had a positive obligation to take action—unilaterally or
collectively— against parties to an armed conflict that were committing violations.
This would not entail an obligation to obtain specific results, but rather an obligation
to take all appropriate measures with a view to ending violations. Concrete examples
of possible measures were discussed, such as diplomatic pressure, public denuncia-
tion, renouncing exports of weapons that are or could be used to commit violations
of IHL, sanctions, and coercive measures, including lawful reprisals or acts of
retorsion. 33 The ICRC has continued to work on compliance mechanisms, with an
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emphasis on improving respect for IHL in non-international armed conflicts. It
should also be noted that at the end of 2005, the European Union adopted "Guide-
lines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law," thus translat-
ing the obligation contained in common Article 1 into practice.
Furthermore, the ICRC organized in September 2003—together with the Inter-
national Institute of Humanitarian Law—that year's San Remo Round Table on
the theme: "International Humanitarian Law and Other Legal Regimes: Interplay
in Situations of Violence." This event has helped to clarify which legal regime ap-
plies in a given situation, in particular IHL and human rights law. This question is
particularly relevant with regards to terrorist and counter-terrorist activities.34
In December 2003, the ICRC convened an expert meeting to discuss issues
linked to multinational forces. When does IHL apply to them? Is it the law ofinter-
national armed conflict or internal armed conflicts? Does the law ofoccupation ap-
ply to them? De jure or de facto7.
More generally, the ICRC plans to look into some aspects of the question of oc-
cupation, having in mind, in particular, the recent armed conflicts in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Besides situations of occupation in the traditional sense, there may be a
need to develop a more functional approach in order to ensure the comprehensive
protection ofpersons. The existing rules on occupation are based on effective con-
trol of a territory and on the premise that the occupying power will administer the
territory. However, practice has shown that there can be situations where a bellig-
erent exercises control only to a limited extent or where persons are captured in
territory that is not occupied in the traditional sense.
Future work on clarification ofIHL will benefit from the ICRC study on cus-
tomary IHL. The ICRC was asked to conduct this study by the 26th Interna-
tional Red Cross and Red Crescent Conference in 1995. Work was carried out
by the ICRC's Legal Division and almost 50 national research teams, supervised
by a Steering Group. In addition, government and academic experts of great
reputation have contributed to the study. The study, which has revealed the
great amount of practice in the area of IHL, will be useful inter alia for the
teaching of IHL, the drafting of military manuals, as well as for international
and domestic courts.
The study
—
published in March 2005—will be particularly useful for non-in-
ternational armed conflicts. Maybe the most important result of the study is the
fact that many rules of the 1977 Additional Protocol I relating to the conduct of
hostilities also apply to internal armed conflicts on a customary law basis. Further-
more States not party to certain IHL treaties will be bound by their customary
rules. The ICRC intends to update the study as needed. It is hoped that the study,
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through the clarification and extension of the applicability of IHL rules, will ul-
timately improve the protection of war victims in the field.
Another issue where some clarification is needed in the ICRC's view is related to
chemical weapons. Both the 1925 Gas Protocol and the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention prohibit the use of toxic chemicals, including incapacitating agents.
However, the Chemical Weapons Convention permits the use of chemical agents
for law enforcement. This could lead to the proliferation of incapacitating agents
for law enforcement and could eventually undermine the existing prohibition of
the use of such agents in warfare. It is therefore important that States clarify the
meaning of the Convention's law enforcement exemption.
The important role of national and international tribunals in the interpretation
and clarification of IHL should also be mentioned here.
The Need for Development of IHL
Finally, should IHL be further developed? Should a complete revision of the
Geneva Conventions or their Additional Protocols take place, or should rules be
developed only in certain domains? For its part, the ICRC believes that a complete
overhaul of the basic IHL treaties is neither necessary nor realistic. To open up the
Geneva Conventions could easily mean opening a Pandora's box, with very uncer-
tain results at the end of the day. There would even be a real risk that the existing
standards could be undermined. In any event, it would seem that the current inter-
national climate does not allow major normative developments.
However, the ICRC is ofthe opinion that there is space for developments in cer-
tain specific areas ofIHL. In that respect, it is useful to review briefly some develop-
ments in the last ten years or so. The record is quite impressive when one looks at
the list of adopted treaties, which are testimony of a very dynamic development:
1993 Chemical Weapons Convention
1995 Prohibition of Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol 4 to the 1980 Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW))
1996 Amendment to Protocol II to the CCW
1997 Ottawa Convention prohibiting antipersonnel mines
1998 Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court
1999 Protocol on the protection of cultural property
2000 Optional Protocol strengthening the protection of children in armed conflict
2001 Extension of scope of the CCW to non-international armed conflicts
2003 New protocol to the 1980 Convention on "Explosive Remnants of War"
(Protocol 5).
2005 Protocol on the adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem.
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One very good example of successful work in the field of development ofIHL is
the question of "explosive remnants of war," which are a serious consequence of
modern armed conflict. Explosive remnants of war are the unexploded and aban-
doned ordnance that remain after the end of active hostilities. In September 2000,
the ICRC launched an initiative to reduce the human suffering caused by these
weapons at an expert meeting held in Nyon, Switzerland. 35 Following discussions
at the 2001 Review Conference, States party to the Certain Conventional Weapons
Convention agreed to establish a Group of Governmental Experts to negotiate a
new instrument on explosive remnants of war.
The negotiations came to a fruitful conclusion when the State parties on No-
vember 28, 2003 adopted—by consensus—a "Protocol on Explosive Remnants
of War." 36 This protocol—Protocol 5 to the CCW—is an important develop-
ment ofIHL. It is the first multilateral agreement to address the generic problems
of unexploded or abandoned ordnance. While the existing treaties have focused
on specific weapons, Protocol 5 applies to all explosive ordnance not covered by
earlier instruments.
The new Protocol requires each party to an armed conflict to:
• Clear the explosive remnants of war in territory it controls after the end of
active hostilities.
• Provide technical, material and financial assistance to facilitate the removal
of unexploded or abandoned ordnance in areas it does not control resulting from
its operations. This assistance can be provided directly to the party in control of
the territory or through a third party such as the United Nations,
nongovernmental organizations or other institutions.
• Record information on the explosive ordnance employed by its armed
forces and to share that information with organizations engaged in the clearance
of explosive remnants of war or conducting programs to warn civilians of the
dangers of these devices.
• Provide warnings to civilians of the dangers in specific areas.
• The protocol also creates future meetings of State parties in which States
with explosive remnants of war predating the entry into force of the protocol can
seek and receive assistance to help them address the problem.
The obligations to provide technical and material assistance to facilitate the
clearance of explosive remnants ofwar in territory a party does not control and to
record and share information on the explosive ordnance used during an armed
conflict are of particular importance. Implemented correctly, these obligations can
make an important contribution to the rapid removal of explosive remnants of
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war, the establishment of risk education programs and the provision of warnings
to civilians. The adoption of these rules reflects recognition by the international
community that the parties to an armed conflict cannot ignore the post-conflict ef-
fects of the weapons they use and that they must take measures before, during and
after a conflict to reduce the impact on the civilian population.
The new protocol has, of course, several limitations. Qualifications like
"where feasible" were necessary if an agreement was to be concluded by consen-
sus. These qualifications are in part compensated by the protocol's vast scope of
application.
In addition to concluding the new protocol, State parties agreed that the Group of
Governmental Experts would continue its work on anti-vehicle mines and cluster
sub-munitions in 2004. Work on these issues was indeed conducted in the following
years, so far without tangible results.
Concerning cluster bombs and other sub-munitions areas of work included
technical features to prevent these weapons from becoming explosive remnants of
war, as well as proposals to strengthen the regulations on their use in armed con-
flict, such as the ICRC proposal for a prohibition on the use of sub-munitions
against any military objective located in a civilian area. Such a rule would
strengthen the restrictions on targeting contained in 1977 Additional Protocol I. 37
The Group of Governmental Experts met regularly in Geneva during 2004,
2005, and 2006. The Review Conference of the CCW will take place at the end of
2006 and will be an important point in time to assess the whole CCW process and
lay the ground for future work.
One area that would certainly need further analysis with a view to possible de-
velopment are the rules that apply in non-international armed conflicts. Those
rules are quite rudimentary, at least in treaty form. To put it in a provocative way:
has the time come to have a fresh look at the feasibility of a normative develop-
ment? Such a development would at last narrow down the differences between
the law of international and of non-international armed conflict. What was im-
possible in 1977, would it be possible today? Can the study on customary IHL
give some momentum to such an idea? The ICRC for its part has not planned any
initiative going into that direction. However, if the general mood were favorable
to a normative development, the ICRC would be pleased to carry the idea for-
ward, together with governmental and other experts. In the past, the ICRC has
actively contributed to the development of IHL by organizing expert meetings
and submitting draft proposals.
The extension of the scope of application of the CCW to non-international
armed conflicts in 2001 was relatively easy. A few years before that, the Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court also contributed to narrowing the
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difference in treatment between international and internal armed conflicts. These
examples seem to indicate that today's atmosphere is quite different from the one
that prevailed during the diplomatic conference from 1974 to 1977 that adopted
the 1977 Additional Protocols.
One particular issue that the ICRC has been discussing during its regional expert
meetings is whether organized armed groups could be given incentives to respect
IHL.38 Could this aspect be included in the discussion ofa possible new instrument?
Speaking about non-international armed conflicts, the issue of missing persons
should be briefly mentioned. If a new instrument was to be developed on internal
conflicts, it would be important to include rules related to missing persons—or
rather rules that could help prevent persons from becoming missing. 39 Indeed,
many of the existing rules apply formally only in international armed conflicts.
Finally, how not to mention the adoption, in December 2005, of a new Third
Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions creating a new distinctive emblem,
the "Red Crystal?" This emblem will be at the disposal of those States and national
societies that have difficulties with the present red cross or red crescent emblems.
The adoption of the additional emblem was the culmination of a long process
that started more than ten years ago. In 2000 a draft protocol was elaborated, but
due to the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, its adoption had to be
postponed. The 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
in December 2003 adopted an important resolution on this question, following the
commitment of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to
achieve, with the support of States, a comprehensive and lasting solution to the
question of the emblem. The resolution also requested the Standing Commission
to continue to give high priority to securing, as soon as circumstances permit, a
comprehensive and lasting solution. The Standing Commission set up a Working
Group to continue work on the emblem issue.
Early in 2005 Switzerland, as depository ofthe Geneva Conventions and oftheir
Additional Protocols, initiated new consultations. Since they turned out to be posi-
tive, Switzerland convened an informal meeting in Geneva on September 12 and
13, 2005 and later on sent out invitations for a Diplomatic Conference, which took
place in Geneva from December 5 to 8, 2005. The Diplomatic Conference adopted
the text of the Third Additional Protocol that had been drafted in 2000.
The adoption of the additional emblem was facilitated by the conclusion, on
November 28, 2005, of a Memorandum of Understanding signed between the
Magen David Adorn in Israel and the Palestine Red Crescent Society. This Memo-
randum was signed "in en effort to facilitate the adoption ofa Third Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to pave the way for the membership
of both societies in the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement."
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On the same day, the two societies also concluded an operational agreement.
This second agreement aims at enhancing their cooperation when carrying out
their humanitarian mandate. It should be noted that these two agreements were
also signed by the Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the ICRC, the In-
ternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the Standing
Commission.
It should be made clear that the additional emblem does not in any way replace
the existing emblems. Most importantly it does not have any religious, political,
ethnic, cultural, or other connotations. It is also recognizable at a distance, as was
shown during visibility tests conducted by Switzerland. The new Protocol stipu-
lates that all distinctive emblems shall enjoy the same legal status.
The new emblem does so far not have an official name, but the name "Red Crys-
tal" has been proposed and has received considerable support. This name should
be made official in the course of this year. There is no doubt that the additional em-
blem will promote unity and universality within the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement.
Conclusion
Existing IHL on the whole adequately responds to the challenges ofprotection gen-
erated by today's armed conflicts. It represents a careful balance between military
imperatives and the protection of human dignity. It is therefore important to vig-
orously reaffirm the existing principles and rules of IHL, in peacetime, during
armed conflict and after the armed conflict is over.
However, it is at the same time necessary to work on the clarification of certain
concepts and provisions in order to make them workable in practice. There are also
specific domains where it is desirable that the law be developed, as has already oc-
curred in several respects in the past few years. When developing the law, great care
should be taken not to weaken existing standards of protection.
The "war on terror" represents a particularly difficult challenge. Terrorism is a
complex issue where IHL can only play a limited role. Other tools like domestic law
enforcement and cooperation between States are usually much better suited to
reach the desired results. It must be determined which law applies in a given situa-
tion. IHL applies when the fight against terrorism amounts to an armed conflict.
IHL itself clearly prohibits acts of terrorism when committed during an armed
conflict. Those committing violations of IHL must be punished. "Unlawful com-
batants" enjoy the protection of IHL, even though they can be punished for the
mere participation in the hostilities. Persons in the hands of the adversary must be
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treated humanely, which includes due process oflaw, and benefit from the univer-
sally recognized judicial guarantees.
Finally, a clear distinction must be made between jus ad helium and jus in hello.
To develop the former—through an amendment ofthe UN Charter—could repre-
sent an important contribution to the fight against terrorism. This would help
avoid invoking IHL to justify the use of force.
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XVII
Enforcing the Law
John F. Murphy1
The focus of this panel, as well as that ofmost panels in this conference, is on
the jus in bello, the law regulating the way armed force is applied. It is per-
haps worth noting parenthetically, however, that participants at the Dumbarton
Oaks and San Francisco conferences determined that, unlike the Covenant of the
League of Nations, the United Nations Charter should outlaw war. 2 As the major
hostilities phase of the conflict in Iraq dramatically demonstrates, we are a long
way from achieving the goal of the founders of the United Nations. Indeed, it is
highly unlikely that we shall ever reach the goal ofoutlawing armed conflict. None-
theless, as recent events also demonstrate, there is an overriding need for people of
good will to recommit themselves to the pursuit of this goal.
During this conference most of the discussion and debate has revolved around
four international armed conflicts of the 1990s and the early 2000s: the Gulf War,
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. But it is important to remember that international
armed conflict is not the primary kind of armed conflict today, but rather it is in-
ternal or civil wars. In the main, these wars are being fought with no concern for the
jus in bello and are largely ignored by the great powers. This is especially the case in
Africa. A major reason for the failure to deal effectively with these wars is lack of
political will. But it appears clear as well that the jus in bello applicable to internal
wars—Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol II—is
inadequate; yet efforts to improve this law are strongly resisted.
Enforcing the Law
Jean-Philippe Lavoyer suggests in his paper that the jus in hello we currently
have is not the major problem but the failure to implement it in good faith. This
seems clear, but as the debates at this conference have clearly shown, there are at
the least major differences as to interpretation ofthe existing rules, even among the
leading experts of Western developed States, much less on a worldwide basis.
Ideally these ambiguities would be resolved by international negotiations to revise
the existing law. However, as Dr. Lavoyer also notes in his paper, the risk of this
route is that it might open Pandora's box and result in a much less rather than a
more satisfactoryjus in hello. This is also a problem with the jws ad helium, the law
of resort to the use of force, and efforts to revise the UN Charter. There are now 191
member States ofthe United Nations, and more and more ofthem, especially those
from the so-called "third-world," are demanding to be heard. 3
Under a rule of law paradigm,4 courts would play a major role in resolving am-
biguities in the law of armed conflict and in prosecuting and punishing the perpe-
trators of war crimes. 5 Courts have usually not played such a role, but this may be
changing. As Ambassador Alan Baker reported in his presentation, Israel's applica-
tion and enforcement of the law of armed conflict is supervised by its supreme
court. In his presentation, Colonel Charles Garraway noted that, especially in Eu-
rope, there is an overlap between international human rights law and the law of
armed conflict. This overlap was dramatically demonstrated by the claim brought
before the European Court of Human Rights by several Yugoslav nationals that
various North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries had violated the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Conven-
tion) by their 1999 intervention in Kosovo. The European Court never reached the
merits of the challenge because it decided that the applicants did not come within
the jurisdiction of the respondent States for purposes of Article 1 of the European
Convention, which provides: "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to ev-
eryone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of
this Convention."6 Nonetheless, the stage had been set for possible future chal-
lenges to the use ofarmed force based on international human rights law. As sug-
gested by Colonel Garraway, at the least, there would seem to be considerable
need to ensure that international human rights law and the law ofarmed conflict
are compatible.
At this writing there are in existence three international criminal tribunals: the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal
Court (ICC). Although both the ICTY and the ICTR have had their share of criti-
cism, it is generally agreed that the two tribunals, especially the ICTY, have played a
significant role in interpreting and applying the law of armed conflict. Moreover,
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while the International Criminal Court has not yet started any proceedings, it may
well do likewise, especially with respect to the jus in hello of internal wars. Accord-
ing to media reports, the ICC's first cases are likely to arise from situations in the
Congo and other conflicts in Africa.
Also, as Professor Adam Roberts suggested during this conference, the ICC may
stimulate national law enforcement authorities and courts to do a better job of en-
forcing the law ofarmed conflict. The failure to prosecute such crimes as genocide,
war crimes and crimes against humanity at the national level has often been cited as
a primary reason for establishing the International Criminal Court.
Belgium has recently learned how difficult it can be for a national legal system to
prosecute these crimes. Belgium had legislation7 so wide-ranging in scope that it
resulted in Belgian courts being flooded with cases based on universal jurisdiction
and the Belgian government being involved in heated international controversies.
One of these controversies, over a Belgian arrest warrant issued for the foreign
minister ofthe Congo, resulted in a ruling by the International Court ofJustice that
Belgium had violated international law because the foreign minister enjoyed im-
munity from judicial process. 8 As a result ofthis ruling, Belgium had to drop prose-
cutions of officials such as Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who had been the
object of a criminal complaint for war crimes filed by survivors ofthe 1982 massa-
cres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut, Lebanon. In the Sharon case,
however, Belgium's highest court ruled that Sharon could be tried for war crimes
after he leaves office and that his co-defendant, Amos Yaron, the former Israeli
Army chief of staff, could be tried before Belgian courts. 9 Later, as the US war in
Iraq was getting under way, representatives of seven Iraqi families who claimed
they had lost loved ones in the 1991 Gulf War, filed a criminal complaint naming
former US President George H.W. Bush, as well as Secretary of State Colin Powell
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1991), Vice-President Dick Cheney (Sec-
retary of Defense in 1991) and Norman Schwarzkopf, the general in charge of US
forces during Operation Desert Storm. 10 This apparently was the last straw, and re-
sulted in such strong protest from the United States that Belgium modified its leg-
islation to allow cases to be brought only ifthe victim or suspect is a Belgian citizen
or long-term resident at the time ofthe alleged crime. The revised law also guaran-
tees diplomatic immunity for world leaders and other government officials visiting
Belgium. 11
Recently, an important alternative to prosecution before an international crimi-
nal tribunal or a national court has begun to emerge, the so-called "hybrid court."
In Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, the United Nations has established hy-
brid courts, consisting of international and national elements, to prosecute atroci-
ties committed in these regions. Also, on May 13, 2003, after long and tortuous
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negotiations, the UN General Assembly approved an agreement with the govern-
ment of Cambodia to establish a hybrid court to prosecute some of the perpetra-
tors ofthe crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge during the mid-to-late 1970s. 12
Although these hybrid courts have taken a variety offorms, perhaps the archetype
is the hybrid court for Sierra Leone. 13 Under the court's statute, there is a three judge
trial chamber and a five judge appellate chamber. The government of Sierra Leone
appoints one judge to the trial chamber and the UN secretary-general appoints two.
The appellate chamber has two judges picked by the government of Sierra Leone and
three selected by the secretary-general. Further, after consultation with the govern-
ment of Sierra Leone, the secretary-general appoints the prosecutor and registrar.
The court has jurisdiction over serious violations of the law ofarmed conflict as well
as certain crimes committed since November 30, 1996 under the national law of Si-
erra Leone. The judges of the court as well as its prosecutor (an American national)
and its registrar (a British national) have been selected, and accused persons have
been brought before the court. The court has also indicted Charles Taylor, at the time
the president of Liberia but now enjoying asylum in Nigeria.
The arrangements for the hybrid court for Cambodia contrast sharply with
those for Sierra Leone and reflect five years of difficult negotiations between the
United Nations and the Cambodian government. Under the agreement approved
by the General Assembly in May 2003, Extraordinary Chambers will be established
in Cambodian courts under Cambodian law but will have subject matter jurisdic-
tion over several offenses defined under international law as well as certain offenses
proscribed by Cambodian law when committed between April 16, 1975 and Janu-
ary 6, 1 979. In the two-tier system ofthe Extraordinary Chambers, a majority ofthe
judges must be Cambodian while the remaining judges are to be appointed by the
Cambodian government based upon nominations by the Secretary-General. The
vote of at least one UN-nominated judge is required for a judgment of guilt. 14 It re-
mains to be seen whether these arrangements will be both effective and just.
The hybrid courts in Kosovo and East Timor present still another model of ad-
judication. Under a UN Security Council resolution adopted at the conclusion of
the 1999 conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Yugosla-
via, 15 Kosovo has been governed by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK), and this arrangement will continue until Kosovo's final status is deter-
mined. As the interim authority, UNMIK has established local courts that prose-
cute both ordinary offenses and certain violations of the law of armed conflict.
Foreign lawyers have been appointed as prosecutors, and a majority of the judges
are foreign nationals.
Shortly after the people of East Timor voted for independence from Indone-
sia in August 1999, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East
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Timor (UNTAET) began its administration of East Timor, which lasted until
the territory became an independent State on May 20, 2002. 16 During this time
UNTAET established a hybrid court system in East Timor. An UNTAET regula-
tion adopted in March 2000 created special panels of the District Court of Dili
(the capital of East Timor) and granted them exclusive jurisdiction over three
international crimes
—
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity—as
well as crimes of torture, murder, and crimes of sexual violence when commit-
ted between January 1, 1999 and October 25, 1999. In 2001 ten defendants were
convicted of crimes against humanity.
After its independence, the United Nations established a Mission of Support in
East Timor (UNMISET) to assist the new nation for two years. As UNTAET had
previously, UNMISET administered the Serious Crimes Unit of the East Timorese
judicial system.
In the aftermath ofthe US-led forces' attack on Iraq, there has been substantial
debate about how to bring to justice, to the extent possible, the 55 most-wanted,
as well as other high ranking officials, of the Saddam Hussein regime. The US
government has expressed its preference for prosecutions in reconstituted Iraqi
courts, operating with foreign assistance. 17 Many commentators, including lead-
ing human rights organizations, have called for the establishment of either an in-
ternational or hybrid court established under UN auspices, arguing that, after
decades of subservience to Ba'ath Party rule, Iraqi courts are not capable of dis-
pensing impartial justice. 18 Other commentators, including this writer, have sup-
ported the US position on the ground, among others, that the creation of an
impartial and professionally competent judiciary in Iraq is not a mission impos-
sible and that, in any event, the ultimate decision on the kind oftribunal or tribu-
nals to try the leaders of the Hussein regime should be made by the new
government of Iraq. 19 As of this writing no final decision has been made on this
issue. The US government has indicated that it plans to prosecute Iraqis in US
military tribunals for war crimes committed against US forces during the 2003
Iraq war, and perhaps also for war crimes against Americans committed during
the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
A primary issue arising out ofthe "war on terrorism" is the appropriate legal re-
gime to apply to efforts to control terrorism after the horrific events of September
11, 2001. Prior to September 1 1 international terrorism had been treated primarily
as a criminal law matter. Under this regime the perpetrators of terrorist crimes
were prosecuted as common criminals in the civilian courts. After September 1
1
the situation is much less clear, as the debate over the proposed use of military
commissions for prosecuting Taliban and Al Qaeda members detained at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba demonstrates. The case against Zacarias Moussaoui, a
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confessed member of al Qaeda and the only person so far charged in a US court
with conspiring in the terrorist attacks of September 11, is especially salient. Be-
cause the US government refused to allow Moussaoui to interview captured mem-
bers of al Qaeda who might provide useful information for his defense on the
ground that it would endanger national security, a federal district court judge has
ruled that the government cannot seek the death penalty against him and that
prosecutors would be barred at trial from trying to link him in any way to the Sep-
tember 1 1 attacks. Although the government has appealed this ruling, there is spec-
ulation at this writing that, if it loses the appeal, the government may transfer
Moussaoui to a military commission, possibly at the US military base in
Guantanamo Bay. 20
Should such a transfer occur, it would likely be met with a firestorm of protest,
"given the obvious implication that civilian courts—because of the procedural
rights they provide to criminal defendants—are no longer capable of dealing with
defendants accused of terrorism." 21
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XVIII
Protection of Cultural Property:
The Legal Aspects
Jan Hladfk
1
Dr. Jean-Philippe Lavoyer's paper, Should International Humanitarian Law
be Reaffirmed, Clarified or Developed?,2 provides an excellent overview of
international humanitarian law and touches briefly on the need for the protection
of cultural property during armed conflict.
The principal law of war treaty provisions protecting cultural property are
found in the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection ofCultural Property in the
Event ofArmed Conflict (Hague Convention) 3 ; its First Protocol,4 also adopted in
1954; and its Second Protocol of 1999. 5 The following substantive areas of the
Hague Convention and the Second Protocol are, in my view, those that have the
primary impact on the conduct of military operations:
• Safeguarding of cultural property (Article 3 of the Hague Convention and
Article 5 of the Second Protocol);
• Respect for cultural property (Article 4 of the Hague Convention and
Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Second Protocol);
• Military measures (Articles 7 and 25 of the Hague Convention);
• Protection of cultural property in occupied territory (Article 5 of the Hague
Convention and Article 9 of the Second Protocol);
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• Special protection under the Hague Convention and enhanced protection
under the Second Protocol (essentially Chapter II of the Hague Convention and
Chapter 3 of the Second Protocol); and
• Sanctions (Article 28 of the Hague Convention and Chapter 4 of the
Second Protocol).
Safeguarding of Cultural Property
Under Article 3, States party to the Hague Convention are to undertake the safe-
guarding of cultural property through the taking ofappropriate measures in peace-
time against the foreseeable effect of armed conflict. Such measures only address
property situated in the territory of the State concerned. The Convention does not
define the nature or scope of the measures; it leaves those questions to the discre-
tion of the State in question. This omission is remedied by Article 5 of the Second
Protocol, which provides for the following preparatory peacetime measures: the
preparation of inventories, the planning of emergency measures for protection
against fire or structural collapse, the preparation for the removal of movable cul-
tural property or the provision for adequate in situ protection of such property,
and the designation of competent authorities responsible for the safeguarding of
cultural property. It should be stressed that the safeguarding measures may prove
helpful not only in case ofarmed conflict but also in the event of natural disaster or
as a highly effective weapon against theft.
Respectfor Cultural Property
Article 4 ofthe Convention provides for respect for cultural property. Such respect
consists in two mutually corresponding obligations of State parties: ( 1 ) to refrain
from the use of cultural property and its immediate surroundings or of the appli-
ances for its protection, situated both within their own territories as well as within
the territory of other State parties, for purposes likely to expose it to destruction or
damage in the event of armed conflict; and (2) to refrain from any act of hostility
directed against such property.6
The next paragraph of Article 4 introduces a very important exception to this
rule —the waiver of these obligations when required by military necessity. 7 This
waiver is referred to in Article 4.2, which is applicable to generally protected cul-
tural property as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. It permits a waiver only
where required by "imperative military necessity." Withdrawal of immunity is ad-
dressed in Article 1 1.2 for cultural property under special protection (a subject to
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which I will return). Such withdrawal is permitted only in "exceptional cases ofun-
avoidable military necessity."
Article 4.2 of the Convention permits the State parties to use cultural property
and its immediate surroundings or ofthe appliances in use for its protection, situ-
ated within their own territory as well as within the territory ofother States parties,
for military purposes and to conduct hostilities against such property "where mili-
tary necessity imperatively requires such a waiver." The concept of "unavoidable
military necessity" in Article 11.2 has stricter conditions for its application to cul-
tural property under special protection. In particular, the immunity may be with-
drawn "only for such time as that necessity continues." Article 11.2 further
provides that "Such necessity can be established only by the officer commanding a
force the equivalent ofa division in size or larger." Finally, whenever circumstances
permit, an advance warning is to be provided to the opposing party a reasonable
time in advance of the withdrawal of immunity.
Regrettably, the lack of a universally accepted definition of military necessity
leaves room for a loose interpretation ofthese provisions or even their abuse. Three
interesting definitions illustrate this issue. The first is from the Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis
Lieber. Known as the Lieber Code, they were promulgated as General Orders No.
100 by President Lincoln on April 24, 1863. They provide, in part, as follows:
Article 14. Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in
the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the
war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages ofwar.
Article 15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed
enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the
armed contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of every armed enemy, and every
enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of peculiar danger to the captor; it
allows of all destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of
traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life
from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy's country affords
necessary for the subsistence and safety ofthe army, and of such deception as does not
involve the breaking of good faith either positively pledged, regarding agreements
entered into during the war, or supposed by the modern law ofwar to exist. Men who
take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be
moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.
Article 16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty - that is, the infliction of
suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except
in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does not admit of the use of poison in
any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a district. It admits of deception, but
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disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity does not include any act of
hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessary difficult."8
The second definition comes from Morris Greenspan who defined military ne-
cessity as "the right to apply that amount and kind of force which is necessary to
compel the submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time,
life and money." 9 Finally, Black's Law Dictionary states that military necessity is
'[a] principle of warfare that permits enough coercive force to achieve a desired
end, as long as the force used is not more than is called for by the situation." 10
Black's provides a background reference to the 1907 Hague Convention on Laws
and Customs of War.
It is important to point out that military commanders were aware of this ambi-
guity and in this connection General Eisenhower's order of December 24, 1943
stated: "Nothing can stand against the argument of military necessity. This is an ac-
cepted principle. The phrase 'military necessity' is sometimes used where it would
be more truthful to speak of military convenience or even ofpersonal convenience.
I do not want it to cloak slackness or indifference." 11 For this reason, the Second
Protocol amplifies the provisions regarding military necessity as it relates to both
cultural property under general protection and that under enhanced protection.
What are the main substantive issues contained in the new definition of military
necessity in the Second Protocol? In my opinion, Article 6 includes two new ele-
ments: first, a waiver of the respect obligation on the basis of imperative military
necessity when cultural property has now been transformed, because of the man-
ner in which it is being used, into a military objective (Article 6(a) (i)); and second,
tightening the circumstances under which the obligation not to use cultural prop-
erty for purposes likely to expose it to destruction or damage (Article 6(b)) may be
waived. The first provision concerns the attacker, while the second applies to the
defender. In addition, Article 6(a)(i), which is based on Article 52.
2
12 of the 1977
Additional Protocol I on the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, thus makes a nexus between the
Second Protocol and the definition of military objective under Protocol I. Article
13, which de facto develops the definition of "unavoidable military necessity" un-
der Article 1 1.2 of the Convention, brings in two new elements: the decision to at-
tack must be ordered at the highest operational level of command and the
obligation to provide advance warning. It is necessary to point out that to effec-
tively implement these abstract definitions they must be further clarified in mili-
tary manuals and rules of engagement and must be interpreted in good faith.
To conclude on the issue of military necessity, let me quote Burrus M.
Carnahan, an acknowledged expert in the law of armed conflict:
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Today, military necessity is widely regarded as something that must be overcome or
ignored if international humanitarian law is to develop, and its original role as a limit
on military action has been forgotten. As a result, the principle has not been applied in
new situations where it could serve as a significant legal restraint until more specific
treaty rules or customs are established. 13
Article 4.3 of the Convention introduces the obligations to prohibit, prevent and
put a stop to theft, pillage, misappropriation of, and acts of vandalism against cul-
tural property. State parties are also required to refrain from requisitioning cultural
property located in the territory of another party (Article 4.3) and from making cul-
tural property the object ofreprisals (Article 4.4). The prohibition ofreprisals against
historic monuments, works of art or places of worship constituting the cultural or
spiritual heritage ofpeoples is reiterated in Article 53(c) ofAdditional Protocol I. The
waiver of military necessity is not applicable to those obligations.
Articles 7 and 8 of the Second Protocol provide for precautions in attack and
precautions against the effects of hostilities, respectively. Article 7 imposes a num-
ber of obligations on a military commander, such as verifying that objectives to be
attacked are not cultural property, selecting means and methods of attack that
avoid or minimize incidental damage, abstaining from attacks that cause excessive
incidental damage, and cancelling or suspending attacks if the objective is cultural
property or the attack may cause excessive incidental damage to cultural property.
The first two obligations require the military commander to do everything that is
feasible, in other words what is in his/her power, to fulfill those requirements. As to
the Article 8 precautions against the effects of hostilities, State parties must, to the
maximum extent feasible, remove movable cultural property from the vicinity of
military objectives or provide for adequate in situ protection, and avoid locating
military objectives near cultural property. Attention should be again drawn to the
word "feasible." The implementation ofthis obligation will depend on a number of
factors such as the density of the population, the location of armament industries
or economic potential ofthe State concerned. Finally, it should be stressed that Ar-
ticles 7 and 8 mirror Article 57 (Precautions in attack) and Article 58 (Precautions
against the effects of attack) ofAdditional Protocol I, thus ensuring cohesion in the
implementation of both the Second Protocol and the Additional Protocol.
Military Measures
Military measures are mainly embodied in Articles 7 and 25 of the Convention.
These, to a certain extent, complement each other. Article 7 provides for two prin-
cipal categories of State party obligations: (1) introduction in peacetime into their
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military regulations or instructions of provisions ensuring observance of the Con-
vention and fostering in their military personnel respect for the culture and cul-
tural property of all peoples; and (2) the establishment, again in peacetime, of
services or specialist personnel whose purpose is to secure respect for cultural
property and to cooperate with the civilian authorities who are responsible for its
safeguarding. In addition, Article 30.3(a) of the Second Protocol expressly obli-
gates States to incorporate guidelines and instructions on the protection of cultural
property into their military regulations.
To facilitate the dissemination of the Second Protocol within the armed forces,
the UNESCO Secretariat has prepared a series of inserts 14 for training military per-
sonnel on the Protocol's obligations. The main insert contains a detailed discussion
of the Protocol's provisions. Other inserts provide a list of possible instructor ques-
tions for those providing training to officers and soldiers' rules for the training ofen-
listed members of armed forces. It is up to each State's armed forces to adapt the
inserts to its military traditions, military doctrine and training methods.
Protection of Cultural Property in Occupied Territory
The 1954 Convention requires the occupying State to take the "most necessary mea-
sures" to preserve cultural property damaged by military operations that is situated
in the occupied territory if the competent national authorities of the occupied State
are unable to do so (Article 5.2). This Article's obligations are complemented by Ar-
ticle 9 of the Second Protocol requiring the occupying Party to prohibit and prevent:
( 1
)
any illicit export or other removal or transfer of ownership of cultural property;
(2) any archaeological excavation, except when strictly required to safeguard, record
or preserve cultural property; and (3) any alteration to, or change of use of, cultural
property which is intended to conceal or destroy cultural, historical or scientific evi-
dence. Furthermore, no archaeological excavation of, alteration to, or change of use
of cultural property in occupied territory may be carried out without close coopera-
tion with the competent national authorities of the occupied territory, unless cir-
cumstances do not permit such cooperation.
Finally, it should be stressed that the 1954 Protocol, a complementary instru-
ment to the original Hague Convention, prohibits the export of cultural property
from occupied territory. If export does occur, it requires each State party to return
such property that is located within its territory to the competent authorities of the
territory from which it was illicitly exported. This is to occur when hostilities have
ended. The 1954 Protocol also expressly forbids the appropriation of cultural
property as war reparations. This provision is of fundamental importance because
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of its clear recognition that the unique nature of cultural objects makes them inap-
propriate subjects ofwar reparations.
Special Protection under the Hague Convention
and Enhanced Protection under the Second Protocol
It should be noted that in addition to general protection 15 under Chapter I of
the Hague Convention, Article 8.1 provides that special protection may be
granted to three categories of property: (a) refuges intended to shelter movable
cultural property in the event of armed conflict; (b) centers containing monu-
ments; and (c) other immovable cultural property of very great importance.
Unlike the general protection which is attributed to all categories of cultural
property, the granting of special protection is not automatic. The Convention
subjects the granting of such protection essentially to two conditions: (1) the
cultural property in question must be situated at an adequate distance from a de
facto military objective; and (2) such property must not be used for military
purposes.
What is "an adequate distance?" The phrase is not defined by the Conven-
tion and is, therefore, left to the discretion of each State party to the Conven-
tion. Its definition will obviously depend on a number of factors, such as the
presence of military units or armament industry or requirements of national
self-defense. The only exception to the requirement of the adequate distance is
found in Article 8.5. Under that provision, if the cultural property is situated in
the proximity of an important military objective, the special protection maybe
nevertheless granted if the State concerned undertakes not to use this military
objective in the event of armed conflict. Finally, special protection is granted
upon request by the State where the cultural property concerned is situated.
Cultural property under special protection is listed in the "International
Register of Cultural Property under Special Protection," a registry maintained
by the Director-General of UNESCO. At present, cultural property in three
States (Germany, the Holy See, and the Netherlands) is entered in the Register.
The total property protected is four refuges for movable cultural property and
the whole of the Vatican City State. Two States (Austria and the Netherlands)
submitted registration requests but later withdrew them. Since only three
States have placed five sites under special protection and the last entry in the
Register took place in 1978, clearly the concept of special protection has never
fully developed its potential.
Why have the vast majority of States abstained from placing their cultural sites
under special protection? There may be several reasons. In particular, the
325
Protection of Cultural Property: The Legal Aspects
impossibility ofcomplying with the condition ofadequate distance from a large in-
dustrial center or military objective for densely-populated countries; technical dif-
ficulties in submitting nominations; or the fear ofdesignating cultural property for
special protection because of possible terrorist attacks; or, in fact, providing an
eventual adversary with a ready made "hit-list."
Because the special protection provisions ofthe Hague Convention had failed to
gain widespread usage, the Second Protocol in Chapter 3 establishes a new concept
of "enhanced protection" that combines aspects of special protection from the
Hague Convention and the criteria for listing of cultural property in the World
Heritage List under the 1972 UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. 16 Under the new concept of enhanced
protection, three conditions are to be met: the cultural property in question must
be of the greatest importance for humanity; it must be protected by adequate do-
mestic legal and administrative measures that recognize its exceptional cultural
and historic value; and it may not be used for military purposes or to shield military
sites. A declaration to this latter end must be provided. Enhanced protection is
granted by entering the property in the List of Cultural Property under Enhanced
Protection provided for by Article 27.1(b).
The granting of enhanced protection is accorded by a twelve-member inter-
governmental Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict. As in the case of special protection, objections to the granting of
enhanced protection are permitted but they must be based only on the failure to
meet one or more of the three criteria described above. This prevents States who
are party to the Second Protocol from making objections based purely on politi-
cal animosity or mutual non-recognition, thus avoiding cases such as that of
Cambodia, which in 1972 requested the entry of several sites in the Register. Be-
cause of the objections filed by four States who did not recognize the Govern-
ment of Cambodia at that time, the entry was not made. Finally, unlike the
granting of special protection which requires no objection from any other state
party to the Hague Convention, enhanced protection may be granted by a major-
ity of four-fifths of the above Committee. 17
Sanctions
Article 28 ofthe 1954 Convention imposes an obligation on States to prosecute and
punish those persons (regardless of their nationality) who commit breaches or or-
der the commission ofbreaches ofthe Convention. The deficiency of this provision
is its general character—Article 28 does not contain a list ofcrimes or offenses to be
sanctioned nor does it sets forth the procedural aspects of sanctions.
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This deficiency is addressed in Chapter 4 of the Second Protocol. Article 15 es-
tablishes a category of serious violations (which can be of either the 1954 Conven-
tion or the Second Protocol itself). Five offenses fall within this category:
• Making cultural property under enhanced protection the object of attack;
• Using cultural property under enhanced protection or its immediate
surroundings in support of military action;
• Extensive destruction or appropriation of cultural property protected under
the Hague Convention and the Second Protocol;
• Making cultural property protected under the Hague Convention and the
Second Protocol the object of attack; and,
• Theft, pillage or misappropriation of, or acts ofvandalism directed against,
cultural property protected under the Convention.
Article 16.1 establishes universal jurisdiction with regard to the first three types
of offenses.
Chapter IV also addresses other aspects of criminal responsibility
—
jurisdic-
tional issues, extradition, mutual legal assistance, and the adoption of legislative,
administrative, or disciplinary measures to address other violations ofthe Conven-
tion or Protocol. Again, each State party to the Second Protocol must adopt those
articles within its national penal legislation, either civilian or military or both.
To facilitate the domestic implementation of the provisions of Chapter IV, the
UNESCO Secretariat commissioned and widely distributed a consultant's study on
this issue. This study is composed of three parts: the first part introduces the rele-
vant provisions ofChapter 4 and compares them with other international humani-
tarian law penal provisions by referring to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, the
1977 Additional Protocol I, and the 1998 Rome Statute ofthe International Crimi-
nal Court; the second provides twelve case studies related to six countries with a
common law tradition (Australia, Canada, India, Nigeria, the United Kingdom,
and the United States) and six countries with a civil law tradition (Argentina,
France, Japan, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation and Switzerland); the third
part contains a summary of recommendations. 18
Conclusion
It is important that there be close cooperation between UNESCO and national mil-
itary forces in implementing and enforcing the body of cultural protection law that
is set forth in the 1954 Hague Convention and its First and Second Protocol be-
cause it is those forces that must ensure its application during the execution of
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combat operations. Unless military forces are properly trained and informed ofthe
location of cultural property in the adversary's territory and unless rules of engage-
ment address the protection of cultural property, then cultural property will not be
accorded the necessary protection.
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XIX
The Law ofArmed Conflict
and the War on Terrorism
David E. Graham 1
In commenting on Mr. Lavoyer's presentation, as well as his paper,
2 allow me to
begin with his concluding remarks and then move from there to speak to his
observations regarding whether there is a need to revise, amend, or supplement the
existing law ofarmed conflict in light ofthe events of September 1 1 , 2001—and the
ensuing declaration by the United States that it is now engaged in a "war on terror-
ism." I would note that, contrary to Mr. Lavoyer, I ^will use the term "law of armed
conflict" (LOAC), as opposed to "international humanitarian law" (IHL). Once
again, as I have stated on a number ofprevious occasions, both at conferences here
in Newport and elsewhere, I have yet to hear a definitive explanation as to the need
for—or the body oflaw encompassed by—this latter term. If it is but a kinder, gen-
tler synonym for the law ofarmed conflict, it is duplicative in nature—and unnec-
essary. If, on the other hand, it purports to embrace some undefined aspects of
human rights law, I reject it as unclear, confusing, and fraught with peril for com-
manders in the field.
In the draft of his paper, Mr. Lavoyer notes that, "The best guarantee for respect
[of the law ofarmed conflict] is to keep the law realistic." With this statement, I am
in complete agreement. Aspirational LOAC standards are inherently subjective in
nature and bear little reality to the practice of warfare and modern weapon sys-
tems. Moreover, they harm the credibility of the LOAC as a whole. As has been
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previously stated in many fora, this is a principal reason why the United States has
rejected a number of the provisions of Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions3—and why it has chosen not to become a party to this Protocol.
Mr. Lavoyer notes that, "[T]he main challenge today is without any doubt the
proper application of IHL in today's armed conflicts. Extensive research into re-
cent armed conflicts has led the ICRC to conclude that, on the whole, the existing
rules are adequate enough to deal with today's armed conflicts." 4 Once again,
I agree completely with this statement. I do not number myself among those who
now criticize the law ofarmed conflict "for not being adequate to deal with the 'war
on terror.'" 5 More on this particular point, later.
Now, lest you feel that I am being overly kind to Mr. Lavoyer, let me turn to a
number of areas of disagreement. In his paper, he makes reference to a study con-
ducted by the International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC) regarding the cus-
tomary LOAC. (He refers to it as "customary IHL.") In doing so, he states that,
The study
—
published in 2005—will be particularly useful for non-international
armed conflicts. Maybe the most important result of the study is the fact that many
rules of the 1977 Additional Protocol I relating to the conduct of hostilities also apply
to internal armed conflicts on a customary law basis. Furthermore, States not party to
certain IHL treaties will be bound by their customary rules.6
This, of course, is a significant overstatement of the effect of this study. The inter-
national community, at large, has not been privy to the results of the ICRC's work.
However, I think that it is safe to say that, given the somewhat controversial nature
of the study's process—to include even the supposed mandate of the ICRC to en-
gage in this endeavor, not all States will find themselves in full agreement with the
conclusions which are drawn therein. It is always useful to remember that the es-
sence of customary international law in general, and the customary LOAC in par-
ticular, is State practice, and—for better or worse—the principal practitioner of
the LOAC is the United States.
Mr. Lavoyer refers to the ICRC as the "promoter and 'guardian' of IHL." 7 Well
enough. However, in his draft paper he then goes on to declare that, "Based on its
assessment ofthe needs ofthe victims ofarmed conflicts, it is well placed to prepare
clarifications or developments of humanitarian law." With this assertion, I dis-
agree. Clarifying and formulating the LOAC is the domain of the international
community—not that of the ICRC. The former does not respond to the demands
of the latter. Such an arrangement would far exceed the ICRC's charter and mis-
sion. While the ICRC can play a vital role in facilitating the efforts of the interna-
tional community in addressing LOAC matters, it cannot unilaterally dictate the
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agenda. A prime example of the ICRC's attempt to aspire to the latter is the state-
ment in Mr. Lavoyer's draft paper that, the "[development of humanitarian law
has to continue in specific domains. The restriction or prohibition ofweapons is a
good example." I would submit, to you, that such decisions regarding weapon sys-
tems lies with the community of States—not the ICRC.
Let me now turn my attention to the primary point ofdiscussion—Did 9/11 and
the US Administration's subsequent pronouncement of a "war on terrorism"
manifest the need for a fundamental revision ofthe LOAC in the beliefthat the cur-
rent body of law is simply incapable of effectively dealing with this "new form of
conflict"? Mr. Lavoyer says, "No"—I agree. He notes that
It has been asserted that terrorist attacks—including the attacks ofSeptember 1 1, 2001
—
as well as counter-terrorist activities were part of a global "armed conflict" in the legal
sense, an armed conflict that started years ago and that will continue until the end of
terrorist activities. Such a conclusion would have considerable consequences in practice,
especially if it is used to justify that States could theoretically strike the transnational
group at any time and everywhere—without having to obtain any kind of approval, e.g.,
from those States on whose territories the military interventions take place.8
I agree that if the war on terror were considered as a "global armed conflict" there
would be considerable consequences. But those consequences are not reached, be-
cause, for good reasons, it's not a "global armed conflict."
From a legal perspective, the "global war on terrorism" is simply hyperbolic fic-
tion—a good political sound bite, but nothing more. Is this "declaration ofwar" by
the Executive branch, vice Congress, truly intended to advise the international
community that the President, acting unilaterally, will now deploy US armed
forces across any international boundary or boundaries, with or without the con-
sent of the State or States concerned, to engage in combatant activity against any
terrorist organization—regardless of the cause purported by such an organiza-
tion? Pause for a moment to consider not only the LOAC concerns that such a pro-
nouncement would invoke, but the broad range of jus ad bellum issues, as well.
Indeed, the US congressional and United Nations Security Council resolutions au-
thorizing the use offeree against the Taliban government ofAfghanistan pointedly
tied such a use offeree against only those who engaged in the 9/11 attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon—and those who assisted these individu-
als in their efforts. In no way can these resolutions be cited as authority for the cur-
rent Administration to unilaterally declare that it is engaged in a "global armed
conflict" against "terrorism," which itself is an undefined phenomenon.
For this reason, we must continue to draw a sharp distinction between acts of
"terrorism" to which numerous international conventions are applicable, and
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what can legitimately be perceived as an unlawful "armed attack" against the
United States committed by "unlawful combatants" or "unprivileged belligerents,"
i.e., al Qaeda personnel, aided and abetted by the Taliban government. Well de-
fined international conventions and State domestic laws apply to terrorist acts,
while the LOAC applies to the use of force undertaken in self-defense in response
to an armed attack. The United States must choose: Does it view al Qaeda members
as "terrorists" to whom the law relevant to terrorism applies, or does it view these
individuals as "unlawful combatants" engaged in an unlawful belligerency (armed
attack) against the United States and its citizens to whom the LOAC is applica-
ble? It cannot have it both ways. When viewed in this context, one must come to
the conclusion, arrived at by Mr. Lavoyer, that, if the United States does view its
ongoing use of force against al Qaeda as a response to an armed attack, the LOAC
requires no significant revision; it need only be applied.
While the current Administration might assert the validity of its use of military
force against al Qaeda personnel—and those who support them—wherever they
might be found, even this claim must realistically be tempered by the rights of sov-
ereign States under existing international law. How, for example, does the United
States realistically apply the LOAC to a global war against al Qaeda? When the
United States targeted suspected al Qaeda members in Yemen, did it comply with
the applicable LOAC? With international law in general? Did the United States gain
the consent ofthe Yemeni government prior to its use of force within the latter's bor-
ders? Absent the consent of any State in which al Qaeda personnel might be discov-
ered, does the relevant Security Council resolution sanction the use of armed force
by the United States within such a State? Does all of the LOAC apply to such opera-
tions? If not, what provisions ofthe LOAC do apply? These are but a few of the ques-
tions associated with this subject that merit serious consideration—and resolution.
The last issue I shall address among those discussed by Mr. Lavoyer is the legal
status of those individuals captured by coalition forces in Afghanistan, and, in par-
ticular, those currently being detained at Guantanamo Bay. I agree with his assess-
ment that the coalition military action taken against the Taliban government and al
Qaeda operatives within Afghanistan clearly constituted an international conflict
to which the LOAC, in its entirety, applied—a fact belatedly and reluctantly agreed
to by the current US Administration. Given this fact, he questions why none of the
captured personnel have been afforded prisoner ofwar (POW) status—why all, in
fact, have been declared to be "unlawful combatants." Again, he asserts that this is
not a matter that gives rise to a necessity for revising or amending the LOAC; the
existing LOAC—the long established provisions of the Third Geneva
Convention 9—need only be applied. Once again I agree with Mr. Lavoyer. I even
find myself in agreement with his contention that while he might understand how
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the relevant provisions ofArticle 4 ofthe Third Convention could be interpreted in
such a way thatPOW status could be denied to all al Qaeda personnel, how can the
same be said to be true ofmembers ofthe Taliban army as a whole? The question of
the status of Taliban fighters deserves far more careful consideration than that ap-
parently given it by the responsible US decision makers. While a case can be made
for the decision not to accord POW status to the Taliban captives, some have ar-
gued that sound legal, as well as policy, considerations should have dictated a dif-
ferent course of action.
Where I do disagree with Mr. Lavoyer, however, is with his contention that, the
US decision "To make a blanket determination and to disqualify from the start all
captured combatants from POW status raises serious concerns." 10 He specifically
contends that "If there is doubt about that status, competent tribunals as foreseen
in the Third Geneva Convention should come into action." 11 While this statement
refers to Article 5 tribunals, he does not cite the text of this article, which reads, in
part: "Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent
act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories
enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Con-
vention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal."
Mr. Lavoyer clearly implies that the United States had a LOAC obligation under
Article 5 to employ tribunals to determine the status ofboth al Qaeda and Taliban
captives. Yet this is clearly not the case. An examination ofPictet's Commentary re-
veals that this provision was intended to apply only to deserters, and to those per-
sons who accompany the Armed Forces and who have lost their identity cards. 12
Even more telling is the clear language ofArticle 5, itself: "Should any doubt arise as
to whether persons...belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4. . . ."
(Emphasis added.) While one might argue with the Administration's legal ratio-
nale for determining that all al Qaeda and Taliban captives were to be viewed as
"unlawful combatants," one cannot posit the argument that there existed any de-
gree ofdoubt on the part ofthe Administration as to the status ofthe individuals in
question. I would submit to Mr. Lavoyer—and to others who have raised this is-
sue—that the "doubt" referred to in Article 5 must arise in the "mind" ofthe "Cap-
turing Party," not that of third States, the ICRC, or the collective psyche of the
international community. When the President of the United States makes a deter-
mination as to the status of personnel captured by US armed forces on the battle-
field, there would appear to be no doubt on the part ofthe Capturing Party as to the
status of the individuals concerned, and, in the absence of such "doubt," there
clearly exists no LOAC obligation to conduct Article 5 tribunals.
It is important, I think, that in the final analysis we are in agreement on Mr.
Lavoyer's essential premise: The events of 9/11 do not call for revising or
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supplementing the LOAC. What is called for is a candid recognition of the true na-
ture of the "conflict" in which the United States is engaged—and a good faith ad-
herence to both the law of armed conflict and the other controlling principles
of international law.
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Interoperability and the Atlantic Divide:
A Bridge over Troubled Waters
Charles H. B. Garraway
1
9/11 has now passed into folklore. As everybody, in another generation, can re-
call where they were when they heard of the assassination of President Ken-
nedy, so for this, the first information ofthe terrible events that unfolded that bright
September day are indelibly engraved on the memory. I am a member ofboth gener-
ations and just as I can recall standing in my school dormitory in England, frozen
with horror, at the news from Dallas, so I recall the cold shiver down my spine as I
stood on the second tee ofthe famous Berkshire GolfClub, hearing on a radio, going
full volume on a local building site, the chilling account of what was happening in
New York. By the time I returned to the Club House, the news from Washington and
Pennsylvania was also in. The world would never be the same again.
The purpose ofthis article is to look at the effect of9/1 1 on the field ofinternational
and operational law, in particular on interoperability between the United States and
Europe. For most of the last century, the United States and Europe (the United King-
dom in particular), have worked together in the military field, to the great benefit of
world peace. It has been like a marriage. We have been comfortable together and
learned to work together, recognizing each others foibles. Difficulties have been over-
come with good will and a willingness to appreciate one another's point ofview. How-
ever, I will be suggesting in this analysis that there seems now to be less understanding
and more talking across each other. I, like a good marriage guidance counselor, will
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seek to go behind the rhetoric and try to look at what I see as the underlying causes of
this malaise. In medical terms, I will try to look at the root of the illness rather than the
symptoms. That may involve analyzing some difficult, and indeed sensitive, areas.
I spent most of my career in the UK Army working in the field of international,
and what we now call operational, law. To me, the former is the academic side and
the latter, in relation to the law of armed conflict, the practical application. Both go
hand in glove. One of the advantages of being a military lawyer is that one can mix
the academic and the practical, checking out the theory on the sounding board of
fact. The battlefield is a very practical place. There is no room for ivory towers or fine
theories. Delays can cost lives. Decisions have to be instant. The law of good faith is
often the lodestone. Over the years, I have learned that the law ofarmed conflict is a
vital tool in the commander's tool box. However, just as with the myriad of other
tools that can be found in that box, it must prove its usefulness if it is not to be dis-
carded. Law that is impracticable will be disregarded on the battlefield. That is a fact
and those of us involved in the negotiation of international treaties and the develop-
ment ofinternational law forget that at our peril. The law ofarmed conflict is in some
ways a Faustian pact between the interests of humanity and military reality. If the
balance tilts too far in either direction the result is a breakdown in the whole system.
Much of my professional life has also been spent working with US forces. From
my early days as a young officer at the US Army JAG School at Charlottesville, Vir-
ginia, through a tour at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Belgium, to
Operation Desert Shield/Storm, I have worked alongside my US colleagues in friend-
ship and harmony. We have shared ideas and, on the surprisingly few occasions
when we have disagreed, we have worked together to find practical solutions to the
practical problems that we have encountered. As a result, I have rarely found any se-
rious interoperability problems on the ground between UK and US forces.
But things are beginning to change. Since 9/11, there seems to have been an in-
creasing disconnect between the United States and Europe. That appeared to reach
its climax in the unseemly rows over the questions raised by Operation Iraqi Free-
dom. 2 The divide between the United States and what Secretary Rumsfeld de-
scribed as "Old Europe" 3 opened into a chasm. The distrust, and in some cases,
open dislike, that has developed will take a long time to overcome. The old "en-
tente cordiale" appears to have broken down and even within the "special rela-
tionship," there seem to be strains appearing. The United States and the United
Kingdom appear at times to be moving along diverging tracks. Tony Blair, in at-
tempting to form a bridge between the United States and Europe has found him-
self like a rider trying to sit astride two horses at the same time. At times those
horses have moved further apart than has been good for the health of the rider.
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This divergence of political views has reached into other areas as well. Within the
law of armed conflict, stresses have appeared that are beginning to impact on
interoperability and hence operational efficiency. The United States is seen increas-
ingly as looking upon European forces as a liability rather than an asset in opera-
tional terms. Traditional alliances are overlooked and there is growing emphasis on
"coalitions of the willing."4 This began in Kosovo where the United States gave the
impression of feeling constrained by its European allies, continued in Afghanistan
where offers of assistance from European States (other than the United Kingdom)
appeared to be declined, and culminated in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Whilst that
purported to be a coalition, it was one run very much on US terms. I have myself
been involved on the ground in Operation Iraqi Freedom working as part ofthe Co-
alition Provisional Authority and I have to admit that, in terms of interoperability, it
has been the hardest of all the operations in which I have participated.
Why is that? Where does this divergence spring from? I want to look at three areas
where problems have arisen and examine them in detail. What is the nature of the
problems? How have they arisen and can they be overcome? Finally, I will try to look
to the future. Are the traditional alliances doomed to wither on the vine amidst mu-
tual recriminations and increasing US isolationism? Or can these issues be resolved
in such a way that the United States, acknowledged as the world's only remaining su-
perpower, will lead a willing, rather than recalcitrant, world in the pursuit ofpeace?
I will start by jumping in the deep end ofthe pool. Probably the most public dis-
agreement between the Atlantic allies has been over the question of "unlawful
combatants." The issue of Guantanamo and its inmates has become a running
sore. Yet, in my view, it need not be so. It has turned into a disagreement of sub-
stance but in its early days, I would suggest that it was more a matter of linguistics.
As much as anything, it is the term "unlawful combatant" that has caused the prob-
lem. It has confused the matter of combatant status and has led to some ex post
facto lawyering that always, in my experience, leads to trouble.
In order to understand the problem, it is necessary to go back into the history of
combatant status. By tradition, States had a monopoly on violence. Only States
could conduct wars and it was therefore for States to decide who could take part in
them. With the limited range ofweaponry up until the last century, it was not diffi-
cult to have a clear division between those who were authorised by the State to take
part in warfare and those who were not so entitled. If these latter chose to involve
themselves in the hostilities, they were common criminals and could be prosecuted
for the acts that they carried out. Those who had official authorization had an im-
munity which enabled them to carry out acts that would otherwise be unlawful
without sanction. This immunity led to the development of "combatant status" to
represent those entitled to take part in hostilities. Those who were not so entitled
339
Interoperability and the Atlantic Divide: A Bridge over Troubled Waters
were "non-combatants" (though this distinction is somewhat confused by Article
3 of the Regulations attached to Hague Convention IV of 1907 5 ).
It is important to note that this concept, that combatant status arises out of the
entitlement of a State to authorize persons to take part in hostilities, is, of necessity,
limited to international armed conflict. There can be no "combatant immunity" in
non-international armed conflict where one side—or in some situations such as So-
malia, all sides—lack that essential authority. This previously accepted tenet has
come under stress in recent years with attempts to bring together the law relating to
international and non-international armed conflict. There has been an increasing
tendency to use the term "combatant" in relation to participants in non-interna-
tional armed conflict. However, this loose use of language is, in my view, dangerous
as the word is used in a separate sense from international armed conflict. Participants
in non-international armed conflicts remain subject to domestic law and dissident
forces have no immunity from that, even in respect of acts which would be legitimate
under international law, such as attacks on military personnel or military objectives.
There have, indeed, been some non-international armed conflicts where the level of
intensity has been such that a form of belligerent status has been accorded to rebel
fighters, but these are the exception rather than the rule and such concessions have
usually been more for pragmatic than for legal reasons. The word "combatant" has
always indicated a particular status and attempts to extend its use should be resisted.
In the arguments that have arisen out ofAfghanistan and the Guantanamo situa-
tion, similar loose use oflanguage occurs and this can have an effect on some funda-
mental tenets of international law as defined over the years. In the first instance, the
"war on terror" raises the whole question ofwhat is an international armed conflict.
By custom, this has been limited to conflicts between States. Under treaty law, it is
defined in Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions6 as "all cases of declared
war or ofany other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them."
The inclusion of the words "High Contracting Parties" makes it plain that this
provision also involves States. Non-State entities fall outside its terms. Thus pirates,
however well organised and however international their activities, cannot, by attack-
ing State forces, create a state of international armed conflict so as to gain for them-
selves combatant status. They remain pirates and subject to the law relating to
piracy—not the law relating to armed conflict. Similarly, criminal organizations
such as the Mafia and drug cartels, despite having tentacles that reach across interna-
tional boundaries and often using levels of force that would in other circumstances
fall within the definition of "armed conflict," cannot benefit by bringing themselves
out of the ambit of criminal law into the law of armed conflict. "Terrorists" are in a
similar position, though in their case, the situation is complicated further by two
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additional factors, the lack of an agreed definition of the term and the existence of
State sponsored terrorism. However, in this latter case, it is not the acts of terrorism
that may create an international armed conflict but the involvement of the State be-
hind those acts. In cases where terrorists have no State sponsor, their acts remain
criminal but cannot, in themselves, amount to international armed conflict.
The campaign in Afghanistan muddied the waters. It is beyond dispute that
there was indeed an international armed conflict between the Coalition and Af-
ghanistan. That meant that combatant status was an issue for those people involved
in that conflict. But just because there was a specific armed conflict taking place
does not mean that the status of "international armed conflict" extended to all ac-
tivities in the "war against terror." Even within the United States, some alleged
"terrorists" were arrested and dealt with by the ordinary criminal justice system. It
follows that the first decision in relation to any attempt to obtain combatant status
is to identify the international armed conflict to which the claim relates.
However, the mere identification ofan international armed conflict is not suffi-
cient. It is then necessary to examine the individual concerned to see if that person
satisfies the definition of "combatant." Not everybody to be found on the battle-
field is necessarily a combatant.
Most examinations into the definition of combatant begin with Article 1 of the
Hague Regulations of 1907. 7 This reads:
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and
volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
In countries where militia or volunteer groups constitute the army or form part of it,
they are included under the denomination "army."
The Hague Regulations were accepted as reflecting customary international law at
Nuremberg and their terms have been relatively unchallenged. However, within this
Article lie the seeds of a controversy that has surfaced in the first part of the 21st cen-
tury, one hundred years later. It will be noted that the four conditions only appear to
apply to militia and volunteer corps who do not "constitute the army or form part of
it." Does this mean that the "army" itself is exempt from these conditions? The answer
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is not as easy as it might seem. At the time, in 1907, the difficulties in distinguishing be-
tween combatants and non-combatants were not so severe. Battlefields were for the
most part linear and armies, almost by definition, wore distinguishing features by way
of uniform. It was therefore not necessary to require armies to comply with such con-
ditions because it was assumed that they would. This view is supported by case law
both within the United States and the United Kingdom which made it clear that mem-
bers of armed forces could not excuse themselves from compliance. 8
The definition contained in the Hague Regulations would stand until 1977, de-
spite huge changes in the nature of warfare. It was reinforced by the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949 which dealt with prisoner ofwar status. This granted prisoner
of war status, inter alia, to:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those
oforganized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in
or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such
militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the
following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that ofconducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs
or war.
y
Apart from the wording specifically referring to organized resistance movements
which I have highlighted, this is taken directly from the Hague Regulations. However,
the same assumption is made in the distinction between armed forces and "other mili-
tias and members of other volunteer corps" which do not form part of the armed
forces. Anybodywho had suggested in 1949 that armed forces were exempt from com-
pliance with the four conditions would have been looked at with considerable puzzle-
ment. Did the conditions not provide a definition ofwhat armed forces were?
This is made plain by the Commentary to the Third Geneva Convention, pub-
lished by the International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC), which states in re-
lation to Article 4:
The drafters of the 1949 Convention, like those of the Hague Convention, considered that
it was unnecessary to specify the sign which members of the armed forces should have for
the purposes of recognition. It is the duty ofeach State to take steps so that members of its
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armed forces can be immediately recognized as such and to see to it that they are easily
distinguishable from members of the enemy armed forces or from civilians. 10
In 1977, in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, 11 an attempt was
made to bring together the separate strands of "Hague" and "Geneva" law. Arti-
cles 43 to 47 deal with "Combatant and Prisoner-of-War Status." Some of these
provisions are controversial and undoubtedly do not represent customary law.
However, others are uncontroversial and, whilst perhaps a restatement oflaw, re-
flect an international consensus. Amongst those provisions is Article 43 12 which,
in part, reads:
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces,
groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the
conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an
authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to
an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.
2. Members ofthe armed forces ofa Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel
and chaplains . . . ) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate
directly in hostilities.
While this may seem to be a withdrawal from the Hague standards, Article 44(2) 13
makes it clear that: "... all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules ofinter-
national law applicable in armed conflict. . . ." Article 44(3) 14 lays down a general
rule that: "... combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation prepara-
tory to an attack. ..." Article 44(7) 15 states that: "This Article is not intended to
change the generally accepted practice of States with respect to the wearing of the
uniform by combatants assigned to the regular, uniformed armed units of a Party
to the conflict." These provisions provide a general format little removed from that
contained in the Hague Regulations. As the ICRC Commentary puts it: "The pro-
visions of Article 4 of the Third Convention are fully preserved." 16
Articles 44 to 47 ofAdditional Protocol I also deal with a number ofunusual sit-
uations, including that of spies and mercenaries. It is here that controversy arises,
particularly in Article 44(3) which deals with exceptional circumstances where the
duty to distinguish can be relaxed. These provisions lay down that, in certain cases
of non-compliance, the combatant may forfeit his right to prisoner-of war status,
while in others he forfeits his right even to combatant status.
Additional Protocol I is also significant because, for the first time, it attempts to
define the term "civilian." Essentially, a civilian is anyone who is not a combatant,
other than those who have lost their combatant status under Articles 44 to 47. 17
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The principle is clear. There is no gap; a person is either a combatant or a civilian.
However, just as it is possible to lose combatant status, and the immunity that goes
with it, by failure to comply with the rules, so the protection given to civilians can
also be lost if "and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities."
While the drafting of Protocol I is hardly a model of clarity with different terms
being used almost interchangeably at times, one thing does appear to stand out. A
combatant who loses the right to combatant status does not become a civilian. In
the same way, a civilian who loses his right to protection as a civilian does not be-
come a combatant. Each remains within their respective designation but loses the
rights and privileges attached to that designation.
How does this affect the situation in Guantanamo? It would appear that the
term "unlawful combatant" is being used in a generic sense to cover a multitude of
different categories of people. First there are those who might be described as the
armed forces of Afghanistan. Such people may well fall within the definition of
"combatant" within the law of armed conflict. Some may have committed
breaches of the law ofarmed conflict. That will not necessarily deprive them of the
right to combatant status or to combatant immunity, and consequently to pris-
oner-of-war status. 18 However, that immunity only extends to legitimate acts of
warfare and so they will be liable to trial and punishment for unlawful acts. These
people can perhaps be described as "combatants acting unlawfully."
Others may also fall within the definition of "combatant" but by their actions
have forfeited the right to that status or to combatant immunity. 19 These people
can be tried not only for war crimes but, since they have forfeited their combatant
immunity, for acts that would otherwise be legitimate acts ofwar. It is this category
of person for whom the title "unlawful combatant" is perhaps the closest fit but
even then, it does not really adequately describe their position.
There are also those who do not begin to fit within the definition ofcombatant
but who choose to take part in the hostilities. These people can never be described
as "combatant" and therefore begin with the status of "civilian." However, by
their acts, they have forfeited the rights and privileges that go with the status of
"civilian." 20 They do not become "combatants" but can be tried for the part that
they have taken in the hostilities since they have no entitlement to take such a
part. It is misleading to describe such people as "unlawful combatants" as they
never were combatants, whether lawful or unlawful. My preferred description,
even if it seems somewhat dated to the modern ear, is that used by Richard
Baxter, "unprivileged belligerents."
It will be noticed that I have avoided such terms as "Taliban" or "al Qaeda." I do
not find such terms helpful in this analysis. The law of armed conflict deals with
factual situations rather than titles. Thus, there will be Taliban members who could
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not be described as "combatants" under any circumstances and, possibly, some Al
Qaeda who could. That does not mean to say that such personnel necessarily are
entitled to be treated as combatants but only that they fall on that side ofthe divid-
ing line at the first assessment. Their subsequent conduct as combatants may well
disqualify them from being entitled to be treated as combatants, or to hold pris-
oner-of-war status.
I said at the start that this issue began as a matter oflinguistics but is now turning
into an issue of substance. If the use of the term "unlawful combatant" was origi-
nally loose language, it has now begun to take on a meaning of its own with argu-
ments being advanced that there is indeed such a category of person. This is
summed up by the words of Professor Dinstein: "One cannot fight the enemy and
remain a civilian."21
The core ofthe argument here is that a civilian who takes a direct part in hostili-
ties not only loses his civilian protection, but also his status as a civilian. Indeed, he
becomes a combatant. However, because he does not come within the definition of
a combatant as laid down in the law of armed conflict, he gains none of the rights
and privileges ofa combatant but becomes, in effect, an "outlaw." It is this category
to whom the term "unlawful combatant" is most appropriately applied.
As will be apparent, I can find no basis in law for this new category—nor do I
think it is necessary. Dinstein states: "Under the ius in hello, combatants are per-
sons who are either members of the armed forces (except medical and religious
personnel) or
—
irrespective ofsuch membership—take an active part in hostilities in
an international armed conflict."22 [My emphasis]. Cited as authority for this state-
ment is the Model Manual on the Law ofArmed Conflict, published by the ICRC, and
entitied "Fight it Right."23 The same authority is cited in the Israeli response to the
Mitchell Report where a similar proposition is put forward.24
I regret to say that I have been unable to find anything in that ICRC Manual which
would support this proposition. Certainly, the paragraphs of the Manual cited in the
Israeli response25 fall some way short of that and it would indeed be surprising if the
ICRC, of all people, were to put forward such a view which would seem to widen
considerably the definition of "combatant," whether lawful or unlawful.
Paragraph 601 of the Manual states:
a. Only combatants may:
( 1
)
take a direct part in hostilities, and
(2) be attacked.
b. Combatants are members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict except
medical and religious personnel.
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Paragraph 601 goes on to describe activities prohibited to civilians but nowhere
does it state that civilians, by taking a direct part in hostilities, become combatants.
Similarly paragraph 1 106c merely states: "Civilians are protected unless and for
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities." Despite the grammatical incon-
sistency, this again does not in any way imply that civilians become combatants,
merely that they lose their protection.
Dinstein goes on to say: "A civilian may convert himself into a combatant In
the same vein, a combatant may retire and become a civilian." 26 The analogies
drawn here are incomplete. Indeed, a civilian can convert himself into a combatant
—
by bringing himself within the definition of "combatant" by, for example, joining the
armed forces. The combatant, by retiring, has ceased to come within that definition
and therefore has become a civilian. The combatant does not, however, become a civil-
ian if he goes off to occupy himself in civilian pursuits. A soldier undergoing a
university course at a civilian institution remains a combatant even though he may be
indistinguishable from the civilian students surrounding him.
Dinstein further states: "Combatants can withdraw from the hostilities not only
by retiring and becoming civilians, but also by becoming hors de combat." 27 1 agree.
But even hors de combat, the combatant retains his combatant status. He merely
gains extra protection in return for not taking part in the hostilities. He does not
change his status and become a civilian.
There is a justifiable concern about what is sometimes described as the "revolv-
ing door syndrome"—the farmer by day and the fighter by night. This is indeed a
problem which needs addressing. However, I would suggest that it can be resolved
better by looking again at the interpretation ofArticle 51(3) ofAdditional Protocol I. 28
That provision reads: "Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section,
unless andfor such time as they take a direct part in hostilities" [My emphasis.] It is
here that the difficulty is to be found that leads to the "revolving door syndrome" and
it maybe necessary to take a wider view ofthe period during which protection is lost.
It is clearly impracticable to argue that the civilian who takes part in a hostile act re-
gains his immunity as soon as that act is completed. However, the temporal duration
of the loss of protection needs to be limited in some way. International law does not
allow for a permanent loss of protection so that, years after the act, the person re-
mains vulnerable, even if he has taken no part in the hostilities since.
On the other hand, the term "combatant" has always been narrowly defined
and limited to international armed conflict. The current attempts to extend the
definition, and to widen the definition of "war" or "armed conflict," amount to a
slippery slope. It is difficult to come up with clear boundaries and gives far too
much freedom to interpretation. While the events of 9/1 1 pose a real challenge to
the forces oflaw and order all over the world, the solution arrived at by the creation
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of this new category of "unlawful combatant," although understandable, is, in my
view, unsound and, in less scrupulous hands, could be manipulated in such a way
as to remove to a large extent the protections built into the law for both combatants
and civilians.
The second area that I wish to look at is the question ofwar crimes and, in particu-
lar, methods of trial. I want to move between the Scylla of international jurisdiction
as exemplified by international tribunals, and in particular the International Crimi-
nal Court, and the Charybdis of universal jurisdiction, particularly when used to
bring charges against individuals in States with no links to the crime itself, the vic-
tims or the alleged participants. These are both interesting subjects in their own
right but I will concentrate primarily on the controversy caused by the US propos-
als to hold military commissions to deal with alleged war crimes. 29 1 will limit my-
self further to the nature of the commissions themselves, rather than the separate
issue of their jurisdiction which is primarily a question ofUS domestic law.
I believe that the United States has been somewhat surprised by the strength of
the reaction by their European allies against the concept ofmilitary commissions. 30
While some ofthis antipathy is undoubtedly caused by specific detail such as issues
arising from the death penalty and the apparent limitations on the rights ofthe de-
fense, 31 there is a more fundamental objection which is rather a cultural divide
than a legal one. Again, only by appreciating this, can the two sides reach any form
of modus vivendi.
There is no doubt that there is a duty upon States to deal with violations of the
laws of armed conflict. The ideal method of so dealing is by national jurisdiction
but that may not always be possible. The Afghan courts, for example, are not yet in
a fit state to deal with such cases even if the United States were prepared to release
people to be so tried. Furthermore, not all States have given themselves jurisdiction
to deal with the full array of international crimes arising out of armed conflict and
quasi conflict situations. There is, therefore, no reason why the Coalition should
not be entitled to take action themselves. Indeed, it is not so much the fact that
cases will be brought but rather the forum that has caused the disquiet.
Military tribunals have a long and distinguished record. After World War II, the
majority ofwar crimes trials were dealt with by way ofnational military tribunals. 32
They had the advantage that they could sit anywhere in the world and not be lim-
ited by territorial considerations. In the Geneva Conventions, the use of military
courts to try certain categories of offense was not only approved but mandated.
Prisoners of war are made "subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in
the armed forces of the Detaining Power." Article 84 of the Third Convention, in
particular, provides that:
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A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the
Detaining Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces
of the Detaining Power in respect of the particular offence alleged to have been
committed by the prisoner of war.33
Similarly, in relation to occupied territories, Article 66 of the Fourth Convention
provides that, in respect of breaches of penal provisions of occupation law: ". . . the
Occupying Power may hand over the accused to its properly constituted, non-politi-
cal military courts, on condition that the said courts sit in the occupied country."34
In the light of this, why is there this visceral reaction by many Europeans to the use
by the United States of military commissions?
The answer lies in two separate areas, though there is a link between them. One
is historical and the other legal. In historical terms, since the end ofWorld War II,
military justice in general has earned a bad reputation. While in the United
States—and the United Kingdom—we remain proud of our military and see them
as a bastion ofour national freedom, this is not so in many other parts ofthe world.
The history of South America and the independent African States has been full of
military dictatorships and even in Europe, the military, in the old communist
States, was seen as a symbol ofrepression rather than a flag carrier for freedom. The
jurisdiction of military courts was extended so that they became part of the State
system of control over the civilian population. "Security courts," often manned by
military personnel, enabled these dictatorships to survive. "Military justice" be-
came a contradiction in terms.
Linked to this is the rise ofhuman rights, particularly in Europe. The European
Court ofHuman Rights, under the auspices of the Council of Europe, has become
probably the most influential human rights body in the world. 35 Its judgements are
binding on members of the Council of Europe and the Court has adopted a pro-
gressive attitude to human rights in general. It sees the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) as a living document which may need to be reinterpreted
as circumstances change. One of the key rights embodied in the Convention is the
right to a fair and impartial trial. 36
In recent years, particularly since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the influx of
Eastern European judges on to the bench, the Court has been called upon increas-
ingly to rule on matters relating to the military. Many ofthese rulings are called for
as a result of cases brought in relation to military justice. The suspicions of military
justice which have inevitably arisen out of the misuse of such systems by dictator-
ships of different types have been apparent in rulings by the Court. Whereas in
1949, when the Geneva Conventions were drafted, military justice was accepted as
fair and impartial, now it is not necessarily so accepted and increasing restrictions
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have been imposed upon its use. For example, over the last ten years both the sum-
mary justice system and the court martial system used by the UK armed forces have
had to be utterly overhauled as a result ofrulings by the European Court ofHuman
Rights. 37 The assumption that military officers will conduct their duties "without
partiality, favour or affection" has been replaced almost by an assumption the
other way. Any trace of possible bias or command influence has to be removed so
that justice is not only seen to be done but manifestly seen to be done.
In some countries, such as Belgium, there have been moves towards abolishing
the military justice system altogether and in many other continental countries,
military personnel already are dealt with by civil tribunals. The trend is undoubt-
edly away from military justice and in particular to any exercise of military justice
over civilians. It follows that what was acceptable in occupied Germany in 1945, or
even in 1949, is not acknowledged as necessarily acceptable now. The United King-
dom, for example, has legislation in the form of a Royal Warrant dating from
1945,38 permitting the establishment ofmilitary courts to try war crimes. However,
the legislation is now effectively obsolete as it has not been updated for over fifty
years and any attempt to do so would probably fail politically. The Royal Warrant
therefore has been left to wither on the vine.
The question ofhow to deal with war crimes is a very real one and needs to be
addressed. It arises again in relation to Iraq, though in that case, it is likely that most
cases will be tried before Iraqi courts. The correct disposal of such cases is a matter
of international concern and it is therefore important that some degree of consen-
sus is reached on a way forward. Ifwar crimes trials, whether carried out by domes-
tic civil courts or by military tribunals, are not seen as fair and impartial by
international standards, then they will cause another running sore in that "mar-
tyrs" will be created and allegations of "victors' justice" will again circulate.
Like most in the US or UK military, I am convinced that my national system of
military justice is as fair as it could be, and in many cases fairer than the civil system
which some would like to replace it by. However, that is in itself insufficient. There
is an inbuilt suspicion ofmilitary justice brought about by years ofmisuse by some.
Failure to appreciate that suspicion—and the reasons behind it—will simply work
to increase the divide between the United States and Europe. On the other hand, an
appreciation may lead to dialogue which can only serve to bridge the gap before it
becomes too great.
The third area with which I wish to deal is linked to this. It is the growing impact
ofhuman rights law in general on operations. For decades, human rights law and the
law of armed conflict developed separately, partly because the United Nations was
reluctant to involve itself in the law of armed conflict, seeing an inherent inconsis-
tency in its role to abolish war as a means ofdispute resolution. However, gradually a
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more pragmatic approach was adopted and the updating ofthe law carried out in the
1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions grew out of initiatives started
in the human rights community. 39 Indeed, there are clear resonances of human
rights law in some of the drafting, particularly in Additional Protocol II.40
However, there has never been an attempt to define the relationship between
the two legal systems, and as human rights law has increased both in scope and in
applicability, it was inevitable that the two would eventually run up against each
other. By tradition, human rights law has been seen as applicable in peacetime and
the law ofarmed conflict in time ofwar, but in law that has never been so. Most hu-
man rights treaties do indeed have provisions allowing some form of derogation in
time of war, but such derogation is usually limited and closely defined. For exam-
ple, Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides:
1. In time ofwar or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High
Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this
Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies ofthe situation, provided that
such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.
2. No derogation from Article 2 [Right to Life], except in respect of deaths resulting
from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3 [Prohibition of Torture], 4(paragraph 1)
[Prohibition of slavery] and 7 [No Punishment without Law] shall be made under
this provision.
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it
has taken and the reasons therefore. It shall also inform the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of
the Convention are again being fully executed.
4
' [My emphasis.]
It follows from this that the Convention is indeed applicable in time ofwar subject to
any derogation. Such derogations cannot include certain articles and furthermore, the
European Court ofHuman Rights has taken to itselfthe right to decide on whether any
particular derogation is indeed "strictly required by the exigencies ofthe situation." 42
Despite this, it has only been in recent years that the Court has begun to become
involved in operational matters. There have been a number of cases involving Brit-
ish military operations in Northern Ireland, including the McCann case dealing
with the shootings of IRA terrorists in Gibraltar.43 There have also been a series of
cases arising from the Kurdish insurgency in Eastern Turkey44 and some from the
occupation of Northern Cyprus.45 For the most part, in such cases the Court was
looking at domestic law issues and comparing them with the terms of the Conven-
tion. For example, in the McCann case, the British Government did not seek to put
forward an absolute right to shoot the three terrorists but sought to justify the kill-
ings by the fact that the soldiers believed that the terrorists might be about to
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explode a remote-controlled device. Indeed, the actions ofthe soldiers in that case
were specifically upheld by the Court though the United Kingdom was held liable
(by a majority of one) on other grounds. The Court has not yet had to examine in
any depth the interplay between the Convention and the law of armed conflict.
However, this can only be a matter of time.
In the Bankovic case,46 the Court was asked to rule on the legality of the attack on
the TV station in Belgrade carried out byNATO forces during the Kosovo campaign.
An action was brought by some of the survivors of that attack and relatives of the
dead against all the European NATO States alleging a breach ofArticle 2, the right to
life. The case was dismissed on the technical grounds that the applicants were not
"within the jurisdiction" of any of the States concerned. However, had the case pro-
ceeded to arguments on the merits, some interesting points would have arisen. The
first and most important would have involved the applicability of the Convention.
The United Kingdom, for example, had not sought to derogate from the Convention
in relation to the Kosovo campaign. Would that have meant that they could not have
taken advantage of the exemption for "lawful acts of war" under Article 15? If not,
what would be the position if the action, even if legitimate under the law of armed
conflict, failed to meet the exacting standards of Article 2 of the Convention?
Sooner or later, such issues are going to arise and the Court will have to rule on
the relationship between the two legal systems. Will it defer to the law of armed
conflict or will it seek to impose some form ofhuman rights supremacy? The Inter-
national Court ofJustice in the Nuclear Weapons case47 referred to the law ofarmed
conflict as a "lex specialis" and it would seem the most sensible solution for the
Court to defer to that law where there appears to be a conflict. This appeared to be
the line taken by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Abella
case.
48 However, in the later Las Palmeras case,49 the Commission seemed to indi-
cate that it could not take into account the law ofarmed conflict as its constitution
only entitled it to make decisions based on the human rights treaties under which it
was established. Such a line would appear to put the human rights community on a
collision course with the law of armed conflict.
However, assuming that common sense prevails and that the lex specialis argument
is upheld, there remains the question ofthe detailed interrelationship between the two
systems. For example, Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention provides that:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and
having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to one of the categories enumerated
in Article 4 [entitlement to prisoner-of-war status], such persons shall enjoy the
protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been
determined by a competent tribunal"50 [My emphasis.]
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The Convention does not seek to define further what a "competent tribunal" is
or what procedures should be adopted by that tribunal. In the absence of any dero-
gation, is the nature of the tribunal and its procedures governed by human rights
law and if so to what extent? These are untested questions and while ten years ago,
no one would have given them a second thought, they are now beginning to appear
very much on the radar. European governments increasingly have to take into ac-
count the possible effects of the European Convention on military operations both
at home and abroad.
This will inevitably affect interoperability between US and European forces. The
United States is obviously not a party to the European Convention and while it has
its own human rights obligations, it would rightly not consider itselfbound by in-
terpretations laid down by the European Court of Human Rights. However, such
issues are not new. NATO has for many years operated with States being bound by
different legal obligations. Most NATO States are parties to Additional Protocol I;
the United States and Turkey are not. In the past, this has caused few problems as a
result of close consultation leading to agreed procedures. Each side recognized the
obligations of the other and agreed to work round them.
A similar problem arises, I would suggest, with the European Convention on
Human Rights. It does impose certain restrictions on European partners. Further-
more, because of the uncertainty as to its scope at the present time, Europeans are
likely to be cautious in areas where it could be held to be applicable.
And so what does the future hold? The United States has a number of options. It
could simply say, in relation to coalition operations, "We are the most powerful
and we don't have to bother with this." That would be understandable but would
lead to an inevitable isolationism. The number of operations on which even the
United Kingdom would be able to assist and support would be greatly reduced and
it would leave the United States with no choice but unilateral action, with its
friends and allies on the sidelines. Such a choice would be unfortunate.
The alternative is to sit down and try to work through these issues. I do not con-
sider that any are insurmountable. What is required is a willingness to understand
each others position and to be sensitive to that position. At the same time, it is nec-
essary for the human rights and law of armed conflict communities to enter into
dialogue to ensure that the two systems remain complimentary. If they become
contradictory, then I would suggest that nobody wins and the world will be a more
dangerous place. If the lawyers cannot agree, then the commanders will call a
plague on both houses and both systems will be discredited. On the battlefield, dis-
credited law amounts to no law at all.
I return to my theme of marriage guidance. Do I consider that the old alliances
are subject to irretrievable breakdown? Not at all. However, what is needed is
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greater communication between the parties and a willingness to talk with each
other rather than at each other. Furthermore, each side needs to respect the others
position and seek to accommodate it.
But then has any marriage guidance counselor ever said anything different?
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the Naval War College. Professor Murphy's research and teaching interests focus
on international law, international terrorism, international business transactions,
and European Union constitutional law. Since 2000, Professor Murphy has con-
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gic Studies, London, from 2002 to the present. In 1990, he was elected Fellow ofthe
British Academy (FBA). In 1997, he was elected Honorary Fellow, London School
of Economics and Political Science. In 2002, Professor Roberts was appointed
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